all watch houses, signal stations, signals, and other similar appliances that may be now or at any time hereafter required," it has been held that an interlocking system is not a "similar" appliance within the meaning of the contract. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. (1901) 113 Wis. 169, 87 N. W. 1085, 89 N. W. 180.

Similar arrangement - contract.

In. Mitchell v. McCullough (1893) 4 Ohio C. D. 471, 1 Ohio Dec. 510, evidence that on the expiration of a contract "a similar arrangement" was entered into was held to be insufficient to show that the terms of the new contract were the same as the old. Similar articles-import duties.

Construing a statute relating to import duties, the court in United States v. Komada (1908) 89 C. C. A. 385, 162 Fed. 465, affirmed in (1909) 215 U. S. 392, 54 L. ed. 249, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 136, said: "One of the definitions of the word 'similar' which is given in Webster's Dictionary is ‘nearly corresponding; resembling in many respects; somewhat alike; having a general likeness.' We think it is in this sense the word is used in the section just quoted. The language of the statute is that each imported article not enumerated, which is similar 'either in material, quality, texture, or the use to which it may be applied, shall pay the same rate of duty which is levied on the enumerated article which it most resembles in any of the particulars before mentioned;' thus showing clearly that the article need not be the same in all respects, but that the required similarity is shown if there is a resemblance either in material, quality, texture, or the use to which it may be applied. And this similarity must, of course, be a real or substantial similitude in some one of the essential particulars named." See to the same effect, John A. Paterson & Co. v. United States (1908) 92 C. C. A. 524, 166 Fed. 733, wherein the court said: "Section 7 the similitude clause provides that each and every imported article, not enumerated in this

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act, which is similar, either in material, quality, texture, or the use to which it may be applied, to any article enumerated in this act as chargeable with duty, shall pay the same rate of duty which is levied on the enumerated article which it most resembles in any of the of the particulars before mentioned.' . . . It will be observed that in order to invoke the provisions of the similitude clause it is not necessary that the imported article shall be found similar to the enumerated article in all the particulars mentioned in § 7; it is enough if similarity be found in any one of these particulars. This is clearly stated in the brief for the appellee as follows: "There are four qualities in which the similitude may reside under § 7, to wit, material, quality, texture, and use; and the presence of one of these qualities is sufficient to establish the necessary degree of similitude.' It would seem, therefore, when the collector examined the tariff to find an article similar to a horsehair hat braid and found a very vague and questionable resemblance to one enumerated article in 'material,' and an exact identity to another enumerated article in the 'use to which it may be applied,' that it was his duty to proceed under the paragraph describing the latter." See also infra, "Similar description-import duties."

In the similitude of bank bills-forgery.

It has been held that "similar" does not mean "in the similitude of," within the meaning of a statute providing that "if any person shall have in his possession at one time, ten or more bank bills or notes, in the similitude of the bank bills or notes payable to the bearer or to the order of any person, issued or purporting to have been issued by any bank or banking company, etc., with intent to utter and pass, etc., such bank bills or notes, as true or false, knowing the same to be forged or counterfeit, he shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life, or any term of years;" and that an indictment charging a defendant with having “in his custody and possession, at the

same time, ten similar false, forged, and counterfeit bank bills, purporting to be ten bank bills, each payable to the bearer thereof, and to be signed by the president and cashier of the Merchants' Bank," etc., was insufficient. State v. McKenzie (1856) 42 Me. 392.

Similar buildings — water rate.

Under a statute (18 Vict. chap. 30, § 2) authorizing a municipality to specify and declare by by-law that the proprietors or occupiers of "houses, stores, and similar buildings" in the city should be subject to an annual rate, or assessment, which should not exceed 2 shillings in the pound on the assessed annual value of "occupied houses," and one half of the amount on "stores and similar buildings," it has been held that a building "in the lower part of which goods were sold, as well by wholesale as retail, and in the upper part of which there were offices, may, as regards water rates, be considered similar to buildings used for the storing and selling of goods by wholesale; and therefore that it ought to be held subject to the lower of the two water rates." Shaw v. Quebec (1864) 15 Lower Can. Rep. 68.

Similar business - agreement in lease. Where premises were leased with a covenant that the lessee should not conduct a business "similar" to that of another tenant, it was held that any business which was sufficiently like the designated business to compete therewith was "similar," within the meaning of the contract. Drew v. Guy [1894] 3 Ch. (Eng.) 25, 63 L. J. Ch. N. S. 547, 71 L. T. N. S. 220, 58 J. P. 803, 7 Reports, 220.

-building and loan association.

In People ex rel. Griffith v. Standard Home Co. (1915) 59 Colo. 355, 148 Pac. 869, it was held that a corporation which collected money from contract holders who were not stockholders, by stated dues and fines, and which loaned its funds to the contract holders on the terms provided for in the contracts, was engaged in doing a business similar in form and character to one which collected its 17 A.L.R.-7.

funds from its stockholders by statec dues and fines and loaned the funds to the stockholders.

Similar case - jurisdiction of court.

A state court having jurisdiction of a suit to recover a penalty for usury under the state law only where a demand was proved has been held to have jurisdiction of a suit to recover a penalty for usury from a national bank, without proof of a demand under a Federal statute (Rev. Stat. § 5198, Comp. Stat. § 9759, 6 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 747) conferring jurisdiction to entertain suits for the recovery of such a penalty from national banks on state courts "having jurisdiction in similar cases." Commercial Nat. Bank v. Phillips (1916) 61 Okla. 179, 160 Pac. 920. In that case the court said: "The additional point is made that the Federal statute confers jurisdiction to entertain suits of this nature only upon state courts 'having jurisdiction in similar cases,' and that inasmuch as demand is necessary as a condition precedent to maintaining such a suit against a state bank or an individual, brought under the state statute, the courts in this state have no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for the recovery of a penalty for usury against a national bank unless demand be proved, for the reason that unless such a demand be proved a state court has no jurisdiction of any action similar' to that arising under the Federal statute. With this contention we are not able to agree. In our judgment the word 'similar,' used in the Federal statute, refers to cases of like general nature, and does not mean cases exactly the that under the Federal

same as statute."

ing quarter to charitable institutions similar to those mentioned in article 13." The court held that the institutions named in article 13 were not competent to take under this provision of the will, but that institutions resembling them in the important particulars were competent to take.

Similar circumstances-price of electricity.

Under a statute (Act of Parliament 1882, § 19) which provided that every person within a certain area should be entitled to a supply of electricity on the same terms on which any other person in the area was entitled, under "similar circumstances," to a corresponding supply, it has been held that the circumstances were not similar where one consumer was on the day load, and another on the night load. Metropolitan Electric Supply Co. v. Ginder [1901] 2 Ch. (Eng.) 799, 70 L. J. Ch. N. S. 862, 84 L. T. N. S. 818, 49 Week. Rep. 508, 65 J. P. 519, 17 Times L. R. 435.

Similar construction — patent flooring.

It has been held that under a stipulation, in a contract granting a license to use a patent flooring process, that "the party of the second part, during the existence of this contract, shall not use or sell, or cause to be used or sold, any construction similar to that of said party of the first part which is hereby granted," any construction which could be used for the same purposes as that granted, so as to compete therewith, was "similar" and violation of the covenant. Standard Fireproofing Co. v. St. Louis Expanded Metal Fireproofing Co. (1903) 177 Mo. 559, 76 S. W. 1008.

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Similar description-import duties.

Under the United States Customs Act of 1862, which provided for a duty "on all delaines, cashmere delaines, muslin delaines, barege delaines, composed wholly or in part of worsted, wool, mohair, or goat's hair, and on all goods of similar description," it was held that the words "of similar description" were not words of art or commercial terms, but that the similarity intended by the statute referred to the product and its adap

tation to uses, and to its uses, and not to the process by which it was produced. Greenleaf V. Goodrich (1875) 1 Hask. 586, Fed. Cas. No. 5,778, affirmed in (1880) 101 U. S. 278, 25 L. ed. 845. See also supra, "Similar article-import duties."

Similar employment — discharged servant.

It has been held that it is not the duty of a tailor who has been wrongfully discharged, to hire out as a cook or a domestic servant, or to engage in other occupations uncongenial to him, under the rule requiring one who has been discharged to seek "similar employment." Tenzer v. Gilmore (1905) 114 Mo. App. 210, 89 S. W. 341.

Similar fees - foreign insurance company.

In Fidelity & D. Co. v. Brown (1918) 92 Vt. 390, 104 Atl. 234, the following section of the Vermont Insurance Statutes was construed: "If another state or country imposes upon or requires of a domestic insurance company or its agents doing business therein, fees, fines, penalties, deposits, obligations, or prohibitions exceeding those imposed by this state upon or required of foreign insurance companies doing business herein, an insurance company organized under the laws of such other state or country and its agents doing business in this state shall be subject to the fees, fines, penalties, deposits, obligations. or prohibitions similar to those so imposed in such other state or country." The court said: "It seems pretty clearly to have been the intention of the legislature, when this statute is applicable, to return like for liketo treat an insurance company coming from another state or country, to do business here, the same as such a company from this state is treated in such other state or country, while doing business there. So long as the provisions of the original bill related solely to life insurance companies, the amount of the fees, etc., was aptly fixed as 'the same.' And yet it was fixed by classification, for no two insurance companies, even of the same class, are identical; they have but a

general likeness, are therefore only similar. Were the law in terms to impose the same fees, etc., 'similar insurance companies,' there should seem to be no doubt as to the meaning intended; and yet as the law was passed, and as it now is, broad enough to bring within its provisions all insurance companies, we think the same idea of classification obviously flows out of the nature of the purpose to be accomplished, and that the word 'similar,' in connection of its use, carries with it this basic idea, and that such was the intention. Therefore, by the law of the section of the statute in question, when applicable, the fees, etc., which shall be imposed upon or required of an insurance company organized under the laws of another state or country, and its agents doing business in this state, shall correspond in amount to the fees, etc., imposed by such other state or country upon an insurance company of the same classification, incorporated in this state, or its agents, doing business in such other state or country." Similar household effects - import duties.

Under a statute providing that "books, libraries, usual and reasonable furniture, and similar household effects of persons or families from foreign countries, all the foregoing if actually used abroad by them not less than one year, and not intended for any other person or persons, nor for sale," shall be exempt from duty, it has been held that an automobile cannot be said to be similar to books, libraries, or usual and reasonable household furniture. v. W. R. Grace & Co. A. 596. 166 Fed. 748.

United States (1909) 92 C. C.

Similarly indorsed commercial paper. It has been held that the term "similarly indorsed," when used with relation to commercial paper, means presented to the holders in the same manner, and indorsed in the same handwriting. Merchant's Bank V. Bostwick (1878) 28 U. C. C. P. 450. Similar intelligence- instruction jury.

to

In Barker v. Ohio River R. Co.

(1902) 51 W. Va. 423, 41 S. E. 148, 90 Am. St. Rep. 808, 12 Am. Neg. Rep. 580, the court held that, in an instruction that "contributory negligence is the absence of that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person of similar intelligence and of the same class would exercise under like circumstances," the term "similar intelligence" meant ordinary intelligence.

Interest similarly affected — judgment.

In Mottet v. Stafford (1917) 94 Wash. 572, 162 Pac. 1001, it was held that where two creditors garnished a judgment, and only one of them was successful in the lower court, the unsuccessful creditor and an assignee of the judgment garnished were not parties whose interests were "similarly affected" within the meaning of the following statute: "All parties whose interests are similarly affected by any judgment or order appealed from may join in the notice of appeal whether it be given at the time when such judgment or order is rendered or made, or subsequently; and any such party who has not joined in the notice may at any time within ten days after the notice is given or served, serve an independent notice of like appeal, or join in the appeal already taken." Similar jurisdiction -hustings court.

In Chahoon v. Com. (1871) 21 Gratt. (Va.) 822, the court held that a clause in the Virginia Constitution declaring that "for each city or town in the state containing a population of 5,000, shall be elected, on the joint vote of the two houses of the general assembly, one city judge, who shall hold a corporation or hustings court of said city or town, as often, and as many days in each month, as may be prescribed by law with similar jurisdiction which may be given by law to circuit courts of this state, and shall hold his office for a term of six years," etc., was intended as an extension and not as a restriction, and that although the circuit court did not have jurisdiction of prosecutions for felonies, the hustings court might by law be given such jurisdiction.

Similar law - benefit of statute.

In Orr v. Wright (1898) Tex. Civ.

App. 45 S. W. 629, construing a statute providing that "the benefit of the provisions of this chapter shall not extend to the residents of any state, territory, district, or county in which a similar law does not exist in favor of the residents of this state," the court said: "The word 'similar' is often used to denote partial resemblance also sameness in all essential particulars. Com. v. Fontain (1879) 127 Mass. 454. Mr. Webster defines 'similar' as 'exactly corresponding, resembling in all respects, precisely alike; also, as nearly corresponding, resembling in many respects, somewhat alike, having a general likeness.' Webster's Int. Dict. 1895. We do not think that the restricted and circumscribed definition of the word 'similar' insisted upon by appellants is the one intended by the legislature when this statute was enacted. It was not contemplated that the benefits of this statute should only apply to the residents of the state, territory, etc., having a statute exactly like ours. It was intended that the benefits of this statute should extend to the residents of any state, territory, district, or county in which a remedy was provided by the laws of such state, territory, district, or county, for the removal of the estate of a nonresident ward of such state, etc., corresponding in its essential particulars to the provisions of our statute relating to nonresident guardians and wards."

Similar law-elections.

Construing a statute providing that, "after an election has been held in any territory under the provisions of this or any other similar law, no other or subsequent election shall be ordered or held for the same territory, or any part thereof, within six months next after said election," it has been held that an election to vote on annexing territory was similar to a former election to vote on annexing other territory, which included the territory subsequently sought to be annexed. State ex rel. Sigsbee v. Birmingham (1908) 160 Ala. 196, 48 So. 843.

Similar offense — punishment.

In Com. v. Fontain (1879) 127 Mass.

452, the court had under consideration a statute providing as follows: "When it is provided by law that an offender shall be punished by a fine and imprisonment in the jail, or by a fine and imprisonment in the house of correction, such offender may, at the discretion of the court, be sentenced to be punished by such imprisonment without the fine, or by such fine without the imprisonment, in all cases where the offender shall prove or show to the satisfaction of the court that he has not before been convicted of a similar offense." It was held that the legislature intended the word "similar" to denote sameness in all essential particulars, and that a conviction. for illegally keeping liquor for sale was not similar to a conviction for keeping a tenement used for illegally keeping and selling liquor, within the act.

Under a statute providing that "every person . . . who has or retains in his control or possession, after a distinctive paper has been adopted by the Secretary of the Treasury for the obligations and other securities of the United States, any similar paper adapted to the making of any such obligation or other security, except under the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury, or some other proper officer of the United States, shall be punished," etc., it has been held that a person having such distinctive paper in his possession without the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury was guilty of a violation of the act, as the paper was "similar" to itself in that it was "exactly alike." Krakowski v. United