there is no foundation for the ordinary presumptionwhen he is acquainted with circumstances plainly indicating that the agent will not advise his principal. The rule is intended to protect those who exercise good faith and not as a shield for unfair dealing. The Distilled Spirits, 11 Wall. 356, 367; American Surety Co. v. Pauly, 170 U. S. 133, 156; American Natl. Bank v. Miller, 229 U. S. 517, 521, 522; Mechem on Agency, 2d ed., § 1815.

Section 2765 of the Florida statutes, ante, undertakes to designate as agents certain persons who in fact act for an insurance company in some particular; but it does not fix the scope of their authority as between the company and third persons and certainly does not raise special agents with limited authority into general ones possessing unlimited power. We assume Hogue, Torrey and the medical examiners were in fact designated agents of the company with power to bind it within their apparent authority; and in such circumstances the statute does not affect their true relationship to the parties. See Continental Ins. Co. v. Chamberlain, 132 U. S. 304, 310; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 77 Fed. Rep. 94, 103; Wood v. Firemen's Insurance Co., 126 Massachusetts, 316, 319; John R. Davis Lumber Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 95 Wisconsin, 226, 234–235.

The assured at the least consciously permitted an application containing material misrepresentations to be presented by subordinate agents to officers of the insurance company under circumstances which he knew negatived any probability that the actual facts would be revealed; and later he accepted policies which he must have understood were issued in reliance upon statements both false and material. He could claim nothing because of such information in the keeping of unfaithful subordinates. Moreover, the false representations accompanied and were essential parts of the policies finally accepted. He did not repudiate, and therefore adopted and approved, the

Syllabus.

representations upon which they were based.

241 U.S.

Beyond

doubt an applicant for insurance should exercise toward the company the same good faith which may be rightly demanded of it. The relationship demands fair dealing by both parties. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 117 U. S. 519, 529, 533, 534; Assurance Co. v. Building Associ ation, 183 U. S. 308, 361; U. S. Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 92 Fed. Rep. 503.

Considered with proper understanding of the law, there is no evidence to support a verdict against petitioner and the trial court should have directed one in its favor.

Judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause remanded to the United States District Court, Northern District of Florida, for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

MR. JUSTICE PITNEY dissents.

HOLMES v. CONWAY.

Reversed.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS.

No. 335. Argued May 1, 1916.-Decided June 12, 1916.

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not control mere forms of procedure in state courts or regulate practice therein. All the requirements of the due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment are complied with, provided the person condemned has sufficient notice and is afforded adequate opportunity to defend. An attorney having obtained certain funds from the clerk of the court, the court in a summary proceeding directed him, after a full hearing to restore the same; on appeal this order was affirmed, and on re

241 U. S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

hearing the attorney set up that he had been denied due process of law by not being given adequate notice or a fair opportunity to defend. Held that, as the record does not sustain his contention in those respects, this court cannot say that he has been deprived of a Federal right.

92 Kansas, 787; 93 Id. 246, affirmed.

THE facts, which involve the validity under the due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment of a judgment of a state court, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Leonard S. Ferry, with whom Mr. Thomas F. Doran and Mr. John S. Dean were on the brief, for the plaintiff in error:

The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the judgment of the District Court on the ground that summary proceedings may be employed in enforcing claims against attorneys for acts done in a professional capacity. Summary proceedings must be based upon notice, and the party must be apprised of the nature and purpose of the proceedings, and have an opportunity to be heard. 37 Cyc. 530; 4 Cyc. 975; In re Wall, 107 U. S. 265; Jefferie v. Laurie, 23 Fed. Rep. 786; Lynde v. Lynde, 58 L. R. A. 471; Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 368; Union Bldg. Ass'n v. Soderquist, 87 N. W. Rep. (Ia.) 432; Simon v. Croft, 182 U. S. 427; Rees v. Watertown, 19 Wall. 107, 122; Iowa Central Ry. v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389; Davis v. Board of Commissioners, 65 Minnesota, 310; Kuntz v. Sumpton, 2 L. R. A. (Ind.) 655; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97; 3 Words & Phrases, pp. 2244, 2245; Hooker v. Los Angeles, 188 U. S. 318.

The judgment affirmed by the Supreme Court of Kansas was rendered against plaintiff in error without due process of law, as required by the Fourteenth Amendment, as no notice was given him, and no adequate opportunity to defend was afforded him. Louis. & Nash. R. R. v. Schmidt, 177 U. S. 230; Simon v. Croft, 182 U. S.

427; Davis v. Board of Comm., 65 Minnesota, 310; Kuntz v. Sumpton, 2 L. R. A. 655; Hooker v. Los Angeles, 188 U. S. 318.

A man's business, occupation, profession, or calling is his property, and is protected and guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36; Consolidated Steel Co. v. Murray, 80 Fed. Rep. 821; Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 922.

There was no appearance for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the court.

Plaintiff in error, Holmes, a lawyer practicing before the courts of Kansas, maintains that judgment has been rendered against him, in a cause where he appeared as counsel, without notice or opportunity to defend, contrary to inhibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Acting for one Hess, he instituted proceedings against defendant in error in the District Court, Woodson County, Kansas, seeking personal judgment on a note and foreclosure of mortgage on real estate. Judgment was rendered November 16, 1910, for $2,612.00; and the sheriff sold the land January 19, 1911, to Hess for $1,700.00, subject to redemption within eighteen months. An assignment prepared by Holmes immediately transferred the certificate of purchase to C. F. Harder, but no public record of this transaction was made until August 24, 1912.

An insured building on the mortgaged property burned shortly before sheriff's sale and, upon motion presented by Holmes, the court made an order "restraining and enjoining the said defendant Conway from in any manner disposing of said insurance policies upon the buildings on said mortgaged premises, or disposing of any moneys

collected." Questions arose concerning validity of policies and following an agreement between Holmes and Hogueland, attorney for Conway, a compromise was effected under which the companies paid $1,075.00-$500.00, February, 1911, and $575.00, March —, 1911. Conway and his attorney claimed that under the agreement this sum was to be applied towards redeeming the land. Holmes claimed it was to go towards discharging the personal judgment.

On February 24, 1911, $500.00 of the insurance money was paid into court by Hogueland. The clerk gave a receipt reciting, "the same being in part payment of the redemption in the above entitled cause." On the next day this sum was withdrawn by Holmes and, as he claims, remitted to Hess. On March 31, 1911, Hogueland delivered a draft for remainder of insurance money to Holmes, who claims that he remitted proceeds to Hess. Conway paid into court $738.03, July 15, 1912, which, with the $1,075.00 above referred to, made up amount necessary to redeem property sold by sheriff, and the clerk gave him a redemption receipt.

Exactly when Holmes began to represent Harder is not clear-certainly it was not later than June 1, 1911. In August, 1912, Holmes as counsel entered a motion for an order directing the sheriff to convey to Harder the land theretofore sold. Conway resisted, claiming that by paying the necessary sum he had redeemed the property. Solution of the issue presented depended upon professional conduct of Holmes, and his affidavits were put in evidence. The motion was denied; but a rehearing was granted and took place in February, 1913. Additional proofs, including two more of his own affidavits, were offered by Holmes, then present in court, and taken under consideration. April 30, 1913, Holmes still being present, the court denied motion for instruction to sheriff and further "ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the plaintiff A. E.