French Government had issued orders to its ships of war in the West Indies to give assistance to Spain and to prevent by force the adventurers of any nation from landing with hostile intent on the island of Cuba. A few days previously the British chargé d'affaires at Washington had given official notice that his Government had issued similar orders to its naval forces. Commenting on these interviews, Mr. Crittenden said that the President regarded this action of the two powers as a matter of grave importance. The orders had no doubt been occasioned by the then recent unlawful expedition of less than 500 men which had evaded the vigilance of the United States and escaped from New Orleans. The expedition was landed by the steamer Pampero, in Cuba, where it was soon captured, and many of its members were executed. The President did not regard this accident as a sufficient basis for the combined action of the two great European powers. Their object could hardly be accomplished without claiming a dangerous power of visit and search; but, apart from this, there was another point of view in which the intervention of France and England could not be viewed with indifference by the President. The geographical position of Cuba was such that it would become, in the hands of any European nation, an object of just jealousy and apprehension to the people of the United States. The Government of France and other European nations had long been officially apprised that the United States could not see without concern the island transferred by Spain to any other European state. Moreover, the people of the United States were "naturally jealous of European interference in American affairs."

Mr. Crittenden, Acting Sec. of State, to M. de Sartiges, French min., Oct.
22, 1851, MS. Notes to French Leg. VI. 163.

M. de Sartiges, in a note to Mr. Crittenden, of October 27, 1851, stated
that the instructions issued by his Government were (1) "sponta-
neous and isolated," and (2) for “an exclusive case," and were appli-
cable "only to the class, and not to the nationality of any pirate or
adventurer that should attempt to land, in arms, on the shores of a
friendly power." France herself, said M. de Sartiges, was sensitive
on the subject of the right of search, and the orders given to the
French commander were intended to apply only to the case of piracy
according to her maritime code. Moreover, the attitude assumed by
President Fillmore and his Cabinet had been so upright that the
French Government, far from intending to imply any doubts on the
subject, had reason to believe that it would find in those same lati-
tudes the American squadron, acting in the same spirit and pursuing
a similar object. (MS. Notes from French Legation.)
On the 18th of November Mr. Webster replied that he had submitted
M. de Sartiges' note to the President, who had directed him to say
that the apprehensions of the United States and the reasons therefor
were considered to have been frankly stated in Mr. Crittenden's note
of the 22nd of October, and that, as M. de Sartiges now avers that
the French Government had only in view the execution of the pro-

vision of its maritime code against pirates, further discussion of the subject would seem to be for the present unnecessary." (Mr. Webster, Sec. of State, to M. de Sartiges, French min., Nov. 18, 1851, MS. Notes to French Leg. VI. 171.)

See President Fillmore's message of July 13, 1852, and accompanying documents, H. Ex. Doc. 121, 31 Cong. 1 sess.

"For many reasons the United States feel deeply interested in the destiny of Cuba. They will never consent to its transfer to either of the intervening nations, or to any other foreign state. They would regret to see foreign powers interfere to sustain Spanish rule in the island should it provoke resistance too formidable to be overcome by Spain herself."

66

Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Buchanan, min. to England, No. 2, July 2, 1853, MS. Inst. Gr. Brit. XVI. 220.

Nothing will be done, on our part, to disturb its [Cuba's] present connexion with Spain, unless the character of that connexion should be so changed as to affect our present or prospective security. While the United States would resist at every hazard the transference of Cuba to any European nation, they would exceedingly regret to see Spain resorting to any power for assistance to uphold her rule over it. Such a dependence on foreign aid would, in effect, invest the auxiliary with the character of a protector, and give it a pretext to interfere in our affairs, and also generally in those of the North American continent."

Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Soulé, min. to Spain, No. 2, July 23, 1853, H. Ex. Doc. 93, 33 Cong. 2 sess. 3; same to same, Apr. 3, 1854, and Nov. 13, 1854, id. 80, 134.

"Should the rule of Spain over Cuba be so severe as to excite revolutionary movements in that island, she will undoubtedly find volunteers in the ranks of the Cubans from various countries, and, owing to very obvious causes, more from the United States probably than from any other; but it would be unjust to impute to this and the other governments to which those volunteers formerly belonged, an unfriendly disposition towards her, or a desire to aid clandestinely in the attempt to wrest that island from her. There is reason to believe that Spain herself, as well as other European governments, suspects that the people of the United States are desirous of detaching Cuba from its present transatlantic dependence, regardless of the rights of Spain, with a view of annexing it to this Union, and that our Government was disposed to connive at the participation of our citizens in the past disturbances in that island, and would again do so on the recurrence of similar events. Our defense against such an unfounded suspicion, and the only one which self-respect allows us to make, is an appeal to our past course."

Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Soulé, July 23, 1853, H. Ex. Doc. 93, 33
Cong. 2 sess. 3, 4.

As to the seizure of the Black Warrior, see H. Ex. Docs. 76 and 86, 33
Cong. 1 sess.; H. Ex. Doc. 93, 33 Cong. 2 sess.

As to the Ostend Manifesto, see Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Soulé,
min. to Spain, No. 27, Nov. 13, 1854, H. Ex. Doc. 93, 33 Cong. 2 sess.
134; and Curtis's Life of Buchanan, II, 136 et. seq.

"The truth is, that Cuba, in its existing colonial condition, is a constant source of injury and annoyance to the American people. It is the only spot in the civilized world where the African slave trade is tolerated; and we are bound by treaty with Great Britain to maintain a naval force on the coast of Africa, at much expense both of life and treasure, solely for the purpose of arresting slavers bound to that island. The late serious difficulty between the United States and Great Britain respecting the right of search, now so happily terminated, could never have arisen if Cuba had not afforded a market for slaves.

"It has been made known to the world by my predecessors that the United States have on several occasions endeavored to acquire Cuba from Spain by honorable negotiation. We would not, if

we could, acquire Cuba in any other manner. This is due to our national character. All the territory which we have acquired since the origin of the Government has been by fair purchase from France, Spain, and Mexico, or by the free and voluntary act of the independent State of Texas in blending her destinies with our own. This course we shall ever pursue, unless circumstances should occur which we do not now anticipate, rendering a departure from it clearly justifiable under the imperative and overruling law of selfpreservation.

"The Island of Cuba, from its geographical position, commands the mouth of the Mississippi and the immense and annually increasing trade, foreign and coastwise, from the valley of that noble river, now embracing half the sovereign States of the Union. With that island under the dominion of a distant foreign power this trade, of vital importance to these States, is exposed to the danger of being destroyed in time of war, and it has hitherto been subjected to perpetual injury and annoyance in time of peace.

"Whilst the possession of the island would be of vast importance to the United States, its value to Spain is comparatively unimportant. Such was the relative situation of the parties when the great Napoleon transferred Louisiana to the United States."

President Buchanan, annual message, Dec. 6, 1858; Richardson's Messages, V. 510.

Mr. Slidell's report on acquisition of Cuba, Jan. 24, 1859, is in S. Rept. 351, 35 Cong. 2 sess.

For minority report, of Jan. 24, 1859, of committee in the House of Representatives, objecting to the bill appropriating $30,000,000 for the purchase of Cuba, see H. Rept. 134, 35 Cong. 2 sess.

On May 7, 1867, Mr. Seward had a confidential interview with Mr. Goni, Spanish minister, upon the subject of the condition of Cuba and its connection with Spain. Mr. Seward intimated an opinion that Cuba would eventually, "by means of constant gravitation," "fall into the United States, without the practice of any injustice or unfriendliness and with the consent of the people of the island and of the Government of Spain." The United States, said Mr. Seward, were content that Cuba should indefinitely remain a colony of Spain, but they must regard with very great concern its transfer to any foreign power; and the subject had recently been forced upon his thoughts for the reason (1) that Cuba, being so near the United States, still remained a slave-holding province; (2) that a change in the relations of Cuba and Spain had more than once been suggested in quarters hostile to the Spanish Government; (3) that it was reported that a pledge of the financial chest of Cuba had been offered by the Spanish Government to American capitalists as security for a loan, and that the suggestion had been made that Congress might think it well to accept the pledge and lend its credit to such a loan; (4) that a report, apparently originating in Madrid, had been published to the effect that the Spanish Government had offered the Cuban revenues to French capitalists as security for a loan. In view of these facts Mr. Seward thought it proper to say to Mr. Goni that, if the Government of Spain either had or should have a desire to sell the island or pledge its revenues, it was hoped that they would make their wishes known to the United States before concluding an arrangement for such a purpose with the government or subjects of any other nation. Mr. Seward said that he would ask no reply, and that the suggestion might remain under the seal of confidence.

Memorandum of Mr. Seward, May 7, 1867, MS. Notes to Spanish Leg. IX. 398.

Rumors having reached Washington that the Spanish Government was attempting to negotiate a loan in London or Paris with the revenues of Cuba as security, the American minister at London was instructed, while avoiding "an offensive attitude of interference," to say, in case he should find the rumors to be well founded, "that, in view of assurances given to this Government by the Spanish authorities, the United States can not regard such hypothecation or pledge with favor." The Government of the United States could not look with favor upon any arrangement which might "hypothecate or pledge the revenues of that island, or compromit any interests con

nected therewith, or give to any foreign government a right to interpose in the affairs of Cuba."

Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Motley, min. to England, No. 128 (confid.),
Jan. 10, 1870, MS. Inst. Great Britain, XXII. 161.

A similar instruction was addressed to Mr. Washburne, at Paris, with
whom Mr. Motley was authorized to correspond on the subject, if
necessary. (Ibid.)
Referring, nearly a year later, to a report that the Spanish Government
intended to ask authority from the Cortes to raise a considerable loan
on the pledge of the revenues of Cuba, Mr. Fish said: "The relations
of this Government towards the island of Cuba are such that, while
ourselves abstaining scrupulously from any effort to hasten the time
when we believe that the connection of the island with Spain must
cease, we can not contemplate with indifference, or in silence, any
measures which may promise to give any possible ground of claim
on the part of any foreign power to acquire any rights of ownership,
or control, over that island or its revenues." (Mr. Fish, Sec. of State,
to Mr. Moran, chargé at London, No. 26, Dec. 1, 1870, MS. Inst. Great
Britain, XXII. 329.)

As a matter of fact such a pledge of the revenues of Cuba was subse-
quently given by the Spanish Government. (S. Doc. 62, 55 Cong. 3
sess. part 2, pp. 48-50 et seq.

(2) REFUSAL OF NEUTRALIZATION.

$951.

On August 21, 1825, Mr. King, American minister at London, transmitting a proposal from Canning that the United States, Great Britain, and France should sign either of three ministerial notes-one between Great Britain and the United States, one between the United States and France, and one between France and Great Britain--or else one tripartite note, signed by all, disclaiming each for itself any intention to occupy Cuba and protesting against such an occupation by either of the others. This proposal was declined by the United States, first, on the ground that to allay the apprehensions of the King of Spain with regard to the seizure of his colonial possessions by another power, might induce him to desire to prolong the war with his colonies. Viewing the matter in another light, the Government of the United States considered it unnecessary to make any declaration on its own part because of its pacific policy and the forbearance which it had already shown. Nor was any apprehension felt that Great Britain would entertain "views of aggrandizement in regard to Cuba, which could not fail to lead to a rupture with the United States." The case of France might be different, and the fact that instructions had been given to the commander of the French forces in the West Indies to aid the governor of Havana in quelling internal disturbances, proved that the French Government had delib