at the same time, with such a combination of Powers to resist, and sustain itself, victoriously, as the French nation has done.

Are we to satisfy ourselves with the belief that the French will not invade us, and become unprepared to defend ourselves, while in actual war with that Power? Sir, is not this inviting invasion? But, admit that invasion is not to be dreaded-is that the only means the French have of annoying us of disturbing the peace, and introducing war into our country?

While we are considering whether our Constitutional power to adopt measures to repel invasion is or is not expedient to be exerted, let it not be forgotten, our country has a vulnerable side, other than that exposed to invasion; a point, sir, that will not escape hostile notice; a point, sir, which the Southern States have most to dread, and where, if war in our country is to happen, it will probably commence.

As to the expense to be incurred by maintaining the army proposed to be discharged, it is admitted it cannot be much; too trifling, it is acknowledged, to be an object, if the mission to France succeeds. In that event it is merely questionable whether there would be any saving at all by disbanding the army now, as most probably the pay which may be considered as proper to bestow on its discharge, would be fully equal to its support during the whole period of its enlistment.

JANUARY, 1800.

in the disrepute of its citizens? No, sir, it must forcibly attach to it in every mind.

It has been urged that the wisdom and prudence of this House are involved in the present question. I sincerely coincide in this sentiment. I will go further: the dignity, sir, of this House is involved in entertaining this question. I call loudly to be extricated as speedily as possible. Scarcely, sir, has a month elapsed since this House, without a division, announced to the American people, to the world at large, that it is the dictate of wisdom, of duty, to persevere in the system of defence adopted by the councils of our country. This sentiment is emphatically expressed in the Address of this House to the President. And we are now, without even the suggestion of a change of situation, called on to make an inroad on that system, to commence its destruction.

I hope, sir, the question will be taken this day. I feel every disposition to accommodate gentlemen in their feelings and wishes, but I hold the interests of the country, which I sincerely believe to be involved in the length of this debate, as too expensive a sacrifice. I apprehend every gentleman has made up his mind, without the probability of relinquishing the point on which it rests; if so, a further postponement can only be to afford an opportunity for a display of oratory. If gentlemen have made up their minds, and if it is important that a prompt decision should be had, it will Much has been said on the subject of economy. be better to take the vote now and have the speeches Truly, sir, it is an important consideration, and afterwards-they doubtless will prove entertainought always to be present in our councils. But, ing and instructive essays; and this course will sir, economy consists in a due application of the be considered less exceptionable, as it has been exwealth and resources of the country; to promote emplified with no small success by an ancient measures calculated to produce the peace, safety, orator of celebrity. I allude to Cicero, and his and happiness of the citizens; to insure the pros- oration in defence, but not heard until after the perity and welfare of the Republic. This kind of trial, of his friend Milo. It is true it was of no economy is as distant from the paltry considera- manner of service to his friend-but it was nevertions of an impolitic parsimony as it is removed theless a very fine speech, and contributed not a litfrom the waste of an inconsiderate prodigality. Itle to increase the fame of his eloquence. I hope, therefore consider what has been urged on that subject as of no moment in the present question; and much better calculated to tickle the ears of an unreflecting populace, than convince the minds of a deliberative assembly. It has been alleged that the existence of this army occasions unpleasant sensations in the minds of the citizens at large; that the sound of the drum and the glitter of arms among their peaceful habitations distresses them. Sir, doubtless it excites their attention, and produces from them inquiries on the subject, but when told that this army is raised to be ready to protect the rights and support the honor of their country, which has been and still is injured and insulted by a foreign Power, they are satisfied. But what would be the operation of the measure proposed on the minds of these very citizens? They find the army disbanded, they inquire what reparation has our Government received for the injuries, what satisfaction for the insults, heaped on our country? None. Why is the army then disbanded, and, after the expense of organization for the defence of our country, why are we now left without the proposed means of defence? Sir, can these questions be answered without involving our Government

therefore, sir, that this course may be taken, rather than the decision should be any longer delayed. At this point the Committee rose, and had leave to sit again.

FRIDAY, January 10.

REDUCTION OF THE ARMY.

The House, in Committee of the Whole, Mr. MORRIS in the Chair, resumed the consideration of Mr. NICHOLAS's resolution for reducing the Army Establishment.

Mr. KITCHELL thought that the question before the Committee had been treated by the gentlemen on both sides upon much too extensive grounds, many of which had nothing at all to do with it. It appeared to him that the real merits of it would be better ascertained, and a vote taken with much more propriety, if it only rested on these two points, to which he wished to call attention:

First. What would its influence be with the French Directory in the present state of the negotiation?

Secondly. What would be its influence or use in case of invasion?

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Reduction of the Army.

H. of R.

These were the principal grounds on which it invaded the country. He did not believe that the was opposed, but, he conceived, without much people could not support this army; they could, foundation. As to its influence on our negotia- or one ten times larger, if necessary, and they tion with France, he thought the arguments very would do it in that event. But he was confident weak. Could it be supposed that an army of three that a cheaper and more efficient protection was or four thousand men, at a distance of at least to be found in the people of the United States. three thousand miles, could bid defiance to a Power Suppose this army were to be divided to guard that the combination of all Europe would not ap- different parts of the coast. Our coasts are so expal? That must be an absurd conclusion. This tensive that there could not be a sufficient quansmall army could not possibly affect a negotiation tity at any one point to do any good against an when the Atlantic separated the Powers. In army that should invade, and therefore what use what form could they be used to attack the French? could they be in that service? Could they be transported across the ocean to com- Mr. K. said he merely threw out these ideas to pel the Directory to attend to the terms we should show his reasons for voting in favor of the resoludictate? If the attempt was made, our great and tion, which he must do unless his objections, and good allies would meet, and very probably impress some others which had been mentioned by gentlethem into their service. Or was a bridge to be laid men who spoke before him, were satisfactorily reacross for their transportation to Europe? But, if moved. He thought the money could be better they could get there, what would they do? These applied to arming and disciplining the militia, notions, he believed, would be acknowledged ab- and he never could give a vote to impair that surd; but in what other way could the preserva- great foundation of our strength, which ought to tion of this army influence the Directory? Yet be cultivated with assiduity. Nor was he any wise gentlemen had ascribed to it that wonderful pow-apprehensive of invasion if the war in Europe er. He concluded it could have no such effect. should cease, because of the affinity of France and Great Britain to each other, which would operate as a sufficient check. Besides, it could not be supposed that after a war of this great length, and urprecedented for fatigue and sanguinity, either of those Powers would enter on new adventures, when a few years rest and peace would be so requisite to recruit their men as well as their finances. It was said that in another year they may invade us, and therefore we ought to preserve the army. To be sure it was possible, but the argument would lead to making provisions for another century. If there is any way, said Mr. K., in which we can attack the French Republic, it must be by sea; we have no fear of them by land, because they will not attack us, and it is not probable we shall attack them. If, indeed, that is our wish, we must increase our force, instead of diminishing it. They do distress our commerce, we ought not therefore to be negligent of our navy, but to protect it; but as for an army, we can have no use for it.

But the gentleman from Delaware said, if the French could have emissaries here to direct our councils, they would recommend such a motion as this. No, said Mr. K., they would rather advise or influence us to augment the forces, in order to drain our resources, so that we should be unable to meet them, if they had any design upon us. They would wish rather to disable us from making any opposition, which could be more effectually done by leaving us without money than without troops. Not that he conceived our financial state to be at so low an ebb as to disable us in any event from keeping up the army, but while our expenditure was already more than our revenue, it would certainly be imprudent not to attend to every opportunity of decreasing it, so as to bring it as nearly level as possible.

Farther. What effect could this army have in case of invasion? What would our whole army, of fifteen or sixteen thousand men, do against the great number any European Power, who was so inclined, could throw into our country? If such madness should seize them as to send an army here for the invasion of our country, could it be supposed that they would immediately send a flag of truce to inform us of the manner of its execution? Certainly not. Would they not be so well acquainted with our country and situation as to land where these troops could not be brought to operate against them? Then can we suppose that the keeping up of these men, at the rate of four millions of dollars a year, will compel France to do what we please? No, sir, this army would not be found, were a disembarkation to take place; and our militia would have to stand the whole attack.

Mr. K. believed that at any time a well armed, and well disciplined militia would be competent to all the purposes required to make head against an invasion from any nation. He therefore thought that while a standing army of this force would be useless to make any impression on the French mind, so it would on their armies, if they actually 6th CoN.-11

Mr. S. SMITH believed, with two gentlemen who had lately spoken, that if a bill was now brought in to create the army in question, it would have very few advocates. The gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. WILLIAMS) had said, that if he had voted for raising this army, he certainly should now vote for its continuance, because he saw no change in circumstances sufficient to warrant any change in measures. Mr. S. said, he disagreed with that gentleman: he did not think the same occasion now existed.

Mr. S. said, he came to Congress this year with a strong impression upon his mind that the expense of this army was an unnecessary one; but he did not expect such a resolution to be brought forward at so early a period of the session. He had hoped that the gentleman would have delayed his motion until every document relating to the army was laid before the House by the Secretary of War, and every document of finance from the Treasury Department. Unprepared as he was, and unwilling as he was to vote, he was

called on now so to do, and therefore must vote upon such documents as were in possession of the House.

He conceived it necessary to call the recollection of gentlemen to the state of affairs when the law in question had passed. It had been thought proper, by the Senate of the United States, to pubfish the despatches of our envoys to France, which by him, and many others, was considered in no other light than as a manifesto to prepare the minds of the people for war; for all had declared that France could not do otherwise, after their publication, than declare war. The House thought so, and declined the publication on their part. However, having been made public, it became a duty to assume a posture of defence; the necessity of which so strongly impressed him, that he could not have returned to his constituents without seeing the proper measures taken.

It had been said, that this part of the army was not a part of the system of defence. What else could it be? To be sure it was not the only means of defence adopted, but it was considered that this army would operate valuably as a rallying point round which the militia would assemble. It was thought that wherever the United States should be invaded, the enemy would first be met by the militia, and that these troops, being prepared, would rapidly come to their aid.

JANUARY, 1800.

for 5.520. The raising of the six troops of dragoons (no men being yet engaged) might also be stopped, and the whole expense of their bounty and clothing, besides the purchase of horses, would be saved. Under this statement of facts, would gentlemen think of destroying this army at once? Would it not be more prudent to wait two or three months for advices from our Envoys? He felt well assured in his own mind that a peace would be the result of our negotiation. If gentlemen thought with him, they would wait the event. If successful, the army would of course be discharged under the law.

The resolution, Mr. S. said, was calculated to discharge all these men without a single shilling to carry them home. He trusted they would not be sent home without such provision as had been usual to make.

This army had been called a standing army, and it was said that excuses would be found to keep it up, even after a peace. But this cannot happen, for the law expires," whenever the differences between France and America are made up."

Sir, said Mr. S., there is no man that places more reliance on the militia than I do, but before I place all my reliance on that truly essential part of our defence, much as I admire it, I must see a better militia law framed than exists at present. Until that time, I must say that a regular army Under these impressions, Mr. S. said, he had in case of war will be always deemed necessary. thought it his duty to bring forward a resolution I was pleased to hear the gentleman from Virfor raising eight regiments, and six troops of dra- ginia (Mr. RANDOLPH) say that something like a goons; the House carried it further, and voted requisition was necessary, and that the money twelve regiments and the dragoons. The mea- appropriated to this army ought to be applied tosure was then thought to be so essential a feature of wards disciplining our citizens, that they may be our defence, that there were but eleven members ready on an emergency. But how can that genwho voted against it. It will be recollected that tleman make these men serviceable under the prea gentleman expressed an opinion that the right sent militia law, when their time of service is so wing of the Army of England (as it was then short, that in many instances it will be nearly excalled) would probably come to this country; al-pired before they can arrive at the scene of action? though he had no such idea, he had thought that the Southern States might be in danger of a descent from Hispaniola, and therefore thought that a small army might be necessary.

It would not be considered improper for gentlemen to vote for continuing the men who had been recruited into the twelve regiments a few months longer; for although they could not be draughted into the old regiments, yet many of them might and probably would be recruited for those regiments, and a saving of clothing, &c., would thereby be effected. He presumed something like this was the middle ground contemplated by the gentleman from Virginia. At present no regiment appeared to have more men than would make a battalion. The supernumerary officers might therefore retire home till called for, and thus make a considerable saving.

From the reports of the War Department, Mr. S. said there were no more than 3,399 men recruited for that service; many of these would be objected to when they came to the muster, so that they would probably be reduced to 3,000; 8,520 was the total number of men wanted for the twelve regiments. By stopping the enlistments, there would be a saving of bounty and clothing

Sir, a requisition might be useful in this country. It is the youth of a nation that can most easily be made its effectual defence; France has proved it-oppressed by the great Powers of Europe, in a manner deprived of her soldiery, she called out by requisition the young men from eighteen to twenty-three. What was the consequence? The veterans of Europe were not able to withstand this shock, and France was everywhere victorious. Again oppressed by numbers. the armies of France, pressed by the troops of Russia and Austria, were defeated at all points, and again she had recourse to the young men. The conscripts (being those who had passed the age of eighteen since the first requisition) were called on; they joined the armies of their country, and the proud armies of the allies fled before them, from the morasses of Holland and from the mountains of the Alps, and victory again decided for the armies of France.

Mr. Chairman, grant a militia law such as has twice been reported to this House, where the youth from eighteen to twenty-five are selected, in which a plan is digested for arming, disciplining, and holding them in a constant state of preparation, and with power of keeping them in the

JANUARY, 1800.

Reduction of the Army.

H. of R.

field a sufficient length of time, and I do not hesi- about the motion. An honorable gentleman from tate to say that an army on a regular establish- Pennsylvania (Mr. GALLATIN) declares that he ment will be rendered wholly unnecessary. Amer should not, in that case, think it worth while to ica would then feel herself perfectly secure; an make this motion; and the honorable gentleman army of 120,000 young citizens, well armed and from Virginia, who brought it forward, (Mr. NICHwell trained, would deter all nations from an at- OLAS,) fully concurs in this sentiment. But it is tempt at invasion. The truth being, that there precisely because they think that the negotiation are not more men recruited for the new regiments may fail, that they feel anxious to carry this meathan would fill the permanent army, of course no sure. It is because they think that we may be left extraordinary expense will be incurred beyond the in a state of war with France that they wish to usual estimated expenses of the army, except that disband the army. It is because we may have to of the officers of the twelve regiments; the amount contend with a powerful and an insidious foe, of which was not such as in his opinion ought to which shall have refused to treat with us, and induce a conduct that would have but too much may meditate an immediate blow against our the appearance of versatility in our Government. country, that gentlemen wish to deprive us of this He should therefore vote against the motion, un-arm of force for our defence. It is not in case of der a firm reliance that the recruiting service peace they wish to reduce, to disband, the national would be stopped immediately. force, but in case of war; a war, too, against a Power whose constant policy it is to divide and conquer; to avail itself of every party contention, every internal discontent, every jealousy against Government, in order to disarm those on whom it intends an attack; to employ every act of intrigue, and hold out every insidious appearance of friendship, for the purpose of lulling into a false and fatal security the victim which it has destined for its future prey.

Mr. HARPER said: What, Mr. Chairman, would be the effect of this motion, if adopted, on the negotiation now pending between this country and France? What would be its effects on the state of this country should the negotiation fail? Such are the questions which arise out of the resolution upon your table, and present themselves for the consideration of this Committee. So strongly am I impressed with their magnitude, that I should regard myself as a traitor to that country which gave me birth, and in defence of which I drew my sword before fifteen years had passed over my head, dead to every feeling of that patriotic affection for it which I drew in with my mother's milk, were I to pass over, with a silent vote, questions so deeply interesting to its honor and welfare. These questions, indeed, have been so ably discussed, that I am far from hoping to urge any new reasons, or to adduce any additional information; but if I can renew the impression formerly made, which the length of the discussion may have in some degree obliterated, I shall consider the time which I may occupy as not wholly misspent.

What then, Mr. Chairman, let me be permitted again to ask, will be the effect of this motion, if adopted, on the success of our negotiation with France? What would be its effects on our safety should that negotiation fail?

Sir, it is this view of the subject which strikes my mind with awful alarm. It is not foreign force that I dread, but internal division: it is not an attack from without that fills me with apprehension, but a weakness within, arising from timid counsels, which may prevent us from exerting our strength; from party animosity, which may render one half of the country the instrument for destroying the other; from jealousy of our own Government, which may prevent us from entrusting it with the means of defending us against the enterprises of another. I have heretofore been charged with endeavoring to spread alarm; and I have confessed the charge; for, when I feel alarm, .I hold it my duty, as one of those persons to whom this nation has confided the task of watching over its safety, to spread that alarm. When danger is abroad, it is the duty of the sentinel to give the alarm; and it is by being alarmed that, alone, we The motion from which these questions arise, can be saved. And I confess, sir, that when I see becomes infinitely more important and alarming men, no doubt of the best intentions, so blinded to my mind, when combined with the avowed ob- by the spirit of opposition, so carried away by ject for which it is introduced. Gentlemen tell party animosity and jealousy of the Executive, as us, most explicitly, that it is not on the success, to struggle, with all their might for the disbandbut on the failure of the negotiation, that their ment of the army in the midst of a war; as to conmotion becomes altogether necessary; because, tend, with the most persevering zeal, that the failin that case, the army, by the very terms of its ure of the negotiation is the precise case in which establishment and of the act under which it was we ought to divest ourselves of our only regular raised, is to be disbanded. The troops were en- diciplined force, I do feel extreme alarm, and am listed to serve "during the continuance of exist-most awfully anxious for the fate of my country. ing differences with France." Should these differences be terminated, which is the object of the pending negotiation, the troops are disbanded of course. This gentlemen well know; and, therefore, they feel that their motion would be wholly unnecessary in case the negotiation should succeed. They even tell us, in plain terms, that did they consider the success of the negotiation as certain, they should feel very little solicitude

This alarm it is my desire to spread, for I am fully convinced that unless we take the alarm, in occasions like this, we must be lost.

But to return, Mr. Chairman, from this digression, into which I was irresistibly impelled by the force of my feelings, let me be permitted to discuss the first of the two questions which present themselves for our consideration. Let me inquire, what must be the effect of this motion, should it succeed,