THE CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE. amendto propose intending to deny its power ments to the Constitution; in pursuance of this declaration, that the President attempted to prevent the execution of the tenure-of-office act by devising means whereby to prevent Mr. Stanton from forth with resuming the functions of the office of Secretary of War, notwithstanding the refusal of the Senate to concur in his suspension; and, further, devised means to prevent the execution of the act making appropriations for the Army for the year ending June 30, 1868; and also to prevent the execution of "An act to provide for the more efficient gov erniment of the rebel States," passed March 2, 1867. There are not less than four distinct charges here made, any one of which, if proved, affords sufficient foundation to sustain this article, and, so far as the facts are similar to those embraced in several of the preceding articles, the arguSome of the ment need not be repeated. charges appear to have been sustained by the proof, and that is sufficient to determine the proper vote, though other allegations contained in the article may or may not be sustained by proper proof. After saying this it may be useless to pursue the subject further; but among the independent charges here clustered together there is one of the gravest in the whole series made against the President in relation to the execution of the act for the more efficient government of the rebel States, upon which a brief comment may not be inappropriate. Nearly all of the other unlawful acts charged upon Andrew Johnson have been done by him in order to enable him to accomplish his great crowning purpose of defeating the legislation of Congress for the rebel States. Proof in relation to any other allegations, therefore, in the end contributes to the support of this charge, as well as whatever proof may be found on the record particularly relating to it. Evidence in relation to such a charge to a large extent must necessarily be circumstantial, where the party, while ostensibly executing the law, predetermines its miscarriage, and must be surrounded by difficulties, but it does not seem easy to dismiss the matter as having no foundation whatever. The animus of the President has been made offensively conspicuous in his assignments and changes of the commanders of the several military departments, and especially by the removal of General Sheridan and the appointment of General Hancock in Louisiana, whose action in that department, regarded as a dread calamity by Union men, so enraptured the President that he even ventured upon the official impudence of asking Congress to tender to the new commander a vote of thanks, well knowing that Congress could have no other feeling than that of painful solicitude, if not of disgust, in regard to the part which the President had persuaded one of our veteran generals to assume in the execution of the reconstruction acts; but all such facts, which have not been formally offered in evidence, may be excluded from our view of this article, and there will enough remain of substance in other charges of the article to justify the conclusion that it should be considered as having been conclusively supported by the proof. The various charges in the articles of impeachment raise the question whether the President can do certain acts with impunity. Can he, in violation of his oath, refuse to take care that the laws be faithfully executed? Can he, in violation of the Constitution, exercise an exclusive power to remove and appoint to office? Can he, in violation of the laws of the land, disobey such parts of the laws as he pleases, and when he pleases? With so much he appears to have been justly charged, and such acts would not seem to be improperly characterized when called high misdemeanors. If they are not, what are they? Certainly they are not innocent acts. What is a misdemeanor? The definitions given in Webster's dictionary are as follows: "1. Ill behavior; evil conduct; fault; mismanage nent. "2. (Law.) Any crime less than a felony. The term If we limit the term to the law definition, it If the President is guilty, he cannot be guilty of anything less than a misdemeanor. If the facts charged do not amount to a misdemeanor, then the power to impeach the President might as well forever be abandoned. his assent from the bill before it became a law, and with equal deliberation when he subsequently conformed to the strict letter of the law in the suspension of Stanton, though giv ing unsatisfactory reasons therefor. When he flatly disobeyed the law by removing Stanton, February 21, 1868, and authorized Thomas to fill his place, he did not act inadvertently-he had pondered long how to break the law with personal impunity-and, although it is not pretended that this last move of President Johnson was devised or advised by any of his constitutional advisers, it cannot have been made through a mere blunder as to the meaning of the law, but it appears more like a bold attempt to trample the law under the heels of executive power. If the intent of the President was good, that should mitigate and possibly shield him from the extreme penalty hanging over him for the offenses charged and either proved or admitted. A positive breach of the law carries on its face a bad intent, and there is little or no proof of good intent other than the offer of proof through members of his Cabinet of what the President had at some time said to them, or what they had at some time said to him. Suppose this be admitted: that his Cabinet, one and all, pronounced the law unconstitutional; that it did not include the Secretary of War; and that the question as to the validity of the law ought to be carried to the Supreme Court. All this would only show that the President gave and received bad advice, which, to say the least, is not the best evidence of good intent, and, instead of diminishing the offense, theoretically increases it; for, after all, the President, by whomsoever advised, must be held responsible for his own acts, and, in addition thereto, to some extent, for the acts of his ministers. If he choose to break the law he must do it at his own peril and take the consequences. The advice of his Cabinet, if good, would only But the issues immediately involved in the articles of impeachment only thinly cover other and graver matters, identical in character with some of the great questions raised by the recent rebellion. It is a serious question whether the executive department of the Government shall be permitted to absorb some of the most important powers conferred upon Congress by the Constitution; but it is an aggravation of the question when this absorption is struggled for in the interest of disloyal citizens, and in behalf of the fallen fortunes of slavery. It is as much the duty of Congress to maintain its own rights as it is its duty not to trench upon the just powers of the Executive; but the maintenance of the rights of Congress looms up to higher importance when it is seen that just now hereon hangs the right of ten States to a republican form of government, to freedom, and the protection of equal laws. To concede that laws made by a vote of two thirds of each branch of Congress, the President's objections to the contrary notwithstanding, may be litigated or disregarded and set at defiance by a vetoing President, would be to yield a plain provision of the Constitution. Even to allow such laws to be avoided, or to wink at a halting execution of such laws, would soon undermine and destroy the check which it was intended should be placed upon an ambitious and self-willed Executive. Ifthe President can make and unmake, remove and appoint the chief officers of the Government at his own will and pleasure-shield the President if practically adopted, but having in view no other consideration than whether they are or are not subservient to his policy-then, instead of being the agent of the Constitution to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," he becomes the agent of governmental patronage, to bend both the lawmakers and the people to his will. the Senate has the right to be consulted as to appointments, this right cannot be abrogated by Congress nor nullified by the President. In time of war the power of the Executive stretches out its strong arm over a new and vast field; but even in time of war, and over military and naval officers, the power of the President does not extend to the latitude which President Johnson claims in time of peace in regard to officers in the civil service. it would be monstrous to shield him from the fact that bad advice had been given to him when it is too plain that the tender of good advice, if unpalatable, would be at the peril of the instant removal of the party by whom given. It is quite plain that the President intended to If oust Mr. Stanton at all hazards-by fair means if he could, but at any rate to oust him-and he did not intend himself, whatever others might do, to resort to any lawsuit in the process. The testimony of General Sherman shows that the President believed Mr. Stanton would yield because, as he said, he was "cowardly" so when General Thomas brought to the White House the account of his doings on the 21st of February, the President said, "Very well; go and take charge of the office and perform the duties." It would be wrong to convict President John- There was then no hint of disappointment at the lack of a lawsuit. It was not until the next day, when the masquerade was over and Adjutant General Thomas found himself in the clutches of the law, that the President again said, according to General Thomas, "Very well; that is the place I want it, in the courts. Though others might litigate the question, it is not clear that he ever sought to initiate any legal proceedings himself. But the assumption on the part of the President that it was his privilege, if not his duty, to violate the law rather than to faithfully execute it, in order to make upa case for the decision of the courts, instead of showing good intent, exhibits an obstinate purpose not to yield to a law passed by a constitutional majority of Congress against his objections. And the pretense that the courts would decide against the constitutionality of the law is sheer assumption. Even if there had been reasonable doubt as to its constitutionality, it was the law of the land until decided otherwise by the Supreme Court, the only tribunal having authority to stay the force Certainly of any law for a single moment. the President, who swears to maintain the Constitution, which makes it one of his chief duties to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, cannot, at his own will, elect what laws he will execute and what he will ignore. But there is hardly more reason to suppose the Supreme Court would decide the tenureof-office act unconstitutional than any other law among our statutes. Nor can good intent be found in the mode pursued by the President in striving to get rid of the hated War Minister. When he suspended Mr. Stanton, in August, 1867, in order to prevail upon the Senate to consent to the suspension, he made General Grant Secretary of War ad interim-entirely an unexceptionable appointment. But after he quarrelled with General Grant because he did not, when the Senate refused to consent to the suspension, aid and abet him in placing the office in the lap of the President before Mr. Stanton could repossess it, then he proposed to act independently of the law and of the Senate, and took General Thomas, so utterly unfit that his very designation impeaches the judgment if not the integ rity of the appointing power. Later nominations are open to criticism, either as bad, or, when otherwise, they appear too evidently extorted in the nature of a propitiation to the Senate sitting on the trial of the impeachment of Andrew Johnson. The general history of the conduct and manner of the President, in his various attempts to remove Mr. Stanton, certainly fails to furnish evidence of any good intent; nor is it to be believed, if the field had been opened for a wider search, that it would have been attended by any happier result. Having been among those who were originally for living down the administration of President Johnson rather than to attempt to bring it to an abrupt close by an impeachment, although admitting his culpability, I have yet had no other desire than to be able to render a just and impartial verdict. Summoning to my aid all the light with which the case has been illuminated, and at the close of the trial the culpability still appearing no less, I cannot, under the solemnities of an oath, declare the President innocent. The example of President Johnson, were it possible so gross a wrong could have passed unheeded, might have been comparatively harmless; but when solemnly adjudicated, with the eyes of the world fixed upon it, establishing, as it will, a precedent to be quoted and followed in all future time, I cannot consent to ignore or waive it as a light matter, and thereby ingraft the idea into the republican Constitution of the United States that the Executive is paramount, and may dominate at will over the legislative branch of the Government. Mr. Stanbery, counsel for the President and late Attorney General, has made a feeling appeal to us in behalf of his client. He has seen him often tempted by bad advice, and knew that evil counselors were around him more than once, but never discovered anything in him but loyalty to the Constitution and the laws. "Yes, Senators," says Mr. Stanbery, "with all his faults, the President has been more sinned against than sinning. Fear not to acquit him. The Constitution of the country is as safe in his hands from violence as it was in the hands of Washington." This appeal would be more apt not to go unheeded if Mr. Stanbery himself could be considered an impartial judge as to what course the President ought to pursue, and had not heretofore failed to discover anything in that man but loyalty; but it is painful to be obliged to presume that Mr. Stanbery, as one of the chief advisers of the President's most obnoxious measures, is entitled to some share of the doubtful honor of our Chief Magistrate's present position. Neither the facts surrounding this case nor those making the history of President Johnson's administration show evidences of good intent or justify future confidence. Ever since Andrew Johnson reached the Presidency more or less pressure has been felt that it was necessary for Congress to remain in session-adjourning late to meet early and at extraordinary and inconvenient seasons-lest grave evils and perplexing complications should be pre cipitated upon the country by his headstrong, if not treacherous, action in the absence of the legislative branch of the Government. Decide the charges here in his favor now; say that he has done no wrong; admit that the House of Representatives are all at fault, and Congress or the Senate never more need to remain here as the guardians of law and of a representative form of government, or as a bulwark against the encroachments of executive power. President Johnson and all future Presidents may break laws or make appointments at will, and do anything which goes to make up the character of an uncurbed despot. I am glad to remember that at the commencement of the late rebellion Andrew Johnson took a bold, outspoken stand in behalf of the Union; and that fact shall protect him, so far as my vote is concerned, from any other penalty for his recent great offenses than a simple removal from othice. I would not deprive him of the poor privilege of being a candidate for the suffrages of any portion of the people who may think him worthy, whether for President or alderman. But his appointment to office of men supposed corruptly to be putting more money into their own pockets than into the Treasury; his discreditable use of the pardoning power; his unmasked threat in his last annual message that it might become proper for him to "adopt forcible measures or such as might lead to force" in opposing an unconstitutional act of Congress; his appointment, in violation of law, to places of honor and trust, rebels not able to take the oath of office, in preference to loyal men; his malign attempts to foist.upon the country his policy of restoring the rebellious States without security for the future and against the measures of salutary reform proposed by Congress; and his bitter and active efforts to defeat the adoption of the constitutional amendment proposed by the Thirty-Ninth Congress, known as article fourteen, and known, also, as the great seal of security for the broad principles of national freedom and human rights: these facts, and such as these, do not allow me to gratuitously credit the President with good intent in the past, nor can I, notwithstanding his counsel's appeal, in the face of such a record, by a verdict of acquittal, become responsible for his conduct in the future. OPINION OF HON. SAMUEL C. POMEROY. As no man can see with the eyes of another, so no one can control his judgment upon the precise views and opinions of others. And although other Senators may, and have, given better and perhaps more logical reasons for their votes upon questions involved in this great trial of impeachment of the President, still as my own judgment must be controlled by my own views and opinions, I propose to set them forth, as briefly as possible, in the opinion and views I now submit. The people of the United States, through the House of Representatives in Congress assembled, have, in constitutional form, presented at the bar of the Senate eleven articles of impeachment against Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, for high crimes and misdemeanors in office. The charges have been answered by him; and after over forty days of patient trial, the time has come when Senators are required or allowed to state their conclusions upon the pleadings and proofs. This brief statement will explain the reasons of the judgment I am prepared to give by my response to each article. In considering the questions to be decided, it is to be borne in mid that this proceeding is not a suit between Andrew Johnson and Edwin M. Stanton, or between the persons appearing here as managers and Andrew Johnson. The Senate of the United States has no jurisdiction of such controversies, nor should they be influenced by considerations relating to individual persons. The proceeding is national. The people of the United States impeaching through their constitutional agents a public officer, high in place and power, for his public acts, and demanding judgment against him, not for a private injury, but for public wrongs, violations of the Constitution, which they formed and adopted for the general welfare, and transgressing laws enacted by them through their constitutional representatives in Congress assembled. If these violations are set forth in the articles of impeachment, and admitted in the answer, or proven on the trial, then the verdict of conviction must not be withheld. To this point I now address myself. The first, second, and third articles of impeachment relate to the removal of Mr. Stanton from the office of Secretary of War and the appointment of Lorenzo Thomas as Secretary of War ad interim on the 21st day of February, 1868, without the advice and consent of the Senate, then in session, there being no vacancy in the office of Secretary, and having been none during the recess of the Senate. These official acts of Mr. Johnson are averred to be in violation of the tenure-of-office act, and of the Constitution of the United States. It is set up in defense or excuse 1. That Mr. Stanton was not removed on the 21st day of February, and is still Secretary of War. 2. That Mr. Stanton is not Secretary of War, because his term expired at the death of Mr. Lincoln. 3. That Lorenzo Thomas was not appointed Secretary of War ad interim on the 21st day of February. 4. That Lorenzo Thomas was lawfully ap pointed Secretary of War ad interim, Mr. Johnson having the constitutional power to appoint him, without the advice and consent of the Senate. 5. That the act regulating the tenure-ofoffice is unconstitutional. 6. That Mr. Johnson has the "power at any and all times of removing from office all executive officers for cause to be judged of by the President alone.” 7. That the removal and appointment were made only to test the validity of the tenure-ofoffice act before the judicial tribunals. It needs but a glance to see that the grounds of defense are absolutely inconsistent with each other, conflict with the Constitution and act of Congress, and tend to overthrow the form and spirit of republican government. No question has been discussed so fully since the foundation of the Government as the constitutionality of the tenure-of-office act, and four successive times the Senate's judg ment pronounced the act to be in conformity with the Constitution, and that judgment of the Senate was pronounced deliberately by Senators upon their official oaths; no less solemnly than the oath under which they have conducted this trial. No new view or argument has been presented on this trial to shake the validity of that act. The effort, on the ground of former precedents, to excuse the removal of Stanton and the ad interim appointment of Thomas without the advice and consent of the Senate in session, and no vacancy existing in the office, fails, because no similar instance can be found, but in every case, save one, there was an existing vacancy; and in that one the removal was accomplished by the submission of an appointment to the Senate, and a distinct recognition of its constitutional authority. The President on the 21st of February, by an order of that date, declared that Mr. Stanton was thereby removed from the office of Secretary of War; and by another order of the same date, "on that day, Mr. Stanton was removed from the office of Secretary of War, and Lorenzo Thomas appointed Secretary of War ad interim." And also, on the same day, by an official message to the Senate, announced the removal and the appointment. If in the face of his own official acts and records he can send lawyers to the bar of the Senate to plead and pretend there was no removal, and that his message to the Senate was false, it would be an example of official prevarication without a parallel in the history of mankind! Finally, the claim set up in Mr. Johnson's answer of power at any and all times to remove executive officers, for cause to be judged of by him alone, effectually abrogates the constitutional authority of the Senate in respect to official appointments, subverts the principles of republican government, and usurps the unlimited authority of an autocrat. It moreover puts to flight the ridiculous pretense that the President designed only to submit the tenureof-office act to the test of judicial decision. In my deliberate judgment, therefore, I must believe the people of the United States have clearly maintained and substantiated the allegations contained in the first, second, and third articles of impeachment. But to be more particular I will for a few moments consider these first three articles separately and in detail, as we must answer, in our judgment, of guilty or not guilty upon each one separately. The first article charges a violation of the act of Congress regulating the tenure of civil offices by the unlawful removing of Edwin M. Stanton from the office of Secretary of War. The fact of removal, as I have said, is fully established by official acts and records, namely: 1. The President's order of removal on the 21st day of February, 1868, which states that Mr. Stanton is "hereby removed from the office as Secretary for the Department of War," and that his functions as such would terminate upon the receipt of said communication, and directs him to transfer to Lorenzo Thomas, as Secretary of War ad interim, "all records, books, papers," &c. 2. The order of same date to said Lorenzo Thomas, declaring that Edwin M. Stanton "having been this day removed from the office as Secretary for the Department of War," he, the said Thomas, was authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War ad interim, and directed immediately to enter upon the discharge of the duties pertaining to that office. 3. By the message of the same date to the President of the Senate announcing that he had removed Mr. Stanton. 4. By the continual recognition of Mr. Thomas as Secretary of War ad interim from that until the present day. The fact of removal being thus established, it is sought to justify it on two grounds: first, that the tenure-of-office act is unconstitutional; and second, that, if valid, its provisions do not restrict the President from removing Mr. Stanton. Without entering into a protracted discussion, it is sufficient to say that the constitutionality of the "tenure act" was fully discussed in the Senate before its original passage, and by a large and solemn vote it was held to be constitutional. The objection was again specifically made by the President in his veto message, and the act was again held to be constitutional by a vote exceeding two thirds of the Senators present. The question was a third time made in the Senate by the President in his message relating to Mr. Stanton's suspension; and was a fourth time decided upon the consideration of the message of the 21st of February announcing Mr. Stanton's removal. No question, I repeat,|| has been so fully and thoroughly considered or so often deliberately decided as the constitutionality of the tenure-of-office act. And in the discussion during this trial the counsel for the President have advanced no new views or arguments which had not been several times considered in the Senate. So that if any question can be settled by this Senate and put by us, at least forever at rest, so that there is no room for further dispute, it is the constitutionality of the tenure-of-office act. That Mr. Stanton's tenure of office as Secretary of War was at the time of his removal within the provisions of that act, and hence his removal was a violation of the act is also equally plain. The first clause of the first section of the act applies to all civil officers and prohibits their removal without the advice and consent of the Senate. The proviso makes an exception and limitation in respect to Cabinet officers. It was admitted that Mr. Stanton had been duly appointed Secretary of War by Mr. Lincoln, and was serving out, as was Mr. Johnson, the residue of Mr. Lincoln's term. If the Cabinet were not within the proviso, then by the first clause of the first section of the act they were not subject to removal or suspension without the sanction of the Senate. If within the proviso, they could not be removed without such sanction until the expiration of thirty days after the term of appointment. So that it makes no difference which horn of the dilemma Mr. Johnson selects, for in either case he transgressed the law. Mr. Johnson is, moreover, concluded absolutely on this point by his own official acts and records. During his Administration treaties with foreign nations have been made, foreign territory has been purchased. Every civilized nation of the globe has been dealt and negotiated with by Mr. Seward as Secretary of State. Loans have been contracted, revenues collected, taxes imposed, thousands of millions of dollars in money or public credit have been expended or invested by Mr. McCulloch as Secretary of the Treasury. Fleets have been dismantled,|| naval vessels and armaments sold by Mr. Welles as Secretary of the Navy. Armies have been disbanded, a new army raised and organized, and millions of dollars of military disbursements expended every month under the direction of Mr. Stanton as Secretary of War. The Departments of State, Treasury, War, and Navy for three years have been held under the same tenure. How, then, can it now be pretended by Mr. Johnson that the term of these officers expired at the death of Mr. Lincoln, or that a new appointment was necessary, when none was made? What, in such a view, would be the condition of our foreign relations or national credit? But the objection now raised by or in behalf of Mr. Johnson is not only answered by these acts done under his authority, but it is also repelled by the most solemn records under his own hand. The order suspending Mr. Stanton was addressed to him as "Secretary of War," and professed to suspend him from that office. The veto message of the tenure act insisted that its operations extended to Cabinet officers. The annual message urged that specific objection. The message to the Senate relating to the suspension of Mr. Stanton again pressed that point. And the order of removal specially stated that he was on that day (February 21, 1868) removed from office as Secretary for the Department of War. The ad interim appointment of Thomas, the appointments of Ewing and Schofield declare Mr. Stanton "removed," not pretending that his office had expired by the death of Mr. Lincoln. Without pursuing the subject further, the terms of the Constitution, the plain words of the act of Congress, the acts and the official records of the President, and the solemn judgment of the Senate, determine clearly as human understanding can comprehend that the tenure-of-office act is constitutional, and that Mr. Stanton did lawfully hold the office of Secretary of War on the 21st day of February last by the tenure-of-office act beyond removal without the advice and consent of the Senate; and that his removal "on that day" by Andrew Johnson was in contemptuous disobedience and flagrant violation of the law, constituting a high misdemeanor! and, consequently, that Andrew Johnson is guilty in manner and form as charged in the first article of impeachment. The second article charges that on the 21st day of February, 1868, the Senate being in session, and there being no vacancy in the office of Secretary of War, with intent to violate the Constitution of the United States and the act of Congress regulating the tenure of certain civil offices, Andrew Johnson, President, &c., did issue and deliver to Lorenzo Thomas a letter of authority, set forth in the article of impeachment, whereby Thomas was authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War ad interim, and directed immediately to enter upon the discharge of the duties pertaining to that office; that the Senate was in session on the 21st day of February last; that there was no vacancy in the office of Secretary of War, and that the President on that day did issue the letter of authority as charged, are fully proved: first, by the letter of authority having the genuine signature of Andrew Johnson; second, by the statement in the said letter of authority that Edwin M. Stanton had "been this day removed from office as Secretary of War ;" and, third, by the President's message of the same date to the Senate. Issuing this letter of authority to Lorenzo Thomas was a direct violation of the tenure-ofoffice act. Now, if that act be constitutionalas I have shown-then the President's guilt under the second as well as the first article stands without defense; and hence I am forced to the conclusion that the President is guilty as he stands charged in the second article of impeachment. The third article charges that on the 21st of February last, while the Senate was in session, Andrew Johnson, President, &c., without authority of law, did appoint one Lorenzo Thomas Secretary of War ad interim without the advice and consent of the Senate, with the intent to violate the Constitution of the United States, no vacancy in said office having happened during the recess of the Senate, and no vacancy existing at the time of the appointment of the said Thomas. That the President did make the appointment, that the Senate was in session, that no vacancy existed at the time of the appointment, are all facts undenied and fully proved by the evidence referred to in the preceding article. But the President sets up in defense that similar appointments were made by his predecessors, and that he is vested, as President, with "the power at any and all times of removing from office all executive officers for cause to be judged of by the President alone." This ground of defense fails, because no tenure-of-office law prohibited his predecessors from making such appointments; and because no case has been found in which a President assumed the right to create a vacancy by removal and then make an appointment without the advice and consent of the Senate, when this body was in session. Before Mr. Johnson usurped authority independent of the Senate, removals during the session recognized in every instance the constitutional authority of the Senate over the proposed appointment. Its denial would deprive the Senate of that constitutional check which constitutes one of its most important functions, and would establish the distinctive claim of independent, exclusive executive power, now, for the first time in our national history, boldly and defiantly avowed. The act of President Johnson is not only unsanctioned by precedent, but on principle the claim of power set up is contrary to the Constitution, which says "the President may nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate appoint," &c, but it is also incompatible with the honor, safety, and existence of our form of government. Regarding the act of the President, in appointing Lorenzo Thomas Secretary of War ad interim, as an unlawful usurpation of power, violating the Constitution and an act of Congress, the President is guilty, in my judgment, in manner and form as charged in the third article of impeachment. The fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh articles of impeachment charge an unlawful conspiracy by Mr. Johnson with Lorenzo Thomas, to accomplish the unlawful object specially set forth in each of the before-named articles. Whatever conclusion might be formed on these articles, if they stood alone, unaccompanied by any overt acts, in furtherance of the objects stated, the evidence in this case, taken in connection with the several acts named, compels the belief that there was a clear, distinct understanding, combination, and conspiracy between Johnson and Thomas, with the intent and purpose set forth in the several articles. His efforts to have orders issued and obeyed without (as provided by law) their going through the office of the General of the Army: his finding a man who would obey his orders without regard to the law," and appointing him for the time being; his reappointment of Colonel Cooper after he had been rejected by the Senate at this very session; all these acts taken together, and others of the same character, compel in me the belief that the President did unlawfully conspire with others to violate the law, and hence is guilty in manner and form as charged in the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh articles of impeachment. The eighth article charges that the letter of authority of February 21, 1868, was issued by President Johnson to Lorenzo Thomas with intent to control the moneys appropriated to be disbursed for the military service in violation of the Constitution and of the civil-tenure act. It is not denied that the appointment of Lorenzo Thomas Secretary of War ad interim would give him, while he acted under such appoititment, the same control exercised by a Secretary of War duly nominated and confirmed by the Senate. The military disbursements, amounting to many millions of dollars, were thus placed in the hands and at the power of a mere appointee of the President and the creature of his will, made and unmade by the breath of his power alone. It is an invariable maxim that every manand especially every high official-intends the consequences of his own acts; and hence that Mr. Johnson designed to invest Lorenzo Thomas with power over the military disbursements-especially when aided by Cooper, unlawfully in the door of the Treasury-thus putting the Treasury within reach of the arm of the President alone. This is both a crime and a misdemeanor; and therefore he is guilty in manner and form as charged in the eighth article of impeachment. The ninth article charges that the President instructed General Emory, commander of the military department of the District of Columbia, that the law which required all orders and instructions relating to military operations be issued through the General of the Army was unconstitutional and in contravention with General Emory's commission, and this was done with intent to induce General Emory, in his official capacity as commander of the department, to violate the provisions of the act of Congress aforesaid, and with further intent to prevent the execution of the tenure-of-office act and to prevent Mr. Stanton from holding and executing the duties of the office of Secretary of War. The fact that the President did instruct the military commander of this department that the law requiring military orders to be issued by the President through the General of the Army was unconstitutional is distinctly proved by General Emory. Why was such instruction given at that time, and why were there such suspicions aroused because officers were called at General Emory's headquarters? It was only on account of what the President had decided to do!-to control the Department of War! It was in furtherance of what he had said to General Grant-"that as early as last August he had determined to dispossess Mr. Stanton of the War Office at all haz ards." These whisperings to General Emory have a peculiar significance to my mind, when I remember what was at that moment in the mind of the President relating to getting pos session of the Department of War and dispossessing Mr. Stanton and getting around General Grant by issuing orders direct to his subordinate officers. It, to my mind, admits of no other motive or intention than that which is charged, and, taken with all attendant circumstances, forces the conclusion that the President is guilty in manner and form as charged in the ninth article of impeachment. Chief Executive, preceded, accompanied, and followed by acts in strict accordance with the theme. They have thus become significant facts, full of enormity in themselves, and boldly threatening the peace, welfare, and existence of constitutional government. While some of the articles, which would seem to operate in the first instance only on an individual, the offenses charged in the tenta and eleventh articles embrace in their range all the powers of the Government, and the validity of all the legislation of Congress since the rebellion began. The national debt. the taxes imposed and collected by acts of Congress, the collection of the revenue-in short, every operation of the Government depending upon the action of Congress during and since the rebellion, are struck at by the hand of the President. And if I was to declare, on my oath, for the acquittal of the President under these articles, charged and proved, then, indeed, would I feel myself to be guilty of pervert The tenth article charges that at sundry times and places therein set forth, Andrew Johnson, President, &c., made certain intemperate, inflammatory, and scandalous harangues, and uttered loud threats and bitter menaces as well against Congress as the laws of the United States, with intent and design to set aside the powers of Congress, and to bring the Legislature and the several branches thereof into disgrace, ridicule, hatred, and reproach, and to impair and destroy the regard and respect of the good people of the United States for Congress and the legislative powers thereof, and to excite odium and resentment against Congress and the laws duly and constitutionally enacted. And all this while the President was under his oath to see that the laws were faithfully executed. It has been estab-ing the trust imposed upon me under the Conlished beyond dispute that the scandalous harangues set forth in this article were made by the President at the times and places stated. Their intent is manifest as plainly as human speech can exhibit the motive and impulse of man's heart. And these denunciations, threatening to "veto their bilis," were spoken out of the "abundance of the heart" which led him thus to "impromptu speak," and to defy the very laws he was sworn to execute. Our Government was framed to rest upon opinion and reason, and not upon force. The good will of the nation toward the laws and the law-makers is of the highest importance to secure obedience, and the man or the public officer who, by act or speech, strikes at this foundation, does an irreparable injury. The history of republican governments shows that the first efforts of tyrants and usurp ers has been directed to undermining and destroying the faith of the people in their rep||resentative and legislative bodies. In his harangues, Andrew Johnson followed with more than usual directness the beater path toward the overthrow of constitutional government-a government which encourages and secures the largest freedom of speech consistent with its own perpetuity; a government, too, that has provided for striking down the sappers and miners who work at its own foundations. Under this charge and by the proofs the President must stand guilty of the high misdemeanor charged in this tenth article of impeachment. The eleventh and last article charges that on the 18th day of August, 1866, Andrew Johnson, President, &c., did, by a public speech, declare and affirm, that the ThirtyNinth Congress was not a Congress authorized by the Constitution to exercise legislative powers; that its legislation was not valid or obligatory upon him, except so far as he might approve the same; and also denied its power to propose amendments to the Constitution. This article further specifies certain of his official acts done in pursuance of that declaration, devising and contriving, among other things, to prevent the execution of the tenureof office act, and to prevent the execution of other laws, especially the "acts to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel States." The public speech referred to in this article was made before a large assemblage at the Executive Mansion, and clearly proved, as well as substantially admitted. It imports nothing less than a total denial of the constitutional power of Congress to pass any laws but such as he approves. It usurps the whole lawmaking power, and vests its validity absolutely in his approval. The powers of Congress are thus abrogated; and the Government of the United States is practically vested in Andrew Johnson! It is vain to treat this and the preceding article with levity or affect to pass them over with contemptuous indifference or frivolous excuse. They are public declarations by the stitution of the United States as a member of this high court of impeachment. If I am to vote for acquittal I shall sanetion these new violations of law and of the Constitution. I shall consent that the President may possess himself of each and all departments of this Government, and merge into one head all the independent prerogatives of each of the departments as were wisely provided by the early framers of our representative Gov ernment. I cannot be thus false to my convictions of duty, false to the trusts imposed by my posi tion as a Senator sitting upon this great trial. nor false to my loyal, earnest, and devoted eonstituency, whose every impulse I feel, nor faise to my anxious countrymen, whose eyes are upon me. Conviction to my mind is a doty, ay, a necessity, under my oath as a Senator trying this cause. I cannot escape if I would the conviction which the evidence in this cause forces upon me. And conviction is, to my vision, peace. It is quiet to our long distracted country. It means restoration upon the basis of loyalty, liberty, and equal suffrage, which secures and perpetuates equal rights to all American freemen-now, thank God, American citizens! Charged by the Constitution with a share in this trial, I cannot shut my eyes to the crimes and misdemeanors charged, and proved also, in this the eleventh article of impeachment; and with uplifted hand and heart I declare my belief to be that the President is guilty! OPINION OF HON. LOT M. MORRILL. The President is impeached by the House of Representatives of high crimes and misdemeanors, in that on 21st of February last be issued an order for the removal from office of Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, with intent to violate the tenure-of-office act, and to remove said Stanton from office. In that on said 21st February he issued to General Thomas a letter authorizing and empowering him to act as Secretary of War, there being no vacancy in that office, with intent to violate the tenure-of-office act. In that on the said 21st of February he did appoint said Thomas to be Secretary for the Department of War ad interim, without the advice and consent of the Senate, no vacancy having happened in said office, with intent to violate the Constitution of the United States. In that he conspired with said Thomas to hinder and prevent said Stanton from filling said office; to prevent and hinder the execution of the tenure of office act; to get possession of the War Office, and of the property of the United States in the Department of War. In that, with intent to violate the tenure-ofoffice act, he authorized said Thomas to act as Secretary of War, there being no vacancy in said office, and the Senate then being in session. THE CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE. In that he attempted unlawfully to induce General Emory to obey his orders, and not those issued by the General of the Army, with intent to enable him to defeat the tenure-ofoffice act, with intent to prevent said Stanton from holding his office. In that, to bring Congress into contempt, and excite the odium of the people against Congress and the laws by it enacted, he made certain public addresses, indecent and unbecoming in the Chief Magistrate, by the means whereof he brought the office into contempt, ridicule, and disgrace. In that he attempted to prevent said Stanton from resuming the office of Secretary of War, after the refusal of the Senate to concur in his suspension; also to prevent the execution of the act of 2d March, 1867, making appropriations for the support of the Army, and an act to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel States. that the extent of its authority is as a precedent Besides, it is well known that the Congress Indeed, the President is not understood to invoke the Senate now to declare void for conflict with the Constitution a law which had so re The President, answering, does not controvert the essential facts charged, but insists that the acts complained of are authorized by the Constitution and laws; and further, that if in any respect this plea fails of a complete justi-cently received its sanction, and that after his fication he should still be acquitted, as those acts were all done in good faith in the performance of public duties, arising in the execution of his office, imposed upon him by the Constitution and laws and in defense and execution of them. Concurring in much of the reasoning of the Senators who are of opinion that the answer and defense of the President as to several of the charges fail of such justification, shall content myself with a statement of the grounds of my opinion upon a portion of the articles only. The first three articles and the eleventh relate to the attempt to remove Mr. Stanton from the office of Secretary of War; the authority to General Thomas to take possession and to do the duties of the office; the appointment of General Thomas as Secretary of War ad interim; and the attempt to prevent Mr. Stanton from resuming the duties of his official office after his suspension had been non concurred in by the Senate. The question arising under these articles turns chiefly upon the question whether the tenure-of-office act is in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, and the case of Mr. Stanton was affected by it. These are understood to be the grounds upon which the counsel for the President place the defense to these articles, and that upon which opinion divides in the Senate. Is the tenure-of-office act unconstitutional, and is Mr. Stanton embraced in its provisions so as to be protected by it? As to the first proposition as between the Senate and the President, it is not a new question, and it is difficult to perceive how it can properly be regarded by either as an open question. The act had been fully considered when it was first enacted in the Senate, was reconsidered after it had been returned by the President with his objections fully stated, and again passed with that unanimity necessary to give it the force of law, his objections to the contrary notwithstanding, and calculated to leave little doubt as to the confidence with which the Senate held its opinions. The legislative and executive precedents and practice in our history touching the power of the President to remove from office, relied upon by him as authoritative interpretation of the Constitution, were known and familiar to Congress at the time. It is not suggested that the act was hastily or inconsiderately passed, as it will not be doubted that Congress had, in the recent examples of the exercise of this power by the Executive, abundant opportunity of judging of the expediency of a further continuance of this practice. The binding force of this practice of removal by the President rests upon the interpretation given to the Constitution by the First Congress. It is not insisted that this interpretation by that Congress was authoritative and conclusive upon succeeding Congresses, and it is admitted SUPPLEMENT-31. || objections to it had been fully considered, but that the argument presented is rather in extenuation of his refusal to obey and enforce it. For the purpose of these proceedings, the act in question may properly and must necessarily be regarded as valid, unless, indeed, it should be deemed advisable that Congress should repeal all laws the validity of which may be questioned by the President, which he may deem inexpedient, or to which he does not yield a willing obedience. We are then brought to consider the question whether the case of Mr. Stanton was affected by the tenure-of-office act. The first section of that act is as follows: "That every person holding any official office to which he has been appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and every person who shall hereafter be appointed to any such office, and shall become duly qualified to act therein, is, and shall be, entitled to hold such office until a successor shall have been in a like manner appointed and duly qualified, except as herein otherwise provided: Provided, That the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, of the Navy, and of the Interior, the Postmaster General, and the Attorney General, shall hold their offices respectively for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed, and for one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." The counsel for the President contend that out of this body of the section it is explicitly declared that there is to be excepted a partic ular class of officers, 'except as herein otherwise provided.' The Senator from Iowa, [Mr. GRIMES,] in his published opinion, says: "Mr. Stanton's case is not within the body of the first section. The tenure which that provides for is not the tenure of any Secretary." Other Senators, who agree with Mr. GRIMES in the conclusion to which he comes, adopt the views of the counsel for the President. These views are the opposites in statement and principle, and cannot be reconciled with each other. The construction of Judge Curtis is, that the body of the section-the words "every person holding any civil office, appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate'-necessarily includes Mr. Stanton's case, as he was a civil officer who had been appointed with advice and consent of the Senate; and to get rid of Mr. Stanton's case he is forced to the construction that the words "except as herein otherwise provided" "except him out of the body of the section;" while the Senator from Iowa accomplishes the same result more directly, but not less erroneously, by denying altogether that his case is included in the body of the section. It admits of no argument that this last opinion is unsound, and that conclusions drawn from such premises are untenable. The words "every person holding any civil office," &c., by the force of the unavoidable meaning of language, it must be conceded, embrace the case of Mr. Stanton, then holding the office of Secretary of War. But leaving this discrepancy of deduction I turn to the construction of the act of Judge Curtis, which seems to be the generally received interpretation of those who hold that Mr. Stanton's case is not provided for in the act. He concedes that the words "every person holding any civil office," &c., include Mr. Stanton, but insists that the words "except as herein otherwise provided," taken in connec tion with the proviso that follows, operate to exclude him from this general description of persons. The words "except as herein otherwise provided," it is plain, either standing alone or taken in connection with the proviso, are not entitled to the force of terms of absolute exclusion, but rather are used in the sense of qualifying some antecedent provision in the body of the section. Now, what are these antecedent words or provision to which these Do they qualify the proqualifying words relate, and which they are vision "every person holding any civil office,' supposed to modify? &c., "except as herein otherwise provided." or the words "is and shall be entitled to hold his said office until his successor shall in like manner be appointed and qualified?" "except as herein otherwise provided." Do the qualifying words operate to exclude a portion of the persons from holding office under this act altogether, or do they operate to qualify the condition of holding? The former construction, it is submitted, does violence to the intent of the act; besides, it is an obvious misapplication of the qualifying words to a portion of the section to which they do not relate. It is clear that it was the intent of the of all the persons described in the body of the act to regulate a tenure of office of some sort section, that is, "every person holding any civil office," &c.; but by this construction a portion of those persons fail to be provided for altogether; while the adoption of the other view provides for them a tenure of office, but different in its conditions, and is thus in harmony with the objects of the law. If it be accepted that the Secretaries are not excepted out of the body of the section, and that the effect of the proviso is simply to provide and determine what their tenure of office shall be, the only remaining question is whether the provision does make such tenure for Mr. Stanton. It is contended that it does not, as he was not the appointee of Mr. Johnson, and that the term of Mr. Lincoln, whose appointee he was, was determined by death. It is con ceded that Mr. Stanton was appointed by Mr. Lincoln in his first term of office, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to hold during the pleasure of the President for the time being; that he was duly holding office under that appointment in the second term of Mr. Lincoln and up to his death. He was, therefore, the appointee of Mr. Lincoln by original appointment in his first term, and not less so in his second term, in effect, by adop tion and continuance in office under the first appointment, the person and office being identical, and there being no limitation in the tenure of office, except the pleasure of the President for the time being. Mr. Stanton was, therefore, properly holding office by appoint ment of Mr. Lincoln in his second term at his death. He continued to hold under such appointment and commission from Mr. Lincoln after the succession of Mr. Johnson, and by his adoption and continuance in office, and was so holding at the passage of the tenure-of-office act. But it is said that if he is to be regarded as the appointee of Mr. Lincoln in his second term he is still not embraced in the terms of this act, as that term closed with the death of Mr. Lincoln, and that since that event he has been holding in the term of Mr. Johnson. It therefore becomes necessary to determine what was the "term" of President Lincoln. Was it an absolute period of four years, or was it that period during which he served in his office; the period for which he was elected, or the period he held and occupied his office? Was the term of his office subject, in the language of the counsel for the President, to a "condi |