Part 3 of title I wisely supplements the Commission's activities by providing for a congressional Joint Committee on Civil Rights to study the field with a view toward legislating to improve respect for an enforcement of civil rights. The committee is given subpena powers.

The establishment of such a committee to investigate ways to further our freedom of speech, religion, and press is a necessary counterbalance of the House Un-American Activities, whose inevitable tendency has been to restrict those very same freedoms.

I think one great function that such a committee could perform would be of this nature-when the Un-American Activities Committee, as it recently did, performs such acts as to demand from the colleges a list of all the textbooks used in their courses, when Congressman Ober, of Maryland, who passed the notorious Ober bill down there, attempts to get two professors of his alma mater fired because of their political views, the alma mater being Harvard, and the only support for one demand for discharge being that the professor in question spoke in opposition to the Ober bill at a legally called political meeting-when that sort of thing happens, I think that it would be the function of this joint committee to investigate the entire field to see what other attempts have been made to impose censorship upon our colleges and schools. It would be their function to see how many alumni demand that colleges admit only a certain number of Jews, or a certain number of Negroes, or a certain number of Italians, as a prerequisite to their getting gifts from these alumni.

It would also be interesting to note how many politicians, legislators, lobbyists go in and try to influence universities such as Harvard in the selection of the books and the choice of personnel.

This discussion with Mr. Ober was made public only after several months of correspondence. My hunch would be there are probably many and frequent instances of such things occurring.

The substantive provisions of the bill are to be found in title II; part 1 thereof consists of amendments and supplements to existing civil-rights statutes found in the Criminal Code, title 18.

Section 241 (a) of that code now provides that—

If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same

such conduct is criminal.

Section 201 of the proposed act would change the word "citizens" to "inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District," and thus desirably extend the classes of persons protected and make the language of this section coincide with that of section 242.

While the desirability of such an extension is obvious, it would be unfortunate if this attempt to widen the applicability of the bill resulted in some cases in its narrowing.

Thus, it is conceivable that one who is a citizen but is not an inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District might be deprived of his rights, and the bill would unfortunately remove this protection. This can be remedied by changing lines 17-18 of page 10 to "any citizen or inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District."

It is only fair to add that this morning I appeared before the Senate subcommittee on the Judiciary Committee, and Senator McGrath took me to task on that and claimed any person even sojourning in the United States for a day, 2 days, or a few hours, would come under the legal definition of "inhabitant," and thus remove the objection that I have made here. I agreed with him if such were the clearly manifested congressional intent, we would completely abandon the suggestion, but the word "inhabitant" unfortunately has been very seldom construed by the courts, and I think that the colloquy between myself and Senator McGrath this morning, plus what I am saying now, would remove any doubt as to the intent of this bill.

The last part of the present section 241 (a) is left unchanged. The substitution in the bill of the word "of" for the word "or" of the present bill is obviously a misprint. This error occurs in line 24, page 10, of H. R. 4682.

It renders criminal the going of two or more persons in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder the free exercise or enjoyment of a right or privilege so

secured.

The bill then would add two valuable new subsections to section 241. Subsection (b) would make an individual guilty of criminal conduct if he performed alone the acts already criminal under subsection (a) if he has performed them in concert with another.

This remedies an obvious defect in the existing law, since acts when criminal when performed by two should not be considered innocent because performed by one.

Subsection (c) is most valuable, as it gives the persons whose civil rights have been violated a private right to a civil action for damage or other relief. There is a need for this law. Only recently it was held in Hardyman v. Collins (80 F. Supp. 501), that those who were threatened with beatings by many because of their attempt to run an orderly political meeting, had no right to sue their assailants for

a violation of the hts law. Much obscurity surrounds the

present aspect of their rule, as a reading of the opinion makes obvious. Subsection (c) would dispel the clouds. It should also be added that the congressional power to enact the rule of subsection (c) was reaffirmed in that very case.

Mr. BYRNE. We will have to adjourn now because there is a roll call on the floor of the House. We will meet again this afternoon at 2:30.

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The subcommittee reconvened at 2: 30 p. m., pursuant to recess.) Mr. DENTON. Mr. Levy, would you want to go ahead? Mr. Byrne will be here in a few minutes. It is unfortunate we have to interrupt you this way.

STATEMENT OF HERBERT M. LEVY, STAFF COUNSEL, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION-Resumed

Mr. LEVY. I understand the problems.

When we adjourned for the morning session I believe that I was reading a dispatch from the New York Post concerning itself with the difficulties of prosecuting the Klan under State law in Alabama.

I think it is best if I possibly read this again, with your indulgence. The headline was "30 KKK 'probers' are Klansmen; 'leak' of police plans aids terrorism.”

BIRMINGHAM, June 18.-Most members of the sheriff's force, whose duty it is to halt the hooded night riders of the Ku Klux Klan here, either are Klansmen or sympathizers, the Post Home News learned today.

Sheriff's deputies, working with special State investigators, it was also disclosed, are letting the movements of the State agents get back to the Klan chieftains, as the terrors of the KKK lash gripped Jefferson County for the ninth straight day.

Four State investigators have been working here the last few days under pressure of Bankhead Bates, State public-safety director, who has said "there is no room for mob rule in Alabama."

Of the 50 deputies on the sheriff's force, at least 30 admit they sympathize with the KKK. Most even admit to membership in the Klan.

Sheriff Holt McDowell says he's never been a Klansman and denied any knowledge of Klan sympathies among his deputies.

However, last June, the sheriff publicly approved a raid by the hooded night riders on a Girl Scout camp near Birmingham where white scoutmasters were training Negro scout leaders. He said at the time, "It's a good thing it happened."

The dispatch goes on to add that the American Legion is organizing opposition against this. I submit that if we reach a stage where law enforcement breaks down in Alabama, so that you have the American Legion pitted in actual battle against the Ku Klux Klan, I think it is time for the Federal Government to step in and do something about it, and I think this bill is the ideal thing for the Government to do. Rather, have the Government enact this bill and give a basis for later Government action.

Section 202 of the bill would amend the present section 242 of the Criminal Code to increase the punishment of one who deprives another under color of law of his rights, privileges or immunities, or subjects an inhabitant to different punishments because of his race, color, or being an alien, when such conduct results in death or maiming.

I might also add that again the word "inhabitant" is used in section 202, where possibly the words "inhabitant or citizen" should be used, as I mentioned earlier today.

Section 203 of the bill would add a new section 242A, defining six of the rights, privileges, and immunities referred to in section 242, thus adding much clarity to the bill.

Very possibly the rights, privileges, and immunities referred to in section 241 are further defined by this section, but it is not at all clear that that is being done. I think that is something that bears further consideration. I understand that some of the later speakers will talk to that.

Section 204 of the bill would add to title 18, United States Code, section 1583, dealing with involuntary servitude, a provision that whoever "holds" a person in involuntary servitude is guilty of a crime and outlaws all transportation for involuntary servitude not merely by vessel, as the law now reads. Other language therein is merely clarifying.

I would like to add that a further language change should be made in this and other sections if they are to be entirely clear. Thus, the bill would make liable anyone who "causes to be subjected" another to the prohibited conduct of section 242. The present 242 omitted these quoted four words, the revisers feeling that the language was unnecessary because the definition of a "principal" in section 2 of the

Criminal Code rendered criminally liable a person who caused another to commit this crime. The words "causes to be subjected" were also omitted by the revisers from the present section 1583. But if this act adds the words to section 242 and does not add them to section 1583, it_might afterward be argued that 1583 does not apply to a person who causes the crime to be committed, in spite of the definition in section 202 of the Criminal Code.

Part 2 of title II strengthens the Federal protection of the right to political participation. Section 211 thereof clarifies section 594 of the Criminal Code by expressly making criminal interference with voting not only at general elections but at special and primary elections as well.

Mr. DENTON. On account of race or religion?

Mr. LEVY. Yes. That is the very next sentence that I have.
Mr. DENTON. Pardon me.

Mr. LEVY. Section 212 of the bill makes the right to qualify to vote and to vote a right protected by section 242 of the Criminal Code, as discussed above, and adds that equal opportunity to vote shall be given without distinction, direct or indirect, based on religion or national origin, as well as on the already prohibited basis of race or color. Distinction on the basis of previous condition of servitude is omitted, since no such distinctions can exist any more.

Section 213 of the bill gives a right of civil action to one aggrieved by a violation of section 211, and provides that sections 211 and 212 shall also be enforceable by the Attorney General, thus giving two practical remedies for the deprivations of these civil rights. The prohibited conduct will be much less likely to occur if these remedies, easily pursued, are added to the already-existent but seldom-enforced criminal penalties.

Part 3 of title II prohibits discrimination or segregation in interstate transportation. While the Supreme Court has ruled that a State law imposing segregation is unconstitutional as an undue burden on interstate commerce (Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373, 1946), it is not clear whether or not a self-imposed carrier regulation imposing segregation is unconstitutional. In fact, the constitutionality of such a requirement is at this very moment before the United States Supreme Court, which will probably rule upon it this fall. The States themselves probably cannot outlaw these regulations, since that, too, would be an undue burden on the interstate commerce (Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485 (1877)). No cry can possibly be raised of States' rights, for, as was said in the Hall case:

If the public good requires such legislation, it must come from Congress and not from the States (Id., at 490).

There can be no doubt that the public good requires the end of segregation. This degrading process must be stopped, not only to stop the inroads of Communist propaganda but also to restore dignity to all men, be they white or black.

Mr. BYRNE. Are there any questions?

Mr. DENTON. Let me ask you this question: Are you interested in the antilynching law at this time or not?

Mr. LEVY. Yes; we most certainly are.

Mr. DENTON. Let me ask you about one phase we have been talking about here.

Mr. LEVY. Surely.

Mr. DENTON. Some of the bills give a cause of action against the community in which the lynching took place. Some do not. What is your reaction toward that?

Mr. LEVY. Frankly, my own personal reaction is one of puzzlement. I am not sure which I would prefer. My organization has not taken any official position on which is preferable.

My own view is that, in line with our traditional policies, we would probably very much be opposed to making the entire community liable. That is nothing more or less than guilt by association, which is a rather popular concept these days. If a man is merely a member of an organization on the Attorney General's list or if he has been a member of any one organization during the past 10 years, by the mere fact of his membership he is denied a right to a job in private employment which might give him access to classified material. We oppose that. It strikes me that if you make an entire community liable for the sins of some of its officers you are imposing guilt, or at any rate fining them by the taxing power, fining the individuals who had absolutely nothing to do with the conduct being condemned.

Mr. DENTON. I have another question on that same thing. This is presented by one southern Congressman and by one from the North. They propose in this antilynching measure that the States adopt a law giving either the governor or the attorney general the right to take action and bring an action in a county other than that in which the lynching occurred, and then the Government will not step in unless they fail to take action within a reasonable time, but the Government will step in if they do not have that law, and if they do have such law and do not take action in a reasonable time.

Here is their theory: That all criminal law requires the consent of the people who enforce the law and the consent of the Government, and if the Southern States would do this themselves it would not be as obnoxious to them and would accomplish the result better than having the Government do it. What is your reaction on that?

Mr. LEVY. My reaction to that is this: First, I am very much troubled by the time element. I have spoken to one of our attorneys who used to be the head of the civil-rights section. I was speaking to him only this morning, and he informed me that one of the greatest factors in being able to initiate these prosecutions successfully is the time element; that if the United States attorneys are not promptly alerted, that if the investigation is not made very promptly, all chance of catching the culprits is just about completely gone. So, if you say that in each particular investigation you have to wait for the State investigation to run its course, you may find that the Federal Government will never be able to act effectively.

Mr. DENTON. I did not make myself clear. It was not the investigation I was referring to, but it was the taking of the court action, which the bill provides.

Mr. LEVY. Who would make the investigation? There would have to be an investigation before court action, I assume.

Mr. DENTON. Certainly. Under their theory, I do not believe that would prohibit the Government from making an investigation.