tion." (Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Cameron, min. to Russia, No. 6, June 23, 1862, MS. Inst. Russia, XIV. 264.) "The explanations of the views of the Russian government made to you by Prince Gortchacow, and his assurances of its fidelity and constancy towards the United States are deeply interesting and eminently gratifying. . . Naturally the first thought which, in a time of apparent danger to our country, occurs to a foreign friend is the desirableness of an adjustment or arrangement of the strife. This suggestion is enforced by a contemplation of the calamities and sufferings which are wrought upon the battlefield. The generous mind, glowing with friendly zeal, refuses to admit the fact, however obvious, that composition of such troubles is impossible. This has been the case, especially with the excellent Russian minister plenipotentiary here. He has for some time pressed upon us the same sentiments which were expressed to you by Prince Gortchacow. Mr. Adams has informed us that Baron Brunnow, at London, has equally urged them, though with great delicacy, upon him. The Russian government need not doubt for a moment that the PresiIdent will hail the first moment when any proposition of peace can be made which will arrest the strife without a sacrifice of the nation's Constitution and life. That period can not now be far off." (Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Taylor, chargé at St. Petersburg, No. 5, Nov. 22, 1862, MS. Inst. Russia, XIV. 297.) Dec. 14, 1862, Mr. Seward enclosed to Mr. Taylor, for the latter's information, a copy of his No. 263, of Dec. 13, 1862, relative to the proposal of the French Emperor to Great Britain to unite in recommending an armstice. (Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Taylor, chargé at St. Petersburg, No. 8, Dec. 14, 1862, MS. Inst. Russia, XIV. 301.) With reference to "the report of an intended new design on the part of the French Emperor to propose mediation in our civil war," Mr. Seward wrote: "Any such proceeding would meet with a prompt and decided answer from the United States. The principle of foreign, mediation in our affairs can not be, in any form or under any circumstances, admitted. You will make this explanation, or refrain from making it, in the exercise of your own discretion." (Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Dayton, min. to France, No. 621, July 30, 1864, Dip. Cor. 1864, III. 134–135.) A copy of the foregoing instruction was sent to Mr. Adams, at London. (Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Adams, min. to England. No. 1058, Aug. 1, 1864, MS. Inst. Gr. Br. XIX. 411.) "I leave the French proposal to take its place among the incidents already past of the lamentable civil war of which we again think we are beginning to see an approaching end." Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Adams, min. to England, No. 414, Nov. 30, 1862, Dip. Cor. 1863, I. 2. See circular of Mr. Seward to the diplomatic officers of the United States, No. 20, Aug. 18, 1862, giving the views of the President as to any possible attempt at intervention or mediation by European powers in the American civil war. (Dip. Cor. 1862, 176.) In a circular to the diplomatic officers of the United States, March 9, 1863, Mr. Seward transmitted a copy of concurrent resolutions of Congress concerning intervention in the civil war. These resolutions recited that it appeared from the diplomatic correspondence submitted to Congress that a proposition, friendly in form, looking to pacification through foreign mediation, had been made to the United States by the Emperor of the French and promptly declined by the President, and that, as the idea of mediation or intervention in some shape might be regarded by foreign governments as practicable, and as such governments might thus be led to proceedings tending to embarrass the friendly relations existing between them and the United States, it seemed fit, in order to remove all chance of misunderstanding on the subject and to secure for the United States the full enjoyment of that freedom from foreign interference which was one of the highest rights of independent states, for Congress to declare its convictions on the subject. The resolutions concluded by announcing it as the "unalterable purpose" of the United States that the war would be "vigorously prosecuted, according to the humane principles of Christian states, until the rebellion shall be overcome." Dip. Cor. 1863, II. 812-814. As to rumors of intervention on the part of France, see Dip. Cor. 1862, 173 et seq. The French minister of foreign affairs declared that no thought of intervention was entertained. (Dip. Cor. 1862, 404.) "Your despatch of August 20th has been submitted to the President. I give you herewith extracts from Mr. Dayton's latest communication treating of French proposals for British intervention in our affairs, and of the condition of Mexico. We are quite sure that the French government can not practice insincerity in its official communications with us. You will perceive, therefore, that what your informant in Scotland told you in regard to the Emperor is erroneous. You have confirmed the expectations which we had entertained concerning the opinion of Great Britain in regard to the proceedings of the Emperor in relation to Russia, and in relation to Mexico. What seems difficult to understand here, however, is that Great Britain gives no indications of concurrence in these opinions, and that the press of the country seems to become more intolerant of the United States the more clearly the failure of the intervention is revealed." (Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Adams, min. to England, No. 700, Sept. 5, 1863, MS. Inst. Great Britain, XIX. 5.) "The correspondence which took place between this government and that of Her Majesty at an early stage of the insurrection shows that the United States deemed the formation of a mutual engagement by Great Britain with France, that those two powers would act in concert with regard to the said insurrection to be an unfriendly proceeding, and that the United States, therefore, declined to receive from either of those powers any communication which avowed the existence of such an arrangement. I have, therefore, now to regret that Earl Russell has thought it necessary to inform this government that Her Majesty's government have found it expedient to consult with the government of France upon the question whether Her Majesty's government will now recognize the restoration of peace in the United States. "It is a further source of regret that Her Majesty's government avow that they will continue still to require that any United States cruisers which shall hereafter be lying within a British port, harbor, or waters, shall be detained twenty-four hours, so as to afford an opportunity for any insurgent vessel, she actually being within the said port, harbor, or waters, to gain the advantage of the same time for her departure from the same port, harbor, or waters.” Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Sir F. Bruce, Brit. min., June 19, 1865, Dip. "The fact that the national attachment of this country to France is so pure and so elevated, constitutes just the reason why it could be more easily supplanted by national insult or injustice than our attachment to any other foreign state could be. It is a chivalrous sentiment, and it must be preserved by chivalrous conduct and bearing on both sides. I deduce from the two positions which I have presented a conclusion which has the most solemn interest for both parties, namely, that any attempt at dictation-much more any aggression committed by the govenment of France against the United States-would more certainly and effectively rouse the American people to an attitude of determined resistance than a similar affront or injury committed by any other power. There is reason to believe that interested sympathizers with the insurrection in this country have reported to the French government that it would find a party here disposed to accept its mediation or intervention. I understand that they reckon upon a supposed sympathy between our Democratic citizens and the French government. It may as well be understood as soon as possible that we have no Democrats who do not cherish the independence of our country as the first element of Democratic faith, while, on the other hand, it is partiality for France that makes us willingly shut our eyes to the fact that that great nation is only advancing towards, instead of having reached, the democratic condition which attracts us in some other countries." Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Dayton, min. to France, No. 278, Dec. See Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Adams, min. to England, No. 771, By the treaty of peace between China and Japan, concluded at Shimonoseki, April 17, 1895, the Liaotung peninsula, including Port Arthur, was ceded to Japan. Russia, however, secured the support of France and Germany in a "friendly representation" to Japan to the effect that she would not be permitted to retain any increase of territory on the mainland. Japan, on the advice of Great Britain, reluctantly yielded to what appeared to be inevitable, and abandoned her conquest. Subsequently, Russia took possession of Port Arthur under a "lease," and virtually assumed control of the Liaotung peninsula. This incident and its consequences eventually brought about the war of 1904 between Japan and Russia. Hall, Int. Law, 5th ed., 295–296. See, as to the "lease" of Port Arthur, supra, §§ 807, 813. 2. POLICY OF NONINTERVENTION. (1) DECLARATIONS OF POLICY. $ 898. "You are afraid,' says Mr. Oswald to-day, 'of being made the tools of the powers of Europe.' 'Indeed I am,' says John Adams. I. What powers?' said he. 'All of them,' said I. 'It is obvious that all the powers of Europe will be continually manoeuvering with us to work us into their real or imaginary balances of power. They will all wish to make of us a make-weight candle, when they are weighing out their pounds. Indeed, it is not surprising; for we shall very often, if not always, be able to turn the scale. But I think it ought to be our rule not to meddle; and that of all the powers of Europe, not to desire us, or, perhaps, even to permit us, to interfere, if they can help it.'" May Mr. John Adams's Diary, Nov. 18, 1782, 3 John Adams's Works, 316. "Our form of government, inestimable as it is, exposes us more than any other, to the insidious intrigues and pestilent influence of foreign nations. Nothing but our inflexible neutrality can preserve us. The public negotiations and secret intrigues of the English and the French have been employed for centuries in every court and country of Eu rope. Look back to the history of Spain, Holland, Germany, Russia, Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, Italy, and Turkey, for the last hundred years. How many revolutions have been caused! How many emperors and kings have fallen victims to the alternate triumphs of parties, excited by Englishmen or Frenchmen! And can we expect to escape the vigilant attention of politicians so experienced, so keensighted, and so rich? If we convince them that our attachment to neutrality is unchangeable, they will let us alone; but as long as a hope remains, in either power, of seducing us to engage in war on his side and against his enemy, we shall be torn and convulsed by their manœuvres." 66 64 Patriot Letters," 1809, 9 John Adams's Works, 277. "The principle of foreign affairs, which I then advocated, has been the invariable guide of my conduct in all situations, as ambassador in France, Holland, and England, and as Vice-President and President of the United States, from that hour to this. . . . This principle was, that we should make no treaties of alliance with any European power; that we should consent to none but treaties of commerce; that we should separate ourselves, as far as possible and as long as possible, from all European politics and wars. In discussing the variety of motions which were made as substitutes for Mr. Chase's, I was remarkably cool, and, for me, unusually eloquent. On no occasion, before or after, did I ever make a greater impression on Congress." (Mr. J. Adams to Dr. Rush, Sept. 30, 1805, 1 John Adams's Works, 200.) "If I could lay an embargo, or pass a new importation law against corruption and foreign influence, I would not make it a temporary but a perpetual law, and I would not repeal it, though it should raise a clamor as loud as my gag-law, or your grog-law, or Mr. Jefferson's embargo." (Mr. Adams to Mr. Rush, Sept. 27, 1808, 9 John Adams's Works, 604.) Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence, she must be engaged in Washington. frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course." President Washington's Farewell Address, Sept. 1796, Writings of Washington, by Ford, XIII. 277, 316. As to the French alliance, see, supra, § 821. Jefferson. "I have ever deemed it fundamental for the United States never to take an active part in the quarrels of Europe. Their political interests are entirely distinct from Their mutual jealousies, their balance of power, their complicated alliances, their forms and principles of government, are all ours. |