Opinion of the Court. advantage of a credit induced by his apparent prosperity and thus obtain property which he had every reason to believe he could never pay for. In such a case he does an act, the necessary result of which will be to cheat and defraud another and the intention to cheat will be inferred." And it was decided that "in the case of bankers, where greater confidence is asked and reposed, and where dishonest dealings may cause widespread disaster, a more rigid responsibility for good faith and honest dealing will be enforced than in the case of merchants and other traders;" and that "a banker who is, to his own knowledge, hopelessly insolvent, cannot honestly continue his business and receive the money of his customers; and although having no actual intent to cheat and defraud a particular customer, he will be held to have intended the inevitable consequences of his act, i.e. to cheat and defraud all persons whose money he receives, and whom he fails to pay before he is compelled to stop business." The Circuit Court did not, in the present case, express any different view, but held that the bill was not properly framed to present the question. Certainly there must be sufficient equity apparent on the face of a bill to warrant the court in granting the relief prayed; and the material facts on which the complainant relies must be so distinctly alleged as to put them in issue. Harding v. Handy, 11 Wheat. 103. And if fraud is relied on, it is not sufficient to make the charge in general terms. "Mere words, in and of themselves, and even as qualifying adjectives of more specific charges, are not sufficient grounds of equity jurisdiction, unless the transactions to which they refer are such as in their essential nature constitute a fraud or a breach of trust, for which a court of chancery can give relief." Van Weel v. Winston, 115 U. S. 228, 237; Ambler v. Choteau, 107 U. S. 586, 591. The defendant should not be subjected to being taken by surprise, and enough should be stated to justify the conclusion of law, though without undue minuteness. The bill alleged that the bank was insolvent on the 5th day of May; that this was well known to its officers; that it wrongfully neglected to disclose its insolvency to complainant, VOL. CXXXII-37 Opinion of the Court. and, by continuing business and otherwise, represented to complainant and all other persons dealing with it, that it was solvent; that complainant, on the faith of these representations believed such to be the fact, without suspicion that the bank was, or was in danger of becoming, insolvent; that, acting upon the representations, and relying on the bank's solvency, complainant delivered the draft; that next morning the bank closed its doors, and the draft was collected thereafter; and that, by reason of the premises, the draft or its proceeds did not become the property of the bank. The receiver in his answer specifically denied these averments. We think the issue thus framed was sufficient to enable the court to proceed to a decree. The fraudulent intention flowed from the guilty knowledge, and the bank must be held to the consequences of a representation which it knew to be contrary to the fact, and upon which the complainant innocently acted. Granted that the mere omission to disclose the insolvency, if there had been ground for the supposition that the bank might continue in business, would not be sufficient, there is nothing for such a belief to rest on here. As a matter of pleading, the averment was that the bank wrongfully neglected to make the disclosure; as a matter of fact, the condition of the bank was so hopeless that it was its duty to make it. The omission to specifically state in the pleading the degree of insolvency which rendered the bank's conduct fraudulent, was not fatal, as the conclusion asserted showed the intention of the pleader, and the particular contention could fairly be tested on the hearing. The decree is reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to enter a decree in favor of the complainant according to the prayer of the bill and to take further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. MR. JUSTICE BREWER was not a member of the court when this case was argued, and took no part in its decision. Statement of the Case. GREGORY v. STETSON. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS. No. 1514. Submitted January 6, 1890. — Decided March 3, 1890. A Circuit Court can make no decree in a suit in the absence of a party whose rights must necessarily be affected thereby. Two attorneys representing two separate parties, delivered a promissory note to a third person as bailee, and took his receipt therefor, in which he stated that he held it subject to their joint order, and to be dealt with as they might jointly direct. One of the separate parties filed a bill in equity against the bailee to compel him to deliver up the proceeds of the note (which had been paid) without making parties to the bill the two attorneys and the other party; claiming that he was entitled to do so by reason of an award in an arbitration that had taken place by which it had been decided that he should become the owner of the note on the performance of certain conditions which he had performed; Held, that they were necessary parties to the bill and that no decree could be made by the court in their absence. THIS was a suit in equity brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts by Charles A. Gregory, a citizen of Illinois, against William C. N. Swift and John G. Stetson, citizens of Massachusetts, for the alleged violation by Stetson of the following contract of bailment as respects the $15,000 note therein mentioned: "BOSTON, Dec. 24, 1886. "Received of Thomas II. Talbot, Esq., as attorney for Mary H. Pike, executrix of Frederic A. Pike, and of Francis A. Brooks, Esq., as attorney of Charles A. Gregory, two notes of hand made or signed by W. C. N. Swift, of New Bedford, dated April 20, 1883, one for $15,000, on two years' time, and one for $20,334.60, three years' time, payable to Charles F. Jones. Said notes are to be held by me, subject to the joint order and direction of the said Talbot and Brooks, and dealt with as they may jointly direct. "JOHN G. STETSON." The amended bill filed on the 30th of January, 1889, alleged that on the 10th of January, 1887, complainant filed a bill in Statement of the Case. that court against the defendants Swift and Stetson, and one Thomas H. Talbot, and referred to that bill as in part incorporated therein. The material allegations of that bill, so far as concerns this case, were as follows: That on or about the 16th of December, 1884, complainant filed a bill in one of the state courts of Massachusetts against the defendant Swift and one Frederic A. Pike, of Calais, in the State of Maine, to obtain possession of the two notes heretofore mentioned, then in the possession of Pike, which suit was afterwards removed into the court below where it was then pending and undetermined; that the defendants to that suit filed their respective answers to the bill, issues were joined, proofs taken and the case assigned for final hearing, but was not heard, for the reason that it was then agreed in writing between Pike and complainant to refer their controversy to the Hon. E. R. Hoar to determine the true ownership and rights of possession of the notes referred to, and in case of the death of either or both of them their respective legal representatives should be bound by the award to be made; that soon after the submission to the referee, Pike died testate, having appointed his wife, Mary A. Pike, executrix of his will, and residuary legatee of his estate, who proceeded in relation to the matter before the referee in the same manner as if the submission had been entered into by her personally; and that the referee after hearing the parties interested made and published the following award, and delivered a copy of the same to complainant : "The undersigned, referee in the matter submitted to him by Charles A. Gregory and Frederic A. Pike, under the submission, a copy of which is hereto annexed, having duly heard the parties, awards and determines thereon, and this is my final award in the premises as follows, to wit: That the said Pike is not entitled to detain or withhold from said Gregory the two Swift notes mentioned or described in the submission except for the purpose of securing the payment of another certain note, signed by G. W. Butterfield and Charles F. Jones, for the sum of $2437.50, dated July 26, 1883, and payable to C. H. Eaton of Calais, Me., or order, a copy of which is hereto Statement of the Case. annexed; that upon or after the said Eaton note, or whatever sum is now due thereon with interest, as stipulated in said note, shall have been paid by the said Gregory, the said Gregory will be entitled to the possession of the two Swift notes, one of $15,000, and one of $20,334.60. He also finds and determines that upon the payment of said Eaton note by said Gregory, he will be entitled to a transfer or delivery to himself of said Eaton note, and to the benefit of any sums which may be recovered of the said Butterfield and Jones on said note. Dated at Boston, the thirtieth day of November, in the year one thousand eight hundred and eighty six. "E. R. HOAR. "On or before January 1, 1884, we promise to pay C. H. Eaton, or order, two thousand four hundred and thirty-seven dollars and fifty cents, with interest at the rate of one per cent per month from date. Value received. "G. W. BUTTERFIELD. "CHARLES F. JONES." It was then alleged that afterwards Mrs. Pike, having examined the award which had been temporarily returned to the referee for that purpose, undertook to revoke the power under which the referee had acted, and to vacate and annul the award made by him, whereupon the referee, upon being waited upon by complainant through F. A. Brooks, his attor ney, accompanied by Thomas H. Talbot, the attorney for Mrs. Pike, returned the award to complainant and gave the said notes to said attorneys, who thereupon took them to defendant Stetson, receiving from him the receipt, heretofore set out in full; that complainant on the 4th of January, 1887, in order to entitle himself to the sole and exclusive possession of the notes heretofore mentioned, paid the note of $2437.50 in favor of C. H. Eaton, mentioned in the award, whereby he became entitled to receive from the defendant Stetson the two notes referred to, the rights of Mrs. Pike and her attorney, Talbot, in and to the same thus having ceased and become of no effect; and that by an instrument in writing dated December 5, 1884, Charles F. Jones, the payee of the two notes, |