contract. Except incidentally, the court does not touch that matter in a proceeding like this, but simply acts with reference to an excess so apparent as to amount to misconduct.

As stated by the court in Bowling Green Savings Bank v. Todd, supra, "the law is not guilty of the absurdity of holding that, after a client has spent years in collecting through his attorney a lawful demand, he shall be put to spending as many more to collect it from his attorney, and if that attorney should not pay, then try the same track again.'

In this case, the respondent attached property, and obtained a judgment of seventy-five dollars and costs for the petitioner against the American Mills Company, in the justice's court of Warwick, in April, 1881. In November, 1881, a subsequent attaching creditor brought a bill in equity against the sheriff and deputy sheriff to review the taxation of costs, and to restrain the sheriff from paying over the costs as taxed. As these costs were incident to judgments, the judgment plaintiffs were afterwards made parties to the bill. But the only question at issue was the amount due to the officers and keepers, no question being made as to the judgment debt itself. The petitioner was in no way interested in the result; for, not having paid these costs, he would be under no obligation to pay them at all if they were decided to be illegal, and otherwise the sheriff would pay them, as he had received the money for that purpose. It was a matter in which only the officers were interested, although others were nominal parties to the bill. Numerous hearings were had, and after decision another suit was brought against the sheriff in the circuit court of the United States about the same matter, which is still pending; but to this suit the petitioner and other judgment creditors. are not parties. The respondent claims to hold the whole. amount of the judgment for services rendered in these cases and hearings, and also in a suit which he brought against the sheriff in a special court of common pleas, without the knowledge or authority of the petitioner, and which was, under the circumstances, both unnecessary and fruitless. We do not think he is entitled to maintain such a claim. The only service rendered to the petitioner was the issuing of a writ, attaching property, and obtaining a nil dicit judgment, followed by execution, on which, after considerable trouble it is true, the money was paid in full. The petitioner cannot be held to pay for defending the large allowance made to the officers for costs. The respondent charges, among other things,

for going to Philadelphia, pending the bill in equity, to induce the petitioner not to sell his claim to other parties. But he cannot charge for doing that. If the petitioner was willing to sell his claim, subject to the lien for costs and service, it was no part of his counsel's duty to prevent it. On the contrary, if he was to be charged with all the litigation then in prospect, it would have been greatly to his advantage to sell and get what he could out of it, before the whole was consumed in expenses; and his counsel, if asked, should have so advised him.

The whole controversy was about the officers' fees, and the defense to the litigation was solely to enable them to hold that which had been allowed to them. No doubt the respondent thought that, as plaintiff's attorney in the justice's court suits, he was bound to defend the officers in the litigation that ensued, and that he had the right to make charges to his clients therefor, but he had not the right to think so. The fact that the cause of complaint against the officers happened to grow out of those suits did not cast upon the plaintiffs the burden of defending them. Moreover, it appears by the record in the Furbush case that, in a week after the filing of the bill, the ex parte injunction, which had been granted to restrain the sheriff from paying out the funds in his hands, was dissolved as to the judgment debts and all costs, except those taxed for taking inventories and for keepers' fees. From that time, it cannot be claimed that the petitioner and other judgment creditors had any interest in the suit, even though they were made parties to it for the purpose of reaching the officers, if possible. Upon motion, the sheriff could have been ordered to pay over to them all but the costs in dispute, which in no event were to go to them, and consequently, it is not to be presumed that they would have been held liable for costs, if the complainants had prevailed. The respondent must have understood the matter in this way, for he did not, in that suit, enter an appearance for the petitioner, or for any of the plaintiffs in the justice's court suits, but only for the officers. Clearly he cannot charge the petitioner for services in matters where he did not appear for him. To withhold his money on that account is to withhold it without a legal right to do so.

Under the circumstances, we think that thirty per cent of the judgment debt is certainly as much as could be claimed for all services that the respondent had the right to charge for, and that he should pay over all that he holds above that limit.

SUMMARY JURISDICTION. - Primarily, the power of the court to exercise summary jurisdiction over attorneys and counselors at law rests upon the fact that they are officers of the court, and are therefore responsible to it for professional misconduct in certain cases: Weeks on Attorneys, ed. 1878, secs. 77, 80; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 533, 378; Clark v. Willett, 35 Cal. 354, cited from in note 16 Am. Dec. 99; Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 374; Ex parte Burr, 2 Cranch C. C. 385; and see note 16 Am. Dec. 98. They are made such officers by the entry of the order of admission, which is the judgment of the court that the attorney is properly qualified for admission: Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 378; and the office continues for life, subject, however, to the power of the court to suspend or disbar the attorney for proper cause: Case of Austin, 5 Rawle, 191, 202, 205; 28 Am. Dec. 657. While, as a general rule, the party must be an attorney of the court, yet he need not necessarily be an attorney of the particular court exercising the jurisdiction, since the misconduct charged may arise out of a cause conducted by him before the particular court, in which case he is amenable to the jurisdiction of that court: In re Lord, 2 Scott, 131; Thompson v. Gordon, 4 Dowl. & L. 49. WHAT COURTS MAY EXERCISE JURISDICTION. All courts of record having authority to admit attorneys to practice have power to exercise summary jurisdiction over them in cases of contempts, in all cases where they are guilty of fraud, dishonest or unprofessional conduct, and frequently in matters of gross negligence, and may in all cases punish them by fine or imprisonment, or, in gross cases of misconduct, may strike their name from the roll: Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 273; Floyd v. Nangle, 3 Atk. 568; Ex parte Biggs, 64 N. C. 202; Whitcomb's Case, 120 Mass. 118, 120; 21 Am. Rep. 502; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335; Smith v. State, 1 Yerg. 228; Rice v. Commonwealth, 18 B. Mon. 472, 484; Case of Austin, 5 Rawle, 191, 203; 28 Am. Dec. 657; Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 374; Ex parte Burr, 2 Cranch C. C. 379, 386, et seq.; Baker v. Commonwealth, 8 B. Mon. 592, 599; In re Peyton's Appeal, 12 Kan. 398, 403; Jackson v. State, 21 Tex. 668; Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 510; Weeks on Attorneys, ed. 1878, sec. 80; 1 Archbold's Queen's Bench Practice, Chitty's ed., 1866, 147; In re Davies, 93 Pa. St. 116; Cartwright's Case, 114 Mass. 230, 238; and see note 95 Am. Dec. 334; 12 Id. 178; 79 Id. 536. And this power exists in cases of professional misconduct in and out of court: People ex rel. Elliott v. Green, 7 Col. 237, 242; and it is also extended, not only to attorneys and solicitors, but also to clerks, sheriffs, and other officers of courts: Cartwright's Case, 114 Mass. 230, 239; therefore, a person appointed by the court as a receiver of an insolvent company, being an officer of the court, is subject to the exercise of its summary jurisdiction: Id.; and inferior courts may punish for contempt: note 12 Am. Dec. 180. But the power to punish for contempt rests only in legislative or judicial bodies, and for this reason the common council of a city has no such power, and a statute vesting such authority in it is unconstitutional and void: Whitcomb's Case, 120 Mass. 118, 123; 21 Am. Rep. 502. As to the power of the legislature to punish for contempt, see note 74 Am. Dec. 681; and that a committee of a state senate may punish a witness for contempt for refusal to answer in proceedings before it, see People v. Sharp, 107 N. Y. 427; 1 Am. St. Rep. 851. And in the United States courts, the power to exercise jurisdiction in cases of contempt, although called into existence the moment the court is invested with jurisdiction over any matter, is limited and defined by act of Congress: Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 510. See, upon the general subject of the power of the court to punish for contempt, notes 100 Am. Dec. 514; 1 Id. 252; 12 Id. 178; 98 Id. 413; 58 Id. 642; 42 Id. 162; as to the authority of the court in cases of co

structive contempt, see 2 Id. 391; and upon the question of the power of a judge out of court to act in cases of contempt, see 12 Id. 183.

IS A DISCRETIONARY POWER. — The right of the courts to exercise summary jurisdiction in certain cases is a judicial act resting in sound discretion, and it ought to be exercised justly and legally, with great caution and moderation, especially in cases of disbarment: State v. Kirke, 12 Fla. 287; 95 Am. Dec. 314; Rice v. Commonwealth, 18 B. Mon. 472, 484; Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529; Ex parte Brownsall, Cowp. 829; In re Davies, 93 Pa. St. 121. The discretion to be exercised is not arbitrary, however, but must be applied according to legal rules: State v. Chapman, 11 Ohio, 430, 432; or, as Lord Tenterden says iu Ex parte Bayley, 9 Barn. & C. 691, "according to law and conscience"; so it was declared in this connection in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, that this "power, however, is not an arbitrary and despotic one, to be exercised at the pleasure of the court, or from passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, but it is the duty of the court to exercise and regulate it by a sound and just judicial discretion, whereby the rights and independence of the bar may be as scrupulously guarded and maintained by the court as the rights and dignity of the court itself." For this reason, a removal from the bar should never be ordered where any other less severe punishment, as a reprimand, fine, or temporary suspension, would answer: Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335; see also Dickens's Case, 67 Pa. St. 169; 5 Am. Rep. 420; and it is held in State v. Kirke, 12 Fla. 287, that inferior courts have not an unlimited discretion in cases coming within the exercise of their summary jurisdiction.

DUE PROCESS OF LAW. - Such summary proceeding against an attorney for an indictable offense does not violate that provision of the constitution which forbids the depriving of any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, since such proceeding by the court in cases within its jurisdiction is due process of law: Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 288.

EXCESS OF POWER. — Where, in an order disbarring an attorney from practice, the court adjudges him infamous, such order is wholly without precedent, and illegal, since no power to make such an order exists in any court or judge: Fletcher v. Dangerfield, 20 Cal. 427, 430.

NATURE OF POWER. In cases of disbarment, the exercise of the right, which the court possesses by reason of its summary jurisdiction, is not intended as a punishment, but simply for protection, being merely the exercise of the court's discretion whether a person should be continued as an attorney: Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 273; People v. Turner, 1 Cal. 143; Case of Austin, 5 Rawle, 191, 203; 28 Am. Dec. 657; State ex rel. McCormick v. Winton, 11 Or. 456; 50 Am. Rep. 486; Ex parte Biggs, 64 N. C. 202; State v. Holding, 1 McCord, 379; Jackson v. State, 21 Tex. 668, 673; Walker v. Commonwealth, 8 Bush, 94.

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS. It is held in Massachusetts that proceedings of this character, in matters of contempt, are criminal in their nature: Cartwright's Case, 114 Mass. 230. So it is held that proceedings to dishar are penal in character in New York: In re 1 Hun, 321; and the same ruling obtains in Alabama, where the action is under the code: Thomas v. State, 58 Ala. 365, 368. So in Indiana, where the matter is governed by statute: Klingensmith v. Kepler, 41 Ind. 341; and in Kansas and Texas it is declared. not to be a civil case, but a criminal or quasi criminal one: Peyton's Appeal, 12 Kan. 398, 405; State v. Tunstall, 51 Tex. 81; see also Middlebrook v. State, 43 Conn. 257; 21 Am. Rep. 650; and notes 12 Am. Dec. 186; 95 Id. 335. But in Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 288, it is declared that removal from office

for an indictable offense is no bar to an indictment, since the proceeding is civil in its nature, and collateral to any criminal prosecution.

Proceedings to Disbar Distinct from Those for Contempt. — The power possessed by courts to disbar attorneys is dependent upon other grounds distinct from those upon which rest the power to punish for contempt: Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 512; Jackson v. State, 21 Tex. 668; Case of Austin, 5 Rawle, 191, 204; 28 Am. Dec. 657; Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 374; see titles post, “Practice,” and “Remedy against Unjust or Illegal Exercise of Power."

CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS. In New York it is held that the statute authorizing the exercise of summary jurisdiction is substantially an exposition of the common law: Bowling Green Savings Bank v. Todd, 52 N. Y. 489; and see note 12 Am. Dec. 179; and in Michigan it is declared that the court may disbar an attorney for other causes than those specified in the statute: In re Mills, 1 Mich. 392; though the rule in Indiana is, that where the proceeding is regulated by statute, the provisions must be complied with: Ex parte Trippe, 66 Ind. 531. So in cases of disbarment, all statutory provisions should be strictly construed: Klingensmith v. Kepler, 41 Ind. 341. In North Carolina it is decided that an act is constitutional which provides that before disbarment there must first be a conviction for a criminal offense, or a confession in open court: Ex parte Schenck, 65 N. C. 353; see also, upon statutory provisions in matters of contempt, note 98 Am. Dec. 413.

ACTS COMPLAINED OF MUST BE CONNECTED WITH ATTORNEY'S PROFESSIONAL CHARACTER, although courts may exercise summary jurisdiction over attorneys in order to protect suitors in their rights, and prevent their being exposed to wrongful acts of improper officers; yet where it is sought to compel an attorney to fulfill an undertaking to pay money, or perform a contract, such jurisdiction can only be exercised when the contract or undertaking is made by one in his character of attorney, or so connected with such character as to bring it within the power of the court to require that its officer should behave well as an officer: Re Hill, L. R. 3 Q. B. 543, 547; Weeks on Attorneys, ed. 1878, sec. 78; though the employment is not confined to suits depending in court: Anderson v. Bosworth, 15 R. I. 443, 445; since, if the matter in question be wholly unconnected with the solicitor's professional character, or if the misconduct charged be entirely independent of his profession, the court will not interfere: In re Aitkin, 4 Barn. & Ald. 47; Matter of Husson, 62 How. Pr. 358; 13 N. Y. Week. Dig. 542; 26 Hun, 130. So where an attorney who holds property as a trustee, unconnected with his professional character, violates such trust, and wrongfully and illegally sells the same and converts the proceeds to his own use, this will not warrant the court to act in this proceeding. The remedy must be by private action: People v. Appleton, 105 Ill. 474; 44 Am. Rep. 812. Nor will the court make any order to deliver any writing or papers or moneys coming into an attorney's hands in any other way or on any other account than in the course of his professional business, but will leave the party to his remedy by action: Ex parte Burr, 2 Cranch C. C. 386; Tidd's Practice, ed. 1856, 86. Nor will the court compel a solicitor to fulfill an engagement regarding the loan of money made outside of his professional capacity: In re Chitty, 2 Dowl. P. C. 421. Nor does the fact that the attorney was acting professionally for the party in other matters which were unconnected with the matter in question furnish a ground for the application: Matter of Husson, 62 How. Pr. 358. And where an attorney was directed to employ a proctor to obtain probate of a will, this was held not to constitute such an employAM. ST. REP., VOL. II.-34