warrant, by governmental subordinates, his baggage searched, his letters and papers ransacked, and his person treated with indignity. He was discharged, on the ground that there was no case against him, and proceeded on his journey, occupied in part in visiting the antiquities and other interesting features of the country. Two days afterwards at Athenry, a few miles distant from Loughrea, when about entering on the train for Galway he was again arrested, his baggage again searched, his papers again inspected, while he was kept until midnight a close prisoner by the same magistrate who had examined and discharged him at Loughrea. He was again discharged for the same reason that no case existed against him, although this should have been as fully known by the magistrate at the time of the second imprisonment as at the time of the first discharge. "The question of the amount of pecuniary compensation to which Mr. George would have been entitled in a court of justice is not now material. So far as concerns the principle, it makes no matter whether the injury inflicted on him touched his life, or merely his liberty and the sanctity of his property for a few hours. And, so far as concerns this principle, it is worthy of notice, in this relation, how clearly the question of liability is defined by Mr. Frelinghuysen in his instruction to Mr. Lowell of October 3, 1882: "While citizens of the United States traveling or resident abroad are subject to the reasonable laws of the country in which they may be sojourning, it is, nevertheless, their right to be spared such indignity and mortification as the conduct of the officers at Loughrea and Athenry seems to have visited upon Mr. George. As you have already addressed a note to Lord Granville on this subject, a reply will probably soon be received by you. It is trusted that the tenor of that reply may prove satisfactory to this government, and also relieve Mr. George from any reproach the arrests are calculated unjustly to cast upon him.' "It will be observed that there is here no claim whatever for pecuniary compensation to Mr. George. That claim, it is tacitly assumed, is to be remitted to British courts of justice. The request is for explanation to the government of the United States and exoneration of Mr. George from 'reproach.' Yet the arrest of Mr. George, and that of other 'suspects' under the recent crimes act, was not, it must be remembered, in the course of the English common law. There was apparently no responsible prosecutor, there was no hearing in which witnesses could be met face to face, and consequently, under the cover of a legislative enactment for the time being, the sufferer was denied all opportunity to establish the possible malice of the allegation which led to his arrest, or to identify the secret accuser who could therefore with impunity wound his sensibilities and subject him to serious distress and suffering. Had there been a commit ment, it would not have been in view of a speedy jury trial. Under these circumstances, the case would not have fallen under the rule announced above, that where a foreigner claiming to be injured has redress by an appeal to the courts in the processes of the English common law, a diplomatic demand for indemnity will not be granted by the government of the country in which the injury is claimed to have been received, yet, even in the case of Mr. George and other citizens of the United States put recently without probable cause under summary arrest in Ireland, we hear of no demand made by the government of the United States for pecuniary compensation. "The reason why, in countries subject to the English common law, the question of compensation to foreigners for injuries received on the soil of such countries is exclusively committed to the courts of justice in the place of the injury, is to be found in two conditions: "The first is, that, as has been already noticed, the party injured has the advantage by that law, of a prompt trial by an impartial jury drawn from the vicinage, under the supervision of judges whose integrity, whether it be in England or in the United States, has, viewing them as a body, never been impeached, and who are subject to established and impartial rules of law. The second condition is, that, by the English common law, foreigners, when appealing to courts of justice, have equal rights with subjects. It is not so in other systems of jurisprudence; and it is natural, therefore, that under such other systems of jurisprudence the appeal of a foreigner for compensation should lie, not to the courts which impose upon him unjust discriminations, but through his own sovereign to the sovereign of the country in which the injury has been received. But in countries subject to the English common law, every facility which is given to a subject when approaching a court of justice is given to a foreigner making such approach." Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. West, British min., June 1, 1885, For. "In our diplomatic correspondence with Great Britain we have taken "The case in which this government assumes to interfere in behalf of the present, therefore, Mr. Davis, who has never resorted to the courts of Great Britain, must be remitted, so far as recovery of pecuniary indemnification from the authors of the trespass is concerned, to the usual remedies to which persons in his situation are by the laws of Great Britain entitled. "If, however, he does not see fit to press his claim for pecuniary damages in the judicial tribunals of Great Britain against the parties who may have been guilty of trespassing upon his rights, it may be proper to consider the question of asking that government for an explanation, and, if warranted, an expression of regret." (Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Gebhard, Sept. 9, 1885, 157 MS. Dom. Let. 88.) "When application is made to this Department for redress for the supposed injurious actions of a foreign judicial tribunal, such application can only be sustained on one of two grounds. "(1) Undue discrimination against the petitioner as a citizen of the United States in breach of treaty obligations, or "(2) Violation of those rules for the maintenance of justice in judicial enquiries which are sanctioned by international law. "There is no proof presented in Capt. Caleb's case establishing either of these conditions. It is true that it is alleged that there was a failure of justice and, were this Department sitting as a court of error, it is not improbable that there are points in the proceedings complained of in the Mexican adjudication before us which might call for reversal. But this Department is not a tribunal for the revision of foreign courts of justice, and it has been uniformly held by us that mistakes of law, or even of facts, by such tribunals are not. ground for our interposition unless they are in conflict, as above stated, either with treaty obligations to citizens of the United States or settled principles of international law in respect to the administration of justice. It appears from Consul Beach's report that the proceedings in the civil suit against Capt. Caleb were in correct form, but that in the criminal trial the depositions of witnesses who did not appear in court were accepted as evidence thus denying to the defendant the opportunity to cross-examine such witnesses. But even granting that such an error in the proceedings in the criminal trial existed, Capt. Caleb can hardly be heard in an application for redress, since, apparently not without the cognizance of the authorities, he escaped from detention soon after sentence was finally pronounced against him in the Supreme Court, and he himself expressly acknowledges that during his detention he was treated with the utmost consideration." Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Morrow, M. C., Feb. 17, 1886, 159 MS. See, to the same effect, Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Caleb, Feb. 18, 1886, 159 MS. Dom. Let. 109. Mr. Bayard also stated that upon the papers before the Department the charges made by the Mexican Government against the claimant were well founded. See, as to this case, For. Rel. 1884, 344, 358, 363, 365, 371, 372. July 19, 1886, the American minister to Mexico was instructed "to demand of the Mexican government the instant release of A. K. Cutting, a citizen of the United States, now unlawfully imprisoned at Paso del Norte." Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Jackson, min. to Mexico, tel., July 19, For the grounds on which this demand was based, see Mr. Bayard to Mr. Bayard's No. 221 is given supra, § 201, where other documents and a With reference to the allegation that two persons had been kept in prison in Mexico for eleven months without information of the evidence against them, and that they had been approached since their imprisonment by Mexican officials with offers from which it was to be inferred that the object of the prosecution was to obtain possession of an estate of which one of the prisoners was executor, the Department of State said: "Under these circumstances, I instruct you to call upon the Mexican government to direct that the prosecution against Messrs. Gaskill and Ward be brought at once to trial, and that the proceeding should be conducted in such a way as to give the accused in advance a statement of the witnesses to be produced against them and the opportunity of cross-examining these witnesses face to face on trial, and of producing witnesses on their behalf in defense. It will be proper also to state that the trial will be watched by this government with interest and close attention, so that the Department will be informed if there is any action taken on such trial at variance with the rules of justice acknowledged in common by Mexico and ourselves." Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Jackson, min. to Mexico, No. 226, July 26, 1886, MS. Inst. Mexico, XXI. 535. While it is undoubtedly a general principle "that a denial of justice can not be asserted until judicial remedies have been ex hausted," it is " also true that injustice may be inflicted by delays in the administration of the law, as well as by wrong determinations. This proposition is as true as the first, and is not inconsistent with it." A delay of more than a year and a half consumed in a secret investigation "can not be regarded as reasonable for the trial of an ordinary criminal charge, and to impose such a delay in order to obtain evi dence of guilt is in reality to make the prisoner's apparent innocence the ground of his imprisonment." Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, to Mr. Ryan, min. to Mexico, June 28, 1890, MS. "Nothing short of convincing evidence" that an American citizen "is the victim of intentional discrimination, partiality, or other injustice on the part of the court in which the prosecution is pending, could justify diplomatic intervention in his behalf." Mr. Gresham, Sec. of State, to Mr. Morse, May 31, 1893, 192 MS. Dom. As to the joint investigation of the case of Dr. Ruiz, an American citizen, "Your claim for damages on account of your detention in Peru is not a proper subject of diplomatic intervention. Your detention there seems to have been in pursuance of a regular judicial sentence after trial at which testimony was heard. Even admitting that the sentence was wholly wrong and that your detention was altogether unjust, yet the judgment of the appellate court reversed that sentence and removed all restraint on your liberty. The government of Peru itself has therefore corrected the injustice of the lower court in the manner in which alone all governments, as a rule, correct injustice of their inferior tribunals." Mr. Gresham, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hevner, June 10, 1893, 192 MS. Dom. Of the same purport is Mr. Uhl, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. Grip, min. of (2) REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION. § 915. "If. .. Mr. Speer should be a duly naturalized citizen of the United States; if in returning to the Austrian dominions he should not have incurred any penalty or have violated any obligation originating prior to his naturalization, this government will expect to be informed of the nature of the charge, of the form of proceedings, and to be furnished with a copy of the testimony against him, if this was reduced to writing." Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Jackson, chargé at Vienna, Nov. 6, 1854. "Although it may be unusual for complaints in ordinary cases of alleged offences against the laws of one country by the citizens or |