and when such overflow occurs seven years after the erection of the
levee, the damage is too indirect, remote, and consequential in point of
time and distance to constitute a "taking" of the property for publio
use, so as to entitle the owner to compensation, within the meaning of
the constitution. Lamb v. Reclamation District No. 108, 775.

8. RECLAMATION DISTRICT FORMED AND EXISTING under the laws of Califor
nia for the purpose of reclaiming swamp and overflowed lands has the
right to maintain a levee along a navigable river, and in so doing to dam
the mouth of a slough which in time of flood acts as an escape for part
of the waters of such river upon adjoining lands, but which carries no
water except in time of flood, and the district does not thereby render
itself liable in damages for the overflow of lands caused thereby, when
such lands are on the opposite side of the river, and two miles below the
mouth of such slough. Id.
SLOUGH WHICH ORIGINALLY CARRIES NO WATER of its own, but simply
acts as a conduit by which occasionally some of the flood water of a
navigable river escapes into the lower lands adjoining, does not come
within the legal definition of a "watercourse," so as to apply the doc-
trine that one land-owner on a watercourse cannot dam it so as to flood
the land of the owner below. Id.

WAYS.

1. Gates may be LAWFULLY MAINTAINED ACROSS RIGHT OF WAY by the
party who granted such right, when the grant declares that the property
granted is a 'mere easement of travel and private road privilege, but
no other or greater or further estate whatever, or title or interest of any
kind whatever." Whaley v. Jarrett, 764.

2. GRANT OF RIGHT OF WAY ACROSS GRANTOR'S LANDS DOES NOT IMPLY that
it is to be open or free from gates or bars. Id.

-

WILLS.

1. WILL-PRECATORY PAPER ACCOMPANYING BEQUEST OF TRUNK AND CON-
TENTS, EFFECT OF. A married woman died, leaving a will, and in
a codicil thereto bequeathed her trunk and its contents to her sister.
The trunk was opened after the death of the testatrix, and was found to
contain, among other things, a savings bank book, with a credit of $765,
and a large envelope addressed to the sister, inclosing $1,800 in money,
and a letter in the handwriting of the testatrix, also addressed to the
sister, and written subsequently to the will. A part of the letter was in
these words: "Now, as to what I want done with the money, for God's
sake do the following: In case my child lives, save the principal for it,
and use the interest as you please; see that the child gets a proper edu-
cation, and do not let it want for anything you can give it. In case it
dies, you will have the money, and no one will know anything about it."
The child died in a few months after the death of the testatrix. Held,
-1. That the letter not being attested, as required by statute, nor re-
ferred to in the original will, it could not be treated as a part of the will
itself, nor as a codicil thereto, and the eighteen hundred dollars in money
passed to the sister, but that the money represented by the savings
bank book passed to the surviving husband of the testatrix; 2. That the
alleged fraud of the testatrix on her husband, in concealing from him the
ownership of the money, would not affect the rights of the sister, as she
was ignorant of it. Magoohan's Appeal, 660.

2. TESTAMENTARY PAPER, BY ITS TERMS TO TAKE EFFECT ONLY ON HAPPEN-
ING OF CERTAIN CONTINGENCY, CANNOT BE ADMITTED TO PROBATE as a
will if the contingency does not happen. Morrow's Appeal, 616.

& TESTAMENTARY PAPER, WHEN INEFFECTUAL AS WILL. One who was
about to leave home for a neighboring town wrote and signed a paper,
commencing: "I am going to town with my drill and i aint feeling good
and in case if i shouldend get back do as i say on this paper," etc. He
went to town, where he became ill, but was taken home, and died soon
afterwards. Held, that said paper could not be admitted to probate as
the will of the decedent. Id.

4. IN RHODE ISLAND, WITNESSES TO WILL MUST SUBSCRIBE THEIR NAMES
IN PRESENCE of the testator, and the acknowledgment in his presence
of their signatures, affixed without his presence, is not sufficient. Town
of Pawtucket v. Ballou, 868.

6. PERSON OF SOUND MIND, EVEN IN EXTREMIS, may make a partial will or
gift; and the fact that he attempts at the same time, and as part of the
same transaction, to dispose of the whole of his property, but for some
cause the disposition is ineffectual as to part of it, will not prevent its
being effectual as to the other part. Henschel v. Maurer, 757.

6. BURDEN OF CASE RESTS UPON CONTESTANT OF WILL to the conclusion of
the trial, upon an issue devisavit vel non, and his counsel has the right to
close the argument to the jury. Blume v. Hartman, 525.

7. BURDEN OF PROOF RESTS UPON STRANGER WHO WRITES WILL, by the terms
of which he is the principal beneficiary, of showing that the testatrix
was acquainted with its contents, and had an intelligent consciousness of
the proportion of the estate to be taken by him; but the burden of proof
in this respect rests upon the contestant, where the will is written by
the son of the testatrix, who is the principal beneficiary. Id.

8. BURDEN OF PROOF RESTS UPON CONTESTANT OF WILL of showing that the
testatrix was not acquainted with its contents, and had not an intelli-
gent consciousness of the proportion of the estate to be taken by the
beneficiary, where the will is written by the son of the testator, who is,
by its terms, the principal beneficiary; but the burden of proof is upon
the son if the will was not read by the testatrix, nor read or explained
to her before its execution, nor read by her afterwards before her
death. Id.

9. QUESTIONS WHETHER FRAUD and Undue InflUENCE WERE USED BY PRO-
PONENT IN PROCURING WILL, and whether the will was executed by the
testatrix without a knowledge of its contents, are properly submitted to
the jury, where the will was written by a son of the testatrix, who was
inequitably preferred over the other children, and there is evidence to
show that the testatrix had repeatedly declared her intention to divide
her property equally among her children, that she was in a state of ex-
cessive physical feebleness and exhaustion when she signed the will, and
that she was not acquainted with its contents. Id.

10. SUPREME COURT MAY, ON APPEAL FROM PROBATE Court of Town, AL-
LOWING OR REFUSING PROBATE of a will, try and determine the question
whether the testator was, at the time of his death, a resident of that
town, so as to give the court appealed from jurisdiction, and its deter-
mination that the testator was a resident of the town, and its decree on
the merits affirming the decree of the lower court, are conclusive on the
parties to the proceeding in all the courts of the state. Thornton v.
Baker, 925.

11. WHERE PERSON PRESENTS WILL TO PROBATE COURT OF TOWN, WHICH
REFUSES TO ADMIT IT TO PROBATE, and the supreme court on appeal
affirms the decree of the probate court on the merits, the petitioner is
concluded by the decree of the supreme court, although it be not for-
mally adjudged therein that the testator was resident in that town at
the time of his death, and cannot offer the same will for probate to the
probate court of another town. Id.

12. HUSBAND WHO SUCCEEDS TO WIFE'S REAL ESTATE under her will takes
title thereto subject to its obligation to be applied to the payment of her
debts. Smith v. Seaton, 668.

13. DEVISEE'S TITLE, INTEREST ACQUIRED BY PURCHASER Or. - A devisee's
title to land under the will of his wife was sold at sheriff's sale, under an
execution for his individual debt. Subsequently, the land was sold under
process from the orphans' court to enforce payment of a debt of his wife.
The devisee, as executor of his wife's estate, had full notice of the pro-
ceeding in the orphans' court, and the purchaser of the devisee's title at
the sheriff's sale was fully notified of such proceeding at the time of his
purchase. Held, that such purchaser took only the interest of the devi-
see, namely, the interest in the surplus after payment of his wife's debt,
and that the purchaser under process from the orphans' court acquired
true title to the land.

Id.

14. RULE OF ADEMPTION IS NOT APPLICABLE TO DEVISES of real estate.
Burnham v. Comfort, 462.

15. ADEMPTION IS EXTINCTION OR SATISFACTION OF LEGACY by some act of
the testator, which indicates either a revocation, or an intention to re-
voke the bequest. Id.

16. BEFORE DECLARING THAT ADEMPTION HAS TAKEN PLACE, the mind of
the court should be wholly satisfied as to the meaning of the testator's
act. Id.

17. REVOCATION OF SPECIFIC DEVISE OF REAL PROPERTY MAY ARISE ONLY from
the alteration or alienation of testator's estate during his lifetime, or by
some writing executed with all the formalities required for a valid will.
Hence a devisee of real estate is entitled thereto, notwithstanding she
received from the testator in his lifetime a sum of money, and executed
a receipt therefor, which stated that it was received as her part of the
testator's estate "up to this time, and all such other property as he may
accumulate up to his decease." Id.

See ESTATES OF DECEDENTS; EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.

WITNESSES.

1. CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS IS TO BE DETERMINED BY JURY.
Hoxsie, 838.

State v.

2. PARTY ALLOWING WITNESS TO TESTIFY without being sworn thereby
waives any objection to it on that account. Trammell v. Mount, 479.
3. PEOPLE ARE BOUND BY ANSWER GIVEN ON CROSS-EXAMINATION of the de-
fendant in respect to collateral matters. They cannot ask him about
such matters for the purpose of impeaching or contradicting him in re-
gal thereto. People v. Greenwall, 415.