on the books of the corporation, or recognized by it, accompanied with a private agreement of the transferee that the transferrer should not be liable for anything unpaid on the shares so transferred. Id.

17. BILL FILED BY CREDITOR OF CORPORATION ALLEGED TO BE INSOLVENT, AGAINST STOCKHOLDERS, to compel payment of unpaid capital stock in discharge of the claims of creditors, is a proceeding to enforce the equitable obligations of the stockholders; and since only so much of the unpaid capital as is necessary for the payment of the debts can be called in, and this only when all the other assets are exhausted, there must be an account of the amount of debts, assets, and unpaid capital, and a decree for an assessment of the amount due by each stockholder. Id.

18. OBLIGATION TO MAKE GOOD UNPAID PORTIONS OF CAPITAL STOCK WHEN NECESSITIES OF CREDITORS REQUIRE IT is a charge upon the stock which passes with it to the transferees thereof, subject to exceptional instances where the original subscribers are notwithstanding liable by charters or general statutory provisions. Id.

19. PLEDGEE OF CORPORATE STOCK has right to retain it until the debt for which it was pledged is fully satisfied, but during such time he cannot assert that he holds it adversely, and thereby acquire title under the statute of limitations. Cross v. Eureka Lake and Yuba Canal Co., 808. 20. AS BETWEEN PLEDGEE and PLEDGOR of corporate stock, the general property remains in the latter, and when the debt to secure which the pledge was given is paid, the lien is extinguished. Id.

21. WHERE IN SUIT BY PLEDGEE OF CORPORATE STOCK to recover dividends against the corporation the latter deposits the money in court, and has the pledgor and his assignee made defendants, and it appears that the debt for which the stock was pledged is liquidated, whereupon judgment is rendered by consent of the pledgor for the assignee for the entire amount sued for, as the pledges has no interest in the money he cannot complain of the judgment awarding the assignee the dividends accruing prior to its rendition. Id.

22. LEGAL TITLE TO SHARES OF CORPORATE STOCK, ASSIGNABLE ONLY ON

Books of the corporation, does not pass by an assignment of the shares which is neither made nor recorded on the books of the corporation. Lippitt v. American Wood Paper Co., 886.

See BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; NEGLIGENCE; PLEDGE, 2, 3.

CO-TENANCY.

1. TENANTS IN COMMON OF PERSONALTY MUST JOIN IN ACTION to recover it. Clapp v. Pawtucket Institution for Savings, 915.

2. POSSESSION Of One Co-tenanT is the possession of all. Page v. Branch, 281. 8. TENANT IN COMMON CANNOT MAKE HIS POSSESSION ADVERSE to his co-tenant except by actual ouster; or in the absence of that, it takes twenty years' adverse possession to bar the co-tenant's right of entry. Id. 4. DEED BY CO-TENANT TO STRANGER, though it purports to convey the entire estate, has no other effect than to invest the vendee with the rights of the vendor, and does not change the relation of co-tenant which has subsisted between the vendor and his co-tenant. This rule extends to the purchaser of the interest of a co-tenant at execution sale, and to the vendee of such purchaser. Id.

See LANDLORD AND Tenant, 4; PARTITION.

COUNTIES.

1. COUNTY IS CORPORATION WITHIN MEANING OF CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA, ARTICLE 16, SECTION 8, providing that "municipal and other corporations and individuals invested with the privilege of taking private property for public use shall make just compensation for property taken, injured, or destroyed by the construction or enlargement of their works, highways, or improvements"; and as such corporation, it may be held liable, in an action on the case, for consequential damages to private property injured by the erection of a county bridge. County of Chester v. Brower, 713.

2. RECONSIDERATION. — A board of commissioners, or other like body, acting in a ministerial capacity, cannot, by any system of rules of its own making, preclude reconsideration and correction of its erroneous action, whether resulting from haste and want of consideration or from intentional wrong. McCord v. Pike, 85.

3. ACCEPTANCE OF BID BY COUNTY COMMISSIONERS CONFERS NO VESTED RIGHT on the bidder, and interposes no obstacle to a suit to enjoin them from conveying property pursuant to such bid, if proper grounds for such injunction are shown. ld.

4. WHERE COMMISSIONERS OF COUNTY HAVE MAINTAINED BRIDGE IN PROPER REPAIR, as originally planned and erected in a small village, the county is not liable for failure of the commissioners, in the exercise of a proper discretion, to anticipate the growth of the village into a city, or, in the exercise of that discretion, for a like failure to determine the necessity for a new bridge, or for improvements necessary to meet the demands of a greatly increased travel, or to anticipate that horses would become frightened and unmanageable on the wagon road, and that injuries might thereby be inflicted upon foot-passengers. Lehigh Co. v. Hoffort, 587. 5. COUNTY 13 NOT LIABLE FOR INJURIES resulting from the failure of its county commissioners to exercise discretionary power under the statute which authorized them to make certain improvements at the expense of the county, no time being fixed within which the work was to be performed, nor the method of its performance being in any way prescribed, but leaving the matter wholly to the judgment and discretion of the commissioners. Id.

6. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-NON-LIABILITY FOR UNFORESEEN ACCIDENT.— A foot-passenger, while crossing a long and narrow county bridge in a large city, was caught by the wheel of a wagon drawn by a team of runaway horses, and injured. The injury occurred upon the foot-way, which was narrow, and not separated from the wagon road by any guard or rail. The bridge had been built fifty years, but was in good repair, and in all respects substantial and secure. In an action against the county to recover damages for the injury, held, that it was unreasonable to suppose that such an occurrence could be foreseen by the authorities & the result of a failure to erect guards or barriers, and that the county was not liable. Id.

7. COUNTY EMPLOYING ONE TO DO CERTAIN WORK, and accepting it, going into possession, and using it after it is finished, is liable for the reasonable value of the work, though not performed strictly according to the contract. Harris Co. v. Campbell, 467.

COVENANTS.

COVENANT IN DEED FOR QUIET AND PEACEABLE POSSESSION runs with the land, and is binding upon the grantor and all of his subsequent gran

tees to the same land. Schwallback v. Chicago, M., & St. P. R. R. Co., 740.

CRIMINAL LAW.

1. PROSECUTION IS NOT BOUND TO ESTABLISH GUILT OF ACCUSED CONCLUSIVELY, but only beyond a reasonable doubt. And therefore an instruction whose language implies that the state is bound to prove conclusively the guilt of a defendant is rightly refused. State v. Hoxie, 838.

2. EVIDENCE OF CRIME DIFFERENT FROM ONE CHARGED is never admissible except for the purpose of showing motive, interest, or guilty knowledge. In rebuttal of evidence of good character, it is not competent to give evidence of specific acts of immorality or crime. People v. Greenwall, 415. 3. EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S BAD CHARACTER is not admissible unless he has first offered evidence to show that his character is good. Id. 4. ACCUSED, BY VOLUNTARILY OFFERING HIMSELF AS WITNESS IN HIS OWN BEHALF, WAIVES his constitutional privilege of refusing to answer a question because the answer may tend to criminate him. State v. Thomas, 351.

5. "SPOTTER," OR PAID INFORMER, IS NOT ACCOMPLICE, in contemplation of law. State v. Hoxie, 838.

6. UNDER PENAL STATUTE PRESCRIBING PUNISHMENT for crime by fine or imprisonment, the prisoner cannot be both fined and imprisoned. State v. Walters, 310.

7. “OR” IN Criminal Statute cannot be interpreted to mean “and,” when the effect is to aggravate the offense or increase the punishment. Id. 8. WHERE PRISONER HAS LOST HIS APPEAL through a failure to perfect it, but has been granted a writ of certiorari as a substitute, the effect of granting the writ is to stay the execution and entitle the prisoner to bail. Id. 9. PRISONER IN CAPITAL CASES HAS RIGHT TO BE, AND MUST BE, personally present at all times in the course of his trial, when anything is said or done affecting him as to the charge against him, in any material respect. State v. Kelly, 299.

10. PRISONER, IN FELONIES LESS THAN CAPITAL, HAS RIGHT to be present at all times during the course of his trial, but it is not essential to conviction that he must be so present at all events. Id.

11. IN FELONIES LESS THAN CAPITAL, prisoner may waive the right to be present at his trial, but his counsel cannot waive the right for him. Id. 12. GENERALLY, IF NOT IN ALL CASES, PRISONER'S PRESENCE is required when judgment is entered, especially when the punishment to be inflicted requires it. Id.

13. PRISONER, IN FELONIES LESS THAN CAPITAL, who is under recognizance for his appearance, and is present when his trial begins, but flees the court while it is pending, waives his right to be present during the remainder of the trial, and is not entitled to be discharged, or to have a new trial, on account of his absence. Id.

14. BURGLARY AT COMMON LAW IS OFFENSE against the habitation of man. It might also include the felonious breaking and entering a church. People v. Richards, 373.

15. WORD "BUILDING," AS USED IN PENAL CODE defining the crime of burglary, must be regarded as limited to those structures which the common law, as amended and enlarged by our statutes relative to the crime, made capable of being broken and entered burglariously. Id.

16. BURGLARY. — BREAKING AND ENTERING BUILDING IN PROCESS OF CONSTRUCTION, and not yet fit for the purpose for which it is being con

structed, if with intent to commit a felony, is burglary by the statute of Wisconsin. Clark v. State, 732.

17. BUILDING IS A STRUCTURE which has capacity to contain, and is designed for the habitation of, man or animals, or the sheltering of property. It need not be completed, if it is in condition to hold tools or other articles of personal property. Id.

18. BURGLARY.-THE WORD "STABLE," as commonly used and understood, is equivalent to the word "building." Id.

18. WORDS "OTHER ERECTION OR INCLOSURE," employed in the statute defining burglary, must be interpreted as including only things of a similar nature to those already described by the specific words found in the statute. People v. Richards, 373.

20. Breaking and Entering Vault, Intended and Used for Interment of the dead, cannot constitute the crime of burglary at the common law, nor by the statutes of New York. Id.

21. WHERE HOMICIDE IS SHOWN TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED WITH DEADLY WEAPON, and intentionally, the court may instruct the jury that if the testimony does not satisfy them that the offense is manslaughter, it is their duty to convict of murder. State v. Thomas, 351.

22. MERE PROOF OF SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR IS SUFFICIENT to justify the jury in finding that the sale was illegal, where the statute provides that evidence of the sale or keeping for sale shall be evidence that the sale or keeping is illegal, since it would be unnatural for the accused not to produce his license if he had one. State v. Hoxsie, 838. 23. REQUEST TO CHARGE THAT NOTORIOUS CHARACTER OF DEFENDANT'S PREM ISES, or the notoriously bad and intemperate character of persons visiting the same, or the keeping of implements or appurtenances usually appertaining to grog-shops, tippling-shops, and places where intoxicating líquors are sold, is not prima facie evidence that such places are nuisances, is properly refused as ambiguous, where the statute makes such matters evidence, but not prima facie evidence, of a nuisance. Id. 24. TWO PERSONS MAY BE JOINTLY CONVICTED OF SAME NUISANCE, although one assists the other merely as an agent or clerk. Id.

25. PLACE USED FOR PURPOSE OF SELLING LIQUORS MAY BE LIQUOR NUISANCE, although that be only an incidental or subordinate, and not the main, purpose. Id.

26. WHERE RAPE IS CHARGED, PROSECUTING WITNESS MAY TESTIFY as to her marriage, and such testimony will warrant the jury in finding the fact of marriage, and that such witness is not the wife of defendant. State v. Hooks, 728.

27. Defendant ON TRIAL UPON INFORMATION FOR RAPE cannot be convicted and sentenced for adultery. Id.

28. INFORMATION FOR RAPE IS SUFFICIENT WITHOUT ALLEGING that the female upon whom the offense was committed was a married woman. But if alleged and proved, still a conviction of adultery cannot be sustained upon the charge of rape. Id.

29. PARTY CHARGED WITH ONE CRIME CANNOT BE CONVICTED OF ANOTHER and different, unless the allegations necessary to constitute the greater crime charged in the indictment or information are also sufficient to constitute the lesser crime. Id.

20. TO CONSTITUTE Rubbery, PROPERTY TAKEN NEED NOT BE ATTACHED TO PERSON of the individual robbed, or in his immediate presence. If a party binds a person in one room, and by violence extorts from him

information of the place where his property is in another room, which he then enters, and from which he takes the property, while his victim remains bound in the adjoining room, this is a sufficient taking from the person, within the meaning of the statute, to constitute the crime of robbery. State v. Calhoun, 252.

31. WHETHER CORD USED BY ROBBER TO BIND HIS VICTIM, while he was engaged in robbing the house, is a dangerous weapon or not, is a proper question to submit to the jury. Id.

DAMAGES.

1. EXCESSIVE VERDICT. — Where instructions of court are not properly considered by the jury, and where, from the undisputed facts, the negligence of the defendant, if any existed, was slight, while that of the plaintiff seemed greater, a verdict of ten thousand dollars is so excessive that it shows either bias in favor of the plaintiff, or prejudice to defendant, or a misconception of the instructions of the court. Central R. R. v. Smith, 31.

2. EVIDENCE OF Nature of PLAINTIFF'S BUSINESS, AND VALUE OF HIS PERSONAL SERVICES, is admissible in an action to recover for a personal injury entailing loss of time, as when he has suffered from assault and battery, negligence, or the like, for which defendant is answerable Reeves v. Winn, 287.

See INSANITY.

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

WHEN PARTY HAS RESERVED TO HIMSELF BY CONTRACT the right to discharge the obligation in two or more different ways he may elect, at any time before the date of payment has passed, in which way he will discharge it, and when he has a peculiar interest in discharging the obligation in a certain manner, he cannot be deprived of his right to do so, either by the act of his creditor without his consent, or by garnishment in a suit against the creditor. Drake v. Harrison, 717.

See CORPORATIONS.

DEEDS.

1. DELIVERY OF DEED IS ALWAYS ESSENTIAL TO ITS OPERATION AND VALIDITY. Weber v. Christen, 68.

2. SIMPLEST MODE OF DELIVERING DEED IS MANUAL TRANSFER OF IT by the grantor to the grantee, with intent of transferring title to the property and of relinquishing all control over the instrument. Id.

3. Delivery of DEED MAY BE EFFECTED without actually passing the writing from the grantor to the grantee, as where, while the instrument is in the presence of both parties, the grantor directs the grantee to take posses. sion of it, with intent to transfer the property, and the latter expresses his willingness so to do. Id.

4. ESCROW.-Deed in the hands of the grantee is never treated as an escrow.

ld.

5. DELIVERY OF DEED. - Act and intention are two elements essential to the delivery of a deed. Id.

6. DELIVERY OF DEED IS NOT EFFECTED BY SIGNING, ACKNOWLEDGING, AND RECORDING IT, without the knowledge or assent of the grantee, if he is an adult, unless it is shown that the grantor intended thereby to give