Opinion of the Court.

234 U.S.

of the State, although interstate commerce was thereby indirectly affected; and that until specific action by Congress or the Commission, the control of the State over such incidental matters remained undisturbed. Hence, a decision by the Supreme Court of Kansas, awarding a mandamus to require the company to restore the service of transferring cars between the lines of another railroad and the Larabee Mills and Elevator, in aid of interstate and intrastate shipments alike, was affirmed. This case arose after the enactment of the Hepburn Act.

On the other hand, it was held in the Reid Case that since Congress had taken control of the subject of the making of rates and charges, and by § 2 of the Hepburn Act had forbidden the carrier to engage or participate in transportation unless the rates, fares, and charges had been filed and published in accordance with the provisions of the act, a state law requiring railroad companies to receive freight for transportation whenever tendered at a regular station and to forward the same over the route selected by the person offering the shipment, under a penalty of fifty dollars a day besides all damages incurred, was in necessary conflict, since it required the carrier to do the very things forbidden by the Federal law.

So in Chicago, R. I. &c. Ry. v. Hardwick Elevator Co., 226 U. S. 426, it was held that since by the Hepburn Act, Congress had legislated concerning deliveries of cars in interstate commerce by carriers subject to the act, specifically requiring the carrier to provide and furnish "transportation" (cars being embraced within the definition of the term) upon reasonable request, the authority of the State of Minnesota to legislate upon the subject of the delivery of cars when called for to be used in interstate traffic was superseded. And see Yazoo & Mississippi R. R. v. Greenwood Grocery Co., 227 U. S. 1.

These cases recognize the established rule that a state law enacted under any of the reserved powers-especially

if under the police power-is not to be set aside as inconsistent with an act of Congress, unless there is actual repugnancy, or unless Congress has, at least, manifested a purpose to exercise its paramount authority over the subject. The rule rests upon fundamental grounds that should not be disregarded. In Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 148, the court, speaking by Mr. Justice Harlan, said: "It should never be held that Congress intends to supersede or by its legislation suspend the exercise of the police powers of the States, even when it may do so, unless its purpose to effect that result is clearly manifested. This court has said-and the principle has been often reaffirmed that 'In the application of this principle of supremacy of an act of Congress in a case where the state law is but the exercise of a reserved power, the repugnance or conflict should be direct and positive, so that the two acts could not be reconciled or consistently stand together.' Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227, 243." In Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501, 533, the court said: "When the question is whether a Federal act overrides a state law, the entire scheme of the statute must of course be considered and that which needs must be implied is of no less force than that which is expressed. If the purpose of the act cannot otherwise be accomplished-if its operation within its chosen field else must be frustrated and its provisions be refused their natural effect-the state law must yield to the regulation of Congress within the sphere of its delegated power [citing cases]. But the intent to supersede the exercise by the State of its police power as to matters not covered by the Federal legislation is not to be inferred from the mere fact that Congress has seen fit to circumscribe its regulation and to occupy a limited field. In other words, such intent is not to be implied unless the act of Congress fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with the law of the State." [Citing many cases.]

With respect to the specific effect of the Carmack

Amendment (set forth in the margin 1), it has been held, in a series of recent cases (Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491; C., B. & Q. Railway v. Miller, 226 U. S. 513; Chicago, St. P. &c. Ry. v. Latta, 226 U. S. 519; Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 227 U. S. 469; Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639; Missouri, Kans. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657; Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cramer, 232 U. S. 490; Great Northern Ry. v. O'Connor, 232 U. S. 508; Boston & Maine R. R. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97), that the special regulations and policies of particular States upon the subject of the carrier's liability for loss or damage to interstate shipments and the contracts of carriers with respect thereto, have been superseded.

But the Texas statute now under consideration does not in anywise either enlarge or limit the responsibility of the carrier for the loss of property entrusted to it in transportation, and only incidentally affects the remedy for enforcing that responsibility. As pointed out in the Cade

1 That any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company receiving property for transportation from a point in one State to a point in another State shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it or by any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass, and no contract, receipt, rule, or regulation shall exempt such common carrier, railroad, or transportation company from the liability hereby imposed; Provided, That nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or bill of, lading of any remedy or right of action which he has under existing law.

That the common carrier, railroad, or transportation company issuing such receipt or bill of lading shall be entitled to recover from the common carrier, railroad, or transportation company on whose line the loss, damage, or injury shall have been sustained the amount of such loss, damage, or injury as it may be required to pay to the owners of such property, as may be evidenced by any receipt, judgment, or transcript thereof.

Case, supra, it imposes not a penalty, but a compensatory allowance for the expense of employing an attorney, applicable in cases where the carrier unreasonably delays payment of a just demand and thereby renders a suit necessary. In fact and effect, it merely authorizes a moderate increment of the recoverable costs of suit in the large class of cases that are within its sweep, among which are incidentally included claims for freight lost or damaged in interstate commerce.

It is true that in Atlantic Coast Line v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, 208 (a case arising since the Hepburn Act), it was held that § 8 of the act of February 4, 1887, does not authorize the allowance of a counsel or attorney's fee in an action for loss of property entrusted to the carrier for purposes of transportation. But that is far from holding that it is not permissible for a State, as a part of its local procedure, to permit the allowance of a reasonable attorney's fee, under proper restrictions. In claims of this character, based upon the ordinary liability of the common carrier, although regulated by the Commerce Act, the state courts have full jurisdiction, and some differences respecting the allowance of costs and the amount of the costs are inevitable, as being peculiar to the forum. And we think that where a State, as in this instance, for reasons of internal policy, in order to offer a reasonable incentive to the prompt settlement of small but well-founded claims, and as a deterrent of groundless defenses, establishes by a general statute otherwise unexceptionable the policy of allowing recovery of a moderate attorney's fee as a part of the costs, in cases where, after specific claim made and a reasonable time given for investigation of it, payment is refused, and the claimant succeeds in establishing by suit his right to the full amount demanded, the application of such statute to actions for goods lost in interstate commerce is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Commerce Act and its amendments. The local

statute, as already pointed out, does not at all affect the ground of recovery, or the measure of recovery; it deals only with a question of costs, respecting which Congress has not spoken. Until Congress does speak, the State may enforce it in such a case as the present.

Judgment affirmed.

JOHNSON v. GEARLDS.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA.

No. 802. Argued May 1, 1914.-Decided June 8, 1914.

Where complainant's entire case rests on the construction of treaties with Indians in regard to reservations and on the claim that certain of such treaties have been repealed by the subsequent admission of the Territory within which the reservations are situated, this court has jurisdiction of a direct appeal from the District Court under § 238, Judicial Code.

The provision in Article VII of the treaty with the Minnesota Chippewa Indians of 1855, that the laws of Congress prohibiting the manufacture and introduction of liquor in Indian country shall be in force within the entire boundaries of the country ceded by that treaty to the United States until otherwise provided by Congress, relates to the outer boundaries and includes all the reservations that lie within. It is within the constitutional power of Congress to prohibit the manufacture, introduction or sale of intoxicants upon Indian lands, including not only land reserved for their special occupancy, but also lands outside of the reservations to which they may naturally resort; and this prohibition may extend even with respect to lands lying within the bounds of States.

Article VII of the Chippewa treaty of 1855 was not repealed directly or by implication by the subsequent act of Congress admitting Minnesota into the Union, nor was that article repealed by the effect of the subsequent treaties with the same bands of Chippewas of 1865 and 1867; but the intent of treaties of 1855, 1865 and 1867, as construed