independence and ruin their interests. These truths ought everywhere throughout this continent to be impressed upon the public mind; but what can the United States do to resist such European interference whilst the Spanish-American republics continue to weaken themselves by division and civil war and deprive themselves of the ability of doing anything for their own protection?" Mr. Buchanan, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hise, min. to Cent. Am., June 3, 1848, 1 Curtis's Buchanan, 623; H. Ex. Doc. 75, 31 Cong. 1 sess. 92–96. "A guarantee for the general use and security of a transit route, and also for its neutrality, is a desirable measure, which would meet the hearty concurrence of the United States. These views have already been made known to the Governments of Costa Rica and Nicaragua, and they have been informed "that the President indulges the hope that these routes may yet be considered by general consent as neutral highways for the world, not to be disturbed by the operations of war.' These great avenues of intercommunication are vastly interesting to all commercial powers, and all may well join in securing their freedom and use against those dangers to which they are exposed from aggressions or outrages originating within or without the territories through which they pass. "But the establishment of a political protectorate by any of the powers of Europe over any of the independent states of this continent, or, in other words, the introduction of a scheme of policy which would carry with it a right to interfere in their concerns, is a measure to which the United States have long since avowed their opposition, and which, should the attempt be made, they will resist by all the means in their power. The reasons for the attitude they have assumed have been fully promulgated, and are everywhere well known. There is no need upon this occasion to recapitulate them. They are founded on the political circumstances of the American continent, which has interests of its own, and ought to have a policy of its own, disconnected from many of the questions which are continually presenting themselves in Europe, concerning the balance of power and other subjects of controversy arising out of the condition of its States, and which often find their solution of their postponement in war. It is of paramount importance to the states of this hemisphere that they should have no entangling union with the powers of the Old World, a connection which would almost necessarily make them parties to wars having no interest in them, and which would often involve them in hostilities with the other American states, contiguous or remote. The years which have passed by since this principle of separation was first announced by the United States have served still more to satisfy the people of this country of its wisdom and to fortify their resolution to maintain it, happen what may." Mr. Cass, Sec. of State, to Mr. Lamar, min. to Cent. Am., July 25, 1858, Wharton, in his Int. Law. Digest, said: "The Clayton-Bulwer treaty is See, fully, as to Central America, the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and the M. de Sartiges, the French minister, having called at the Department of State and stated that he had been directed by Count Walewski to say "that the French Government had been invited by the British Government to despatch a naval force to San Juan del Norte with orders to land a force, if requested to do so by the Nicaraguan Government, to repel any attack which might be made by illegal military expeditions against that country," Mr. Cass replied: "That this measure, if carried into effect, would but complicate still more the difficulties in Central America. That this Government was doing all in its power to prevent such expeditions from leaving the United States. That a concert of action between France and Great Britain for the employment of force in that region would give much dissatisfaction to the American people, as well as to this Government. Although we have no treaty with France respecting the affairs of Central America, still the French Government is aware of the position which the United States have taken against the exercise of a protectorate or of any dominion over the Isthmian states, and could not view with indifference the adoption of a policy which could scarcely be carried out without the exercise of a control, which would be unacceptable." Mr. Cass, Sec. of State, to Mr. Dallas, min. to England, confid., Nov. 26, See, also, Mr. Cass, Sec. of State, to Mr. Mason, min. to France, No. 169, Should unforeseen and unfortunate circumstances ever bring it into question, the United States will be prepared to repeat and enforce the principle declared by its highest authority, more than half a century ago, that with the Governments [of the American continents] which have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing or controlling in any other manner, their destiny, by an European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States.'" Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, to Mr. Logan, min. to Cent. Am., May 7, 1881, 5. CHILE. § 948. "The policy of the United States in regard to the several SpanishAmerican States, is, or ought to be well known now, after the exposition it has received during the last five years. We avoid in all cases giving encouragement to expectations which, in the varying course of events, we might find ourselves unable to fulfill; and we desire to be known as doing more than we promise rather than falling short of our engagements. On the other hand, we maintain and insist with all the decision and energy which is compatible with our existing neutrality, that the republican system which is accepted by the people in any one of those States shall not be wantonly assailed, and that it shall not be subverted as an end of a lawful war by European powers. We thus give to those Republics the moral support of a sincere, liberal, and as we think it will appear, a useful friendship. We could claim from foreign states no concession to our own political, moral, and material principles or interests if we should not conform our own proceedings in the needful intercourse with foreign states to the just rules of the laws of nations. We, therefore, concede to every nation the right to make peace or war, for such causes other than political or ambitious as it thinks right and wise. In such wars as are waged between nations which are in friendship with ourselves, if they are not pushed, like the French war in Mexico, to the political point before mentioned, we do not intervene, but remain neutral, conceding nothing to one belligerent that we do not concede to the other, and allowing to one belligerent what we allow to the other. "We certainly thought that is was an act of friendship on our part that we obtained assurances from Spain, at the beginning and at other stages of the present war, that in any event her hostilities! against Chile should not be prosecuted beyond the limits which I have before described. We understand ourselves now and henceforth ready to hold Spain to this agreement, if, contrary to our present expectations, it should be found necessary. In this we think we are acting a part certainly not unfriendly to Chile. It was thought to be an act of friendship when we used our good offices with both parties to prevent the war. We have thought we were acting a friendly part using the same good offices to secure an agreement for peace without dishonor, or even damage, to Chile. Those who think that the United States could enter as an ally into every war in which a friendly republican State on this continent becomes involved, forget that peace is the constant interest and the unwavering policy of the United States. They forget the frequency and variety of wars in which our friends in this hemisphere engage themselves entirely independent of all control or counsel of the United States. We have no armies for the purpose of aggressive war; no ambition for the character of a regulator. regulator. Our Constitution is not an imperial one, and does not allow the Executive Government to engage in war except upon the well considered and deliberate decree of the Congress of the United States. A Federal Government consisting of thirty-six equal States, which are in many respects self-governing, cannot easily be committed by its representatives to foreign wars, either of sympathy or of ambition. If there is any one characteristic of the United States which is more marked than any other, it is that they have from the time of Washington adhered to the principle of nonintervention, and have perseveringly declined to seek or contract entangling alliances, even with the most friendly States.” Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Kilpatrick, min. to Chile, No. 9, June 2, 1866, MS. Inst. Chile, XV. 333; Dip. Cor. 1866, part 2, p. 413. 6. COLOMBIA. $949. See, as to the Isthmus of Panama, and the treaty of 1846, supra, Chap. XI. "Mr. Salazar, the minister from Columbia [sic], stated lately, by order of his govt., that a French agent was expected at Bogeta, having already arrived at the port, with power to treat with his govt. respecting its independence. He observed that his govt. had been advised, from an authentic source, that the govt. of France would acknowledge its independence on one condition, the establishment of monarchy, and leave the person to be placed in that station to the people of Colombia; that Bolivar would not be objected to if preferred by them. He asked, should the proposition be rejected and France become hostile in consequence, what part the U. States would take in that event? What aid might they expect from us? The subject will of course be weighed thoroughly in giving the answer. The Executive has no right to compromit the nation in any question of war, nor ought we to presume that the people of Columbia will hesitate as to the answer to be given to any proposition which touches so vitally their liberties." President Monroe to Mr. Madison, Aug. 2, 1824, 7 Writings of Monroe, 30, 31. It was hoped that the attempt to bring about a "more harmonious condition of things" between Colombia and Spain, and one "better calculated to inure in benefits to the Spanish-American state in its intercourse with its former parent country," would be successful. (Mr. Evarts, Sec. of State, to Mr. Dichman, min. to Colombia, No. 30, Feb. 18, 1879, MS. Inst. Colombia, XVII. 76.) 66 7. CUBA. (1) DECLARATIONS OF POLICY. $ 950. Of all the European powers, this country prefers that Cuba and Porto Rico should remain dependent on Spain. If the war should continue between Spain and the new republics, and those islands should become the object and the theater of it, their fortunes have such a connection with the prosperity of the United States that they could not be indifferent spectators; and the possible contingencies of such a protracted war might bring upon the Government of the United States duties and obligations, the performance of which, however painful it should be, they might not be at liberty to decline." Mr. Clay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Everett, min. to Spain, No. 1, April 27, 1825, MS. Inst. U. States Ministers, X. 297. The United States "could not consent to the occupation" of Cuba and Porto Rico "by any other European power than Spain, under any contingency whatever." (Mr. Clay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Brown, min. to France, No. 3, Oct. 25, 1825, MS. Inst. U. States Ministers, X. 404; Am. State Papers, For. Rel. V. 855.) 66 Mr. Gallatin, when minister to London, tried to "impress strongly" on Canning's mind that it was impossible that the United States could acquiesce in the conquest by or transfer of " the island of Cuba to any great maritime power." (Mr. Gallatin to Mr. Clay, Dec. 22, 1866, 2 Gallatin's Writings, 346.) On December 20, 1825, Mr. Clay addressed a note to the ministers of Colombia and Mexico, requesting them to prevail upon their respective governments to suspend any expedition which both or either of them might be fitting out against the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico until the sense of the Congress of Panama might be known on the subject. The President considered that such suspension might have a favorable effect upon the cause of peace, and it was also recommended by other considerations. The Colombian Government promised a substantial compliance with this request, and a copy of its reply was communicated to the Russian Government with a view to incite that Government to new efforts to bring about peace between Spain and her colonies. The Mexican Government appears to have received the request of the United States unfavorably. Mr. Clay, Sec. of State, to Mr. A. H. Everett, min. to Spain, April 13, 1826, See, also, Mr. Clay to Mr. Middleton, Dec. 26, 1825, Am. State Papers, |