if any, and the routes over which goods are to be transported. Dissenting opinion in Bangle v. McDaniel, 42 Ga. 642, adopted. Id. 11. CONNECTING RAILROAD IS LIABLE ONLY AS FORWARDING AGENT, and is not responsible for loss of or damage to goods occurring beyond its terminus, in the absence of a special contract, or proof of an association or partnership between it and other connecting lines, by which each of such lines becomes liable for the contracts of the others. Knott v. Raleigh & G. R. R. Co., 321.

12. EVIDENCE OF CUSTOM OF AGENT OF RECEIVING RAILROAD NOT TO RECEIVE FREIGHT UNLESS IN GOOD CONDITION, and to check it "all right," if in good condition, is admissible to prove that goods were in good condition when received by him. Id.

13. PURCHASE OF SEAT IN DRAWING-ROOM CAR BY ONE who is riding on a free pass does not relieve him from the character of a free passenger. He is therefore precluded from recovering for injuries suffered by him through the negligence of the company or its agents, by a stipulation indorsed on his pass to the effect that the company shall not be liable under any circumstances for the negligence of its servants or otherwise. Ulrich v. New York Central & H. R. R. R. Co., 369.

14. THERE IS NO IRREBUTABLE PRESUMPTION THAT ONE WHO TAKES PASSAGE UPON LIMITED RAILROAD TICKET, the limit of which has expired, is informed of the rules and regulations of the company prohibiting the use of such ticket, by his paying to the conductor of the train the difference between the redemption value of the ticket and a full fare, when no such prohibition appears upon the ticket. Arnold v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co.,

542.

15. ONE WHO TAKES PASSAGE upon Limited RAILROAD TICKET, without knowledge that under the rules and regulations of the company the ticket cannot be used, is not to be treated as a trespasser, but as a passenger who, by mistake, has entered a train upon which, by his contract, he is not entitled to ride; and whether he had no such knowledge or not, so as to make him a trespasser or a passenger, is a question of fact for the jury. Id.

16. TRESPASSER UPON RAILROAD TRAIN CANNOT BE EJECTED THEREFROM without a reasonable regard for his safety; and whether he was so ejected or not is a question of fact for the jury. Id.

17. PERSON TAKING PASSAGE ON FREIGHT TRAIN, With Knowledge of Risks and inconveniences incidental thereto, is bound to be more careful in guarding against injury than he would be in traveling upon ordinary passenger trains. Wallace v. Western N. C. R. R. Co., 346.

18. WHERE PASSENGER RIDING ON FREIGHT TRAIN WAS STANDING UP in the caboose, although there were seats for all the passengers, when he was thrown down and received injuries from the sudden starting or jerking of the train, there is some evidence of contributory negligence on his part, which ought to be submitted to the jury. Id.

19. PASSENGERS ON BAGGAGE-WAGON OR FREIGHT-CAR IMPLIEDLY AGREE to accept the conveniences there received, both as to the way in which they are carried, and as to the means of entering and leaving such conveyances, when they are such as are ordinarily used with respect to such wagons or cars, when employed in the transportation of freight or baggage. Central R. R. v. Smith, 31.

20. RAILROAD COMPANIES NEED NOT PROVIDE FOR PASSENGERS ENTERING OR LEAVING CARS AT UNEXPECTED AND UNUSUAL PLACES. Id

21. IN ACTION AGAINST RAILROAD COMPANY FOR INJURIES sustained while riding as a passenger on a hand-car under invitation of an employee of the company, it is error to charge as matter of law, in the face of evidence to the contrary, that the act of the employee was the act of the company. Such question should be left to the jury. International & G. N. R. R. Co. v. Cook, 521.

22. IN ACTION against Railroad Company for injuries received while riding on a hand-car as a passenger under invitation of an employee, it is error to charge that the company is liable to a greater degree of care and skill than would be required in carrying passengers on regular trains, or to employ a greater degree of care in proportion to the greater degree of danger, when the hand-car is manned by men employed to work on the track, and run the car for their own convenienee, but not accustomed to look after the safety of others, and not employed nor selected for that purpose. Id.

23. IF IN ACTION AGAINST RAILROAD COMPANY for damages from an injury sustained while riding as a passenger on a hand-car under invitation of the company's employee, it appears that after the original destination was reached the passenger requested to be carried farther, and the employee voluntarily complied, evidence of all facts occurring after the original destination was reached is admissible. Id.

24. WHERE CONDUCTOR OF RAILROAD TRAIN DEMANDS TICKET of passenger who has shown his ticket to the brakeman, and requests the conductor to wait a minute until he finds it, being unable to do so because it has become misplaced in his pocket, whereupon the conductor immediately stops the train, and expels the passenger therefrom, the company is liable for the mortification, pain of mind and body, loss of time, and medical expense to which he was subjected by reason of being ejected. and a verdict of five hundred dollars damages in such case is not excessive. International & G. N. Co. v. Wilkes, 515.

25. CONDUCTOR OF RAILROAD TRAIN is bound to wait a reasonable time for a passenger to produce his ticket; what is such reasonable time depends upon the circumstances of each case. But the only fact which authorizes an immediate expulsion of the passenger is his refusal to produce his ticket or to pay fare. Id.

26. HOLDER OF TICKET OVER RAILROAD, WHO BY MISTAKE TAKES PASSAGE ON WRONG TRAIN, IS PASSENGER so far as to entitle him to protection against the negligence of the railroad company. Cincinnati etc. R. R. Co. v. Carper, 144.

27. OBEDIENCE BY PASSENGER TO DIRECTIONS OF CONDUCTOR OF TRAIN, GIVEN WITHIN SCOPE OF HIS AUTHORITY, WHERE SUCH OBEDIENCE WILL NOT EXPOSE the passenger to known or apparent danger which a prudent man would not incur, is not contributory negligence, although it may result in bringing injury upon him. Id.

28. WHERE PASSENGER ENTERS WRONG TRAIN THROUGH HIS OWN MISTAKE, AUTHORITY OF CONDUCTOR, AS REPRESENTATIVE OF CARRIER, TERMINATES when a safe alighting-place is provided, and the passenger has voluntarily left the train in safety. The company is not bound by the general directions of the conductor, in the nature of advice and information, as to what course the passenger shall pursue after he has left the train, and is not liable for an injury received by the passenger while act. ing upon such directions. Id

COMPROMISE.

CONSIDERATION FOR COMPROMISE. - A doubt as to the ability of one to collect a debt by reason of its being barred by the statute of limitations is not a sufficient consideration for a compromise of such debt, if accompanied with a threat that if the compromise is not effected, the son of the person to whom the debt is owing will be prosecuted for a criminal offense. Swint v. Carr, 44.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. OWNER OF PROPERTY HOLDS IT subject to the implied obligation that be will so use it as not to prevent others from having their property, and enjoying the just use and benefit of it, and so as not to destroy, abridge, or injure the rights of the public. State v. Yopp, 305.

2. LEGISLATURE MAY, SUBJECT TO CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, prescribe just and reasonable regulations and restraints upon the use which an owner makes of his property, so as to protect the rights of the public, and of others, to use their property. Id.

See HIGHWAYs, 2.

CONTEMPT.

See RECEIVERS, 4.

CONTRACTS.

1. AGREEMENT OR CONTRACT NOT BASED UPON CONSIDERATION CANNOT BE ENFORCED. Mills County National Bank v. Perry, 228.

2. CONSIDERATION TO SUPPORT PROMISE NEED Not Involve BENEFIT TO PROMISOR, but is equally sufficient when it consists in a detriment to the person to whom it is made. New Hanover Bank v. Bridgers, 317.

3. WHERE OFFER IS MADE IN ONE STATE AND ACCEPTED BY TELEGRAPH in another, the contract is completed in the latter state by sending the telegram, notwithstanding it is to be performed in the former state. Perry v. Mount Hope Iron Company, 902.

4. WHERE ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER REACHES PERSON WHO MADE OFFER, it is immaterial by what mode the acceptance was sent. Id.

5. EVIDENCE THAT SCRAP-IRON WAS NOT KIND ADAPTED FOR USE IN DEFENDANT'S WORKS ought not to be excluded, when the question to be determined is whether he offered to buy it without inspecting it. Id.

6. CONTRACT MADE IN CONNECTICUT AFTER SUNSET ON SUNDAY, being valid in that state, may be enforced in Rhode Island, although the law of the latter state prohibits business in one's ordinary calling during the whole day of Sunday. The enforcement of such a contract does not involve a breach of good morals. Brown v. Browning, 908.

7. IN CONSTRUING CONTRACTS, COURT SHOULD PUT ITSELF, as near as may be, in the situation of the parties, and from a consideration of the surrounding circumstances and the occasion, and apparent object of the parties, determine the meaning and intent of the language used by them in their agreement. Smith v. Kerr, 362.

8. WRITTEN AGREEMENT MAY BE MODIFIED, Explained, ReFORMED, OR SET ASIDE BY PAROL EVIDENCE of an oral promise or undertaking material to the subject-matter of the contract, made by one of the parties at the time of the execution of the writing, and which induced the other party to put his name thereto. Cake v. Pottsville Bank, 600.

9. TESTIMONY OF PARTY TO CONTRACT, WHICH TENDS ONLY TO SHOW HIS THOUGHTS AND PURPOSES, not disclosed at the time of making the contract, is inadmissible to show that his agreement meant something else. Id.

10. EVIDENCE REQUISITE TO REFORM WRITTEN INSTRUMENT on ground of fraud, accident, or mistake must be clear, precise, and indubitable. If the evidence, when admitted, is not such as would move a chancellor to reform the contract or deed, the case should not be submitted to the jury without binding instructions as to its insufficiency. Sylvius v. Kosek, 645. 11. WHEN IT IS SOUGHT TO IMPEACH WRITTEN CONTRACT BY DEFENSE PURELY EQUITABLE, opposing testimony of plaintiff to such defense is conclusive, unless contradicted by two witnesses, or one witness and corroborating circumstances equivalent to a second witness. Id.

12. EVIDENCE TO REFORM WRITTEN CONTRACT IS INSUFFICIENT, which only shows that a third person, to whom it was intrusted merely for the purpose of delivery to the defendant, fraudulently misread it to the latter when he signed it. Id.

13. CONTRACT TO ABANDON PUBLIO DUTY, as where a gas company author. ized by the legislature to manufacture and sell illuminating gas in a city agrees not to manufacture or sell such gas in a designated part of the city, will not be aided nor enforced in equity. Chicago G. L. Co. v. People's G. L. Co., 124.

14. CONTRACT AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY WILL NOT BE ENFORCED, nor specific performance thereof decreed in equity. Id.

15. Contract is AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY which, being entered into between two gas companies, stipulates that one of them shall discontinue for a hundred years the manufacture and sale of illuminating gas in a city in which it had been granted by the legislature the right to manufacture and sell such gas. Id.

16. RULE THAT CONTRACTS IN PARTIAL RESTRAINT OF TRADE are valid does not apply to a contract by a corporation to abandon a part of its duty to the public. Id.

17. THOUGH RESTRAINT OF TRADE IMPOSED BY CONTRACT IS BUT Partial, it will not be enforced if it is unreasonably injurious and oppressive to the public. Id.

See CORPORATIONS, 2-4; JUDGMENTS, 1-3; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

CORPORATIONS.

1. CORPORATIONS HAVE SUCH POWERS ONLY as the act creating them confers, and are confined to the exercise of the powers expressly granted, and such incidental powers as are necessary to carry into effect those specifically conferred. Chicago G. L. Co. v. People's G. L. Co., 124.

2. CORPORATION OWING DUTY TO PUBLIC cannot make a valid contract not to discharge such duty. Id.

3. TRANSFERS OF POWERS OF ONE CORPORATION TO ANOTHER, without the authority of the legislature, are against public policy, and the courts will do nothing to promote the transfer. Id.

4. ULTRA VIRES. Contract by a corporation authorized to manufacture and sell illuminating gas in a city, by which it agrees to discontinue such manufacture and sale, is ultra vires, and therefore void. Id.

5. PAPER SEAL PASTED ON NOTE OF CORPORATION DOES NOT RENDER IT NONNEGOTIABLE, where there was no vote of the corporation authorizing the

making of a note under seal, the note did not purport to be under seal, the seal was not the corporate seal, and the treasurer, who was a witness, did not testify that it was his seal, or that it was put on by him. The seal, in such case, may be regarded as a mere excess. Mackay v. St. Mary's Church, 881.

6. CORPORATION IS LIABLE FOR TORTS AND WRONGS COMMITTED ULTRA VIRES, outside and beyond the purpose of its creation and not within the scope of its granted powers and authority. Hussey v. Norfolk etc. R. R. Co., 312.

7. CORPORATION IS LIABLE FOR ACTS OF ITS SERVANTS while engaged in its business, in the same manner and to the same extent that individuals are liable under like circumstances. Id.

8. CORPORATION IS LIABLE FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CONDUCTED BY ITS AGENT, and the corporation and its servant may be joined in an action of tort for the injury. Id.

9. INDIVIDUAL OR CORPORATION CANNOT EVADE LIABILITY by committing to another the performance of certain duties affecting the public health or the safety of public travel, and expressly assumed by such individual or corporation in consideration of certain powers and privileges conferred by the public for private emolument. Lancaster Ave. I. Co. v. Rhoads, 608. 10. CORPORATION MAY PREFER ONE CREDITOR TO ANOTHER, and the fact that the preference is exercised in favor of directors or share-holders of the corporation is immaterial, although such directors and share-holders, and all of them, may have voted for their own preference, and for the execution of the mortgage given to secure the indebtedness to themselves. Warfield v. Marshall Co. C. Co., 263.

11. CORPORATION MAY SELL ITS PROPERTY TO ANOTHER CORPORATION, and if the consideration for the sale is the assumption and payment by the corporation purchasing of mortgage debts of the corporation making the sale, to the full value of all the property conveyed, such sale will not be set aside in favor of other unsecured creditors of the corporation that made the sale; nor will they have any lien on the property for which full value has been paid in good faith. Id.

12. MORTGAGE BY CORPORATION TO SECURE DEBT IN EXCESS OF LIMIT allowed by its articles of incorporation is not for that reason invalid, although given to the directors and share-holders as preferred creditors. Id. 13. STOCKHOLDER OF CORPORATION IS LIABLE TO ITS CREDITORS ONLY TO ExTENT OF HIS UNPAID SUBSCRIPTION to the capital stock. Id.

14. OFFICERS AND SHARE-HOLDERS OF CORPORATION, WHO are PREFERRED CREDITORS, ARE NOT ESTOPPED, as against unsecured creditors thereof, to deny that the capital of the corporation was a certain sum, from the fact that the manager of the company used letter-heads on which were printed the word "capital," followed by that sum, where it is not shown that such creditors relied on and extended credit to the corporation on the faith of the representation. Id.

15. ONE WHO SUBSCRIBES TO STOCK OF CORPORATION IN VIEW OF AND FOR PURPOSE OF ITS SUBSEQUENT ORGANIZATION, which is effected, and pays in full for one share and transfers other shares, thereby recognizes and affirms his contract of subscription, and cannot be heard to disaffirm it. Bell's Appeal, 552.

16. LIABILITY OF SUBSCRIBER TO STOCK OF CORPORATION IS NOT DISCHARGED by an informal ex parte transfer of the shares in writing, not entered