with title to the middle of the stream. The boundaries of their land were not extended thereby: Wood v. Railroad Co., 60 Iowa, 456; Serrin v. Grefe, 67 Id. 196. It follows that the defendant could confer no right on the plaintiff to quarry stone in the bed of the river. His title was bounded by ordinary high-water mark. He has certain rights in the land between high and low water mark, but these rights are peculiar to himself, and are not the subject of transfer or sale, independently of a conveyance of the land to which these rights are appurtenant: Musser v. Hershey, supra, and Phillips v. Rhodes, 7 Met. 322.

When, by the action of the water, the river bed was changed, the line of ordinary high-water mark was changed, and the defendant's ownership, or the line of his land, changed with it. The bank of a stream is what retains the water in its channel; and, if changed either by natural or artificial means, the river bank becomes the line: Lockwood v. New York etc. R'y Co., 37 Conn. 387; New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 662 (711). It was doubtless the right of the defendant to have prevented the washing away of the bank of the river by means of stone walls or other contrivances; but, not having done so, his boundary line must be regarded as changing with the changes in the banks of the stream. The fact that the "meandered" line was run where the bed of the river now is, does not affect the question. Meandered lines are not boundary lines. They are run merely for the purpose of ascertaining the quantity of land in the fraction subject to sale: Railroad Co. v. Schurmeir, 7 Wall. 272; Kraut v. Crawford, 18 Iowa, 549; 87 Am. Dec. 414.

2. It is claimed by counsel for appellee that plaintiff cannot recover for the stone, upon the principle that a tenant cannot dispute the title of his landlord so long as his possession is undisturbed. Whether that rule is applicable to the facts of this case, we do not think we should now determine. There is a conflict in the evidence as to what the contract really was. The verdict was general; and, as we have seen, the jury were required to enter upon the consideration of the case on what we regard as an erroneous rule as to the rights of the defendant in the bed of the river. Under the instruction above cited, they probably determined the case without considering the question as to the right of the plaintiff to deny the au thority of the defendant to dispose of the stone in the quarry. Reversed.

RIGHTS OF RIPARIAN OWNERS ON NAVIGABLE STREAM: See Goodwin v. Thompson, 54 Am. Rep. 410; Wood v. Fowler, 40 Id. 330; note to People's Ice Co. v. Steamer Excelsior, 38 Id. 255; Ryan v. Brown, 100 Am. Dec. 154, note 161, where other cases in that series are collected; Stover v. Jack, 100 Id. 566, note 569; Gerrish v. Clough, 97 Id. 561, note 565.

OWNERSHIP OF RIPARIAN PROPRIETOR ON NAVIGABLE RIVER IS NOT ExTENDED to the center of the stream by the enactment of a statute declaring the river non-navigable: Wood v. Fowler, 40 Am. Rep. 330.

WILDER V. SECOR, BURNOP. AND LAW.

[72 IOWA, 161.J

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT BEGIN TO RUN AGAINST CLIENT until he discovers his cause of action arising from the conversion by his attorneys of a claim sent by him to them for collection, and which cause of action they conceal from him, when, by virtue of their relation to him, they were under obligation to reveal to him every fact in connection with the claim which might in any manner affect his interest.

ACTION for the conversion of a draft sent by the plaintiff to the defendants for collection. The opinion states the case.

Cyrus Foreman and G. E. Marsh, for the appellant.

Glass and Hughes, for the appellees.

By Court, REED, J. It is averred in the petition that in the year 1976, and prior thereto, defendants were employed by plaintiff, in their capacity as attorneys, to look after certain business matters in which he was concerned, and that, in the course of such employment, they collected a sum of money for him; that in remitting said amount, they sent to him a draft or check drawn by one Robert Clark on a bank in Chicago; that before said draft was presented for payment to the payee, Clark died, and when it was presented, payment was refused, and it was returned to plaintiff, who thereupon sent it to defendants, with direction to file the same in his name as a claim against the estate of Clark, and procure its allowance or establishment; but that defendants filed said draft in their own name, together with a large number of others held by them, and procured the allowance of the same as a claim in their own favor against the estate, and being indebted to the estate they subsequently settled with the administrator, and set off the amount of the claim so allowed in their favor against their indebtedness, and receipted to the administrator for the amount

thereof, and discharged him and the estate therefrom. This settlement is alleged to have been made more than five years before this suit was instituted, but it is averred that plaintiff was not informed of the transaction until a few months before the suit was brought. It is also averred that plaintiff relied upon defendants as his attorneys to prosecute said claim, and collect the amount due thereon; that he resided in another state, and all of his communications with them with reference thereto were by letter; and that they never disclosed to him that they had procured the allowance thereof to themselves, but concealed that fact from him, and led him to believe that it had been allowed in his name, and that it would be paid by the administrator in the settlement of the estate.

We are of the opinion that, under the facts pleaded, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until plaintiff discovered the existence of his cause of action against defendants. When they procured the allowance of the claim in their own favor, and availed themselves of it in their settlement with the administrator, they converted it to their own use, and a cause of action at once accrued against them in plaintiff's favor for the amount. They concealed the existence of the cause of action from him, and they did this when, by virtue of their relation to him, they were under obligation to reveal to him every fact, in connection with his claim against the estate, which might in any manner affect his interest. Their suppression or concealment of the facts was a fraud upon his rights. The allegations of the petition bring the case within the rule laid down in District Township of Bloomer v. French, 40 Iowa, 601, and subsequent cases, which is, that "when the party against whom a cause of action existed in favor of another, by fraud or actual fraudulent concealment, prevented such other from obtaining a knowledge thereof, the statute of limitations would only commence to run from the time the cause of action was discovered, or might, by the use of diligence, have been discovered."

As plaintiff had the right to rely upon defendants to communicate the facts of the case to him, and as they were under obligation to communicate them, they cannot be permitted to say that he might have discovered the existence of the cause of action at an earlier date than he did by an examination of the records of the proceeding in which the claim was allowed against the estate, and settled by the administrator.

We think the district court erred in sustaining the demurrer. Reversed.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, WHEN BEGINS TO RUN AGAINST CLIENT FOR MONEY COLLECTED BY ATTORNEY: See Roberts v. Armstrong, 89 Am. Dec. 624, note 626, where other cases in that series are collected. The statute of limitations will not bar an action for conversion, in the absence of knowledge by the owner of the conversion, until a reasonable time elapses for learning the facts: Houston etc. R'y Co. v. Adams, 30 Am. Rep. 116. Mere concealment of fraud by defendant prevents the running of the statute of limitations, under a statute providing that, where a party has a cause of action of which he has been kept in ignorance by the fraud of the adverse party, the statute shall not begin to run until the fraud is discovered: Wear v. Skinner, 24 Id. 517.

MUMPER V. WILSON.

[72 Iowa, 163.J

WHERE RESIDENT OF IOWA TAKES PROPERTY THERE EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION TO ANOTHER STATE for a temporary purpose, a creditor of his, who is also a resident of Iowa, will be restrained by the courts of the latter state from enforcing against the property a judgment obtained by him in such other state.

ACTION to restrain the defendant from enforcing a judgment which he holds in Nebraska against property of the plaintiff found in Nebraska, but which is exempt under the laws of Iowa. A temporary injunction was granted upon the petition, which was dissolved on motion of the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed.

Anderson and Eaton, for the appellant.

No appearance for the appellee.

By Court, BECK, J. 1. The petition shows that both plaintiff and defendant are residents of this state; that plaintiff went, for a temporary purpose, to Nebraska, leaving his family here, and intending soon to return; that he took with him, for the purpose of using it to support his family, his team, consisting of two horses and a wagon and harness, the team being exempt from seizure for debts in this state, and that defendant had recovered certain judgments against plaintiff in this state, upon which he brought suit in Nebraska, and caused an attachment to issue, which was levied upon plaintiff's team in Nebraska. The petition prays that defendant may be restrained from enforcing his judgment against the team in Nebraska.

2. In our opinion the court below erroneously dissolved the injunction. The facts in the case are not distinguishable from

those in Teager v. Landsley, 69 Iowa, 725, in which this court held that a creditor, resident of this state, could not, in an action brought in another state, subject to his judgment property of a debtor, also a resident of this state, which under our statutes is exempt from execution. In this case both debtor and creditor are residents of this state. The debtor and property are subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of Nebraska, and the property is exempt under the statutes of this state. In the other case just cited the facts are not explicitly stated, but there can be no mistake in regard to them. The debt, the property sought to be subjected to attachment through garnishment process, was of course within the jurisdiction of Nebraska, as the garnishee could not otherwise have been proceeded against by garnishment process. The debt, the obligation of the garnishee, is ambulatory, and exists and is found wherever he may be. The Nebraska court, of course, had jurisdiction of the res proceeded against in the attachment. So in this case, the res-the team-was subject to the jurisdiction of Nebraska. It does not appear whether the debtor was personally subject to the jurisdiction of Nebraska; but it does appear that jurisdiction attached to the res, and that was sufficient to subject it to the judgment rendered in the case. Such judgment, so far as the property seized in the proceeding is concerned, was just as effective as though the court had jurisdiction of the person of the debtor. In this case the Nebraska court had jurisdiction of the person of the debtor, which gave it jurisdiction of the property. The effect of jurisdiction cannot be different, whether acquired by personal service and seizure of the property, or by publication and seizure. We conclude that, in this case, the jurisdiction of the foreign court was just as complete as the jurisdiction of the Nebraska court in the other case. Indeed, so far as the power of the respective courts is concerned, there can be no distinction between them.

It is suggested that one fact distinguishes the cases; namely, the plaintiff voluntarily took the team to Nebraska. The team is the res subjected to the exercise of jurisdiction of the Nebraska court in this case. In the other case, the debt owed by the garnishee is the res. As we have seen, it was ambulatory, and accompanied the garnishee. The creditor (the plaintiff in that case), by permitting the garnishee to become his debtor, assented to the condition the law imposed, viz., that the debt should go with the debtor; and he could not restrain