196 U. S. 51; Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Watson, 190 U. S. 287; Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Eastin, 214 U. S. 153; Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Howell, 224 U. S. 577; Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Harvey, 228 U. S. 319; Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Stewart, 228 U. S. 357; Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Rosborough, 235 U. S. 429; Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Hill, 237 U. S. 208; Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Bigger, 239 U. S. 330.

As to construction of the statute, see Dwarris (2d ed.), 532; Sedgwick (2d ed.), 97; Maxwell on Interp. Stat. (5th ed.), 131, 285, 291; Beal's Rules of Legal Interp. (2d ed.), 463; Endlich on Interp., §§ 223, 228–9; 1 Sutherland on Stat. (2d ed.), §§ 274-5; Black on Interp. (2d ed.), 328; Broom's Legal Max. (8th ed.), 19; Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U. S. 556; Rodgers v. United States, 185 U. S. 83; United States v. Nix, 189 U. S. 199.

The history of the passage of § 5 of the act of January 28, 1915, shows that Congress intended to take away from the Federal courts only their jurisdiction of the litigations of railroad companies resting upon the ground that such companies were incorporated under act of Congress, or in other words only such jurisdiction as was dependent upon the existence of a constructive Federal question arising from the mere fact of Federal incorporation.

For the purpose of ascertaining the intent of Congress it is proper to consider the development of the act itself, the reports of committees relative thereto, and other similarly definite and reliable indicia. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457; Binns v. United States, 194 U. S. 486; United States v. Nakashima, 87 C. C. A. 646, 160 Fed. Rep. 842; Symonds v. St. Louis & S. E. Ry., 192 Fed. Rep. 335-6, 353.

It also is proper in interpreting a statute to consider the environment, the history of the times, and the particular evil which was pressing upon the attention of Congress, and for which it was seeking a remedy. For this purpose

the court may avail itself of all accessible sources of information, including the proceedings and debates in Congress. Cases supra and Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 50; United States v. Un. Pacific R. R., 91 U. S. 72, 79; Taylor v. United States, 152 Fed. Rep. 1; 52 Cong. Rec. 282, 283, 1544.

There is jurisdiction by reason of the Federal questions which exist and give rise to Federal jurisdiction, unless · Federal jurisdiction has been taken away by the act of 1915 which has not been the case.

A suit to enforce a railroad mortgage given by a federally chartered company necessarily involves one or more Federal questions that are not merely constructive in their character.

A railroad company has only such power to mortgage its property essential to the performance of its public duties as its charter and other governing laws confer expressly or by necessary implication. Jones on Corporate Bonds, §§ 1-4; Baldwin on American R. R. Law, 463; Commonwealth v. Smith, 10 Allen, 448.

That this is a suit to enforce a railway mortgage is either shown by express averment or judicially noticed by the court and is an essential element of the plaintiff's bill. Frye v. Bank of Illinois, 5 Gilman (10 Ill.), 322; Inter. & Great North. R. R. v. Underwood, 67 Texas, 589; East Line Ry. v. Rushing, 69 Texas, 307.

A question determinable by the interpretation and application of an act of Congress is a Federal question. Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449; Howard v. United States, 184 U. S. 676; Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U. S. 410; Male v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 240 U. S. 97; Oregon v. Three Sisters Irrigation Co., 158 Fed. Rep. 346; Bowers v. First National Bank, 190 Fed. Rep. 676; McGoon v. Nor. Pac. Ry., 204 Fed. Rep. 998.

The act of January 28, 1915, does not deprive the Federal courts of their jurisdiction of this case arising out of

the Federal questions therein involved. Leather Manufacturers' Bank v. Cooper, 120 U. S. 778; Petri v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 142 U. S. 644; Continental Nat. Bank v. Buford, 191 U. S. 119; Bowers v. First Nat. Bank, 190 Fed. Rep. 676; Walker v. Windsor Nat. Bank, 5 C. C. A. 421, 56 Fed. Rep. 76; Huff v. Union Nat. Bank, 173 Fed. Rep. 333.

The validity and effect of the various provisions of the mortgage must be determined with reference to the acts of 1873 and 1874, which are not acts of incorporation.

The court has jurisdiction of this cause on the ground of diversity of citizenship, which is sufficiently shown by the record. The absence of a direct averment that it is a citizen of Texas is immaterial, since all the facts are alleged from which citizenship appears as the necessary legal intendment. Sun Printing Assn. v. Edwards, 194 U. S. 377; Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio R. R., 16 How. 314; Balt. & Ohio S. W. R. R. v. Davis, 149 Fed. Rep. 191; Mathieson Works v. Mathieson, 150 Fed. Rep. 241.

The facts above stated with reference to the defendant The Texas and Pacific Railway Company constitute it a citizen of Texas for purposes of jurisdiction of the Federal courts in this cause. Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch, 61; Railroad v. Letson, 2 How. 497; Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Shepherd, 20 How. 227; Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U. S. 444; St. Louis National Bank v. Allen, 5 Fed. Rep. 551; Manufacturers National Bank v. Baack, 8 Blatchf. 137; Orange Nat. Bank v. Traver, 7 Fed. Rep. 146; National Park Bank v. Nichols, 17 Fed. Cas. 1224; Main v. Second Nat. Bank, 16 Fed. Cas. 509; Union Pacific Ry. v. Harris, 158 U. S. 326; North. Pac. R. R. v. Amato, 144 U. S. 465.

A citizen of the United States, residing in any State of the Union, is a citizen of that State. Gassies v. Ballon, 6 Pet. 761.

A corporation may, for the purposes of suit, be said to

be born where by law it is created and organized. Railroad v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 5; Matter of Dunn, 212 U. S. 374. As it is a citizen of the United States and a resident of Texas, defendant is a citizen of Texas for jurisdictional purposes in this cause.

The act of January 28, 1915, does not deprive the Federal courts of their jurisdiction of this case arising out of diversity of citizenship.

Mr. George Thompson and Mr. Henry C. Coke, with whom Mr. Thomas J. Freeman, Mr. Arthur J. Shores and Mr. Alexander S. Coke were on the brief, for appellees.

Mr. Winslow S. Pierce and Mr. Lawrence Greer filed a brief for appellees as counsel for the Protective Committee of Stockholders of the Texas & Pacific Railway Company.

MR. JUSTICE Van Devanter delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a suit to foreclose a railroad mortgage and for other incidental relief. It was brought in the District Court for the Northern District of Texas December 27, 1915, was dismissed by that court for want of jurisdiction and is here upon a direct appeal under § 238 of the Judicial Code.

The bill alleges that the plaintiff, the trustee under the mortgage, is a New York corporation and "a citizen of said State"; that the Texas and Pacific Railway Company, one of the defendants, is a corporation created and existing under the laws of the United States, has its principal place of business and its principal operating and general offices in the Northern District of Texas, and "is a resident and inhabitant" of that district; that the New Orleans Pacific Railway Company, the other de

fendant, is a Louisiana corporation and "a citizen of said State"; that one of the acts of Congress under which the Texas and Pacific Railway Company was created and now exists (act March 3, 1871, c. 122, § 1, 16 Stat. 573) provides that such company "by that name shall be able to sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded, defend and be defended, in all courts of law and equity within the United States"; that under that act and designated amendatory and supplemental acts of Congress (May 2, 1872, c. 132, 17 Stat. 59; March 3, 1873, c. 257, 17 Stat. 598; June 22, 1874, c. 406, 18 Stat. 197) said company came to own and hold on February 1, 1888, certain railroad properties and interests in Texas and Louisiana; that on that date said company, "acting in pursuance of due authority conferred upon it by said acts of Congress", the relevant portions of which are copied into the bill, and the New Orleans Pacific Railway Company, acting in pursuance of authority conferred upon it by the laws of Louisiana, executed and delivered the mortgage in suit covering these railroad properties and interests, a substantial part of which is situate in the Northern District of Texas; that the mortgage was duly filed and recorded in the Department of the Interior pursuant to such acts of Congress; that the mortgagors have defaulted in the performance of the terms and conditions of the mortgage, and that the suit involves the requisite jurisdictional amount and "arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States."

By a motion to dismiss the Texas and Pacific Railway Company challenged the jurisdiction of the District Court upon the grounds that the act of January 28, 1915, c. 22, § 5, 38 Stat. 803, provides: "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction of any action or suit by or against any railroad company upon the ground that said railroad company was incorporated under an act of Congress," and that apart from the Texas and Pacific Rail