force of the shock which this disappointment caused in the West.

This purpose was accomplished in the message of 1829, in which the country was informed that, after the payment of the public debt, there would remain a large surplus in the Treasury, which could be applied to purpo. ses of internal improvements, so as to avoid the objections which had been made to the system. The President says: "To avoid these evils, it appears to me that the most safe, just, and federal disposition which could be made of the surplus revenue would be its apportionment among the several States, according to their ratio of representation; and, should this measure not be found warranted by the constitution, that it would be expedient to propose to the States an amendment authorizing it." This view revived the hopes of the West, believing that, on the extinguishment of the national debt, the surplus revenue would be divided among the States. But when the time came for realizing this new promise, and the Congress of the United States, by almost two thirds of each House, passed a law to divide the proceeds of the public lands among the States, it was met by another veto. When this promise was made, there was no surplus then to divide; now, when there is a surplus of thirty millions, we hear no more of the safe, just, and federal apportionment among the several States; but we are now urged to add the whole to the expenses of the Federal Government.

The principles of this administration are not to be found in the recorded votes on the Senate journal, or in the letter to Govenor Ray, or in the me sage of 1829. In his inaugural address on the 4th of March, 1829, the President expresses himself thus:

"The recent demonstration of public sentiment in scribes on the list of executive duties, in characters too legible to be overlooked, the task of reform; which will require particularly the correction of abuses that have brought the patronage of the Federal Government into conflict with the freedom of elections."

[MARCH 21, 1836.

freedom and purity of elections? Who is it that has of late run a political race on the side of power that does not feel conscious that he was lifted up and borne along by it? Who has run against this power that does not know at every step he was pulled back by it? That the whole power of the Federal Government is now exerted throughout the nation, with wakeful vigilance, to control the next election, is a matter of pubile notoriety, Does not the proclamation which has gone forth, that all the honors and revenues of the republic are lawful spoil, to be divided among the victors in the desperate scramble for power, avowedly bring the offices and treasure of the nation into the political market, to be bartered for votes and influence?

The principles of this administration are not found in . the inaugural address of the 4th of March, 1829. None of the professions of this administration have at tracted more of public attention than those which related to the suppression of paper money and the extension of a metallic currency. Under these professions, what has been accomplished? The administration struck down the best currency in the world, of equal value in all parts of the Union-everywhere preferred to gold and silver. The bank that issued this currency was the only means ever discovered by which the State banks could be checked and regulated, and the currency preserved sound, and the constitutional power of the General Government to fix the standard of value maintained-a means that had received the sanction of Washington and Madison, and its benefits established by the experience of half a century. Since the overthrow of this long-tried system, upon which all commercial relations reposed in security, in place of a currency of the precious metals, the following statement will show the wretched condition of the currency, and the alarming increase of paper money called into existence by the influence of the Gen. eral Government:

In 1832, there were in the United States 330 banks. Circulation,

Aggregate capital,

In 1835, there were 604 banks. Capital,

Notes in circulation, probably,

- $61,000,000 145,000,000

- 400,000,000 200,000,000

This great right of election was reserved by the people, to enable them to maintain their sovereignty. Whenever the exercise of this right shall cease to proceed from a free and virtuous people, and shall be guided and corrupted by the influence of the Federal Government, the power and freedom of the people are gone.

Sr, what is the present gloomy condition of our public affairs, in regard to this view of them? Have not the people every where beheld the federal officers bearing, with all their force, in perfect concert, on elections? Have we not seen them appointing electioneering meetings of the people, and holding political conventions to control public sentiment, and devoting their industry and their means to influence votes? Do we not see that thirty millions of the public money is now in a position where it can be easily brought into conflict with the

back into all the evils of depreciated bills of credit, against which it was one of the main objects of the constitution to guard.

All men of forecast know that, upon the first great reverse in our commercial relations, we are destined again to experience all the train of calamities which will flow from the depreciation of the millions of paper money now in the bands of the people. They know that labor will again be robbed of its earnings, and the property of the people sacrificed at public auction.

The appearance of things at present is delusive. The exorbitant prices of property are not signs of real health and vigor in the body politic; they are rather delusive symptoms of a bloated plethora.

In the face of existing appearances to the contrary, I warn my friends and my constituents, and my country, to be prepared, as well as they can, for the realities that lie behind the present temporary delusion.

Mr. Speaker, permit me here to digress from the consideration of our domestic affairs for a few minutes, for the purpose of inquiring what are the principles of this

Although the unfortunate difference with France is settled, yet there are some views in relation to it which ought never to be forgotten. In the year 1830, the French Covernment took offence at a passage of the President's message to Congress in 1829, which was construed to be disrespectful to France. It was then determined by the administration that a difference so trivial, proceeding from a misunderstanding, should not interrupt the friendly relations with our ancient ally that stood by us in the darkest days of the Revolution, and that it should not interfere with or suspend the pending negotiation.

Mr. Rives, our minister at the French court, promptly explained the President's message in a satisfactory manner, and communicated the result to his Government; and the following extract of a note from Mr. Van Buren, then Secretary of State, to Mr. Rives, by order of the President, will show how well satisfied he was with the explanation which Mr. Rives had given to the French Government of his message of 1829:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, April 2, 1830. "SIR: Your several despatches, to No. 14, inclusive, have been received at this Department, and submitted to the President. He approves fully of your reply to the observations of Prince Polignac in regard to portions of his message to Congress which refer to the state of our affairs with France. It contains, as far as it goes, a fair exposition of his sentiments upon the point alluded to."

But as it is customary among civilized nations, in friendship and peace, to treat each other with marked respect, even in their official communications between departments of the same Government; and lest the impression should still remain in France, that the President intended a menace in his message of 1829, and the negotiation thereby be injured, Mr. Van Buren, under the orders of the President, gave a still more ample explanation of the message of 1829 to the French Government, as fully appears by the following extract of a letter to our minister at the French court:

"The friendly predilections which have so long existed between the citizens of the United States and the subjects of his Most Christian Majesty; the unceasing endeavors of this Government to place the relations of the two countries upon the footing of a still more friendly and mutually beneficial intercourse; the liberality displayed by the United States, in not pressing upon France, in the hour of her difficulties, the immediate discharge of her responsibilities to our citizens; the undeviating delicacy with which they have presented their claims in the season of prosperity, and the patience with which they have awaited the result, are considerations which should dissuade the King of France from too readily construing into a tone of menace the frank, but not unfriendly, language in which the President has expressed the sentiments of the Government and people of the United States. The President has no desire nearer his heart than that of preserving the most har. monious relations with all the world, but particularly with his Majesty the King of France. It was to enable him more certainly to obtain the fulfilment of the first wish of his heart, that he called the national attention, in a spirit of regret and apprehension, to the possible consequences of a protracted continuation of the present untoward state of things. A brave and generous mind never assumes an attitude of menace, as long as any thing can be hoped from a love of justice and a regard to the rights of others. On neither of these, as motives, on the part of his Most Christian Majesty, to a fair ad

[H. OF R.

justment of this most fruitful source of misunderstanding between the two countries, has the President ever entertained a doubt."

In 1835 there again occurred the same difficulty. The French King understood the President's message to Congress in 1834 to charge his Government with bad faith, and as placing this Government in a menacing attitude towards that of France. The President admitted, without reserve, that, in his message of 1834, he did not intend to charge the French Government with bad faith, or to make any threat, or to convey any affront whatever, but that he would not explain this misunderstanding to France.

In the progress of the negotiation between the two nations, the controversy was at last narrowed down to the mere misunderstanding as to a passage in the message of 1834. And upon this point it was decided to devote this nation to the hazards of war, rather than say to the French Government it had placed a meaning on the message which the President admitted he did not intend to give it.

The following are the positions taken in 1835 by this Government:

1st. That a foreign Government, in its intercourse with our own, has no right to take any notice whatever of any communication made by the President to Congress in the discharge of his official duties, and, consequently, no right to demand an explanation of the purport of any such message, whatever imputations it may contain, and however offensive and imperious its terms may seeni.

2d. That to give or offer such explanations would be to admit the right to claim them, and that such an admission, by subjecting the Executive, in the discharge of a constitutional duty, to the interference and control of a foreign Power, would be inconsistent with the character and dignity of our Government, and a virtual sacrifice of the national honor and independence.

This principle, that a foreign nation should not be per. mitted to inquire into the meaning of a message of the President to Congress, was held to be so vital, so con nected with our national independence, that it was said in debate here by one in confidence, [Mr. CAMBRELENG, that, if the nation was flowing in blood from Maine to Orleans, the misunderstanding with France would not be explained.

The misunderstanding of 1830 and 1835, occurring between the same nations, upon a point in all respects precisely similar, was in the first case freely explained; and in the last, war was deemed preferable to explanation. Whether the administration was right in 1830 or 1835, I will not undertake here to decide; but every candid man must see that if the same course had been pursued in the last instance that there was in the first, there would have been no occasion to break the ancient friendship between America and France with any talk of war. Whether the case of 1830 or that of 1835 will be regarded in Europe or America as containing the principle of this administration in regard to the subject, no one can tell, as the two cases were alike and the decisions op. posite.

In 1830 a French treaty was very much desired, and it was very popular, and was made to cut a great figure in the elections of that time. In 1835 there was a large surplus in the Treasury, and the money and the apparent necessity for fleets and armies were well calculated to induce the nation to consent to such an increase of expenditures as would place the surplus under the control of the Federal Government, and defeat the division of any portion of it among the States.

Sir, I will now return from this foreign disgression to our domestic concerns again.

The present dominant party owes its elevation to pow.

years.

Amount of public debt paid from 1821 to 1828, $84,337,986 34.

"The party" being snugly seated in power, these ledges were soon forgotten. We have seen seven years glide away, and the first effective movement for retrenchment has not yet been made. In place of retrenchment, we have, during these seven years, seen annual millions added to the wide-spread extravagance of the public expenses. Sir, in my remarks, I intend to rely upon no facts except those that are established by documents that none can question. What I am about to state in regard to the public expenses is taken from a report made to this House by the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Woodbury, on the 4th day of January, 1836, and which I now hold in my hand. This report shows the annual expenses of the Government from 1816 to 1834, inclusive; this, together with the estimates in the last annual report of the same Secretary for the years 1835 and 1836, shows the expenses of this administration, provided the appropriation bills conform to the estimates. The following tabular statement, ex*acted from said report, shows the annual and total expenditures for the eight years of this administration, from 1829 to 1836, inclusive, contrasted with the annual and total expenditures of the preceding eight years, from 1820 to 1828, including the four last years, eight years of Mr. Monroe's administration, and the four years of Mr. Adams's, showing also the amount paid annually of the public debt during both terms: Annual and total expenditures from 1821 to 1828,

Payments during the same time of public debl.

1821,

$8,367,093 62 8,568,949 12 5,530,016 41 16,568,393 76 12,095,344 78 11,041,082 19 1827, 10,003,668 39 1828, 12,163,438 07

22,656,764 04 1828, 25,459,479 52 Total, $177,831,635 82 84,337,986 34

93,493,649 48

Annual and total expendi tures from 1829 to 1836, inclusive.

Total, $84,337,986 34

exclusive of public debt. Payments during the same time of public debt.

Amount of public debt paid from 1829 to 1836, $65,583,562 15; making the amount paid from 1821 to 1828, $18,754,424 19 more than the payments from 1829 to 1836.

But the people have been told that the reason why the expenses of the Government were so much increased of late was because the present administration had paid off so much of the public debt more than had been previously paid in the same space of time. So far from this being true, the foregoing table shows that there had been paid in the eight preceding years $18,754,424 19 more than during this administration; yet we have seen public festivals and rejoicings upon the point of the transcendent merit of having paid the public debt.

In regard to the payment of the public debt, no President, since the year 1817, deserves either praise or censure, more than the man in the moon.

Those who passed the law of 1817, for the redemption of the public debt, and the people of the United States, whose industry and enterprise filled the public Treasury, deserve all the credit for the payment of the debt.

ment.

Although it is not in place, I will here present a view that will show that the proceeds of the sales of the public lands should be taken from the control of this GovernUnder our revenue system, the money power is almost irresponsible. The price of the public lands not being paid by the people in the form of a tax, their attention is not sufficiently directed to the subject to hold their representatives accountable how they use it. This administration presents a signal instance of the truth of what I say; they are held to no responsibility for substi tuting an increase of the public expenditures of over forty-five millions of dollars, in place of retrenchment, while they are dividing the public treasure as spoils among favorites. In the triumphs of present impunity, they can securely laugh at the simplicity of all those who believed that there was any thing serious in their prom. ises of retrenchment and reform.

By

This signal instance of escape from public censure proves that our redundant income is paid under such circumstances that it can be squandered by a successful party in contempt of all the maxims of economy. dividing the public treasure among a sufficient number of partisans, exemption from responsibility can be secured. The only cure for this evil, the only way to restore accountability, is to take the control of the proceeds of the sales of the public lands out of the hands of this central power, and give them to the States.

The principles of this administration are not to be found in retrenchment, in the economical management of the public finances. So far, professions and practices have run in directions exactly opposite.

I will now refer to two other documents, which do contain the principle, with a view to which this administration has been conducted, and by the aid of which it has attained its dangerous ascendency. These principles were imported from one of the States, where they had been tested; and, since their adoption as the basis of federal action, have already wrought a revolution in the theory and practice of our Government.

We are informed by the President, in his veto of the land bill, that “money is power!" and we are informed by him, in his protest, that "the whole executive power being vested in the President, who is responsible for its

MARCH 21, 1836.]

exercise, it is a necessary consequence that he should have the right to employ agents of his own choice."

Again: he says in the same paper, speaking of the Secretary of the Treasury, "that he was an executive officer, the mere instrument of the Chief Magistrate in the execution of the laws."

[H. OF R.

Treasury was then empty; and in those good old times of honest simplicity, even the sagacious mind of Patrick Henry did not foresee that the use of money would become the principal element in that executive power which he predicted would destroy the liberty of his country. Thus the money power has been matured and

By the original theory and practice under our constitution, the public officers were held to be the agents of the people, bound to discharge their duty according to law, and in the selection of whom regard should be had only to integrity and qualifications; and to remove any one of whom, for opinion's sake, by the Chief Magistrate, would be good cause of impeachment. But now, when they are no longer deemed agents of the people, but the mere instruments of the Executive; when they are no longer bound to discharge their offices according to law, but are required to yield obedience to the will of the President; when their continuance in office no longer depends on able and faithful service to the country, but upon unconditional submission to the dictates of power, the character of our Government is changed, and a distinct and rival interest is established between the public officers and the people; the entire agency by which the whole operations of the Government are conducted is thus brought under the control of one man.

The first effort to bring the money power into the same hand was displayed in the proposition to establish a national bank, as an instrument of the Treasury, upon a capital of public money. The next was seen in the endeavors to subject the Bank of the United States to governmental dictation.

These schemes having failed, and the complete control of the money power having been resolved on, the responsibility was taken, and the public money seized, and is now under the control of no law, placed where the representatives of the people have no power to go and examine whether it be safe or unsafe, or whether it be used for lawful or unlawful purposes. The vast revenues of this republic, between the times of collection and disbursement, are used at the discretion of a single mind. At this moment over thirty millions of dollars, the prop erty of the people, are, through the instrumentality of deposite banks, loaned out, to whom we have no means of knowing, and for what design we can only conjecture. By making a call for the public deposites, the Secretary could crush any of these deposite banks any day he chooses; this gives a control over the capital of the States, as well as that of the nation. The power wielded in the Federal Treasury can put up and put down banks at pleasure. It can regulate the price of stocks and property; it can enrich friends and impoverish enemies. It can send millions into a State or city before an election, to be used, without interest, to reward obedience, or it can withdraw millions to punish disobedience. The Treasury of the United States is the great central fulcrum that sustains the levers by which ambitious aspirants are raised to power.

There are other views which show more clearly the length and breadth, and height and depth, of the all-ingulfing power of money. The President having the appointment of the agency by which the Government is conducted, has, of course, the selection of the hands into which the public treasure shall flow; which enables him to make all officers, and all seekers of office, his "mere instruments."

The power derivable from the use of money was not anticipated at the adoption of the constitution. The

fame was enough for him, but by others under the shade of his military reputation; by a far-reaching sagacity has this golden ladder been erected, upon which they are to climb to greatness in time to come. The operations of the money power have produced effects before which the world has stood astonished; because the secret springs and principles of action were carefully concealed from the public eye. Throughout, we have seen professions and practices running in opposite directions; and yet we have heard the shout of applause as loud for the breach as for the promise. Hence the saying that "the popularity of General Jackson can stand any thing." It is the power to bestow money and office that can stand any thing. General Jackson's power ends on the 4th of March next, but the money power is to be transferred to other hands, where it will continue to do its work. When our venerable President descends from his exaltation, he will see human nature as it is. Of the thronging thousands that revolved in servility around his power, he will find how many crooked their knees for thrift, and how many out of respect for him.

This money power, shielded from all responsibility, from all public inspection, pervading the whole Union, operating upon all interests, brought to bear upon the hopes and fears of millions, is the most ingenious con trivance that was ever devised by the wit of man; and is sweeping along in its wake the right of suffrage, the freedom of the press, State and national legislation.

The declaration that "money is power" is most true, alarmingly true. All the hopes of the friends of human liberty, that free government could be maintained, were reposed upon having its operations conducted by officers of integrity and capacity, who were devoted to the people, and not to power. It is impossible that free gov ernment can last unless its affairs be managed by such agents.

Having ascertained the principles and the means by which federal power is making its rapid marches over the ruins of the constitution, the question is, whether we shall take away from it the money, which is the bone and sinew of its strength, and give it to the people, to build up their rights and restore their ancient and constitutional power in the Government.

Having disposed of the preliminary inquiry into the present character and tendencies of federal power, I will now proceed to the investigation of the main question, What shall be done with the surplus revenue?

At this very interesting point of our history, when it is our duty to make a new movement which will vitally affect the dearest interests of our country for many years to come, we surely ought to rise above present or mere party considerations, and look at the future consequences which will in all probability result from the adoption of each of the three plans which have been suggested of disposing of the public money. I will now proceed to consider them in order.

1. As to the propriety of leaving the surplus to accumulate from year to year in the Treasury, and be disposed of as it now is, according to the discretion of the Execu tive. Some of our ablest calculators tell us that, by January next, there will be fifty millions, and certainly, if unused and unwasted, it would in a few years amount to hundreds of millions. It is evident that, so soon as the amount exceeded all the specie in the United States, every State bank would be in the power of the Treasury, and this system must soon make them all instruments of

the Treasury. The political uses and abuses to which the Government could devote these vast sums have already been very briefly noticed. This view of the subject presents to the minds of the friends of a cheap and a pure republican Government anticipations the most gloomy. But, sir, in addition to the political objections to this employment of the public money, there are others entitled to grave consideration.

It is now most evident that the condition of the public treasure is unsafe. Our revenue is collected in the notes of a great number of State banks, which, in all probability, in the first commercial shock, will become valueless, as they did heretofore. There is of the public funds now deposited in the thirty-five local banks, $50,678,879 91 They have of private deposites, $15,043,033 64; and notes in circulation, $26,243,688 36. Making, in all, $71,965,000 91, and but $10,198,659 24 of specieabout $7 of debt to $1 of specie. There is now due to the Government alone from these banks more than three times the amount of their specie.

The following aggregates exhibit the condition of the thirty-five deposite banks on the 1st February:

Loans & discounts, $65,439,908 Capital,

Domestic exchange, 27,149,935 Treasurer U. S.,
Real estate,

Due from banks,

1,815,238 Public officers, 15,712,977 Due to banks,

- $42,356,088

Notes of other banks, 9,573,089 Contingent fund, - 10,198,659 Profit and loss, dis406,542 count and interest, 96,591 Circulation,

Specie,

Foreign exchange,

Expenses,

Other investments,

8,777,228 Private deposites,

$139,170,171

Other liabilities, Difference,

28,239,744 2,439,135

14,879,161 840,270

3,189,932 26,243,688 15,043,033 5,937,045 1,970

$139,170,171

Sir, what will the people of this country say when they come to understand these facts, and see the present hazardous condition of their money? Would any prudent man risk his own money under such circumstances? If it would be madness for a man to act so in private life, is it not something more than madness for the servants of the people to act so with their money? In a trust capacity public agents are surely bound to act with as much care as a prudent man would with his own.

But it is not at all improbable that the condition of the people's money is far worse than appears from the reports of these banks. How do we know that these reports are true? We have not the power to examine these banks, and count their money. We know that the deposite banks formerly robbed the Treasury of millions, and made reports that they were safe up to the hour of explosion. Who ever knew a bank that intended to break to apprize the public of it beforehand?

But, sir, mystery is stamped upon the front of this report. These thirty-five pet banks, in counting up their means to pay their debts, say they have $8,777,228 79 in "other investments"-but they have concealed from the public what they mean by "other investments." But the friends of these banks contend that, although they have not the means in hand to pay the public deposites, yet, by calling on their debtors, they could pay. A call upon their debtors for the amount of the public deposites, upon a sudden emergency, would make an earthquake in the whole paper system of the United States. But we have no means of knowing whether the persons who have borrowed the people's money from these pet banks are either able or willing to pay. I never have known a bank that was managed for political purposes that did not sooner or later break, and unless we speedily reclaim the public treasure, and place it in the custody of the law, millions of it will be lost. But, sir, the loss of the whole would do much less public mischief than will be done by leaving it where it is, to be used as it is.

[MARCH 21, 1836.

But there is another objection to this mode of using the public money, arising from the injustice of the distribution. The public revenue is used as a banking capital; and while the city of New York has the benefit of ten millions, and the Territory of Michigan over a million and a half, which it seems is principally loaned out in New York and Albany, the State of Kentucky has not the use of a dollar in such way as to contribute to the general utility. It is true that a small bank in Louisville has a small sum; but this bank issues no notes, and the circulating medium is not thereby increased. The interest on $30,000,000 is $1,800,000 per annum, which is given in spoils to favorites; the people deriving not one cent of interest for the use of their money, and running a great risk of losing the principal. The two banks in Michigan have both together but a capital of $569,779 99, and of specie but $97,902 83; yet it seems that, during the year 1835, more than three millions of the public money has passed through their hands. And it seems that they are in the habit of loaning out the public moneys in the cities of New York and Albany for profit. The money of the people has been taken from the custody of the law, and used, regardless of all the maxims of prudence for its safety, and with equal disregard to justice in its distribution. Yes, at this moment the money of the people of Kentucky, which they have earned by honest industry, is loaned out, gratis, to the shavers, and brokers, and speculators, and gamblers in stocks, in the city of New York and elsewhere. Every motive should impel us to pass a law promptly to restore to the people, upon the principles of justice and equality, the use of their own money, and thereby rescue it from hazard, and our institutions from corruption.

2. The second plan of disposing of the thirty millions is to increase the expenses of the Federal Government to that amount, in extensive military preparations; in the raising of armies, and in the construction of fortifications, and the building of a navy.

To induce us to agree to a scheme of national defence, upon a scale much more extensive than has ever been deemed safe by any American statesman, we are emphatically reminded, since the war cloud has blown away, of the maxim, "in peace, provide for war;" and now, for the first time, we are urged to proceed immediately to lay the foundation of a system of preparation for war large enough to exhaust all our present and future means. I desire to know precisely in what sense and to what extent it is proposed to reduce this maxim to practice. In legislation, as in all the active business of life, there is but little information communicated by the reassertion of those general truths to which, in the abstract form, all men agree, because there is such a diversity in applying them so as to suit the condition of individuals and nations, that, in their abstract form, they convey no distinct idea to the mind. For example, the maxim that is now so earnestly pressed upon our attention, "that peace is the proper season to prepare for war," is sustained by general acquiescence. Yet there are no two nations that act upon this maxim alike. It is limited, or extendcd, or modified, so as to suit the institutions and condition of each nation, and the genius of the age.

In different ages, according as the spirit of peace or war happened to pervade the earth, we find the same nations varying the size of their navies and armies, to suit the condition of the times.

The maxim, that in time of peace nations should provide for war, as it is understood and practised in Europe at this time, so far as a standing military force is concerned, is exhibited in the following statements:

France, Belgium, Great Britain,

Troops. 400,000 Netherlands, 110,000 Spain,

100,000 Prussia,

Troops.

77,500

71,300

222,000