no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security. "The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed, by force, in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all independent powers whose governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote, and surely none more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these continents, circumstanaces are eminently and conspicuously · different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course. [Paragraphs 48 and 49, message of Dec. 2, 1823.] President Monroe's annual message, Dec. 2, 1823, Am. State Papers, For. See President Monroe to Jefferson, Dec. 1823, 15 Proceedings of the Mass. 66 first consideration from the country, directed to Engl". in the first The logical conclusion seems to be that the conception of the Monroe VI. CONTEMPORARY ACTS AND EXPOSITIONS. $ 937. "By direction of the President of the United States, you are authorized to proceed to London as soon as possible with the despatches herewith committed to you for the minister of the United States at that place. "After delivering them, you will hold yourself in readiness to proceed, and, under the directions of Mr. Rush, and of Mr. Brown, if he shall arrive in Paris in season to give them, will proceed to any place where a European congress may be held with a view to the consideration of the affairs of Spain and South America. You will thence report to me all such information relating to the proceedings at such congress as you shall deem it may be useful to make known to this Government. You will assume no public character, but take passports as a private citizen of the United States, from the minister of the United States in England or France, as circumstances may require. And you will take all proper precautions for avoiding any appearance or suspicion of your being employed on a public agency. At the conclusion of the meeting of such congress, the occasion for your agency on this service will cease, and you will return to the United States. You will be particularly careful to secure your correspondence from disclosure, either by access to your own papers, or by inspection of it in the process of conveyance." Mr. Adams, Sec. of State, to Mr. Alexander McRae (secret), Dec. 15, 1823, See, also, Mr. Adams, Sec. of State, to Mr. Rush, min. to England, No. 2 January 20, 1824, Mr. Clay introduced in the House the following joint resolution: "That the people of these States would not see, without serious inquietude, any forcible interposition by the Allied Powers of Europe in behalf of Spain, to reduce to their former subjection those parts of the continent of America which have proclaimed and established for themselves, respectively, independent governments, and which have been solemnly recognized by the United States." On May 26 Mr. Clay announced that he "should continue to abstain from pressing upon the attention of the House his resolution, and should allow it to sleep, where it now reposes, on the table." The reason he gave for this decision was that the resolution "proposed an expression of the feelings of Congress in regard to an attack supposed to be meditated by Allied Europe upon the independence of Spanish America;" that events since the President's message tended to show that "if such a purpose was ever seriously entertained, it had been relinquished," and that to pass the resolution " in the absence of any sufficient evidence" of such an inimical design might be thought "unfriendly, if not offensive." Annals of Congress (1823-24), I. 1104; II. 2763. See Cong. Debates, 19 "The amount of it [Mr. Monroe's declaration] was, that this Government could not look with indifference on any combination among other Powers, to assist Spain in her war against the South American states; that we could not but consider any such combination as dangerous or unfriendly to us; and that, if it should be formed, it would be for the competent authorities of this Government to decide, when the case arose, what course our duty and our interest should require us to pursue." Mr. Webster, Mar. 27, 1826, in House of Rep., Cong. Debates, 19 Cong. 1 sess., II., part 2, p. 1807. "It has sometimes been assumed that the Monroe doctrine contained some declaration against any other than democratic-republican institutions on this continent, however arising or introduced. The message will be searched in vain for anything of the kind. We were the first to recognize the imperial authority of Dom Pedro in Brazil, and of Iturbide in Mexico; and more than half the northern continent was under the scepters of Great Britain and Russia; and these dependencies would certainly be free to adopt what institutions they pleased, in case of successful rebellion, or of peaceful separation from their parent States." (Dana's note, Dana's Wheaton, § 67, note 36.) "It [the Monroe doctrine] has been said, in the course of this debate, to have been a loose and vague declaration. It was, I believe, sufficiently studied. I have understood, from good authority, that it was considered, weighed, and distinctly and decidedly approved, by every one of the President's advisers at that time. Our Government could not adopt on that occasion precisely the course which England had taken. England threatened the immediate recognition of the provinces, if the allies should take part with Spain against them. We had already recognized them. It remained, therefore, only for our Government to say how we should consider a combination of the allied powers, to effect objects in America, as affecting ourselves; and the message was intended to say, what it does say, that we should regard such combination as dangerous to us. Sir, I agree with those who maintain the proposition, and I contend against those who deny it, that the message did mean something; that it meant much; and I maintain, against both, that the declaration effected much good, answered the end designed by it, did great honor to the foresight and the spirit of the Government, and that it can not now be taken back, retracted, or annulled without disgrace. It met, sir, with the entire concurrence and the hearty approbation of the country. The tone which it uttered found a corresponding response in the breasts of the free people of the United States. That people saw, and they rejoiced to see, that, on a fit occasion, our weight had been thrown into the right scale, and that, without departing from our duty, we had done. something useful, and something effectual, for the cause of civil liberty. One general glow of exultation, one universal feeling of the gratified love of liberty, one conscious and proud perception of the consideration which the country possessed, and of the respect and honor which belonged to it, pervaded all bosoms. Possibly the public enthusiasm went too far; it certainly did go far. But, sir, the sentiment which this declaration inspired was not confined to ourselves. Its force was felt everywhere, by all those who could understand its object and foresee its effect. In that very House of Commons of which the gentleman from South Carolina has spoken with such commendation, how was it received? Not only, sir, with approbation, but, I may say, with no little enthusiasm. While the leading minister [Mr. Canning] expressed his entire concurrence in the sentiments and opinions of the American President, his distinguished competitor [Mr. Brougham] in that popular body, less restrained by official decorum, and more at liberty to give utterance to all the feeling of the occasion, declared that no event had ever created greater joy, exultation, and gratitude among all the free men in Europe; that he felt pride in being connected by blood and language with the people of the United States; that the policy disclosed by the message became a great, a free, and an independent nation; and that he hoped his own country would be prevented by no mean pride, or paltry jealousy, from following so noble and glorious an example. It is doubtless true, as I took occasion to observe the other day, that this declaration must be considered as founded on our rights, and to spring mainly from a regard to their preservation. It did not commit us, at all events, to take up arms on any indication of hostile feeling by the powers of Europe towards South America. If, for example, all the states of Europe had refused to trade with South America until her states should return to their former allegiance, that would have furnished no cause of interference to us. Or if an armament had been furnished by the allies to act against provinces the most remote from us, as Chili or Buenos Ayres, the distance of the scene of action diminishing our apprehension of danger, and diminishing also our means of effectual interposition, might still have left us to content ourselves with remonstrance. But a very different case would have arisen, if an army, equipped and maintained by these powers, had been landed on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico, and commenced the war in our own immediate neighborhood. Such an event might justly be regarded as dangerous to ourselves, and, on that ground, call for decided and immediate interference by us. The sentiments and the policy announced by the declaration, thus understood, were, therefore, in strict conformity to our duties and our interest." Mr. Webster's speech on the Panama mission, April 14, 1826, 3 Webster's Works, 203; Cong. Debates, 19 Cong. 1 sess. II., part 2, pp. 2254, 2268. "The allied powers were the four great continental monarchiesRussia, Prussia, Austria, and France. Shortly after the overthrow of Bonaparte these powers entered into an alliance called the 'Holy Alliance,' the object of which was to sustain and extend monarchical principles as far as possible, and to oppress and put down popular institutions. England, in the early stages of the alliance, favored it. The menbers of the alliance held several congresses, attended either by themselves or their ambassadors, and undertook to regulate the affairs of all Europe, and actually interfered in the affairs of Spain for the purpose of putting down popular doctrines. In its progress, the alliance turned its eyes to this continent in order to aid Spain in regaining her sovereignty over her revolted provinces. At this stage England became alarmed. Mr. Canning was then prime minister. He informed Mr. Rush of the project, and gave to him, at the same time, the assurance that, if sustained by the United States, Great Britain would resist. Mr. Rush immediately communicated this to our Government. It was received here with joy; for so great was the power of the alliance that even we did not feel ourselves safe from its interpositions. I remember the reception of the dispatch from Mr. Rush as distinctly as if all the circumstances had occurred yesterday. I well recollect the great satisfaction with which it was received by the Cabinet. It came late in the year-not long before the meeting of Congress. As was usual with Mr. Monroe upon great occasions, the papers were sent round to each member of the Cabinet, so that each might be duly apprised of all the circumstances and be prepared to give his opinion. The Cabinet met. It deliberated. There was long and careful consultation; and the result was the declaration which I have just announced. All this has passed away. That very movement on the part of England, sustained by this declaration, gave a blow to the celebrated alliance from which it never recovered. From . |