veloped during the bombardment, seemed to rely upon the Embassy for protection, were at the mercy of the mob or exposed to indiscriminate firing which might at any moment begin. Without conferring with anyone, I immediately decided to ask Generals Huerta and Díaz to come to the Embassy for a consultation, my object being to have them enter into an agreement for the suspension of hostilities and for joint submission to the Federal Congress.' Four hours after the fall of Madero these two generals arrived, with their staffs, at the Embassy and remained there five hours endeavoring to reach an agreement. Three times the discussion was broken off and I interfered and with appeals to their reason and patriotism induced them to continue, with the result that at 1 o'clock in the morning the agreement was signed and deposited in the Embassy and immediate proclamation announcing the suspension of hostilities issued. The consummation of this arrangement I regard as the most successful and far reaching of all the difficult work I was called upon to perform during the revolution in that it stopped further effusion of blood, allow the population of the city to resume their ordinary peaceful occtions, and led finally to the creation of a provisional government which is rapidly establishing peace throughout the Republic.

Moreover, at this crisis the news of the President's telegram to the governors about intervention, his attempt to discredit me with the President at Washington, and his announced intention to use mortars and dynamite shells in attacking the citadel, seemed to relieve me of all moral responsibility to him as Chief Executive of this nation, while, at the same time, the possibilities of increased horrors and dangers added to my responsibilities to the American and foreign colonies in this city. Had it even been possible to communicate with him-which was not the case-he would in all probability, judging from past experiences, have treated my message with scorn and suspicion and pursued his course of devastation and ruin.

THE KILLING OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT.

As this subject seems to have developed considerable press discussion it might be useful to amplify the information contained in my telegrams relative thereto, and to furnish the Department with some details which at the time were not considered essential, as I never for a moment believed the lives of Madero and Pino Suárez to be in danger from the Government.

Immediately after the arrest and imprisonment of Madero and his Ministers I sent the volunteer messenger of the Embassy to General Huerta, asking that no further violence be committed or blood shed, and also that if it were compatible with the safety of the city he would release the Ministers. The messenger brought back to me the assurances of General Huerta that no violence against the President and Vice President was contemplated and that, acting upon my suggestion, he had immediately placed all of the Ministers of the Madero Cabinet at liberty. Later on, as reported in my tele

1 See telegram of Feb. 18, midnight.

See the Ambassador's telegrams of Feb. 16, 3 p. m.; Feb. 16. 7 p. m.; the Secretary's telegram of Feb. 15, midnight; the President's telegram of Feb. 16.

gram of February 19, 10 p. m., he asked my opinion as to what disposition should be made of the President; and as both of the courses he indicated an intention of following seemed to be comparatively mild, I did not think it expedient to assume the responsibility of advising him, but answered that he must do what was best for the peace of Mexico.

Later, as reported to the Department in my telegram of February 20, 6 p. m., I remonstrated with the President, and I think with Mr. de la Barra, against the unnecessary severity of the ex-President's confinement, and suggested that he and the other prisoners should be transferred to more comfortable quarters. It was at this time that the Provisional President informed me that the ex-President and ex-Vice President would be put in a place of safety and later tried for crimes the character of which was not indicated to me.

As reported in my telegram of February 20, 6 p. m., I went to the Presidencia with the German Minister and had a very serious conversation, in which my colleague took part, requesting assurances that the lives of the ex-President and the ex-Vice President would be saved. These, as the Department knows, were given; and I believed, and the German Minister believed, as well as many of our colleagues who had been to the Provisional President on a similar mission, that there existed no reason for apprehension as to the attitude of the Government toward the deposed President and Vice President.

I also, at the request of Mrs. Madero, verbally asked the Provisional President to permit her to see the ex-President and that he should be furnished more palatable food.

At the request of Mrs. Pino Suárez, to whom I paid a visit, I addressed a letter to General Blanquette, especially interceding for the life of the ex-Vice President, which I believed to be in some danger from unofficial enemies.

Not content with these efforts, I personally visited different members of the Cabinet for the purpose of expressing my deep concern for the preservation of the ex-President's life and my desire that his treatment should be humane and considerate. If I had been in the slightest degree apprehensive of any intention on the part of the Government to deal foully with the ex-President I might have been more agitated and more vehement, but not more active.

Moreover, at the request of the family, I sent two special American messengers to General Mondragón for the purpose of recovering the body of the unfortunate Gustavo Madero, and obtained authority for these men to search for the remains near the citadel, which they did for two days without success.

Mrs. Wilson added her efforts to mine and went frequently to see the mother and widow of the ex-President, carrying them flowers and expressions of sympathy.

Believing at one time that the life of Ernesto Madero might possibly be in danger, I sent him a letter inviting him to come, with his family, to the Embassy; and I afterwards caused the soldiers (who were ugly and threatening) to be removed from the house of his brother-in-law, where he was staying.

I think, therefore, that I am warranted in saying that so far as this Embassy is concerned everything was done to save the life of

Mr. Madero that humanitarian considerations, public opinion in the United States, and the instructions of the Department could demand. Concerning the facts of the deplorable death of the ex-President and ex-Vice President it is not possible for this Embassy to furnish the Department with a reliable account beyond the official version, which, in the absence of any other, I felt obliged to accept. A dozen different accounts by "eyewitness." all differing absolutely in details, have been offered to the Embassy, but all are lacking in the elements of probability, and none convincing or positive.

My own opinion is that the Government was not privy to the killing of these men, but that either their deaths resulted as related in the official version or that they resulted from a subordinate military conspiracy, actuated by sentiments of revenge for the murder of General Ruiz in the National Palace, the probable murder of General Reyes, and the shooting to death by the ex-President of Colonels Riverol and Izquierdo at the time he was made prisoner.

History will undoubtedly straighten out this tangle, and while the crime was revolting to all people of civilized and humane sentiments it is not evident to me that, politically speaking, the death of these two Mexicans, relegated to private life by their resignations, should arouse greater expressions of popular disapproval in the United States than the murders, unrequited by justice, of some 75 or 80 Americans in Mexico during the last two years.

I believe that in announcing publicly my acceptance of the official version of the death of these two men-and indeed I could not, with reference to the gravity of the situation, take any other course-I adopted the surest method of arresting hasty judgment and of allay ing that singular and perverse sentimentality which frequently leads to the commission of greater crimes as punishments for lesser ones.

As the Department is aware, an official investigation, apparently impartial, is being made of all of the circumstances connected with the death of Madero, and in due time its conclusions will be published and transmitted by this Embassy.

LEGALITY, ETC., OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT.

There can be no doubt as to the legal constitution of the present Provisional Government in conformity with precedents and the Mexican Constitution.

When President Díaz and Vice President Corral resigned simultaneously, De la Barra, Secretary of Foreign Relations, was summoned by Congress to take the oath according to the Constitution.

Had Díaz died or resigned, his legal successor under the Constitution would have been his Secretary of Foreign Relations; and in case no such appointment had been made the Presidency would, under the Constitution, have devolved upon the Secretary of Gobernación.

Madero and Pino Suárez resigned simultaneously and their resignations were accepted by Congress. Lascurain, Minister of Foreign Relations under Madero, then immediately took the oath as Provisional President under the Constitution. He did not appoint a Secretary of Foreign Relations, but he did appoint General Huerta Secretary of Gobernación. Huerta having taken the oath as Secretary of Gobernación and Lascurain having resigned and his resignation having been accepted, the Presidency devolved upon Huerta under the Constitution

in his capacity of Secretary of Gobernación, and he took the oath of office before Congress as President of the Republic.

The incumbency of Huerta is as legal as was the incumbency of De la Barra after the resignation of Díaz.

From this it would appear that if the Provisional Government of De la Barra, which was recognized without any question by the Government of the United States and by all other Governments as constitutionally inducted into office, the Provisional Government of Huerta is entitled to the same acceptance. [Sic.]

The second consideration for recognition lies in the imperative need of sustaining and strengthening this Government. Without our recognition, upon which the recognition of many other Governments depends, it will be constantly exposed to attacks from its enemies; and our attitude will take on a color of at least constructive sympathy with the elements conspiring against the reestablishment of order and peace in a neighboring and friendly Republic.

The financial situation, too, which at the present moment is pressing and urgent, can not be solved by the procurement of the necessary loans while the question of the legitimacy and constitutionality of this Government is in doubt. By hesitating too long, therefore, we might contribute to the weakening and possible demolition of the present Government and reinvoke the movements of disorder and anarchy which so recently brought us to the verge of an intervention in the affairs of this Republic fraught with great dangers to its future integrity and placing burdens of responsibility upon us the gravity of which can not be accurately estimated but which may easily be imagined.

On the other hand, I do not advocate the recognition of the present Provisional Government until its ability to restore and establish peace and order throughout the Republic and afford guaranties to the lives and property of foreigners shall have been demonstrated to the satisfaction of our Government.

Nor do I advocate it until our just and equitable claims, as set forth in the Department's note of September 15, 1912, and in my subsequent note of February 24, 1913, to the Provisional President, General Huerta, shall have been satisfied either by their acceptance in principle or by adequate fulfillment in fact.

I fully expect this Government to reestablish peace and order and I also expect that within a brief period the substance of our complaints except, perhaps, that relating to general claims for damages growing out of the revolution-will have been satisfied.

The question of our recognition, therefore, would appear to depend more upon expediency and interest than upon correct procedure and I believe that it should be considered entirely from those viewpoints.

THE AMERICAN COLONY.

I can not too highly praise the attitude of the American colony during the recent bombardment. The activity, courage, self-reliance, and self-sacrifice exhibited in hours of danger, and their patience amid discomfort, excessive labors, and their isolation from home and business were conspicuous and worthy of all admiration. I trust that the Department may, in due season, make full recognition of the bearing of these excellent examples of our race and nationality.

PROGRESS OF REESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE THROUGHOUT THE REPUBLIC.

The present Provisional Government has shown remarkable activity and energy in restoring order, in subduing rebellious elements, and in consolidating different political factions and revolutionists in arms against the Government of Madero.

In the brief period of two weeks the whole of the Republic to the south and west of the Federal District has, either by force or persuasion, been brought into a state of comparative peace. A small district in the State of Guerrero is still in arms under Genevievo Delao, but a strong force of Federals has been sent against them and it may be anticipated that they will soon be defeated and brought to submission. Zapata remains inactive at some point south of Cuernavaca, but negotiations with him are being carried on and the indications point to his early submission. In the north all of the leading rebel chieftains, with the exception of Salazar, have submitted to the Government and most of them are now enrolled in its service. Salazar's attitude remains undefined, but it is supposed that he is simply holding out for

terms.

In a general way, it may be said that, with the exception of isolated brigandage committed by roving bands formerly under the lead of chieftains who have now surrendered, the whole of the north is at peace with the exception of the State of Sonora and some portions of the State of Sinaloa, where the governor is supposed to be hostile to the present administration.

MOVEMENT HEADED BY CARRANZA,

The Sonora situation presents some aspects of gravity which should have the attention of the Department. It is not a Maderista movement, but the remains of the movement which was initiated by the border governors to form an independent republic, in which Carranza, then Governor of Coahuila and now a fugitive from justice, was the originator and prime mover.

It must be understood by the Department that the people of Sonora and of a large part of the State of Sinaloa have never been closely identified with this Republic. Most of the people in these States are of Texan origin, of mixed American and Spanish blood, and, as a matter of fact, they would prefer unity with the United States rather than with Mexico. There is evidently, notwithstanding the reassuring advices sent hither by the Department, a movement there to declare an independent republic comprising the States of Sonora and Sinaloa and the Territory of Lower California; and while I have no positive proofs of intrigues by American interests in that direction it is believed here that they exist. The situation, therefore, at this point should be carefully watched by the Department in order that we may not be involved in a movement aimed to disintegrate this Republic.

PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT HUERTA,

General Huerta is preeminently a soldier, a man of iron mold, of absolute courage, who knows what he wants and how to get it, and is not, I believe, overly particular as to methods. He is a firm be