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(112 Wash. 117, 191 Pac. 1101.) advised the jury, in effect, that if the evidence was before the jury, the plaintiff had made any admis that the instruction was a proper sions indicating that the collision one in all except the reference to was due to his own fault, such ad- knowledge of the law applicable missions must be considered in the thereto, but since light of all the circumstances sur
it is a common ad- Appeal
presumption of rounding him when made, and age, known and re- error in would be binding upon him only in peated everywhere, case he was then fully advised as to that every man is presumed to know all of the facts, and as to the law the law, we cannot, in the absence applicable thereto. The evidence of anything in the record to so inwhich called forth this instruction dicate, hold that the jury was miswas introduced by appellant and de
led thereby. nied by respondent, and, as we read An additional error is assigned, it, the statements, if made, and if admissible at all, amounted to no
but not argued, relating to still
another instruction. We have exmore than an expression of opin
amined the instruction referred to, ion that both parties were to blame, or, in one instance, that it was his
and are unable, unaided, to find anyown fault,-in either case a conclu- thing therein approaching reverssion and not a fact, and as such not
ible error. apt to be very con The judgment of the trial court is Evidenceadmission of vincing with a jury, affirmed. fault in
and easily suscepticollision. ble of excuse or ex
Holcomb, Ch. J., and Fullerton, planation. We have no doubt, since Mount, and Bridges, JJ., concur.
Highway: contributory negligence of pedestrian injured by vehicle, in walking
on left-hand side of road.
The legal principle which underlies slight change of position would have this question is what is known as the avoided, and to do so will amount to "law of the road,” which is explained contributory negligence which will in 13 R. C. L. 270, as follows: "In the preclude a recovery for injuries thereUnited States and in England certain by sustained. The exceptions to the rules regarding the rights of vehicles 'rule of the road' depend upon the and persons meeting or passing in the special circumstances of the case, and public highway have been established in respect to which no general rule by long-continued custom or usage, or, can be applied." in many jurisdictions, by statutory Under the common law the rule of regulation. These rules and regula the road does not apply to pedestrians. tions are usually spoken of as the Apperson v. Lazro (1909) 44 Ind. App. law of the road' or the 'rules of the 186, 87 N. E. 97, rehearing denied in road.' These rules are, however, not (1909) 44 Ind. App. 195, 88 N. E. 99; inflexible, and a strict observance Cotterill v. Starkey (1839) 8 Car. & P. should be avoided when there is a (Eng.) 691. plain risk in adhering to them, and And generally the statutes prescribone who too rigidly adheres to such ing the rule of the road have reference rules, when the injury might have to vehicles, and those riding or drivbeen averted by variance therefrom, ing animals upon the highway, and do may be charged with fault. A not refer to pedestrians.
Yore v. traveler may not remain stubbornly Mueller Coal Heavy Hauling & Transand doggedly upon the right of the fer Co. (1899) 147 Mo. 679, 49 S. W. traveled part of the highway, and 855, 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 630; Savage v. wantonly produce a collision which a Gerstner (1899) 36 App. Div. 220, 55
N. Y. Supp. 306, 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 237; along the extreme left of the road. MARTON V. PICKRELL (reported here In this case the court said: “It is a with) ante, 68.
matter of common knowledge that a Elliott, in his work on Roads' & pedestrian on a highway, or Streets, 3d ed. § 1090, says: “The 'law double-track line of railway, is far of the road,' in its strict sense, does better able to look out for his own not obtain with respect to footmen; safety and protection by so traveling they may meet and pass on either side, as to face all oncoming vehicles than and drivers of carriages or other he would be if keeping to the same vehicles may also pass footmen on side of the roadway as vehicular either side, all that is required being traffic, and being thus at all times the exercise of due and reasonable obliged to keep watch to the rear." care under the circumstances. As And it was held in Work v. Philamong themselves, the degree of care adelphia Supply Co. (1920) - N. J. L. required by foot passengers is such -, 112 Atl. 185, that the trial court as the nature of the way, the number could not say as a matter of law that of people upon it, and other circum a pedestrian injured while walking on stances, demand, and must, it is said, the left-hand side of a road, on a side depend in a great measure upon the path for pedestrians, was guilty of injury likely to happen if such care contributory negligence, but that her is not observed.”
negligence was a question for the It was held in the reported case jury, and a finding that she was not (MARTON v. PICKRELL, ante, 68) that negligent was sustained, where it in the absence of clear stat appeared that an automobile, coming utory rule requiring pedestrians to from behind on the right-hand side keep on the right side of the road in of the road, suddenly turned to the passing vehicles, the question of left and slid across the road, turned contributory negligence was for the over in back of the pedestrian, and jury in case of collision between an fell upon her to her injury. automobile and a pedestrian walking
G. V. I.
TURLOCK IRRIGATION DISTRICT, Respt.,
v. JAMES G. WHITE, Tax Collector of Tuolumne County, et al., Appts. California Supreme Court (In Banc) - June 15, 1921.
(- Cal. - 198 Pac. 1060.) Tax — irrigation district as municipal corporation within meaning of tax
laws. An irrigation district is not a municipal corporation within the operation of a constitutional provision rendering the property owned by such corporations outside their boundaries subject to taxation by the organization in which it is located. [See note on this question beginning on page 81.]
(Sloane, J., dissents.)
APPEAL by defendants from a judgment of the Superior Court for Tuolumne County (Nicol, J.) in favor of plaintiff in an action brought to enjoin defendants from attempting to collect certain taxes levied by the defendant county against plaintiff's lands. Affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
(- Cal. 198 Pac. 1060.) Mr. Rowan Hardin for appellants. Authority to levy and collect such
Messrs. P. H. Griffin and Griffin, tax is claimed by the defendant Boone, & Boone, for respondent: county under the Amendment of An irrigation district is not a munic
1914 to § 1 of article 13 of the state ipal corporation for the purpose of
Constitution. As this section of the taxation within the meaning of the Amendment of 1914.
Constitution previously stood, it Dill. Mun. Corp. 5th ed. $ 34;
provided that no property belonging Pleasant Twp. v. Ætna L. Ins. Co. 138
to the "United States, this state, or U. S. 68, 34 L. ed. 865, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. to any county or municipal corpo215; Dean v. Davis, 51 Cal. 406; ration within this state," shall be People v. Reclamation Dist. 53 Cal. subject to taxation. The Amend348; Hoke v. Perdue, 62 Cal. 545;
ment excepts from such exemption People v. La Rue, 67 Cal. 526, 8 Pac.
"such lands and the improvements 84; Central Irrig. Dist. v. DeLappe, 79 Cal. 351, 21 Pac. 825; Lindsay
thereon located outside of the counStrathmore Irrig. Dist. V. Tulare ty, city and county, or municipal County, 182 Cal. 315, 187 Pac. 1056; corporation owning the same as Re Madera Irrig. Dist. Bonds, 92 Cal. were subject to taxation at the time 321, 14 L.R.A. 755, 27 Am. St. Rep. 106, of the acquisition of the same by 28 Pac. 272, 675; People v. Selma Irrig. Dist. 98 Cal. 206, 32 Pac. 1047; Quint
said county, city and county, or v. Hoffman, 103 Cal. 506, 37 Pac. 514,
municipal corporation." 777; Perry v. Otay Irrig. Dist. 127 Cal. The entire controversy in this 565, 60 Pac. 40; Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. case is as to whether or not an irriv. Bradley, 164 U. S. 174, 41 L. ed. 394, gation district, organized under the 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 56.
laws of California, is a “municipal Irrigation districts are public cor
corporation" within the meaning of porations, but not municipal corpora
this section of the Constitution. tions.
This Amendment to the ConstituIndian Cove Irrig. Dist. v. Prideaux, 25 Idaho, 112, 136 Pac. 618, Ann, Cas.
tion (art. 13, § 1) was submitted by 1916A, 1218; People ex rel. Sels v. the legislature to the people in NoReclamation Dist. 117 Cal. 114, 48 Pac. vember, 1914. A printed argument 1016; Re Werner, 129 Cal. 567, 62 Pac. in favor of its adoption accompa97.
nied the publication of the proposed The property of an irrigation dis
Amendment, a copy of such argutrict situated in another county is not
ment being mailed to each voter in assessable and taxable.
the state as required by law. Pol. Webster v. University of California, 163 Cal. 705, 126 Pac. 974; Reclama
Code, $$ 1195, 1195a, 1195b. This tion Dist. v. Sacramento County, 134
argument in favor of the proposed Cal. 477, 66 Pac. 668; Middle Kittitas Amendment clearly explains its Irrig. Dist. v. Peterson, 4 Wash. 147, purpose, and the voters, in acting 29 Pac. 995; Bettencourt v. Industrial upon the Amendment, must be Acci. Commission, 175 Cal. 559, 166 deemed to have considered such reaPac, 323.
sons in interpreting the general Per Curiam:
term “municipal corporation” used This appeal is by defendants, in the proposed Amendment. The from a judgment enjoining them argument, in part, was as follows: from attempting to collect certain
“This Amendment does not seek taxes levied by the defendant county to hinder in any way the developagainst lands of the plaintiff.
ment of enterprises by and for the The plaintiff, an irrigation dis
benefit of counties or municipalities, trict, whose corporate boundaries
in any part of the state, but to are wholly within the counties of protect from loss those counties inMerced and Stanislaus, is the owner
to which they may enter for such of land situated in the county of purposes. A concrete illustration Tuolumne. It is the taxation of this is afforded by the counties of Tuoland by the county of Tuolumne lumne, Mono, and Inyo. In furtherthat is sought to be enjoined.
ance of obtaining a large water
supply, for municipal and other fullest extent that the investing uses, the purchase by San Francisco city might see fit to go. in Tuolumne county aggregated “It is to remedy such a condition over $1,000,000 worth of property. that this Amendment was proposed. Los Angeles, in Owens river valley, Uncertainty on the matter should acquired by purchase over 75,000 be removed by a legal assurance acres of land, amounting to over that, while natural resources withone sixth of the assessed value, and in one county may be directly used more than one fourth of the located for the upbuilding of another, land agricultural land of the county. or other property already upon the The city of Los Angeles has ac invaded county's tax roll shall conquired large holdings in Mono tinue to bear its share of maintaincounty. Before such acquisition the ing the local government. area was tax-paying property. Since "It is hoped, therefore, that the the acquisition in Inyo county, the justice of this Amendment will incity of Los Angeles has continued sure for it the approval of the peoto pay taxes, as a matter of justice, ple of the state.' but its payments are accompanied It is apparent that the term by protests, in order to preserve to "municipal corporation" was thus it the right of refusal to pay which presented to the people as synonymany contend that it has under the mous with such corporations as Los constitutional provision as it stands Angeles and San Francisco; that is at present, and that it might sus to say, as municipal corporations in tain in case of legal contest. While the strict technical sense. not abandoning any right from a In their brief appellants say: "To technical standpoint, the city recog start with, it will be admitted that nizes the justice of the contention by the late decisions of the supreme upon which this Amendment is court said decisions have, by an exbased.
ceedingly fine analysis, determined “The city of San Francisco re that, as a technical, legal proposifuses absolutely to pay one dollar in tion, an irrigation district is an taxes in Tuolumne county on their arm of the state government, or a $1,000,000 worth of property, con public corporation, and not a munictending they are exempt from such ipal corporation, as the term “mua tax by a constitutional provision. nicipal corporation' is technically
known.” "It would be possible for an ac However, appellants' contention quiring city or county to virtually is that the term "municipal corpodestroy the government of a small ration," in its popular acceptation, county by acquiring, for one pur includes irrigation district, and, pose or another, for municipal use, consequently, this popular meaning the substance of its revenue-yield
is to be applied, rather than a tech
nical one. ing property. That such a result
The rule appellants rely would be imporbable and extreme
on is thus stated in a recent case does not alter the fact of its possi
(Pasadena v. Railroad Commission, bility. In the Inyo county instance,
Cal. —, 10 A.L.R. 1425, 192 Pac.
25): "The Constitution, 'unlike the refusal by the city of Los Angeles
acts of our legislature, owes its to pay taxes upon real estate which
whole force and authority to its has heretofore borne its due share
ratification by the people, and they of the expense of the county gov judged of it by the meaning apernment would be a serious matter,
parent on its face, according to the either curtailing the county's wel general use of the words employed, fare or imposing a heavier burden where they do not appear to have on other property. With such a re been used in a legal or technical sult possible to a fractional extent, sense.' Miller v. Dunn, 72 Cal. 465, it would be equally possible to the 1 Am. St. Rep. 67, 14 Pac. 28.
of tax laws.
(-- Cal. 198 Pac. 1060.) Where a word has a popular and contention, because the very nature also a technical meaning, the courts of the subject, the context of the will accord to it its popular mean Amendment, and the manner and ing, unless the very nature of the reason for its presentation, all resubject indicates, or the context quire that it be construed in its suggests, that it is employed in its technical sense, and, hence, it is technical sense.' Weill v. Kenfield, within the exception of the rule of 54 Cal. 113."
construction above stated. There Other instances of its application are, however, other cogent reasons may be found in Miller v. Dunn, 72 for concluding that an irrigation Cal. 462–465, 1 Am. St. Rep. 67, district is not in14 Pac. 27; Towle v. Matheus, 130 cluded within the district as
Tax-irrigation Cal. 574-577, 62 Pac. 1064; San term “municipal municipal Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Co. v. Hamil- corporation" as used within meaning ton, 161 Cal. 610-617, 37 L.R.A. in the Amendment. (N.S.) 686, 119 Pac. 1073; Perrin The nature of an irrigation district v. Miller, 35 Cal. App. 129-132, 169 has been a matter of judicial invesPac. 426.
tigation and interpretation, and it In support of the proposition that has been held that such a corporathe term “municipal corporation” tion is not a municipal corporation, as commonly understood, includes but a "public corporation for munican irrigation district, the following ipal purposes." Fallbrook Irrig. quotation from Merchants
Merchants Nat. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 41 Bank v. Escondido Irrig. Dist. 144 L. ed. 369, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 56. As Cal. 329, 77 Pac. 937, is cited: to swamp land, drainage, levee, and
But the term ‘municipal, reclamation districts, similar to iras commonly used, is appropriately rigation districts, it has been held applied to all corporations exercis that they are not municipal corpoing governmental functions, either rations. People ex rel. Silva v. general or special; and, indeed, this Levee Dist. 131 Cal. 30, 63 Pac. 676; must be taken as the definition of People ex rel. Chapman v. Sacraa public or municipal corporation." mento Drainage Dist. 155 Cal. 373,
Appellants also cite the following 103 Pac. 207; Swamp Land Dist. v. from Re Madera Irrig. Dist. Bonds, Silver, 98 Cal. 51, 32 Pac. 866, and 92 Cal. 296, 319, 14 L.R.A. 755, 27 Reclamation Dist. v. Sherman, 11 Am. St. Rep. 106, 28 Pac. 277: Cal. App. 399, 105 Pac. 277. See also "The municipal corporations which People v. Selma Irrig. Dist. 98 Cal. may be thus created are not limited 206, 208, 32 Pac. 1047, and cases to cities and towns. The Constitu there cited. The Amendment in tion makes provision in various
in various question must be considered to have places for municipal corporations, been framed and submitted to the other than cities and towns. Art. people with these decisions in mind, 11, $$ 9, 10, 12, 16. In each of these by which it was settled that such sections provision is made with ref- corporations were not "municipal erence to the government or officers corporations." of 'county, city, town, or other pub It is worthy of note that, at the lic or municipal corporation,' thus very election at which this constituclearly indicating that there may be tional Amendment was adopted, municipal corporations other than several amendments were submitted those of a town or city.”
in which the term "irrigation disThe fact that the argument sub trict" was used. For illustration, $ mitted to the voters indicated that 13, art. 11, was amended to prohibit the term “municipal corporation” the legislature from interfering was used with technical accuracy with any county, city, town, or requires that the rule relied upon municipal improvement, etc., "exby appellants be applied against cept that the legislature shall have them, rather than in favor of their power to provide for the supervi