Argument for Trunk Line Railways.

234 U. S.

unjust discrimination within the meaning of the Act to Regulate Commerce.

The Commission's order does not result in undue or unreasonable preference or unjust discrimination within the meaning of the Act to Regulate Commerce, either as between common carriers subject to the Act to Regulate Commerce, or as between shippers.

The order does not deprive the appellees of their rights under the Constitution of the United States.

The Commodities Clause does not repeal the Act to Regulate Commerce with respect to the prohibitions against rebating and discriminations.

Cases heretofore relied upon by appellees can be distinguished.

In support of these contentions, see Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 56; Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 206; Brundred v. Rice, 49 Oh. St. 640; Central Pine Assn. v. Shreveport &c. R. R. Co., 10 I. C. C. 193; Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. v. United States, 156 Fed. Rep. 558; 1 Cook on Corporations, 6th ed., 31; 2 Cook on Corporations, 6th ed., 1972, 1974, 1975, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1987; Corporation Tax Cases, 220 U. S. 107; Crane Iron Works v. United States, 209 Fed. Rep. 238; Crane Iron Works v. Central R. R. Co., 17 I. C. C. 514; Crane Railroad Co. v. Phila. & Reading Ry. Co., 15 I. C. C. 248; Demko v. Carbon Hill Coal Co., 136 Fed. Rep. 162; Eastern & Western Ry. Co. v. Rayley, 157 Fed. Rep. 532; General Electric Co. v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R., 14 I. C. C. 237; Hunter v. Baker Vehicle Co., 190 Fed. Rep. 665; Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Int. Com. Comm., 206 U. S. 441; Industrial Railways Case, 29 I. C. C. 212; Re Divisions of Joint Rates, 10 I. C. C. 661; Re Hutchinson Salt, 10 I. C. C. 1; Re Investigation of Tap-line Connections, 23 I. C. C. 277, 283; Int. Com. Comm. v. C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 218 U. S. 88; Int. Com. Comm. v. D., L. & W. R. R. Co., 220 U. S. 235; Int. Com. Comm. v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 227 U. S.

234 U.S.

Argument for Tap Lines.

88; Re Rieger, 157 Fed. Rep. 609; Kendall v. Klapperthal Co., 202 Pa. St. 596, 52 Atl. Rep. 92; Lehigh Mining Co. v. Kelly, 160 U. S. 327; Louis. & Nash. R. R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467; La. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 209 Fed. Rep. 247; Martin v. Martin Co., 88 Atl. Rep. 612; Miller & Lux v. East Side Canal Co., 211 U. S. 293; McKilvergan v. Alexander Lumber Co., 102 N. W. Rep. 332; New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co. v. Int. Com. Comm., 200 U. S. 361; Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197; Peavey Elevator Case, 222 U. S. 42; Procter & Gamble v. United States, 225 U. S. 282; Santa Fe &c. Ry. Co. v. Grant Bros., 228 U. S. 177; Seymour v. Spring Forest Assn., 144 N. Y. 333; Solvay Process Co. v. D., L. & W. R. R. Co., 14 I. C. C. 246; So. Pac. Terminal Co. v. Int. Com. Comm., 219 U. S. 498; Swift v. United States, 196 U. S. 375; Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Updyke, 222 U. S. 215; Taenzer & Co. v. C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 170 Fed. Rep. 240; S. C., 191 Fed. Rep. 543; United States v. Bags of Coffee, 8 Cr. 415; United States v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 231 U. S. 274; United States v. Del. & Hud. R. Co., 213 U. S. 366; United States v. Milwaukee Transit Co., 142 Fed. Rep. 247; United States v. Union Stock Yard, 226 U. S. 286; Wade v. Lutcher, 74 Fed. Rep. 517; Watson v. Bonfils, 116 Fed. Rep. 157; Williams v. Northern Lumber Co., 113 Fed. Rep. 382.

Mr. Luther M. Walter and Mr. H. M. Garwood, with whom Mr. W. R. Thurmond was on the brief, for appellees:

The service performed by each of the appellee railways is a service of transportation by a common carrier within the meaning of the Act to Regulate Commerce.

Appellee railways are not plant facilities and do not perform a plant facility service for the lumber companies, appellees herein.

There was no evidence upon which the Interstate Commerce Commission could base its finding that the participation by the appellee railways in joint rates upon the

Argument for Tap Lines.

234 U. S.

logs and lumber of the appellee lumber companies constitutes an undue or unreasonable preference, or subjects any party to any illegal discrimination within the meaning of the Act to Regulate Commerce.

The Commission's order results in undue and unreasonable preference and unjust discriminations within the meaning of the Act to Regulate Commerce as between carriers subject to the Act to Regulate Commerce and as between shippers.

The order deprives appellees of their rights under the Constitution of the United States.

The order of the Commission expressly overrides the exception contained in the Commodities Clause of the Act to Regulate Commerce.

In support of these contentions, see Amos Kent Co. v. Assessor, 114 Louisiana, 862; Butte & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Montana Union R. Co., 16 Montana, 504; Bridal Veil Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 30 Oregon, 581; 46 Pac. Rep. 790; Beaumont &c. R. R. v. A., T. & S. F., 24 I. C. C. 161, 163; Chapman v. Trinity Valley Ry. Co., 138 S. W. Rep. 440; Columbia Conduit Co. v. Commonwealth, 90 Pa. St. 307; Contra Costa Ry. Co. v. Moss, 23 California, 323; Commodities Clause Case, 213 U. S. 366-417; Crane Iron Works v. United States, 209 Fed. Rep. 238; DeCamp v. Hibernia Ry. Co., 47 N. J. Law, 46; Diffenbaugh Case, 176 Fed. Rep. 409; Elevator Cases, 14 I. C. C. 324; 176 Fed. Rep. 409; 222 U. S. 42; Federal Sugar Case, 20 I. C. C. 200; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196; Greasy Creek Co. v. Ely Jellico Coal Co., 132 Kentucky, 692; General Electric Co. v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 14 I. C. C. 237; Kans. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. North West. Coal Co., 161 Missouri, 288; 61 S. W. Rep. 864; Kettle River Ry. Co. v. Eastern Ry. Co., 43 N. W. Rep. 473; La. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 209 Fed. Rep. 247; Manufacturers Ry. Co. v. St. L., I. M. & So. Ry., 21 I. C. C. 304, 312; Madura Railway Co. v. Raymond Granth Co., 86 Pac. Rep. 27; Mitchell Coal Co. v.

234 U.S.

Argument for Louisiana R. R. Comm.

Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 230 U. S. 247, 264; Solvay Process Co. v. D., L. & W. R. R. Co., 14 I. C. C. 246; Ulmer v. Railway Co., 98 Maine, 581; 57 Atl. Rep. 1001; Union Stock Yard Case, 226 U. S. 286; United States v. Balt. & Ohio R. R. Co., 231 U. S. 274.

Mr. Wylie M. Barrow, with whom Mr. Ruffin G. Pleasant, Attorney General of the State of Louisiana, was on the brief, for the Railroad Commission of Louisiana, intervenor and appellee:

The interest of the State of Louisiana in these cases lifts them from the category of mere private controversy and places them on the plane of public questions.

Many important railroads now operating in Louisiana originated as tap lines.

There is a public necessity for the tap line railroads. The questions here presented, being public in their nature, and not merely private controversy, are of great interest to the people of the State of Louisiana.

In support of the contentions of the State, see Agee v. Louis. & Nash. R. R. Co., 152 Alabama, 344; Amos Kent Brick Co. v. Tax Collector, 114 Louisiana, 862; Butte & Pac. R. Co. v. Montana Union Ry., 16 Montana, 504; Caldwell v. Richmond &c. R. Co., 89 Georgia, 550; Central Yellow Pine Ass'n v. Vicksburg &c. R. R. Co., 10 I. C. C. 193; Chi., B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Cutts, 94 U. S. 155; Chi., B. & Q. R. Co. v. Porter, 43 Minnesota, 527; De Camp v. Hibernia Ry. Co., 47 N. J. Law, 43; Denver &c. R. Co. v. Cahill, 8 Colo. App. 158; Re Divisions of Joint Rates, 10 I. C. C. 385; Dock Co. v. Garrity, 115 Illinois, 155; Lake Superior R. R. Co. v. United States, 93 U. S. 442; McCloud Lumber Co. v. So. Pac. Co., 24 I. C. C. 89; National Dock Co. v. Central R. R. Co., 32 N. J. Eq. 755; N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357; Phillip v. Watson, 63 Iowa, 28; 18 N. W. Rep. 859; Star Grain Co. v. Atchison &c. Ry. Co., 17 I. C. C. 338; S. C., 14 I. C. C. 364; Tap Line

Cases, 23 I. C. C. 277; Re Transportation Hutchinson Salt, 10 I. C. C. 1; Ulmer v. Lime Rock Ry. Co., 98 Maine, 579; United States v. Union Stock Yard, 226 U. S. 286; Winona R. R. Co. v. Blake, 94 U. S. 180.

MR. JUSTICE DAY, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

A preliminary objection is made to the jurisdiction of the Commerce Court in that the order of the Commission is not reviewable because merely of a negative character. The Commerce Court examined this question and in view of the amended order of October 30, 1912, reached the conclusion that the order was affirmative in its nature and of a character permitting of review by proper proceedings in that court under the act giving it jurisdiction in such cases. We find no reason to differ with this conclusion and are of opinion that the Commerce Court had jurisdiction in the case.

It is further insisted upon the authority of Procter & Gamble Co. v. United States, 225 U. S. 282, and other cases in this court which have followed that decision, that in the present cases the decision rests upon conclusions of the Commission as to matters of fact only, which are within the sole jurisdiction of that body and not reviewable in the courts. But we shall consider the case upon the findings of fact preceding this opinion, which are identical with those made by the Commission, and test the conclusions reached as matters of law, giving proper consideration to matters of fact which are not in dispute.

The final decree of the Commerce Court vacated and set aside the portion of the Commission's order reading as follows:

"That the tracks and equipment with respect to the industry of the several proprietary companies are plant facilities, and that the service performed therewith for the