United States must eventually fight when it intervened, but unlike these critics the President had no intention, then or at a later time, of intervening.1

But the new determination of the President did seem to actually project the United States into Mexico's domestic troubles.2 Moreover, it divided the responsibility for what happened in Mexico between the Huertistas and the Constitutionalist faction; though General Carranza, the leader of that party, refused to assume this burden. There were indications of some disposition on the part of the world at large to hold the United States itself in some measure responsible for acts of violence directed at foreigners in Mexico. In February Great Britain requested that the Washington government investigate the death of a British subject, whose killing, it was charged, had been at the hands of troops of the party of Carranza. The United States accepted the responsibility, but on account of strained relations with Carranza its efforts were not an unqualified success.

Mr. Wilson felt called upon to discuss the rumour of European interference on March 2, 1914, and to deny that any pressure had been brought to bear upon the

1 There was widespread demand for change in policy toward Mexico in the late winter. See particularly W. M. Shuster, "The Mexican Menace," Century Magazine, LXXXVII, 593 (February, 1914,) and G. Harvey, "We Appeal to the President," North American Review, CXCIX, 481 (April, 1914).

2 Comment at this time was aroused by two other acts of the administration. Late in January United States marines were landed in Haiti to aid in maintenance of order. On February 12, 1914, formal recognition was given a government recently established in Peru.

United States government by other governments.1 That this denial may have been accompanied by a mental reservation is to be inferred from an occurrence on the following day in the British House of Commons, when Sir Edward Grey announced that if the British government did not obtain satisfaction from the Constitutionalists through the good offices of the United States it reserved the right to obtain reparation by other means when the circumstances should permit.

PANAMA TOLLS

In the meantime other matters were causing concern to the administration. As has been pointed out above, controversies were pending with several governments, and in his conference with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in January the President took the occasion to point out the gravity of the international situation.

Of the questions before him the President decided first of all to take up the contention of Great Britain that the exemption of American coastwise ships from the payment of tolls at Panama was a violation of the treaty of 1901 between the United States and Great Britain. The Democratic platform of 1912 had favoured this exemption and there were Democratic majorities in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Notwithstanding these facts the President on March 5, 1914,

1 From a stenographic report of a talk of the President on March 2, 1914. Published in World's Work, XXVIII, 485–7.

read a message to the Congress in which he asked the repeal of the provision of the act that made the exemption. 1 (Statement No. 15.) In doing so he laid emphasis on the fact that opinion outside of the United States was united in holding that the exemption was contrary to the treaty rights of Great Britain.2 The President's belief was thus expressed, we are too big, too powerful, too self-respecting a Nation to interpret with too strained or refined a reading the words of our own promises just because we have power enough to give us leave to read them as we please."

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He closed his address with an appeal that caused great speculation and endless explanation. "I ask this of you in support of the foreign policy of the administration. I shall not know how to deal with other matters of even greater delicacy and nearer consequence if you do not grant it to me in ungrudging measure." This was widely interpreted to indicate pressure from Great Britain with regard to Mexico. The President denied this in a subsequent talk with the newspaper men. In answer to questioning he stated that there was no particular significance to be attached to the words "nearer consequence." He regarded it as essential, however, that confidence be strengthened in the pledged word of the United States, if the policy of conciliation and co-operation, in which the

1 The proposed repeal applied to the clause that provided, "No tolls shall be levied upon vessels engaged in coastwise trade of the United States." United States Statutes at Large, XXXVII, 562.

2 For compilation of foreign press comment see Literary Digest, XLV, 362-3.

administration had been interested from the beginning, was to make headway in Latin America.1 Before Congress had indicated decisively its reaction to this proposal all attention was taken by startling events in Mexico.

MEXICO

Time had seemed to work no improvement there. As the spring approached the President insisted, in the face of an increasing storm of criticism, that the United States could afford to wait for the desired outcome.2 Haste upon the part of the United States could not but lead to bloodshed. Caution and patience might make it unnecessary.

However, on the third of April the personal representative of the President left Vera Cruz for the United States, serving by this departure to emphasize the failure of his mission, undertaken in August of 1913.3 Whether the President was at this time contemplating a new departure in dealing with the situation in Mexico cannot now be determined. Nor is it important. For events at this

1 World's Work, XXVIII, 490-491.

2 A compilation of adverse press comment from Europe and Latin America as well as the United States may be found in North American Review, CXCIX, 481 (April, 1914).

3 Simultaneously another Latin American problem was before the administration. On April 8, 1914, a treaty between the United States and Colombia was signed at Bogota. This had been anticipated by President Restrepo of Colombia. See Times (London), September 30, 1913. In a letter to the New York Times, published July 20, 1913, Ex-minister J. T. DuBois had stated that his mission had been handicapped because Colombia desired to await the action of the new administration at Washington,

point forced him to abandon, for the time being, the pursuance of his policy.

On April 9, 1914, a United States paymaster and a boat's crew of nine were arrested at Tampico by an officer of the army of General Huerta. By the order of a superior officer they were released immediately and the American commander was tendered an apology, which was later supplemented by an expression of regret from Huerta. Rear-Admiral H. T. Mayo, in command of the fleet, did not regard these as meeting the requirements of the situation and demanded a formal apology, assurance that the officer would be severely punished, and finally that a salute of twenty-one guns be given the United States flag, the flag to be raised publicly by the saluting party. All this was to be done within twenty-four hours.

The President supported these demands, although the time limit was extended, inasmuch as the issue was now widened to include the personal responsibility of Huerta. In replying the representative of Huerta urged the existence of extenuating circumstances, and stressed the immediate release and apology. Upon the American refusal to consider this, Huerta agreed to the original demand, with qualifications, however, which the United States would not accept.

Mr. Lind arrived in Washington on the thirteenth, and the following day had conference with the President and Secretary Bryan. On the same day Nelson O'Shaughnessy, the American chargé at Mexico City, was informed of the final refusal of Huerta to submit to