practised there that a clerk other than the one on duty when she registered, from the character and appearance of her signature, which was without prefix or other indication that it was that of a woman, inferred that the person entitled to occupy the room was a man, and that she was an intruder therein and had gone there for immoral purposes.

The question of the rights and liabilities of an innkeeper toward his guests was discussed in the case of DeWolf v. Ford (1908) 193 N. Y. 397, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 860, 127 Am. St. Rep. 969, 86 N. E. 527, reversing (1907) 119 App. Div. 808, 104 N. Y. Supp. 876, wherein it appeared that a servant of the innkeeper entered the room of a female guest without her consent, her brother being in the room at the time, and accused her of improper and immoral conduct. It was held that the innkeeper was liable for the acts of the servant, the court saying: "Upon the facts of record, considered in the light of this very general statement of the rules which govern the relation of innkeeper and guest, it is clear that the defendants were guilty of a most flagrant breach of duty towards the plaintiff. As a guest for hire in the inn of the defendants, the plaintiff was entitled to the exclusive and peaceable possession of the room assigned to her, subject only to such proper intrusions by the defendants and their servants as may have been necessary in the regular and orderly conduct of the inn, or under some commanding emergency. Had such an emergency arisen, calling for immediate and unpremeditated action on the part of the defendants or their servants, in conserving the safety or protection of the plaintiff or of other guests, or of the building in which they were housed, the usual rules of decency, propriety, convenience, or comfort might have been disregarded without subjecting the defendants to liability for mistake of judgment or delinquency in conduct; but for all other purposes their occasional or regular entries into the plaintiff's room were subject to the fundamental consideration that it was, for the time

being, her room, and that she was entitled to respectful and considerate treatment at their hands. Such treatment necessarily implied an observance by the defendants of the proprieties as to the time and manner of entering the plaintiff's room, and of civil deportment towards her when such an entry was either necessary or proper. Instead of acting according to these simple rules, the servant of the defendants forced his way into the plaintiff's room under conditions which would have caused any woman, except the most shameless harlot, a degree of humiliation and suffering that only a pure and modest woman can properly describe."

So, in McCarthy v. Niskern (1875) 22 Minn. 90, wherein it appeared that the plaintiff engaged and paid for a room at the defendant's hotel, and that, at the time he wished to retire, the defendant refused to let him have the room and ejected him from the hotel, it was held that the defendant was liable for punitive as well as compensatory damages.

So, in Morningstar v. Lafayette Hotel Co. (1914) 211 N. Y. 465, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 740, 105 N. E. 656, wherein it appeared that an innkeeper refused to serve a guest who refused to pay a disputed charge, it was held that if the bill was in fact unjust the innkeeper was liable.

In McHugh v. Schlosser (1894) 159 Pa. 480, 23 L.R.A. 574, 39 Am. St. Rep. 699, 28 Atl. 291, it appeared that an innkeeper caused a guest to be removed from the hotel during his illness, and that the death of the guest resulted. It was held that the innkeeper was liable if he removed the guest in a manner unsuited to his condition.

In Morris Hotel Co. v. Henley (1906) 145 Ala. 678, 40 So. 52, a hotel keeper was held to be responsible for an assault by him on a guest, though he had no knowledge that the person whom he assaulted was a guest of the hotel.

from. Holden v. Carraher (1907) 195 Mass. 392, 81 N. E. 261, 11 Ann. Cas. 724; Hurd v. Hotel Astor Co. (1918) 182 App. Div. 49, 169 N. Y. Supp. 359; Lamond v. Richard [1897] 1 Q. B. (Eng.) 541, 66 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 315, 76 L. T. N. S. 141, 61 J. P. 260, 45 Week. Rep. 289, 61 J. P. 260.

(Mass.)

In Holden V. Carraher supra, it was held that an innkeeper was not liable for using the force necessary to remove a guest from the hotel, where the guest was conducting himself improperly, and refused to leave when requested to do so by the innkeeper.

So, in Lamond v. Richard (Eng.) supra, it was held that a person who remained at a hotel for ten months, and had no intention of leaving, ceased to be a guest of the hotel, and the innkeeper, after giving her reasonable notice to leave, could not be held liable for excluding her from the hotel, she having lost her status as a transient, and the innkeeper being, therefore, under no obligation to continue to entertain her.

In Hurd v. Hotel Astor Co. (1918) 182 App. Div. 49, 169 N. Y. Supp. 359, an innkeeper was held not to be liable for the alleged humiliation and shock to a guest, where an employee, on learning that the guest had received a man in her room contrary to the rules of the hotel, interrogated her, and, on learning that the man was her husband, stated that he regretted having spoken to her about it. The court said: "If a man visits a hotel in which his wife is a guest, and desires to meet her and visit her, surely the obvious, decent thing for him to do, for the protection of all concerned, is to announce his relationship. And if he for some reason, or through carelessness, omits to do so, can he complain if the hotel managers object to his presence in the bedroom of the woman?"

In Malin v. McCutcheon (1903) 33 Tex. Civ. App. 387, 76 S. W. 586, it was held that the plaintiff could not recover damages for humiliation, loss of credit, etc., for being wrongfully excluded from a room in a hotel, where no actual damages were shown.

11. Liability for act of servant. It is generally held that an act of wrongful interference with a guest, committed by a servant of the innkeeper while engaged in his employer's business, or endeavoring to enforce a rule of the house, is within the scope of his employment, and the innkeeper is liable for his act. Florence Hotel Co. v. Bumpas (1915) 194 Ala. 69, 69 So. 566, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 252, 10 N. C. C. A. 144; Wade v. Thayer (1871) 40 Cal. 578; Newcomb Hotel Co. v. Corbett (1921) Ga. App. —, 108 S. E. 309; Lehnen V. Hines (1912) 88 Kan. 58, 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 830, 127 Pac. 612; Overstreet v. Moser (1901) 88 Mo. App. 72; Dalzell v. Dean Hotel Co. (1916) 193 Mo. App. 379, 186 S. W. 41; De Wolf v. Ford (1908) 193 N. Y. 397, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 860, 127 Am. St. Rep. 969, 86 N. E. 527, reversing (1907) 119 App. Div. 808, 104 N. Y. Supp. 876; Boyce v. Greeley Square Hotel Co. (1920) 228 N. Y. 106, 126 N. E. 647, affirming (1917) 181 App. Div. 61, 168 N. Y. Supp. 191. And see the reported case (FREWEN v. PAGE, ante, 134).

830,

Thus, in Lehnen v Hines (1912) 88 Kan. 58, 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 127 Pac. 612, it appeared that the plaintiff, while a guest at the defendant's hotel, was disturbed in the night by the defendant's clerk, who forced his way into the plaintiff's room, and, on her refusing to leave the hotel at his request, had her placed under arrest and taken to jail. It was held that the clerk in ejecting the plaintiff was acting for the defendant, and within the apparent scope of his authority, and that the defendant was responsible to the guest for the acts of the clerk. And see the reported case (FREWEN V. PAGE, ante, 134.)

In Wade v. Thayer (1871) 40 Cal. 578, wherein it was alleged that a servant and an employee of the defendant, a hotel keeper, entered the room of a guest and assaulted him, it was held that, if the assault was committed by the servant and employee while in the performance of their duties as such, the defendant would be liable for the injuries suffered by the guest, though he was not present.

The inference that the clerk and night watchman, or house man, were acting within the scope of their employment, so as to make the innkeeper responsible for their conduct, was held in Newcomb Hotel Co. v. Corbett (1921) — Ga. App. 108 S. E. 309, to be a permissible if not a necessary one, where the house man, who carried pass-keys to the rooms, and who was charged with the duty of keeping order and looking after things generally, including "anything that comes up," at the request of a clerk, who told him that there was something wrong in a certain room, went to the room and opened the door with a passkey in order to ascertain what was going on there.

So, in Overstreet v. Moser (1901) 88 Mo. App. 72, wherein it appeared that a guest at the defendant's hotel was assaulted and injured by one of his servants while the guest was attempting to locate the room of a friend, it was held that the hotel keeper was properly held liable for the acts of his servant.

Likewise, in Florence Hotel Co. v. Bumpas (1915) 194 Ala. 69, 69 So. 566, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 252, 10 N. C. C. A. 144, a hotel proprietor was held liable for the acts of his servants, who removed a guest's baggage from his room, and insulted and humiliated the guest by calling him in the night and demanding that he come to the office.

In Clancy v. Barker (1904) 71 Neb. 83, 91, 69 L.R.A. 642, 115 Am. St. Rep. 559, 98 N. W. 440, 103 N. W. 446, 8 Ann. Cas. 682, 15 Am. Neg. Rep. 594, 18 Am. Neg. Rep. 173, it appeared that the plaintiff and his infant son were guests at the defendant's hotel. The infant son entered a room occupied by one of the defendant's employees, who was off duty at the time, and was struck by a ball from a pistol which was accidentally discharged by the employee. It was held that the hotel keeper was liable for the injuries to his guest caused by the employee, although the employee was not, at the specific time of the injury, in the active discharge of a duty connected with his employment. But the Federal court

took a different view of the case, and in (1904) 131 Fed. 161, held that the defendant was not liable, on the theory that an innkeeper is not an insurer of the safety of his guests against injury, and that the employee was not, at the time of the accident, engaged in the discharge of any duty for the defendant.

In Rahmel v. Lehndorff (1904) 142 Cal. 681, 65 L.R.A. 88, 100 Am. St. Rep. 154, 76 Pac. 659, 16 Am. Neg. Rep. 7, it was held that an innkeeper was not liable to a guest who was assaulted by a waiter while seated at the dining table, since the assault was not authorized or within the scope of the waiter's employment, and it was not shown that the innkeeper was negligent in employing or retaining the waiter.

But compare Duckworth v. Appostalis (1913) 208 Fed. 936, wherein an innkeeper was held to be liable for the act of his servant, who committed an assault on a guest, it being shown that the innkeeper had knowledge of the violent disposition and quarrelsome characteristics of the servant, and still retained him as an employee.

So, it was held in Moon v. Conley (1918) 9 Ohio App. 16, that it is the duty of the proprietor of a hotel to use reasonable care to protect a guest from assault, and in case of failure to perform that duty, the proprietor is liable for damages.

In Stringfellow v. Grunewald (1902) 109 La. 187, 33 So. 190, it appeared that the plaintiff, while a guest at a hotel, procured a waiter to sign a certain letter bearing on the facts of a controversy between the plaintiff and the hotel management. Sometime thereafter the waiter requested her to return the letter. The plaintiff became frightened at the conduct of the waiter, and, while in the act of seeking protection, she slipped on the steps of the hotel and was injured. A judgment for the innkeeper was ordered on the grounds that the plaintiff was in fault for having induced the waiter to sign the letter, and that he was not acting within the scope of his employment when he requested the return of the letter. L. W. B.