ejected from a train without a reasonable regard for his safety. This rule as stated by Mr. Justice Hunt, in the case of Railway Company v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657, is as follows: Whilst a railway company is not bound to the same degree of care in regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to a passenger, it is nevertheless not exempt from responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts. And this same doctrine has been approved by our own authorities, inter alia, in the cases of Pennsylvania Co. v. Toomey, 91 Pa. St. 256; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Lewis, 79 Id. 33; Hydraulic Works Co. v. Orr, 83 Id. 332; Philadelphia etc. R. R. Co. v. Hummell, 44 Id. 375, and Biddle v. Hestonville etc. Passenger R'y Co., 112 Id. 551. If, then, we assume that the plaintiff was a trespasser, still the defendant had a duty to perform with reference to his safety which it was not at liberty to neglect; hence the court erred in directing a nonsuit. But whether Arnold was a trespasser on the train or not, was also a question for the jury. That his ticket expired on the 6th of April at midnight, there can be no doubt, and as this was a fixed fact of which he was bound to take notice, nothing can be predicated of that ticket in his favor. Still the unused coupon had value, and as the company under the act of the 6th of May, 1883, was bound to redeem it, he may well have supposed, assuming that he knew nothing of the rule of the company in this particular, that by tendering money to the conductor, as he did, sufficient with the value of the coupon to cover the price of a return ticket, he would be entitled to a passage to Philadelphia, whither he was bound, and if the jury should so find, he would in that case not be a trespasser, and though liable to expulsion, could not be treated as a willful intruder. In other words, as was held in the Rosenzweig case, above cited, though prima facie he was improperly on the train, yet he might rebut that presumption by facts and circumstances going to show that he was there from no disposition to commit a trespass, but by mistake, and from misapprehension of the defendant's rules.

The judgment is reversed, and a new venire ordered.

NEGLIGENCE IS GENERALLY QUESTION OF FACT FOR JURY: Spencer v. Milwaukee etc. R. R., 84 Am. Dec. 758; Warren v. Fitchburg R. R., 85 Id. 700; Snow v. Housatonic R. R., 85 Id. 720; Philadelphia etc. R. R. v. Spearen, 86 Id. 544; Smith v. O'Connor, 86 Id. 582; Louisville etc. R. R. v. Collins, 87 Id. 486; Stevens v. Inhabitants of Boxford, 87 Id. 616; Fox v. Sackett, 87 Id. 682; Johnson v. Winona etc. R. R., 88 Id. 83; Hill v. Town of New Haven, 88 Id. 613; Baltimore etc. R. R. v. Breinig, 90 Id. 49; Ernst v. Hudson River R. R., AM. ST. REP., VOL. II.-35

90 Id. 761, and note 786; Simmons v. New Bedford etc. Steamboat Co., 93 IA. 99; Sheridan v. Brooklyn etc. R. R., 93 Id. 490; Frankford etc. Turnpike Co. v. Philadelphia etc. R. R., 93 Id. 708; Baltimore etc. R. R. v. State, 96 Id. 528; Northern Central R'y v. State, 96 Id. 545; Quirk v. Holt, 96 Id. 725; Gaynor v. Old Colony etc. R'y, 97 Id. 96; Driscoll v. Newark etc. Co., 97 Id. 761; Nichols v. Sixth Avenue R. R., 97 Id. 780; Pennsylvania R. R. v. Barnett, 98 Id. 346; Detroit etc. R. R. v. Curtis, 99 Id. 141; O'Flaherty v. Union R'y, 100 Id. 343; Johnson v. Bruner, 100 Id. 613; Kay v. Pennsylvania R. R., 3 Am. Rep. 628; Steinweg v. Erie R'y, 3 Id. 673, 675; Eckert v. Long Island R. R., 3 Id. 721; Toledo etc. R'y v. Pindar, 5 Id. 57; Chicago etc. R. R. v. Randolph, 5 Id. 60; Kerr v. Forgue, 5 Id. 146; Kesee v. Chicago etc. R'y, 6 Id. 643; Kelio g v. Chicago etc. R'y, 7 Id. 69; Ihl v. Forty-second Street etc. R. R., 7 Id. 450; Southworth v. Old Colony etc. R'y, 7 Id. 528; Cosgrove v. Ogden, 10 Id. 361; Webb v. Rome etc. R. R., 10 Id. 389; Barton v. St. Louis etc. R. R., 14 Id. 418; Cleveland etc. R. R. v. Crawford, 15 Id. 633; Doss v. Missouri etc. R. R., 21 Id. 371, 378; Twomley v. Central Park etc. R. R., 25 Id. 162; Eppendorf v. Brooklyn City etc. R. R., 25 Id. 171; Texas etc. R'y v. Murphy, 26 Id. 272; City of Atlanta v. Wilson, 27 Id. 396; Nolan v. Brooklyn etc. R. R., 41 Id. 345, 347; Louisville etc. R. R. v. Goetz's Adm'x, 42 Id. 227; Town of Albion v. Hetrick, 46 Id. 230; Peverly v. City of Boston, 49 Id. 37; Stoner v. Pennsylvania Co., 49 Id. 764; Dahlberg v. Minneapolis Street R'y, 50 Id. 585; Vicksburg etc. R. R. v. McGowan, 52 Id. 205; Burns v. Chicago etc. R'y, 58 Id. 227; but when the facts are clear and satisfactory, the question is one of law: Todd v. Old Colony etc. R. R., 80 Am. Dec. 49, and note; 83 I. 679; Penn• sylvania R. R. v. Ogier, 78 Id. 322; Gahagan v. Boston etc. R. R., 79 Id. 724; Snow v. Housatonic R. R., 85 Id. 720; Fox v. Sackett, 87 Id. 682; Butterfield v. Western R. R., 87 Id. 678; Roth v. Buffalo etc. R. R., 90 Id. 736; Gonzales v. New York etc. R. R., 98 Id. 58; Detroit etc. R. R. v. Curtis, 99 Id. 141; Johnson v. Bruner, 100 Id. 613; Bellefontaine R'y v. Hunter, 5 Am. Rep. 201; Pennsylvania R. R. v. Beale, 13 Id. 753; Cleveland etc. R. R. v. Crawford, 15 Id. 633; Lewis v. Baltimore etc. R. R., 17 Id. 521; Pittsburg etc. R. R. v. Andrews, 17 Id. 568; Pennsylvania R. R. v. Weber, 18 Id. 407; Pennsylvania Co. v. Hensil, 36 Id. 188, 192; Thirteenth etc. R'y v. Boudron, 37 Id. 707, 710; Ohio etc. R'y v. Collarn, 38 Id. 134, 135; Richmond etc. R. R. v. Medley, 40 Id. 734; Town of Albion v. Hetrick, 46 Id. 230, 231; Tolman v. Syracuse etc. R. R., 50 Id. 649; Wichita etc. R. R. v. Davis, 1 Am. St. Rep. 275.

RAILROAD COMPANY IS BOUND TO EXERCISE REASONABLE CARE IN REMOVING TRESPASSER FROM CAR: Kline v. Central Pacific R. R., 99 Am. Dec. 282; Holmes v. Wakefield, 90 Id. 171; Indianapolis etc. R'y v. Pitzer, 58 Am. Rep. 387; and reasonable care must be exercised in expelling a passenger who by his conduct renders himself liable to expulsion: Note to Hagan v. Providence etc. R. R., 62 Am. Dec. 383; State v. Overton, 61 Id. 671; note to Chicago etc. R. R. v. Parks, 68 Id. 572; Pennsylvania R. R. v. Vandiver, 82 Id. 520; Higgins v. Watervliet etc. Co., 7 Am. Rep. 293; Jeffersonville R. R. v. Rogers, 10 Id. 103; Philadelphia etc. R. R. v. Larkin, 28 Id. 442; Railroad Co. v. Vallerley, 30 Id. 601; Louisville etc. R. R. v. Sullivan, 50 Id. 186; compare Johnson v. Concord R. R., 88 Am. Dec. 199. As to whether a passenger can only be expelled at a regular station, see note to Commonwealth v. Power, 41 Id. 477; Chicago etc. R. R. v. Parks, 68 Id. 562; Terre Haute etc. R. R. v. Vanatta, 74 Id. 96; Illinois Central R. R. v. Sutton, 92 Id. 81; Chicago etc. R. R. v. Flagg, 92 Id. 133; Illinois Central R. R. v. Whittemore, 92 Id. 138; Jeffersonville R. R. v. Rogers, 92 Id. 276; McClure v. Philadelphia etc. R. R., 6 Am. Rep. 345; Lillis v. St. Louis etc. R. R., 27 Id. 255: Toledo etc. R'y v. Wright, 34 Id. 277.

DICKERSON'S APPEAL.

[115 PENNSYLVANIA STATE, 198.]

OWNER OF PERSONAL PROPERTY MAY IMPRESS UPON IT VALID PRESENT TRUST, either by a declaration that he holds the property in trust, or by a transfer of the legal title to a third party upon certain specified trusts. TRANSFER OF SUBJECT-MATTER OF TRUST IS NOT NECESSARY, if the owner thereof makes himself trustee; but if he selects a third party, the subject of the trust must be transferred to him in such mode as will be effectual to pass the legal title.

TRUST IN PERSONAL PROPERTY IS VALID AGAINST EVERYBODY EXCEPT CREDITORS, where the facts show an executed intention or purpose, coupled with an express trust in the donor, for the benefit of the objects of his bounty, unrevoked by him at the time of his death. RESERVED RIGHT OF REVOCATION IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH CREATION OF VALID TRUST. If the right is not exercised during the lifetime of the donor, and according to the terms in which it is reserved, the validity of the trust remains unaffected, as though there never had been a reserved right of revocation.

ABSOLUTE AND UNCONDITIONAL TRUSTS CREATED BY FATHER IN FAVOR OF

CHILDREN, DESIGNATING HIMSELF TRUSTEE, CANNOT BE REVOKED by the donor undertaking to annex thereto special terms and qualifications not expressed in the original declarations of trust.

HUSBAND MAY DISPOSE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY IN GOOD FAITH, BY GIFT OR OTHERWISE, DURING COVERTURE, free from all post-mortem claims thereon by his widow.

APPEAL by Mary Dickerson, from a decree of the orphans' court of Philadelphia County, making distribution of the estate of her deceased husband, John Dickerson. The decedent died testate, August 10, 1884, leaving surviving his widow, Mary Dickerson, four children by a former marriage,-Charles Thompson Dickerson, Thomas Jefferson Dickerson, Grace Darling O'Connell, and E. Gertrude Manning, -and four children of a deceased son by the same marriage, John M. . Dickerson. The decedent inarried the appellant November 17, 1869, and had no children by her. It was the habit of the decedent, from about the year 1856, as each child was born, to set aside for its benefit, from time to time, various sums of money. Some of the funds so set apart were invested by the decedent in bonds and bank stock, and trusts therein were declared by him in favor of the respective children, in the manner stated in the opinion. The decedent's will, which was dated July 18, 1884, recited that, "whereas I have heretofore at different times invested various amounts in my name, as trustee generally, or as trustee for my respective children, which investments and settlements were purely voluntary upon my part, and in which no terms of trust were declared,

it being my intention to set forth the same in my last will and testament, now, therefore, I do hereby declare that the said securities and investments were and are held by me upon the following uses and trusts, that is to say: In trust to pay to myself the income for life, and at my decease, that the Fidelity Insurance, Trust, and Safe Deposit Company, who shall thereafter act as trustee in my place and stead, shall hold said investments in kind and keep the same invested, and shall pay the net income thereof, as it shall accruc, unto my children respectively, for whose use I have made such investments (as indicated by the registry of the certificates of the same) for life, or, if I shall have made any of such investments as trustee generally, then to hold the same and pay the income thereof to my children now living, to wit, . . . . for life, and after the decease of each one of them respectively, then to hold their share for the use of their children, and pay the income to them until the youngest one attains the age of twenty-one years, and thereupon to divide the principal between them equally, absolutely." The decedent appointed the Fidelity Insurance, Trust, and Safe Deposit Company his executor, and letters testamentary were issued to it. After his death the bonds in question remained in the hands of the company, as trustee for the appellees, and the company was subsequently appointed such by the court. At the audit of the account of the company as executor, the widow of the decedent elected to take against the will, claiming that the trusts were testamentary, and therefore void as to her, and that the bonds formed part of the estate, in which she was entitled to share as widow. The auditing judge allowed her claim. To this, exceptions were filed, which were sustained by the court in bank, Hanna, P. J., filing an opinion. The widow appealed.

Harold Goodwin and J. H. Gendell, for the appellant.

George P. Rich, John W. Patton, Mayer Sulzberger, and Ephraim Lederer, for the appellees.

By Court, STERRETT, J. If the bonds and bank stock in controversy were the subjects of valid trusts, impressed upon them by the testator in his lifetime in favor of his children, and so remained until after his decease, they were not his property in his own right at the time of his death in 1884, and hence appellant, claiming as his widow against the will, has no interest in the securities or the proceeds thereof.

For reasons given in the opinion of its learned president, we think the orphans' court was clearly right in holding that the securities in question were the subjects of express trusts, created by the testator in favor of his children respectively, and unaffected by anything that occurred prior to his death. The decree might well be affirmed on that opinion, without attempting to further vindicate its correctness by adding anything thereto.

About the year 1856, nearly fourteen years before his marriage to appellant, testator inaugurated the scheme of providing a fund for the benefit of each of his children, by setting apart from time to time various small sums of money for that purpose. In 1875 the fund thus accumulated was represented in part by ten one-thousand-dollar bonds of the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, which, on their face, were payable to bearer, with the right to have them registered and made transferable on the books of the corporation. On June 2d of that year, testator executed two assignments of these bonds; one embracing five of them designated by their numbers, to himself, "John Dickerson, trustee for Charles Thompson Dickerson"; and the other embracing the remaining five, designated in same way, to himself, "trustee for Thomas Jefferson Dickerson." These assignments, duly executed and witnessed, were delivered to the company as evidence of the respective equitable interests of his sons in said bonds. At the same time he had the bonds themselves registered on the books of the company in his own name as trustee for each of his sons by name. He also indorsed on each of the bonds, and had same approved by the company, that they had been thus duly transferred and assigned on the books of the corporation by him to himself as trustee for his sons. In addition to all this, the five bonds thus impressed with a trust in favor of his son Charles were placed in an envelope on which testator made this indorsement: "These bonds belong to John Dickerson, in trust for Charles Thompson Dickerson, and were purchased for him from a fund created by the saving of small sums of money from the day of his birth, and set apart for his special benefit." Signed, "John Dickerson." The five bonds in trust for his son Thomas Jefferson were in like manner placed in another envelope similarly indorsed. Afterwards testator frequently spoke of these bonds to several persons, including appellant, as investments made for his children. After his death, the bonds inclosed in the envelopes, as above