(2) The incompatibility of the English liberal political system with the oligarchical government and rude, unprogressive social life and customs of the Boers. (This seems to me the great fundamental cause of the whole struggle. But for this, a great South African nationality might have developed, blending together all the discordant elements, without war, and without the race antagonism that prevailed.) (3) The discovery of gold, and the consequent exploitation of the mines by English capitalists and financiers. This, however, was more the nature of a mere event, than an underlying cause. CHAPTER XI CAUSES OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR (1898) THE HE causes of the Spanish-American War, like those of all other wars between different races or systems of government, can be understood and explained only by a study of the diplomatic relations of the two countries along with their political and economic (especially commercial) systems, as well as the essential inherent characteristics and peculiarities of each people. Admiral Chadwick, in his excellent volume, "Relations of United States and Spain-Diplomacy," characterizes these relations as "the story of more than a hundred years of what has been really a racial strife." He says, "The chief cause was in the absolute racial unlikeness itself, and this racial temperament still has an influence over the relations of men-more potent-than any other force in humanity." 1 The war was but a final episode in a century of diplomatic ill feeling. There was a great difference in the civilizations and the political traditions of the two countries; but, “it was more than antiquity, more than an old civilization, which produced the differences which made it impossible for the North-American Anglo-Saxon to live near his Spanish neighbors without friction." 2 The author's hypothesis that this hundred years of diplomatic struggle between the United States and Spain “was really a racial strife" is not altogether correct. It does not explain all. It is unquestionably true that lack of mutual sympathy and understanding contributed in "no slight de1 Introduction, p. 4. Ibid., p. 3. gree" to the outcome, but economic considerations are also very important (e. g., the struggle over the right to navigate the Mississippi River and the "greed of American and Spanish protectionists" which was at one time at the bottom of the Cuban revolt) in 1895. Professor Hershey, in his review of Mr. Chadwick's book, observes that it is justly pointed out (in Mr. Chadwick's volume) .. that at the time this message (McKinley's final war message to Congress) was sent in, Spain had practically yielded to all the American demands which were officially presented to her. She had revoked the order of reconcentration, and had, at the eleventh hour, granted the required armistice to the Cuban insurgents. In short, President McKinley surrendered to the war advocates at the very moment he had won an apparent victory for peace. McKinley's weakness was not in his failure to yield to those demanding peace, but in not insisting on "the absolute independence of Cuba as the sine qua non of peace." Mr. Chadwick deals with the causes of the war, as we would expect, from the standpoint of diplomatic relations. But the reviewer observes that "diplomatic relations do not tell the whole story of the causes of any war." 5 He indicates that a study must also be made of the "economic, social and general political relations between the two peoples or races." 5 994 The reviewer agrees with Chadwick that it was a good and wise thing "to cut this Gordian knot" with the sword; and adds "what misery and bloodshed might have been avoided if it had been cut by General Grant in 1873, or, perhaps better still, by Sec. Webster in 1850." Why did not Cuba gain her liberty from Spain in 1825, along with the continental Latin-American states? The answer is, the United States prevented her. That the United States interfered in the Latin-American attempt to help Cuba to independence in 1825 and prevented that action, is Hershey in N. A. Review, 16; pp. 148-50. "Hershey in Review of Chadwick's Book. explained by the fact that there was in this country the fear that the freedom of slaves in Cuba, following her independence from Spain, would set the South on fire;—which, indeed it would have done. To quote Berrien, of Georgia, in a debate in Congress at this time: "When we look to the situation of those islands, to the commanding position they occupy with reference to the commerce of the West Indies, we cannot be indifferent to a change in their condition. But when we reflect that they are in juxtaposition to a portion of the Union where slavery exists-that the principle of universal emancipation must march in the van of the invading force, and that all the horrors of a servile war will too surely follow in its train-these merely commercial considerations sink into insignificance. We cannot allow their (European) principle of universal emancipation to be called into activity in a situation where its contagion from our neighborhood would be dangerous to our quiet and safety." And Chadwick sums up the situation in these words: "American slavery was thus the bulwark of what remained of Spanish dominion in the Americas." Henry Cabot Lodge goes so far as to say that "the War of 1898 was the price the United States paid for having kept Cuba in bondage at the dictates of our own slave power." 8 Far be it from us to underestimate the high and noble purposes of the people of this country, and their sympathy for the suffering Cubans; yet, it is not altogether without justice that Europeans look upon this war as one of aggression on the part of the United States, with the ultimate end in view of annexing Cuba, or at least, of so controlling her government and destiny as to best secure the interests of the United States. We are not prepared to say nor do we believe, that the action of our government and people was due mainly to a motive of self-interest. But let us re See Benton, Abridgement of Debates, VIII, 421 & ff. 'Chadwick, p. 8 Lodge, "War with Spain,” p. 6. count a bit of American history, with the opinions of some noted Americans on this subject, and let them speak for themselves. J. Q. Adams, than whose opinions on such subjects no American's are more important, once said: "There are laws of political as well as physical gravitation and if an apple, severed by the tempest from its native tree cannot choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connection with Spain and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only toward the North American Union, which, by the same law of nature, cannot cart her off from its bosom." The View of Jefferson in his time is very interesting: "Do we wish to acquire to our own confederacy any one or more of the Spanish provinces? I candidly confess that I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of states yet, as I am sensible that this can never be obtained, but by war, . . . I have no hesitation in abandoning my first wish to future chances."9 Buchanan, Secretary of State, made this statement in 1848: "If Cuba were annexed to the United States, we should be relieved from the apprehensions which we can never cease to feel for our own safety and the security of our commerce. .. Human foresight cannot anticipate the beneficial consequences which would result to every portion of the Union." 10 This was in the administration of Polk. "Successive later administrations pushed the project of purchase to the very eve of the Civil War." Buchanan was the chief advocate.11 In 1875 (President Grant) the situation was similar to that of 1898. Had Grant yielded to Congress, there would have been war 12 (due largely to Spanish outrages such as Virginius affair). And in 1876: "The President . . . desires to express the desire of the United States to maintain a firm, solid and enduring peace with Spain and to remove 'Jefferson's writings, X, 315. 10 See Chadwick, p. 221. 11 Chadwick, p. 233. 12 See Chadwick, p. 80. |