sion, regulation, and conduct, in such manner as it may determine, of the affairs of irrigation districts, reclamation districts, or drainage districts, organized or existing under any law of this state."

Article 11, § 131, was amended to include "irrigation district" in the phrase "county, city and county, city, town, municipality, or other public corporation," so that the phrase now reads: "Any county, city and county, city, town, municipality, irrigation district, or other public corporation," etc., thus tending to impress upon the voter that the term "municipality" did not include an "irrigation district."

At the same election, art. 11, § 6, was amended by the people. This section restricts the power of the legislature, in the formation of municipal corporations, to providing by general law for their formation, and prohibits the formation of such corporations by special statute. That section uses the term "municipal corporation," as synonymous with "cities and towns." The section reads, in part, as follows: "Sec. 6. Corporations for municipal purposes shall not be created by special laws; but the legislature shall, by general laws, provide for the incorporation, organization, and classification, in proportion to population, of cities and towns.

If it were intended by the legislature and by the people to use the term "municipal corporation" with its broadest possible meaning in art. 13, § 1, supra, it is reasonable to suppose that language similar to that contained in art. 11, § 13, supra, would have been employed, expressly including, as does the latter section, the term "irrigation districts."

One of the important rules of constitutional. construction is thus stated by Mr. Cooley: "If .

a difficulty really exists, which an examination of every part of the instrument does not enable us to remove, there are certain extrinsic aids which may be resorted to, and which are more or less satisfactory

in the light they afford. Among these aids is a contemplation of the object to be accomplished or the mischief designed to be remedied or guarded against by the clause in which the ambiguity is met with." Cooley, Const. Lim. p. 100. (Italics the author's.)

In view of the general policy of the law, and the great necessity on which that policy rests, that property held by public corporations shall not be taxed by the state, much less by other public corporations, and the plain fact that this particular Amendment of the Constitution was manifestly inspired by the desires of three counties to prevent Los Angeles and San Francisco from escaping taxation on property owned by them, situated outside their limits, for the carrying on of public water systems, together with the further fact that the Constitution itself, in other parts thereof, describes "municipal corporations," and provides for their creation in such a way that it cannot be doubted that none other than the ordinary municipal corporations were referred to, it is clear that irrigation districts were not made taxable by the exception contained in the Amendment in question.

It should be stated that it is conceded that irrigation districts were not taxable before the Amendment of 1914, and are not now, unless such taxation is authorized by the Amendment, but it is contended that they then were exempt because. of the special exemption of the property of "municipal corporations" contained in such section, and that such irrigation districts are now taxable under the special exception in the Amendment, authorizing the taxation of "municipal corporations." To the contrary, such exemption existed because of the express exemption of the property of "the state," and contained in that section because of the implications in favor of the exemption of public property. See Reclamation Dist. v. Sacramento County, 134 Cal. 477, 66 Pac. 668, and cases

therein cited for a discussion of the principle applicable. See also Webster v. University of California, 163 Cal. 705, 126 Pac. 974, and cases cited. Reference may also be made to Central Irrig. Dist. v. De Lappe, 79 Cal. 351, 21 Pac. 825, and Lindsay-Strathmore Irrig. Dist. v. Tulare County, 182 Cal. 315, 187 Pac. 1056, for a discussion of the similarity of the organization of reclamation and irrigation districts.

The language quoted in the dissenting opinion from Southern Pac. Co. v. Levee Dist. 172 Cal. 345, 156 Pac. 502, read in the light of the express statement in the opinion that such districts are not "municipal corporations," would indicate that the court considered that the property of the district was "state property," rather than property of a "municipal corporation." The same view is taken in People ex rel. Sels v. Reclamation Dist. 117 Cal. 114, 48 Pac. 1016, where it is said: "Certainly, these districts were not municipal corporations as that term is used in the Constitution." "If these districts can be said to be corporations at all, I think they are properly called public corporations for municipal purposes. That phrase means no more than that they are state organizations for state purposes. They certainly are not municipal corporations in the strict sense."

Similarly, in Re Madera Irrig. Dist. Bonds, 92 Cal. 296, 322, 14 L.R.A. 755, 27 Am. St. Rep. 106, 28 Pac. 278, it was said: "The property held by the corporation is in trust for the public, and subject to the control of the state."

However, the reasons presented for the conclusion reached in Southern Pac. Co. v. Levee Dist. supra, were so numerous and cogent that the differentiation between the various forms of taxing agencies was of little, if any, weight in arriving at the conclusion that it was intended by the Amendment to prohibit all such agencies from exercising the taxing power over railroad corporations, that the decision is of

little or no assistance in reaching a conclusion on the question involved here.

Judgment affirmed.

Angellotti, Ch. J., and Wilbur, Shaw, Olney, Lennon, and Lawlor, JJ., concur.

Sloane, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The reasoning of the majority opinion that this constitutional provision should be strictly interpreted against the tax in question, because all intendments of the law are against the taxation of public property, cannot apply in this instance, because here the provision involved is avowedly dealing with the taxation of public property.

Section 1 of article 13 expressly defines what classes of public property shall be exempt from taxation. It discloses, first, that "all property in the state except as otherwise in this Constitution provided, not exempt under the laws of the United States, shall be taxed." Standing alone, under the rule cited, this might not include public property, exempt under the general rule of public policy, but the section proceeds with a proviso which shows that it is dealing with the subject of taxation as applied to both public and private property.

The proviso is that various enumerated classes of property, including "such as may belong to the United States, this state, or to any county, city and county, or municipal corporation within this state, shall be exempt from taxation."

It is entirely clear that unless the property of an irrigation district is either the property of the state or of a municipal corporation it is not exempt from taxation at all. When the legislature or Constitution has made express provision for the exemption of certain classes of public property, the inference is clear that it did not intend that other classes should be exempt. 26 R. C. L. p. 291; Chicago Sanitary Dist. v. Martin, 173 Ill. 243, 64 Am. St. Rep. 110, 50 N. E. 201; Gate City Guard v. Atlanta, 113 Ga. 883, 54 L.R.A. 806, 39 S. E. 394. But under our

Constitution the matter is made conclusive by the direction that all property not so enumerated shall be taxed.

This court was confronted with such an alternative in the case of Reclamation Dist. v. Sacramento County, 134 Cal. 477, 66 Pac. 668. As stated in the opinion in that case: "The sole question presented is whether property acquired by a reclamation district, as necessary and indispensable to the execution of its objects, is subject to taxation for state and county purposes."

Exemption was claimed for this property by the district under § 1 of art. 13 of the Constitution as it read prior to the Amendment of 1914, exempting all property which belongs to "this state, or to any county or municipal corporation within this state." Reviewing the authorities on the question as to whether or not a reclamation district was a municipal corporation, without directly passing upon this point, the court disposes of the case upon another theory. It says: "It is not necessary to hold this property, thus acquired, to be the property of a municipal corporation, in order to make it exempt from taxation. It would be sufficient to hold that it is public property of the state, within the meaning of the Constitution."

It requires great latitude of construction to hold the property of a reclamation district as property "belonging to the state," but, considering the nature of such district organization, with its limited corporate powers under the law as it existed at the time covered by this decision, it was perhaps a more logical conclusion than to class it as a municipal corporation.

The supreme court of Illinois, in determining the liability of a drainage district of the city of Chicago to taxation upon property it owned outside the corporate limits of the city under analogous constitutional provisions (Chicago Sanitary Dist. v. Martin, supra), held that, as the legal title to the property was

vested in the district, it could not be held to be property "belonging to the state."

People ex rel. Pierce v. Morrill, 26 Cal. 336, defines "lands belonging to the state" as those "(1) which it holds by virtue of grants from the United States; (2) those which it owns by reason of its sovereignty."

In either event, the term implies ownership, and not mere authority and control over. In view of the fact that the law of California governing irrigation districts expressly provides that "the legal title to all property acquired under the provisions of this act shall immediately and by operation of law vest in such irrigation district," it would be an elastic use of terms to hold that the interest of the state in such lands amounts to such ownership as to justify holding such property to belong to the state.

As previously pointed out, the only remaining alternative which will permit of any exemption of irrigation district property at all is to include such district, for the purposes of this section, as a "municipal corporation."

It, of course, follows that, if the general exemption clause of § 1, art. 13, of the Constitution, includes irrigation districts under the classification of "municipal corporations," the exception from such exemption of "lands and the improvements thereon located outside the county, city and county, or municipal corporation, owning the same,' must also apply to such irrigation districts, for the term "municipal corporations" is obviously used in the same sense in both connections. But the most persuasive reason for classifying an irrigation district as a municipal corporation, under this constitutional provision, is that any other construction, in my opinion, defeats the very apparent purpose of the Amendment.

It is doubtless true, as set forth in the argument presented to the voters on the submission of this Amendment, that the inducing

cause of the Amendment was the acquisition of large real-estate interests in the counties of Tuolumne, Mono, and Inyo, for reservoir purposes, by the distant cities of Los Angeles and San Francisco. These corporations happened to be governmental municipalities, but that was not the circumstance which appealed to the voters of these counties and others likely to be invaded by public power and water purvey

ors.

The real purpose was to prevent abuses threatened and likely to recur from permitting private lands subject to taxation in one jurisdiction to be taken over for public uses by other communities, and, by depriving the territory in which the lands are situated of the revenue from this taxation, thus throw part of the burden of such public use upon territory not benefited by it. What possible reason or justification could there be for protecting these outside jurisdictions from the incursions of towns and cities in search of water storage and distribution, and leaving them exposed to precisely the same invasion by extensive irrigation districts outside their territory? The gist of the matter clearly appears in the part of the argument for this constitutional Amendment which says: "Uncertainty on this matter should be removed by a legal assurance that, while natural resources within one county may be directly used for the upbuilding of another, lands or other property already upon the invaded county's tax roll shall continue to bear its share of maintaining the county government."

The direct object of the Amendment was to protect and conserve the revenues of the invaded territory, and with that object in view it can make no difference whether the public use acquired is by a city or county, or some other public corporation exercising municipal functions.

No violence is done to the rules of construction under the interpretation of the term "municipal corpo

It

rations" here contended for. is common knowledge that in popular usage the term "municipal corporation" is understood as applying to all departments of state organization exercising public functions, and the same general use of the term is common in judicial decisions and with law text-writers.

In 19 R. C. L. p. 691, it is said that "municipal," in its primary sense, means "pertaining to a town or city or to its local government," but it also declares that the word "municipal" has two meanings, one of which is ""pertaining to the internal government of a state or nation,' and in that sense every corporation formed for governmental purposes is a municipal corporation;" and further, at page 696, it is said: "The legislature frequently organizes the people of a certain territory into a district having certain limited powers for the carrying out of some particular public purpose. Familiar examples are school districts, irrigation districts,

levee districts; . . but it has been held that such a district is a 'corporation for municipal purposes.'

Such district organizations are very commonly referred to in the California decisions as public corporations for municipal purposes, or quasi municipal corporations. Merchants Nat. Bank v. Escondido Irrig. Dist. 144 Cal. 329, 77 Pac. 937; People ex rel. Sels v. Reclamation Dist. 117 Cal. 120, 48 Pac. 1016; Central Irrig. Dist. v. De Lappe, 79 Cal. 351, 21 Pac. 825; Turlock Irrig. Dist. v. Williams, 76 Cal. 366, 18 Pac. 379; Hughes v. Ewing, 93 Cal. 414, 28 Pac. 1067; Perry v. Otay Irrig. Dist. 127 Cal. 565, 60 Pac. 40; Jenison v. Redfield, 149 Cal. 500, 87 Pac. 62; Fogg v. Perris Irrig. Dist. 154 Cal. 209, 97 Pac. 316; Healey v. Anglo-Californian Bank, 5 Cal. App. 278, 90 Pac. 54; Dean v. Davis, 51 Cal. 409.

The same classification is maintained in the Federal courts in the consideration of such districts under the laws of California. Fall

brook Irrig. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 174, 41 L. ed. 369, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 56; Tulare Irrig. Dist. v. Shepard, 185 U. S. 1, 46 L. ed. 773, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 531; Herring v. Modesto Irrig. Dist. (C. C.) 95 Fed. 705.

In the construction of words used in a constitution, a more general and inclusive definition is often recognized than in the more technical provisions of a statute or a contract. A constitution is the formulation of broad general rules of governmental policy, submitted to the popular will and understanding for their adoption.

"Where a word having a technical as well as a popular meaning is used in a constitution, the courts will accord to it its popular signification." Weill v. Kenfield, 54 Cal. 111; Miller v. Dunn, 72 Cal. 462, 465, 1 Am. St. Rep. 67, 14 Pac. 27; Towle v. Matheus, 130 Cal. 574, 577, 62 Pac. 1064; San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Co. v. Hamilton, 161 Cal. 610, 617, 37 L.R.A. (N.S.) 686, 119 Pac. 1077; Perrin v. Miller, 35 Cal. App. 129, 132, 169 Pac. 426.

This rule of liberal construction appears to have been applied by this court in Southern P. Co. v. Levee Dist. 172 Cal. 345, 156 Pac. 502, construing the use of the word "municipal" in an Amendment to the state Constitution in a way which we think has a marked bearing on this case, In the Amendment of the Constitution by adoption of the new § 14, art. 13, for the purpose of changing the system of taxation of corporations, it was declared that the system of taxation provided should "be in lieu of all other taxes and licenses, state, county, and municipal." Levee district No. 1 of Sutter county, being a levee district organized under the act of the legislature for the creation of such districts, undertook to levy a tax upon property of the Southern Pacific Company within such district, and attempted to sustain the validity of such tax against the plea of of this constitutional

Amendment, on the ground that it is a district, and not a municipality, and that the Amendment does not exempt from district district taxation. This court, in the case cited, while holding directly that such levee district was not a municipal corporation, decided, upon an exhaustive consideration of the purposes of the section and the obvious intent of the constitutional Amendment, that district taxes of this nature were included under the term "municipal," and says: "It would appear to be beyond peradventure, therefore,

that when the Constitution declared that the state taxes 'shall be in lieu of all other taxes, state, county, and municipal,' it used the words 'state, county, and municipal,' as inclusive. and descriptive, and not as designed to exempt districts from its operation."

An irrigation district probably comes nearer than any other of the subordinate public corporations of the state to meeting the technical requirements defining a municipal corporation. It has its own directors and officers, conducts its own elections, can sue and be sued in its corporate name, issues bonds, levies, collects, and disburses its own revenues, acquires and holds property, both real and personal, in its own name, and in the management of its internal affairs is entirely independent of the county and state, aside from the control of general laws.

While the courts have frequently drawn the line between public corporations of a quasi municipal character and those performing strictly municipal functions, it has usually been for the purpose of defining limitations upon the political powers of these lesser state agencies; but no reason seems to exist why the distinction distinction should be pushed so far in this case as to exclude irrigation districts from the operation of the constitutional Amendment under discussion.

Petition for rehearing denied July 15, 1921.