EVIDENCE.

1. Extrinsic evidence to aid in the interpretation of the judgment of a
court or commission is inadmissible unless, after reference to the
pleadings and proceedings, there remains some ambiguity or uncer-
tainty in it. Burthe v. Denis, 514.

2. A recorder's copy of a deed is competent and sufficient evidence of its
contents against the grantee in favor of a person not a party to it,
after the grantee and a person who procured it to be made and to
whom it was originally delivered have failed to produce it upon
notice to do so. Keller v. Ashford, 610.
See BILL OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY

NOTE, 2, 4;

CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES,

(3), (4), (5);

FEES.

See CONSUL, 2, 3;

CONTRACT, 5;
EQUITY PLEADING, 4;
PUBLIC LAND, 2.

DISTRICT ATTORNEY.

FEME COVERT.

See NATIONAL BANK, 6, 7.

FENCE.

See PUBLIC LAND, 5.

FORFEITURE.

See INTERNAL REVENUE, 2, 3, 4.

FRANCE.

See TREATY, 2, 3.

FRAUD.

As respects fraud in law, as distinguished from fraud in fact, in a convey-
ance, if that which is invalid can be separated from that which is
valid, without defeating the general intent, the maxim "void in part,
void in toto" does not necessarily apply, but the instrument may be
sustained notwithstanding the invalidity of a particular provision.
Peters v. Bain, 670.

See ASSIGNMENT FOR THE BENEFIT OF

CREDITORS, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9;

BANK, 2;

BANKRUPT;

CERTIFICATE Of Deposit ;
CORPORATION, 3, 4;

PUBLIC LAND, 2.

BILL OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTE, 4;

INSOLVENT DEBTOR.

An insolvent debtor of Louisiana, under the insolvent laws of that State,
surrendered his property for the benefit of his creditors, the surrender

was duly accepted, and the creditors elected a syndic who qualified and
was commissioned as such. On his schedules the debtor returned the
house in which he resided and the furniture therein as the property of
his wife to which he had no claim. The syndic did not take posses-
sion of it, and laid no claim to it until a foreign creditor, who was
not a party to the proceedings in insolvency, and who had obtained a
judgment against the debtor in the Circuit Court of the United States
after the insolvency, levied upon the house as the property of the
debtor. The syndic then filed in the creditor's suit a third opposition,
setting up claim to the property, and praying that the seizure under
the execution be set aside, and that the marshal be enjoined from
levying upon it. A decree in accordance with the prayer was entered,
conditioned upon the syndic's paying cost of seizure and filing in the
Circuit Court an order from the state court to the syndic to take
possession of the property, and to administer it as part of the insol-
vent's estate; Held, that there was no error in this decree, but that it
was eminently judicious and proper. Geilinger v. Philippi, 246.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 2.

INSURANCE.

The defendant, a fire insurance company, issued a policy of insurance to
the plaintiff, a cotton compress company, on "cotton in bales, held
by them in trust or on commission," and situated in specified places.
The cotton was destroyed by fire in those places. The plaintiff
received cotton for compression, and issued receipts to the depositors,
which said, "not responsible for any loss by fire." The holders of the
receipts exchanged them with one or the other of two railroad com-
panies for bills of lading of the cotton, which exempted the carrier
from liability for loss or damage by fire. On issuing the bills of
lading the railroad companies notified the plaintiff of their issue, and
ordered it to compress the cotton. It was burned while in the hands
of the plaintiff for compression, after the bills of lading were issued.
In a suit to recover on the policy; Held,

(1) It was competent for the plaintiff to prove, at the trial, that it took
out the policy for the benefit of the railroad companies, and in pursu-
ance of an agreement between it and those companies that it should
do so; also, that, by like agreement, it collected from the railroad com-
panies a specified sum for all cotton compressed by it, as covering the
compression, the loading, and the cost of insuring the cotton; also,
that such customs of business were known to the defendant when the
policy was issued, and that an officer of the plaintiff had stated to the
agents of the defendant, when the policy was applied for, that it was
intended to cover the interests of the plaintiff and of the railroad
companies; also, what claims had been made on the railroad com-
panies, by owners of cotton burned, to recover its value;

(2) The railroad companies were beneficiaries under the policy, because

they had an insurable interest in the cotton, and to that extent were

its owners, and it was held in trust for them by the plaintiff;

(3) It was lawful for the plaintiff to insure in its own name goods held
in trust by it, and it can recover for their entire value, holding the
excess over its own interest in them for the benefit of those who
entrusted the goods to it;

(4) The issuing of the bills of lading for the cotton did not effect such a

change in the possession of the cotton as to avoid the policy, under a
provision in it making it void, "if any change take place in the pos-
session of the subject of insurance;

(5) The plaintiff can recover for losses caused by the negligence of the
railroad companies in improperly exposing the cotton to danger
from fire.

(6) The exception "not responsible for any loss by fire" in the receipts
given by the plaintiff, and the clause in the bills of lading exempting
the railroad companies from liability for loss or damage by fire, did
not free the latter from responsibility for damages occasioned by their
own negligence or that of their employés ;

(7) The ruling, that a common carrier may insure himself against loss
proceeding from the negligence of his own servants, made in Phaniz
Insurance Co. v. Erie Transportation Co., 117 U. S. 312, 324, affirmed.
(8) The words in the policy, "direct loss or damage by fire," explained;
(9) The mere fact of the dwelling by the court below, with emphasis, in
its charge to the jury, on facts which seemed to it of controlling
importance, and expressing its opinion as to the bearing of those facts
on the question of negligence, is immaterial, if it left the issue to
the jury;

(10) Under a clause in the policy, that it "shall not apply to or cover any
cotton which may at the time of loss be covered in whole or part by a
marine policy," such clause is not operative unless it amounts to
double insurance, which can exist only in the case of risks on the
same interest in property and in favor of the same person;

(11) The right of action of the plaintiff accrued on the occurring of the

loss, and did not require that the railroad companies should have
actually paid damages for the loss of the cotton. California Insurance
Co. v. Union Compress Co., 387.

INTEREST.

Where a dividend was declared by the receiver in October, 1887, the plain-
tiff is entitled to interest on the amount of his dividend from the
time it was declared. Armstrong v. American Exchange Bank, 433.

See JURISDICTION, A, 9;
MORTGAGE, (7), (8).

INTERNAL REVENUE.

1. Statutes to prevent frauds upon the revenue, although they impose pen-
alties or forfeitures, are not to be construed, like penal laws generally,

strictly in favor of the defendant; but they are to be fairly and rea-
sonably construed, so as to carry out the intention of the legislature.
United States v. Stowell, 1.

2. The forfeiture imposed by the act of February 8, 1875, c. 36, § 16, for
carrying on the business of a distiller without having given bond, or
with intent to defraud the United States of the tax on the spirits dis-
tilled, includes all personal property owned by other persons, know-
ingly and voluntarily permitted by them to remain on any part of the
premises, and actually used, either in the unlawful business, or in any
other business openly carried on there; but in the lot of land on which
the distillery is situated, only the right, title and interest of the distil-
ler, and of persons who have consented to the carrying on of the busi-
ness of a distiller thereon, is forfeited. And there is a like forfeiture
of personal property under Rev. Stat. § 3258, for setting up an unregis-
tered still; and of personal property and interests in real estate under
§ 3305, for omitting to keep books as required by law. Ib.
3. The forfeiture imposed by the act of February 8, 1875, c. 36, § 16, and
by Rev. Stat. §§ 3258, 3305, takes effect from the time of the commis-
sion of the offence, both as to the right, title and interest in the land,
and as to personal property then upon the land. Ib.

4. When the owner of land, upon which an illicit distillery has been set
up and carried on with his consent, has previously made a mortgage
thereof to one who does not permit or connive at the illicit distilling,
and the mortgagor, upon a subsequent breach of condition of the
mortgage, makes a quitclaim deed to the mortgagee, the forfeiture of
the land, as well as of trade fixtures annexed to it for a lawful pur-
pose before the setting up of the still, is of the equity of redemption
only. Ib.

JUDGMENT.

A decree in equity, cancelling bonds of one railroad corporation and a
mortgage by a second railroad corporation of its property to secure
their payment, upon a bill filed by the latter against the former and
the trustee under the mortgage, binds all the bondholders, unless ob-
tained by fraud. And a bill afterwards filed by bondholders not per-
sonally made parties to that suit against those two corporations and a
third railroad corporation alleged to claim a right in the property, by
purchase or otherwise, prior to the lien of the bondholders, charging
fraud and collusion in obtaining that decree, cannot be maintained
without proof of the charges, if the second and third corporations, by
pleas and answers under oath, fully and explicitly deny them, and
aver that the third corporation had since purchased the property in
good faith and without knowledge or notice of any fraud or irregular-
ity in obtaining the decree. Beals v. Illinois, Missouri & Texas Rail-
road Co., 290.

See EVIDENCE, 1;

PUBLIC LAND.

JURISDICTION.

A. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

1. This court has no jurisdiction to review a judgment of the highest
court of a State, unless a Federal question has been, either in express
terms or by necessary effect, decided by that court against the plaintiff
in error. San Francisco v. Itsell, 65.

2. The record from the trial court must be taken in this court as it was
presented to the appellate court below, and an objection to it, not
made there, will not be considered here. Keyser v. Hitz, 138.

3. The decision of a state court that a judge of a Federal Court acted judi-
cially in disbarring an attorney of the court involves no Federal ques-
tion. Manning v. French, 186.

4. A petition for a writ of error forms no part of the record upon which
action is taken here. Ib.

5. The verdict was for $5000, and the judgment was for that amount, and
$306 interest for the time between verdict and judgment, and for
$60.25 costs; Held, that the matter in dispute exceeded the sum or
value of $5000, exclusive of costs, within the act of February 16, 1875,
c. 77, § 3, 18 Stat. 316, even though, without the interest included in
the judgment, the amount, exclusive of costs, would not be over $5000.
Quebec Steamship Co. v. Merchant, 375.

6. Where the Supreme Court of a State decides against the plaintiff in
error on an independent ground, not involving a Federal question, and
broad enough to maintain the judgment, the writ of error will be dis-
missed by this court without considering the Federal question. Hop-
kins v. McLure, 380.

7. In this case, the Supreme Court of the State held that the law was not
changed by an isolated decision made by it, because such decision was
an erroneous declaration of what was the law; and on that view this
court held that no Federal question was presented by the record, and
the writ of error was dismissed. Ib.

8. No judgment or decree of the highest court of a Territory can be re-
viewed in this court in matter of fact, but only in matter of law.
Sturr v. Beck, 541.

9. Upon appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia in general term, affirming a judgment in special term, dis-
missing a bill in equity founded upon a contract bearing interest, the
sum in dispute at the time of the judgment in general term, including
interest to that time, is the test of the appellate jurisdiction of this
court. Keller v. Ashford, 610.

10. The refusal of a Circuit Court to grant a rehearing is not subject to
review here. Boesch v. Graff, 694.

11. To a master's report upon the damages to be awarded in an equity
suit for the infringement of letters patent the bill of exceptions raised
the points: (1), that the infringement was not wilful; (2), that the
reduction in price of the article manufactured by the plaintiff was not