SPEECH.

Mr. CHAIRMAN: I have listened with interest, both yesterday and to-day, to speeches on what is called the "Presidential question." I propose to discuss a question of far greater magnitude-the question of the age-one, whose consequences will not end with the ensuing four years, but will reach forward to the setting of the sun of time.

Sir, our position is this: The United States finds itself the owner of a vast region of country at the West, now almost vacant of inhabitants. Parts of this region are salubrious and fertile. We have reason to suppose that, in addition to the treasures of wealth which industry may gather from its surface, there are mineral treasures beneath it-riches garnered up of old in subterranean chambers, and -only awaiting the application of intelligence and skill to be converted into the means of human improvement and happiness. These regions, it is true, lie remote from our place of residence. Their shores are washed by another sea, and it is no figure of speech to say that another sky bends over them. So remote are they, that their hours are not as our hours, nor their day as our day; and yet, such are the wonderful improvements in art, in modern times, as to make it no rash anticipation that before this century shall have closed, the inhabitants on the Atlantic shores will be able to visit their brethren on the Pacific, in ten days; and that intelligence will be transmitted and returned, between the Eastern and the Western oceans, in ten minutes. That country, therefore, will be rapidly filled, and we shall be brought into intimate relations with it; and, notwithstanding its distance, into proximity to it.

Now, in the providence of God, it has fallen to our lot to legislate for this unoccupied, or but partially occupied, expanse. Its great Future hangs upon our decision. Not only degrees of latitude and dongitude, but vast tracts of time-ages and centuries-seem at our disposal. As are the institutions which we form and establish there, so will be the men whom these institutions, in their turn, will form. Nature works by fixed laws; but we can bring this or that combination of circumstances under the operation of her laws, and thus determine results. Here springs up our responsibility. One class of institutions will gather there, one class of men who will develop one set of characteristics; another class of institutions will gather there, another class of men who will develop other characteristics. Hence, their futurity is to depend upon our present course. Hence, the acts we are to perform, seem to partake of the nature of creation, rather than of legislation. Standing upon the elevation which we now occupy, and looking over into that empty world, "yet void," if not "without form," but soon to be filled with multitudinous life, and reflecting upon our power to give form and character to that life, and almost to fore-ordain what it shall be, I feel as though it would be no irreverence to compare our condition to that of the Creator before he fashioned the "lord" of this lower world; for we, like Him, can engraft one set of attributes, or another set of attributes, upon a whole race of men. In approaching this subject, therefore, I feel a sense of responsibility corresponding to the infinite-I speak literally-the infinite interests which it embraces.

As far as the time allowed me will permit, I propose to discuss two questions; the first is, "Whether Congress can lawfully legislate on the subject of slavery in the Territories?"

On this question a new and most extraordinary doctrine has lately been broached. A new reading of the Constitution has been discovered. It is averred that the 3d section of the 4th article, giving Congress power "to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory, or other property belonging to the United States," only gives power to legislate for the land, as land. It is admitted that Congress may legislate for the land as land-geologically or botanically consideredperhaps for the beasts that roam upon its surface, or the fishes that swim in its waters; but it is denied that Congress possesses any power to determine the laws and the institutions of those who shall in

habit that "land."

But compare this with any other object of purchase or possession. When Texas was admitted into the Union, it transferred its "navy" to the United States; in other words, the U. States bought, and, of course, owned the navy of Texas. What power had Congress over this navy after the purchase? According to the new doctrine, it could pass laws for the hull, the masts, and the sails of the Texan ships, but would have no power to navigate them by officers and men. It might govern the ships as .so much wood, iron, and cordage, but would have no authority over commanders or crews.

But we are challenged to show any clause in the Constitution which confers an express power to legislate over the territories we possess. I challenge our opponents to show any clause which confers express power to acquire those territories themselves. If, then, the power to acquire exists, it exists by implication and inference; and if the power to acquire be an implied one, the power to govern what is acquired must be implied also. For, for what purpose does any man acquire property but to govern and control it? What does a buyer pay for, if it be not the right to "dispose of?" Such is the doctrine of the Supreme Court of the United States: "The right to govern," says Chief Justice Marshall, "may be the inevitable consequence of the right to acquire." Amer. Ins. Co. vs. Canter, 1 Peters, 542. See also McCullough vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat., 422; The Cherokee Nation vs. Georgia, 5 Peters, 44; United .States vs. Gratiot, 14 Peters, 537.

But I refer to the express words of the Constitution, as ample and effective in conferring all the power that is claimed. "Congress may dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations," &c. If Congress may "dispose of this land, then it may sell it. Inseparable from the right to sell is th

It

right to define the terms of sale. The seller may affix such conditions and limitations as he pleases to the thing sold. If this be not so, then the buyer may dictate his terms to the seller. Answer these simple questions: Does the United States own land in fee-simple? Is the Government of the United States under guardianship, or disabled by minority? Is it compos mentis? If none of these disabilities. apply to it then it may sell ;-it may sell the fee-simple, or it may carve out any lesser estate, and sell that. It may incorporate such terms and conditions as it pleases into its deed or patent of sale. may make an outright quit-claim, or it may reserve the minerals for its own use, or the navigable streams for public highways, as it has done in the territory northwest of the river Ohio. It may insert the conditions and limitations in each deed or patent; or, where the grantees are numerous, it may make general "rules and regulations," which are understood to be a part of each contract, and are therefore binding upon each purchaser. No man is compelled to buy, but if any one does buy, he buyssubject to the "rules and regulations" expressed in the grants; and neither he, nor h's grantees, nor his or their heirs after them, can complain. I want, therefore, no better foundation for legislating over the territories than the fact of ownership in the United States. Grant this and all is granted. If I own a farm, or a shop, I may, as owner, prescribe the conditions of its transfer to another. If he does not like my conditions, then let him abandon the negotiation; if he accedes to the conditions, then let him abide by them, and hold his peace.

Sir, in the State to which I belong we hold Temperance to be a great blessing, as well as a great virtue; and Intemperance to be a great curse, as well as a great sin. I know of incorporated companies there, who have purchased large tracts of land for manufacturing purposes. They well know how essential is the sobriety of workmen to the profitableness of their work; they know, too, how wasteful and destructive is inebriety. In disposing of their land, therefore, to the men whom they would gather about them and employ, they incorporate the provision, as a fundamental article in the deed of grant, that ardent spirits shall never be sold upon the premises; and thus they shut up, at once, one of the most densely thronged gateways of hell. Have they not a right to do so, from the merefact of ownership? Would any judge or lawyer doubt the validity of such a condition; or would any sensible man ever doubt its wisdom or humanity? Pecuniarily and morally, this comes under the head of "needful rules and regulations." If tipplers do not like them, let them stagger away, and seek their residence elsewhere.

But the United States is not merely a land owner, it is a sovereignty. As such, it exercises all constitutional jurisdiction over all its territories. Whence, but from this right of sovereignty, does the Government obtain its power of saying that no man shall purchase land of the natives, or aborigines, and that if you wish to buy land in the territorice, you shall come to the Government for it? Is there any express power in the Constitution authorizing Congress to say to all the citizens of the United States, "If you wish to buy ungranted land in the territories, you must come to us, for no one else can sell, or shall sell?" This right, sustained by all our legislation and adjudications, covers the whole ground. Lessee of Johnson et al. vs. McIntosh, 8 Wheaton, 543; 5 Cond. Re. 515.

But, leaving the Constitution, it is denied that there are precedents. The honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. BAYLY) has not only contested the power of Congress to legislate on the subject of slavery in the territories, but he has denied the existence of precedents to sustain this power. Sir, it would have been an assertion far less bold, to deny the existence of precedents for the election of a President of the United States; for the instances of the latter have been far less frequent than of the former. Congress has legislated on the subject of slavery in the territories all the way up, from the adoption of the Constitution to the present time; and this legislation has been sustained by the judiciary of both the General and State Governments, and carried into execution by the executive power of both. See Menard vs. Aspasia, 5 Peters, 505; Phebe et al. vs. Jay, Breese's Re., 210; Hogg vs. the Zanesville Canal Co., 5 Ohio Re., 410; Martin's Louisiana Re., N. S., 699; Spooner vs. Mc Connell, I McLean's Re., 341., Harvey vs. Deeker, Walker's Mississippi Re., 36; Rachael vs. Walker, 4 Missouri Re...,

350.

So far as the uniform practice of sixty years can settle a doubtful, or confirm an admitted right, this power of legislating over the territories has been taken from the region of doubt, and established upon the basis of acknowledged authority. In legislating for all that is now Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, Iowa, Missouri, Arkansas, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Florida, we have legislated on the subject of slavery in the territories. Sixty years of legislation on one side, and not a denial of the right on the other.

But the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. BAYLY) says, that the action of Congress, in regard to the territories, has been rather that of constitution-making than of law-making Suppose this to be true ;; does not the greater include the less? If Congress could make a Constitution for all the territories an organic, fundamental law-a law of laws-could it not, had it so pleased, make the law itself? A Constitution prescribes to the legislature what it shall do, and what it shall not do; it commands, prohibits, and binds men by oaths to support itself. It says, "hitherto SHALT thou come, and no farther." And if Congress can do this, can it not make the local law itself? Can aught be more preposterous As if we could command others to do what we have no right to do ourselves, and prohibit others from doing what lies beyond our own jurisdiction. Surely, to decree on what subjects a community shall legislate, and on what they shall not legislate, is the exercise of the highest power.

But Congress has not stopped with the exercise of the constitution-making power. In various forms, and at all times, it has legislated for the territories, in the strictest sense of the word legislation. It has legislated again and again, and ten times again, on this very subject of slavery. See the act of 1794, prohibiting the slave trade from any "port or place" in the United States. Could any citizen of the United States, under this act, have gone into one of our territories and fitted out vessels for the slave trade? Surely he could, if Congress has no right to legislate over territories only as so much, land and water.

By statute 1798. chapter 28, § 7, slaves were forbidden to be brought into the Mississippi territory from without the United States; and all slaves so brought in were made free.

So the act of 1800, chapter 51, in further prohibition of the slave trade, applied to all the citizens of the United States, whether living in territories or in organized States. Did not this legislation cover the territories?

By statute 1804, chapter 38, § 10, three classes of slaves were forbidden to be introduced into the Orleans territory.

Statute 1807, chapter 22, prohibiting the importation of slaves after January 1, 1808, prohibited their importation into the territories in express terms.

Statute 1818 chapter 91, statute 1819, chapter 101, and statute 1820, chapter 113, prohibiting the slave trade, and making it piracy, expressly included all the territories of the United States.

Statute 1819, chapter 21, authorized the President to provide for the safe-keeping of slaves imported from Africa, and for their removal to their home in that land. Under this law, the President might have established a'depot for slaves within the limits of our territories, on the Gulf, or on the Mississippi. By statute 1820, chapter 22, § 8, Congress established what has been called the Missouri compromise line, thereby expressly legislating on the subject of slavery. So of Texas. See Jo. Res. March 1, 1845.

By statute 1819, chapter 93, statute 1821, chapter 39, § 2, and statute 1822, chapter 13, § 9, Congress legislated on the subject of slavery in the Territory of Florida.

Does it not seem almost incredible that a defender and champion of slavery should deny the power of Congress to legislate on the subject of slavery in the territories? If Congress has no such power, by what right can a master recapture a fugitive slave escaping into a territory? The Constitution "No says: person held to service, or labor, in one State, escaping into another," that is, another State," shall be discharged from such service, or labor," &c. The act of 1793, chapter 7, § 3, provides that when a person "held to labor," &c., "shall escape into any other of the said States, or territory," he may be taken. By what other law than this can a runaway slave be retaken in a territory? If Congress has no power to legislate on the subject of slavery in any territory, then, surely, they cannot legislate for the capt ire of a fugitive slave in a territory. The argument cuts both ways. The knife wounds him who would use it to wound his fellow.

Further than this. If slavery is claimed to be one of the common subjects of legislation, then any legislation by Congress for the territories, on any of the common subjects of legislation, is a precedent, going to prove its right to legislate on slavery itself. If Congress may legislate on one subject belonging to a class, then it may legislate on any other subject belonging to the same class. Now, Congress has legislated for the territories on almost the whole circle of subjects belonging to common legislation. It has legislated on the elective franchise, on the pecuniary qualifications and residence of candidates for office, on the militia, on oaths, on the per diem and mileage of members, &c., &c. By statute 1811, chapter 21, § 3, authorizing the Territory of Orleans to form a constitution, it was provided, that all legislative proceedings and judicial records should be kept and promulgated in the Englis. language. Cannot Congress make provision for the rights of the people, as well as for the language in which the laws and records defining those rights shall be expresse1? Any language is sweet to the ears of man which gives him the right of trial by jury, of habeas corpus, of religious freedom, and of life, limb, and liberty; but accursed is that language, and fit only for the realms below, which deprives an immortal being of the rights of intelligence and of freedom; of the right to himself, and the dearer rights of family.

But all this is by no means the strongest part of the evidence with which our statutes and judicial decisions abound, showing the power of Congress to legislate over territories. From the beginning, Congress has not only legislated over the territories, but it has appointed and controlled the agents of legislation.

The general structure of the legislature in several of the earlier territorial governments was this: It consisted of a governor and of two houses-an upper and a lower. Without an exception, where a governor has been appointed, Congress has always reserved his appointment to itself, or to the President. The governor so appointed has always had a veto power over the two houses; and Congress has always reserved to itself, or to the President, a veto power, not only over him, but over him and both the houses besides. Congress has often interfered also with the appointment of the upper house, leaving only the lower house to be chosen exclusively by the people of the territory; and it has determined even for the lower house the qualifications both of electors and of elected. Further still: The power of r moving the governor, at pleasure, has always been reserved to Congress, or to the President.

Look at this: Congress determines for the territory the qualifications of electors and elected-at least in the first instance. No law of the territorial legislature is valid until approved by the governor. Though approved by the governor, it may be annulled by Congress, or by the President; and the governor is appointed, and may be removed, at pleasure, by Congress, or by the President. To be more specific, I give the following outline of some of the territorial governments:

Ohio Territory, statute 1789, chapter 8.A governor for four years, nominated by the President, approved by the Senate, with power to appoint all subordinate civil and military officers.

A secretary for four years, appointed in the same way.

Three judges, to hold office during good behavior. Governor and judges the sole legislature, until the district shall contain 5,000 free male inhabitants. Then,

A house of assembly, chosen by qualified electors, for two years.

A legislative council of five, to hold office for five years. The house of assembly to choose ten men; five of whom are to be selected by the President and approved by the Senate. These five to be the "legislative council."