1. A tract of land in Leadville, Colorado, was deemed by the municipal authorities as the most convenient and proper situation for the erec- tion of a school-house, which had become a necessity in that part of the town. The person in possession claimed under what was known as a squatter title. Another person laid claim to it under a placer patent from the United States. Both claims of title were known to the authorities, and were submitted by them in good faith to counsel for advice. The counsel advised them that the squatter title was good, and on the faith of that advice they purchased the lot from the per- son in possession, and built a school-house upon it, at a cost of $10,000. The claimant under the placer title brought an action of ejectment to recover possession. The municipal authorities, being satisfied that he must prevail, filed their bill in equity to enjoin him from proceed- ing to judgment in his action at law, and commenced proceedings under a statute of the State for condemnation of the tract for public use. The plaintiff in the ejectment suit appeared in the condemna- tion proceedings, and claimed to recover from the municipality the value of the improvements as well as the value of the land as it was when acquired by the municipality; and, being a citizen of Kansas, had the cause removed, on the ground of diverse citizenship, into the Circuit Court of the United States. It was there agreed that the value of the property, without the improvements, was $3000; and the court instructed the jury that they should find "that the value of said property at this date is $3000;" Held, that this instruction was correct. Searle v. School District No. 2, 553.
2. No vested right is impaired by giving to an occupant of land, claiming title and believing himself to be the owner, the value of improve- ments made by him under that belief, when ousted by the legal owner under an adverse title. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 4.
BILL OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTE.
1. On June 14, 1887, the Fidelity National Bank of Cincinnati drew a draft for $100,000 on the Chemical National Bank of New York City, payable to the order of the American Exchange National Bank of Chicago, and put it into the hands of one W., who delivered it for value to K. & Co. They endorsed it for deposit to their account in the Chicago Bank, which credited its amount to them and paid their checks against it. It was not paid; Held, that the draft was a foreign bill of exchange; that W. did not act as the agent of the Cincinnati Bank; and that in a suit by the Chicago Bank against the receiver of the Cincinnati Bank, which had failed, to recover the amount of the draft,
the Chicago Bank was a bona fide holder and owner of it for value, and want of consideration could not be shown by the receiver. Arm- strong v. American Exchange Bank, 433.
2. The fact that the draft was payable to the order of the plaintiff was not notice to it that W. was not its purchaser or remitter; and the Cincinnati Bank had represented to the plaintiff that W. was a bona fide holder of the draft, for his use in making good trades of his with K. & Co. Ib.
3. An instrument signed by the Cincinnati Bank, dated June 14, 1887, addressed to the Chicago Bank, stating that W. & Co. had deposited $200,000 to the credit of the latter bank, for the use of K. & Co. was put by the former bank into the hands of W. & Co., who delivered it to K. & Co., who deposited it with the Chicago Bank, which gave credit for its amount to K. & Co. as cash, and paid with a part of it an overdraft of K. & Co. and honored their checks against the rest of it. In a suit by the Chicago Bank against the said receiver to recover the $200,000; Held, that the instrument was in its legal character a certificate of deposit; that the plaintiff was an innocent purchaser of it, for value; that, as the Cincinnati Bank had represented to the plaintiff that it had received from W. & Co. consideration for the paper, it was estopped from setting up the falsity of such representa- tion; that the plaintiff did not take the paper under such circumstances as would put a man of ordinary prudence on inquiry; and that there was nothing to lead the plaintiff to suspect that the money represented by the paper was that of the Cincinnati Bank. Ib.
4. A defence set up to the suit on the certificate of deposit was, that H., (the vice-president of the Cincinnati Bank,) its assistant cashier, and W., of W. & Co., conspired to defraud that bank by using its funds in speculating in wheat in Chicago, through K. & Co., so as to make a corner" in wheat; Held, that rumors on the board of trade and in the public press that II. was the real principal for whom W. was act- ing, could not affect the plaintiff; and that the plaintiff could not refuse to honor the checks of K. & Co. against the deposit, on the ground that K. & Co. intended to use the money to pay antecedent losses in the gambling wheat transactions. Ib.
5. The statute of Illinois, 1 Starr & Curtis Stat. 1885, pp. 791, 792, §§ 130, 131, and the case of Pearce v. Foote, 113 Illinois, 228, do not apply to the present case. lb.
CASES AFFIRMED, APPLIED OR APPROVED.
1. Harshman v. Knox County. Knox County v. Harshman, 152.
2. Phænix Ins. Co. v. Erie Transportation Co., 117 U. S. 312. California Ins. Co. v. Union Compress Co., 387.
3. All the questions presented and argued in this case have been often considered and decided by this court, and the court adheres to the
decisions in Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147; Bernards Township v. Stebbins, 109 U. S. 341; and New Providence v. Halsey, 117 U. S. 336. Bernards Township v. Morrison, 523.
4. Cotton v. New Providence, 47 N. J. Law, 401; and Mutual Benefit Life Co. v. Elizabeth, 42 N. J. Law, 235, approved. Bernards Township v. Morrison, 523.
5. County of Greene v. Daniel, 102 U. S. 187, followed. Lincoln County v. Luning, 529.
6. This case differs in no material fact from Delano v. Butler, 118 U. S. 634, and is governed by it. Aspinwall v. Butler, 595.
The case distinguished from that of United States v. Langston, 118 U. S. 389. Wallace v. United States, 180.
1. An instrument signed by the Cincinnati Bank, dated June 14, 1887, addressed to the Chicago Bank, stating that W. & Co. had deposited $200,000 to the credit of the latter bank, for the use of K. & Co., was put by the former bank into the hands of W. & Co., who delivered it to K. & Co., who deposited it with the Chicago Bank, which gave credit for its amount to K. & Co. as cash, and paid with a part of it an over- draft of K. & Co. and honored their checks against the rest of it. In a suit by the Chicago Bank against the said receiver to recover the $200,- 000; Held, that the instrument was in its legal character a certificate of deposit; that the plaintiff was an innocent purchaser of it, for value; that, as the Cincinnati Bank had represented to the plaintiff that it had received from W. & Co. consideration for the paper, it was estopped from setting up the falsity of such representation; that the plaintiff did not take the paper under such circumstances as would put a man of ordinary prudence on inquiry; and that there was nothing to lead the plaintiff to suspect that the money represented by the paper was that of the Cincinnati Bank. Armstrong v. American Exchange Bank, 433.
2. A defence set up to the suit on the certificate of deposit was, that II. (the vice-president of the Cincinnati Bank), its assistant cashier, and W. of W. & Co., conspired to defraud that bank by using its funds in speculating in wheat in Chicago, through K. & Co., so as to make a "corner" in wheat; Held, that rumors on the board of trade and in the public press that H. was the real principal for whom W. was act- ing, could not affect the plaintiff; and that the plaintiff could not refuse to honor the checks of K. & Co. against the deposit, on the ground that K. & Co. intended to use the money to pay antecedent losses in the gambling wheat transactions. Ib.
3. The statute of Illinois, 1 Starr & Curtis, Stat. 1885, pp. 791, 792, §§ 130,
131, and the case of Pearce v. Foote, 113 Illinois, 228, do not apply to the present case. Ib.
CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
The property of a subject of the Emperor of the French in Louisiana was occupied by the army of the United States during the war of the rebel- lion. A claim for the injury caused thereby was adjusted by the com- manding general, but payment was refused in consequence of the passage of the act of February 21, 1867, 14 Stat. 397, c. 57. After the organization of the commission under the Claims Convention of 1880 with France, 21 Stat. 673, his executor (he having meantime died in Paris leaving a will distributing his estate) presented this claim against the United States to the commissioners, and an allowance was made which was paid to the executor. In settling the executor's accounts in the courts of Louisiana two of the legatees, who were citizens of France, laid claim to the whole of the award. The other legatees, who were citizens of the United States, claimed the right to participate in the division of this sum. The award of the commission being silent on the subject, the briefs of counsel on both sides before the commission together with letters from the claimants' counsel, and a letter from one of the commissioners, were offered to show that only the claims on the part of the French legatees were considered by the commission, and the evidence was admitted. The Supreme Court of Louisiana ordered the award to be distributed among all the legatees, French and American; Held, (1) That this court had jurisdiction to review the judgment of the state court; (2) That the French legatees only were entitled to be represented before the commission, and they only were entitled to participate in the distribution; (3) That the briefs of counsel were properly admitted in evidence; (4) That the letters of counsel and of the commissioner should have been rejected; but, (5) That it was immaterial whether the evidence was or was not re- ceived, as the decision of the question depended upon considerations which such evidence could in no way affect. Burthe v. Denis, 514.
COMPTROLLER IN TREASURY DEPARTMENT. A comptroller in the Treasury Department has no power to review, revise or alter items in accounts expressly allowed by statute, or items of expenditures or allowances made upon the judgment or discretion of officers charged by law with the duty of expending the money or making the allowances. United States v. Waters, 208.
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY. See NATIONAL BANK, 3.
CONDITION SUBSEQUENT. See PATENT FOR INVENTION, 6.
A condemnation under the confiscation act of July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. 589, of real estate owned in fee by a person who had participated in the rebellion, and a sale under the decree, left the remainder, after the expiration of the confiscated life-estate, so vested in him that he could dispose of it after receiving a full pardon from the President. Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Bosworth, 92.
1. The Constitution of the United States, in proper cases, permits equity courts of one State to control persons within their jurisdiction from prosecuting suits in another State. Cole v. Cunningham, 107.
2. It is no violation of that provision of the Constitution of the United States which requires that full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the judicial proceedings of every other State, if a court in one State, (in which proceedings have been begun, under a general insolvent law of the State, to distribute the estate of an insolvent debtor among his creditors,) enjoins a creditor of the insolvent, (who is a citizen of the same State, and subject to the jurisdiction of the court,) from proceeding to judgment and execution in a suit against the insolvent in another State, begun by an attachment of his prop- erty there, after knowledge of his embarrassment and actual insolvency, which property the insolvent law of the State of the debtor's residence requires him to convey to his assignee in insolvency, for distribution with his other assets - there being nothing in the law or policy of the State in which the attachment is made, opposed to those of the State of the creditor and of the insolvent debtor. Ib.
3. In an action brought in a state court against the judges of the Court of Commissioners of the Alabama Claims, by one who had been an attorney of that court, to recover damages caused by an order of the court disbarring him, the plaintiff averred and contended that the court had not been legally organized, and that it did not act judicially in making the order complained of; Held, that a decision by the state court that the Court of Alabama Claims was legally organized and did act judicially in that matter, denied to the plaintiff no title, right, privilege or immunity claimed by him under the Constitution, or under a treaty or statute of the United States, or under a commission held or authority exercised under the United States. Manning v. French, 186.
4. The provision in § 501, Rev. Stat. Idaho, that "no person who is a bigamist or polygamist, or who teaches, advises, counsels or encourages VOL. CXXXIII-46
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