making the information contained therein prima facie evidence is quite another. It will be observed that the section makes the certificate or a copy prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. In each of the cases cited by both the appellant and respondent, except the case from Wisconsin, the question arose in an action brought to collect upon a life insurance policy. In none of those cases did the attending physician attempt to set out how or from what cause the disease originated or developed. The certificate simply named the disease causing death. In the present case there is no question that the child died of ptomaine poisoning. The only controversy is as to the cause of such poisoning. The certificate was not essential to establish the fact of death or the disease that caused the same. The physician in his certificate, under the subdivision, "Cause of Death," wrote: "Ptomaine poisoning from decomposed meat." Let it be conceded that medical science has advanced to that degree of exactitude whereby it can be determined as an absolute certainty that a patient is afflicted with a particular disease or ailment. It will not, however, be contended, I assume, that medical science can determine with any degree of absolute certainty what caused such disease, especially when, as in this case, the disease may have resulted from different causes. In the very nature of things, whatever information the physician may have as to the cause of the disease, in a great many cases, at least, must be acquired from information obtained from others, and not from his attendance upon the patient. In support of appellant's contention that the statement in the death certificate respecting the cause of the disease in this particular case was merely a conclusion of the physician, wholly unsupported by any professional judgment, based upon no proven fact, and for that reason not entitled to be designated a fact, in the cross-examination of the physician the following appears: Q. It is a matter of fact that you or any other person cannot tell what caused the child's death, except your judgment would be ptomaine poisoning? A. Yes, sir; that is true. Q. You cannot tell whether it was decomposed meat, or ice cream, or what it was? A. Just as a matter of judgment. Q. And so, when you filed this certificate with the state board of health, and stated the cause to be from ptomaine poisoning, you simply did it because that was your judgment? A. That is right. Q. There was nothing certain about it? A. I would have to say that I would be a Q. Was there? Tell us. That it is advisable and frequently in the interest of the state that a public record be kept of the births and deaths of the inhabitants of the state cannot be well doubted. Such record, when kept as provided by law, ought to be competent evidence of the fact of such birth or death, and is of interest to the public, and a method or means of proving facts which it might be difficult in a great many cases to otherwise establish. But I cannot believe or conclude that the legislature, by the enactment of 5058, supra, intended to nullify and set aside the ordinary rules of evidence and make com (— Utah, - petent ex parte statements or hear- It is, however, insisted by respondent that, if the plaintiff was entitled in the first instance to object to the introduction of the death certificate, that objection was waived by the extensive cross-examination of the physician who made the certificate. That contention is not supported by the authorities. Bowers, Waiver, & 419; Carpenter v. Ginder, 1 Wis. 243; Pratt v. Missouri P. R. Co. 139 Mo. App. 502, 122 S. W. 1125. petition for rehearing in which he insists that this court erred in affirming the judgment. In the brief filed in support of the petition counsel concedes that "the death certificate is prima facie evidence . . . that death was caused from ptomaine poisoning." He, however, contends that we erred in holding that the physician's certificate was admissible in evidence for the purpose of showing the primary as well as the immediate cause of death. death. The statutory requirement is that the attending physician, in the certificate of death, shall state the "cause of death, including the primary and immediate causes and contributing causes or complications, if any, and the duration of each." The statute, therefore, makes it just as essential to state the "primary" or initial cause in the certificate as it does the last or "immediate" cause of death. If the legislature can require the physician to state the immediate cause of death, and can make that statement in the certificate prima facie evidence, upon what theory or process of reasoning can it be held that the legislature may not require him to certify the primary cause, and make that statement prima facie evidence? The matter of requiring death certificates comes directly within the police power of the state, and, as pointed out in the opinion, has been so recognized from time immemorial, both in the civil and common law, and hence is under legislative, and not judicial, control. While it is true that the regulation, whatever course it takes, must not exceed the bounds of reason, how can a court say that it is a reasonable For the reasons indicated, I dis- regulation to require the attending sent. physician to certify the immediate cause of death, but that it is manifestly unreasonable to require him to certify in connection with the immediate cause the primary causes? If the immediate cause comes within the power to regulate, then it necessarily follows that the primary cause is also within that power. Primarily it is a matter for the leg islature to determine to what extent Record-death certificate legislative discretion. the regulation shall go for the protection of public as well as private interests. In order to fully protect those interests it may well be that a statement of the primary and contributing causes are quite as material and important, if not more so, than is the statement of the immediate cause of death. Under certain circumstances private interests may not be fully protected by a mere statement of the immediate cause of death. Merely to require that may in certain instances shed little, if any, light upon the real cause which resulted in death. Indeed, a careless or unscrupulous physician could make a statement concerning the cause of death so as to conceal rather than disclose that cause. Where, as here, a person is concerned in knowing the real cause of death, but doubts the statement of the attending physician, he can, by placing the certificate in the hands of an expert, and one who has experience and training in the science of medicine, learn the real cause of death. An expert, by reason of his knowledge and experience, in case the primary and contributing causes and complications and symptoms are stated, can readily determine whether the immediate cause of death is correctly stated in the certificate or otherwise. If, upon the other hand, nothing is stated except the bare immediate cause of death, no one, however experienced or expert he may be, can determine the truth from the statement in the certificate. To require the statements the statute requires, therefore, may be a safeguard against fraud and deception which can be detected from an inspection of the statements contained in the certificate. Then again, to require a full statement of all the causes and complications, if any, conforms to a sound. rule of evidence, in that it presents the whole case, and not only a fragmentary part. Where the statements fully comply with the statute, and are admitted in evidence, they may afford a protection to the attending physician as well as to those who may be interested in the cause of death; while if only the immediate cause of death is stated, and the case has become stale by lapse of time, injustice may result which can be avoided only by a complete statement of all the causes, complications, and symptoms. The statutory requirements, therefore, tend to protect rights rather than otherwise. If, therefore, the legislature may make the statement of the immediate cause of death prima facie evidence, it can also make the primary and contributing causes prima facie evidence. To hold otherwise would result in substituting the judgment of the courts for that of the legislature, whose province it is to regulate the matter within the bounds of reason. This court is too firmly committed to the doctrine of noninterference with legislative acts, unless such acts are clearly and palpably in disregard of some constitutional provision or are manifestly contrary to public policy, to now undertake to depart from that doctrine. How can a humane and carefully considered regulation like the one in question be held to be in contravention of either the Constitution or public policy? The petition for rehearing should be, and accordingly is, denied. Corfman, Ch. J., and Thurman, J., concur. Weber, J., dissents. Gideon, J., concurring in the order denying petition for rehearing: Every argument found in the petition for a rehearing was contained in the original briefs of counsel and considered by the court at the time the majority and dissenting opinions were handed down. So long, therefore, as a majority of the court are of the opinion that the legislature, by § 5058, quoted in the opinion, intended to make the ex parte statements of the attending physician prima facie evidence not only of the disease that resulted in death, (- Utah, but also of the contributory causes which produced the disease, I can see no reason for granting a rehearing. I fully concur that the statute "requiring death certificates comes squarely within the police power of the state." The police power is re I. Scope of note, 359. 199 Pac. 406.) served for the protection of the public, not to determine private rights. As stated in my former opinion, no case is cited that holds such statements, respecting the cause which produced the disease, as found in the death certificate in this case, admissible in evidence. ANNOTATION. Death certificate as evidence. This note discusses those cases only wherein the question of the admissibility of a death certificate as evidence is discussed. Decisions as to the admissibility of the findings of a coroner to show the cause of death, or as to the admissibility of records of death kept by a clergyman or the like, are excluded as not pertinent. II. Certificate constituting public record. a. View that record is admissible. The decisions as to the admissibility in evidence of a public record or a certified copy thereof containing the certificate of a physician as to the cause of the death of a person seem to be in conflict. Some jurisdictions hold that such a record or a certified copy is admissible to show the cause of the death of the person named therein if the certificate is made pursuant to a statute, and the record is properly kept as required by law. Connecticut.-Hennessy v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. (1902) 74 Conn. 699, 52 Atl. 490. Illinois. National Council, K. L. S. v. O'Brien (1904) 112 Ill. App. 40. Compare Court of Honor v. Clark (1906) 125 Ill. App. 490; Bishop v. Chicago City R. Co. (1917) 204 Ill. App. 286. Massachusetts.-Shamlian v. Equitable Acci. Co. (1917) 226 Mass. 67, 115 N. E. 46. Michigan. Krapp v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. (1906) 143 Mich. 369, 114 Am. St. Rep. 651, 106 N. W. 1107; Gilchrist v. Mystic Workers (1915) 188 Mich. 466, 154 N. W. 575, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 757. Missouri.-Reynolds v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1901) 88 Mo. App. 679; Ohmeyer v. Supreme Forest, W. C. (1901) 91 Mo. App. 189. Compare Lucas v. Current River Land & Cattle Co. (1905) 186 Mo. 448, 85 S. W. 359. Oregon.-State v. McDonald (1909) 55 Or. 419, 103 Pac. 512, 104 Pac. 967, 106 Pac. 444. (1902) 113 Wis. 578, 89 N. W. 504; State v. Pabst (1909) 139 Wis. 561, 121 N. W. 351; McGinty v. Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen (1917) 166 Wis. 83, 164 N. W. 249. Compare Rohloff v. Aid Asso. for Lutherans (1906) 130 Wis. 61, 109 N. W. 989; Cohodes v. Menominee & M. Light & Traction Co. (1912) 149 Wis. 308, 135 N. W. 879. England. See Parkinson v. Francis (1846) 15 Sim. 160, 60 Eng. Reprint, 578; Traill v. Kibblewhite (1845) 10 Jur. 107. Thus, in Hennessy v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. (Conn.) supra, an action on an insurance policy, on an issue as to the cause of death of the father of the insured, the defendant insurance company offered in evidence a certified copy of the "death record" of the father from the public records of the registrar of births, deaths, and marriages of the city. This record was a copy of a certificate filed and signed by the attending physician, in which the cause of death was stated as tuberculosis pulmonum. The plaintiff claimed that he had died of a different disease. The physician had previously testified for the defense that he had attended the father in his last sickness, and that the latter had died of consumption of the lungs. The court held that the copy of the death record was erroneously excluded; that the defendant had the right to put in the copy as corroborative evidence of the testimony of the physician, and also as independent evidence of the facts recorded. In Ohmeyer v. Supreme Forest, W. C. (Mo.) supra, the court said: "The certificate offered in evidence is called a copy of the burial certificate, but is in both form and substance a certificate of death, conforming in every particular with the charter and was deposited where the law required a death certificate to be filed; to wit, in the office of the health commissioner. It was properly authenticated, and, by express provision of the charter, was competent evidence, and should have been admitted as presumptive evidence of the fact that Kate Geraghty died of consumption." In Gilchrist V. Mystic Workers (1915) 188 Mich. 466, 154 N. W. 575, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 757, an action on a life insurance policy, a death certificate which was made out by the physician who had attended the insured, and filed with the secretary of state, as required by the statute, was offered in evidence to prove the cause of death. The last sentence of the death certificate read as follows: "Contributory. Abortion, said by deceased to have been performed by Dr. -." It was contended that this sentence was improperly excluded as hearsay. The court said: "The objection was that this was hearsay, and therefore incompetent, and not a proper part of the certificate required by the statute. We are of the opinion that the certificate properly included the words 'Contributory. Abortion.' A fair interpretation of the certificate is that the contributing cause of death was within the knowledge of the physician, and was not hearsay. The remainder of the certificate was hearsay. The proper certificate was admissible under the statute." In Shamlian v. Equitable Acci. Co. (1917) 226 Mass. 67, 115 N. E. 46, it appeared that the insured left home in search of employment, and nothing further was known of his whereabouts for over a month, when his body was found in a shallow grave. The medical examiner examined the body and filed a certificate in the office of the city clerk as to the time, place, and cause of death, as required by law. In an action by the beneficiary on the insurance policy the defendant objected to the record of the certificate of death being introduced in evidence. It was held that the certificate was properly admitted under a statute providing that a record of the city or town clerk, relative to death, is prima facie evidence of the facts recorded. The court added: "We are of opinion that the statute, reasonably and properly construed, is not merely a police regulation adopted for public purposes only, but that it applies to any proceeding in which the facts recited in the record are relevant and material." In the reported case (BOZICEVICH v. KENILWORTH MERCANTILE Co. ante, 346) it is held that it was not error to admit a certified copy of the record of a certificate of death as evidence of the cause thereof, under a statute providing that if the certificate is made out and recorded as required by the statute, a certified copy of the record is prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. In Thompson v. Seattle R. & S. R Co. (1912) 71 Wash. 436, 128 Pac. 1070, an action for damages for injuries resulting in death, it appeared |