if left to its work, is quite powerful enough, without bloodshed, to gain for humanity, at no expense at all, its object. The individual who is, I conceive, to overthrow the Emperor of Russia-who is to direct his own legions against himself—who is to do, what Napoleon at the head of his Great Army failed to effect, IS THE LITTLE CHILD, WHO LIGHTED BY THE SINGLE WICK OF A SMALL LAMP, SITS AT THIS MOMENT PERCHED ABOVE THE GREAT STEAM-PRESS

OF OUR PENNY MAGAZINE, feeding it, from morning till night, with blank paper, which, at almost every pulsation of the engine, comes out stamped on both sides with engravings, and with pages of plain, useful, harmless knowledge, which, by making the lower orders acquainted with foreign lands—foreign productions-various states of society, &c. tend practically to inculcate―" GLORY TO GOD IN THE HIGHEST, AND ON EARTH PEACE- GOOD WILL TOWARDS MEN."

This child, then-" this sweet little cherub that sits up aloft," is the only army that an enlightened country like ours should, I humbly think, deign to oppose to one who reigns in darkness-who trembles at day-light, and whose throne rests upon ignorance and despotism. Compare this mild, peaceful, intellectual policy, with the dreadful, savage alternative of going to war, and the difference must surely be evident to every one. In the former case, we calmly enjoy, first of all, the pleasing reflection, that our country is generally imparting to the nations of Europe, the blessings she is tranquilly deriving from the purification and civilization of her own mind; far from wishing to exterminate, we are gradually illuminating, the Russian peasant-we are mildly throwing a gleam of light upon the fetters of the Russian Prince; and surely every well-disposed person must see, that if we will only have patience,

the result of this noble temperate conduct must produce all that reasonable beings can desire. But on the other hand, if we appeal to arms-if losing our temper and our head, we endeavour (as the bear is taught to dance) to civilize the Emperor of Russia by hard blows, we instantly consolidate ali the tottering elements of his dominions; we give life, energy, and loyalty to his army; we avert the thoughts of his princes from their own dishonour; we inflame the passions, instead of awakening the sober judgment of his subjects, and thus throwing away both our fulcrum and our lever, by resorting to main strength, we raise the savage not only to a level with ourselves, but actually make ourselves decidedly his inferior; for Napoleon's history ought surely sufficiently to instruct us, that the weapons of this northern Prince of Darkness-(his climate and his legions)—even if we had an army, we ought not, in prudence, to attack; but the fact is, our pacific policy has been to try to exist without an army, in the opinion of all military men we have even disarmed ourselves too much, and in this situation, suddenly to change our system, and without arms or armour to attack one who is almost invulnerable, would be most irrationally to paralyze our own political machinery. If, by its moral assistance, we merely intend, under the blessings of Heaven, to govern and be governed, we surely ought not from anger to desert its standard; and, on the other hand, it must be equally evident that before we determine on civilizing the Emperor of Russia, by trying the barbarous experiment, of whether his troops or ours can, without shrinking, eat most lead, it would be prudent to create an army, as well as funds able to maintain it; for

"Beware

Of entrance to a quarrel; but, being in,

Bear it, that the opposer may beware of thee!"

Ib.

67.

Painful it is to tell my woes-painful

To keep them silent-'tis on all sides horrible. Eschylus in Prom.

68.

There is this malady incident to the tyrant: never to confide in his friends.—Ib.

69.

The frontiers of states are either large rivers, or chains of mountains, or deserts. Of all these obstacles to the march of an army, the most difficult to overcome, is the desert; mountains come next, and large rivers occupy the third place.

Military Max. of Napoleon.

70.

In forming the plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee every thing the enemy may do, and to be prepared with the necessary means to counteract it. Plans of campaign may be modified, ad infinitum, according to circumstances, the genius of the general, the character of the troops, and the feature of the country.—Ib.

71.

When the conquest of a country is undertaken by two or three armies, which have each their separate line of operation, until they arrive at a point fixed upon for their concentration, it should be laid down as a principle, that the junction should never take place near the enemy, because the enemy, in uniting his forces, may not only prevent it, but beat the armies in detail.—Ib.

72.

All wars should be governed by certain principles, for every war should have a definite object, and be

conducted according to rules of art.

War should

only be undertaken with forces proportioned to the obstacles to be overcome.-Ib.

73.

At the commencement of a campaign, to advance or not to advance, is a matter for grave consideration; but when once the offensive has been assumed, it must be sustained to the last extremity. However skilful the manœuvres, a retreat will always weaken the morale of an army, because in losing the chances of success, these last are transferred to the enemy. Besides, retreats cost always more men and matériel than the most bloody engagements; with this difference, that in a battle, the enemy's loss is nearly equal to your own, whereas in a retreat, the loss is on your side only.—Ib.

74.

A general-in-chief should ask himself frequently in the day, what should I do, if the enemy's army appeared now in my front, or to my right, or my left? If he have any difficulty in answering these questions, he is ill-posted, and should seek to remedy it.-Ib.

75.

The strength of an army, like the power in mechanics, is estimated by multiplying the mass by the rapidity; a rapid march augments the morale of an army, and increases all the chances of victory.Ib.

76.

When an army is inferior in number, inferior in cavalry, and in artillery, it is essential to avoid a general action. The first deficiency should be supplied by rapidity of movement; the want of artillery

acted upon the same principles.

These have beento keep their forces united-to leave no weak part unguarded-to seize with rapidity on important points. Such are the principles that lead to victory, and which, by inspiring terror at the reputation of your arms, will at once maintain fidelity, and secure subjection.-Ib.

88..

Peruse again and again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, Frederick. Model yourself upon them. This is the only means of becoming a great captain, and of acquiring the secret of the art of war. Your own genius will be enlightened and improved by this study, and you will learn to reject all maxims foreign to the principles of these great commanders.-Ib.

89.

When war has been once decided on, the moment is past for doubts and scruples. On the contrary, we are bound to hope that the evil which may ensue, will not.-Montecuculli.

90.

The principle of the greatest of republics was to suffer nothing to exist in competition with its own ambition; but the Roman history is a history without fathers and brothers!-D'Israeli.

91.

There is more philosophy in editions, than many philosophers are aware of.—Ib.

92.

To tell stories is not to lay down principles, yet principles may sometimes be conveyed in stories.

Ib.