know it is right. They know the terrible price that we pay when we are silent in the light of actions of this kind.

But they support it also because it will serve America's interests, the interests of our citizens, our voters, and our taxpayers.

The benefits of this treaty are not elusive. They are real and concrete. Let me just cite a few of the reasons for ratification.

First, ratification of the Genocide Convention will strengthen our hand in attacking the gross violations of human rights by the Soviet Union and its allies.

If the Vietnamese Communists commit genocide against religious groups in Cambodia, I want the United States to tell the world about it without challenge to our human rights dedication from other Communist nations.

The People's Republic of China systematically commits genocide against the Tibetans. I want us to be free to condemn that action without the inevitable propaganda about our failure to pass the Genocide Convention.

If one day the Russians turn against one of their national minorities and commit genocide, then the United States should be the world leader opposing that action. Nothing less should be expected from this Nation. But we will be unable to do this effectively without the passage of the Genocide Convention.

In sum, it is unlikely that genocide will be committed in any Western democratic nation. It is more likely that genocide will occur in nondemocratic, totalitarian, or Communist states. We need every device at our disposal to preclude that this happens; and, if it does occur, God forbid, we need every diplomatic, economic, and possibly military asset to stop such events.

We cannot do moral battle against genocide with one hand tied behind our backs.

Second, ratification of the Genocide Convention reasserts our intention to deal firmly with criminals who have violated the most sacred right known to man.

Third, the ratification of the Genocide Convention will help our relations with Third World nations as well.

Fourth, the ratification of this Convention will place the United States in a better position to bring our moral influence to bear in specific cases where genocide is alleged.

Finally, there is a moral imperative to ratify this treaty. Domestic statutes regarding murder are insufficient for, as Senator Javits has pointed out correctly, "genocide is murder and more.”

Mr. Chairman, I have not attempted in my statement to provide a line by line discussion of the Genocide Convention and the arguments that will be raised by the Liberty Lobby later in this hearing. Your next panel will be addressing those questions, and I merely have attempted to set the stage for that discussion.

However, I would like your permission to include as a permanent part of this record my full statement and other material which I believe will be helpful to the committee's review.

Mr. Chairman, the fight for ratification of this Convention often has been frustrating. Senator Javits noted during the 1977 hearings, and I quote:

The numbers of rumors, innuendos, misconceptions and scares that have been spread about this treaty are literally endless, and this has been done by people who are very, very competent and able in many other ways, but who somehow have an absolute blind spot on this one.

Mr. Chairman, some opponents of the Genocide Convention want it

both ways.

On the one hand, they assert that the Genocide Convention is a strong document, threatening our very civil liberties, a position which simply is not substantiated by this committee's own hearing record. On the other hand, they argue that the treaty is a "paper tiger." Where is the real enforcement authority, they ask? Yet, this question comes most often from those who would oppose any international enforcement mechanism the most.

Let me set the record straight.

This Senator is no advocate of one world government. This Senator does not support any super government with "enforcement authority" to interfere in our internal affairs. I do not believe in yielding U.S. sovereignty in any way. This treaty does not do that.

This is a very limited treaty, not a panacea for the world's ills, not a step toward one world government.

But, it is an important moral statement, a strong diplomatic tool in the hands of the world's most powerful and influential country. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Senator Proxmire's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM PROXMIRE

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I particularly want to commend you for the priority you have given this important human rights treaty, since assuming chairmanship of this Committee. Your efforts here today are continuing a long and bipartisan tradition of support for the Genocide Convention, which has been marked by four reports to the Senate enthusiastically recommending ratification. The Committee's tireless efforts to restore America's proper role as a world leader on human rights will not go unnoticed when the Senate ratifies the Genocide Convention.

Mr. Chairman, you are right to be moving ahead now. This is an opportune moment.

First. We have a new Administration-in office nearly a year now-and it is time to get them on record. In announcing the appointment of Elliot Abrams as the State Department's new Human Rights Coordinator, Secretary Haig pledged to restore human rights as a priority within our foreign policy.

Second. We have a new international climate which firmly underscores the need for the United States to regain the high moral ground in our competition with those who wish us ill. We have yielded this ground all too cavalierly by smugly asserting that our own record speaks for itself. It is a luxury that we can not afford if our diplomats are to speak out, and speak out forcefully, against the repressive actions of closed, totalitarian societies.

Third. We have a new Senate. Thirty-eight Members have been elected since your last hearings in 1977. Your own Committee reflects that change, Mr. Chairman. Only six of the current seventeen Members served on this Committee during the 1977 hearings and, only one, Senator Pell, was here when I testified during the 1970 hearings. A new hearing record will be helpful in dispelling any lingering arguments of the opponents of this Convention so that we can at long last proceed to ratification.

A TREATY TO PUNISH CRIMINALS

Mr. Chairman, in reviewing your earlier hearings, I was impressed by the great lengths to which your Committee has gone to consider every argument, allegation and concern raised by the opponents of this Convention. The accumulated testimony effectively refutes those arguments, demonstrating that the

Genocide Convention, together with the Understandings recommended by your Committee, deserves our wholehearted support.

As I pointed out during my testimony in 1977, few treaties have ever received the type of detailed line by line, word by word, syllable by syllable scrutiny that the Genocide Convention has received.

That review has demonstrated that the Genocide Convention really has two aspects.

First, it is a human rights treaty, which seeks to protect the most fundamental right known to mankind—the precious right to live.

Second, it is an international criminal treaty. A treaty designed to ensure that all nations, consistent with their own Constitutions, will do everything possible to prevent and punish criminals who attempt to commit the most heinous crime— the elimination of an entire national, ethnic, racial and religious group. The history of the Genocide Convention is clear on that second point.

The fact that the Genocide Convention evolved from the outrage of all decent human beings to the monstrous actions of the Nazis in attempting to eliminate every man, woman and child of Jewish ancestry within their borders is apparent to everyone.

What is not as apparent is the fact that the Genocide Convention exists because the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg determined that consideration of genocide was outside of the charter that established their Tribunal.

International reaction was swift. The General Assembly, with our support and encouragement, unanimously adopted a resolution declaring genocide an international crime. In the next two years, the Secretary General's office, the Economic and Social Council and a drafting committee, chaired by the United States delegate, John Maktos, labored to draft a Convention which would implement the General Assembly's resolution. In 1948 the General Assembly, with the enthusiastic support of the United States delegation, unanimously adopted the Genocide Convention and two days later the United States signed the Convention.

AMERICANS SUPPORT THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION

Mr. Chairman, since President Truman submitted the Genocide Convention to the Senate for ratification, this treaty has had the broad support of Americans across the country as well as their leaders.

President after President, Administration after Administration, have given this treaty their enthusiastic support-Republicans and Democrats alike, conservative and liberal alike.

This is not a partisan issue. It is not ideological.

The ranks of the Genocide Convention supporters cross party lines and ideological lines.

In fact, you will be hearing very shortly from the Ad Hoc Committee on the Genocide and Human Rights Treaties, a coalition of 52 labor, civic, religious and nationality organizations, representing millions of Americans across this country.

GENOCIDE CONVENTION IS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL AMERICANS

And why do they support the Genocide Convention, Mr. Chairman? Because it will serve America's interests. The interests of our citizens, our voters, our taxpayers.

The benefits of this treaty are not elusive. They are real and concrete.
Let me just cite a few of the reasons for ratification.

First, ratification of the Genocide Convention will strengthen our hand in attacking the gross violation of human rights by the Soviet Union and its allies. While the treaty itself is narrowly constructed, your 1970 hearing record makes it clear how this treaty will help.

Rita Hauser, a Republican respected on both sides of the aisle, and President Nixon's delegate to the Human Rights Commission, testified:

"We have frequently invoked the terms of this Convention as well as the provisions of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights . . . in our continued aggressive attack against the Soviet Union for its practices, particularly as to its large Jewish communities, but also as to the Ukranians, Tartars, Baptists and others. It is this anomoly (that) ... often leads to the retort in debates plainly put, simply put, "Who are you to invoke a treaty that you are not a party to?"

The 1977 hearings provide other devastating examples:

"The Soviet Union, usually on the defensive when the issue of human rights was proposed at the U.N., could and would charge the U.S. with hyprocrisy. In January, 1964, for example, when the U.S. member of the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination, Morris Abram, advocated forceful measures of implementation' in dealing with racial and ethnic discrimination, this Soviet colleague had but to remind the body that the U.S. was not even a contracting party to the Genocide Convention.

"Two years later, Abram vigorously endorsed a Costa Rican proposal that would have marked a significant breakthrough in the area of international human rights enforcement. . . . The Soviet Union's response was devastating. Its representative pointed out that in view of the fact that Americans 'resolutely refused to accept legal obligations' through ratification of human rights treaties, it was ‘almost indecent' and certainly ‘hypocritical' for the U.S. to advocate the establishment of special human rights institutions in the international field. Shortly afterward, Pravda drove the point home. It was 'no accident', the Communist Party organ commented, that the U.S. had not ratified the Genocide Convention since 'racial and national oppression is still very widespread in the United States of America.'"

Our representatives to the Helsinki Accord review conferences make a similar point. That where the United States should be on the offensive, holding the feet of the Soviet Union and its allies to the fire to live up to their pledges on human rights, instead we spend our time apologizing for our record on ratification of human rights treaties.

Mr. Chairman, the time has long since passed when we can smugly sit back and assume that our human rights record-which I firmly believe is the finest in the world-speaks for itself. Why permit Communist nations, which all too often only give lip service to these obligations, to take the high moral ground in these debates? Mr. Chairman, they have no right to it and we are foolish to abandon it to them.

If the Vietnamese communists commit genocide against religious groups in Cambodia, I want the United States to tell the world about it without challenge to our human rights dedication from other communist nations.

If the People's Republic of China systematically commits genocide against the Tibetans, I want us to be free to condemn that action without the inevitable propaganda about our failure to pass the Genocide Convention.

If one day the Russians turn against one of their national minorities, and commit genocide, then the United States should be the world leader opposing that action. Nothing less should be expected from this nation. But we will be unable to do this effectively without passage of the Genocide Convention.

In sum, it is unlikely that genocide will be committed in any Western democratic nation. It is more likely that genocide will occur in non-democratic, totalitarian or Communist States. We need every device at our disposal to preclude that this happens, and if it does occur, God forbid, we need every diplomatic, economic and possibly military asset to stop such events.

We cannot do moral battle against genocide with one hand tied behind our hacks.

Second, ratification of the Genocide Convention reasserts our intention to deal firmly with criminals who have violated the most sacred right known to man. There is firm precedent for ratification of this type of criminal treaty. Just this year, in July, the United States approved a treaty dealing with hostages, unanimously. We were following the same policy on issues such as narcotics (1961), pollution of the sea by oil (1954) and treatment of prisoners of war (1949).

Contemporary practice makes it clear that the Senate has the authority to approve treaties involving international treaties and to hold Americans accountable for their actions before American Courts (as the Genocide Convention and its implementing legislation provides) for actions committed abroad. Third, the ratification of the Genocide Convention will help our relations with Third World nations as well. Our failure to ratify a treaty so consistent with the high ideals expressed in our Declaration of Independence, Constitution and Bill of Rights, places us in dubious company with nations such as South Africa whose dedication to human rights is clearly questionable. With all other major Free World countries supporting the Convention, our inaction raises unnecessary doubts regarding our ability to lead.

Fourth, the ratification of this Convention would place the United States in a better position to bring our moral influence to bear in specific cases where genocide is alleged. For example, in the early seventies the State Department wrote to me, indicating that our efforts to halt the genocide of Biafrans during the Nigerian civil war would have been strengthened immeasurably had we been a party to the Convention.

Finally, there is a moral imperative to ratify this treaty. Domestic statutes regarding murder are insufficient for, as Senator Javits has correctly pointed out, "genocide is murder and more."

The different effect of this type of treaty is impossible to quantify but, as Bruno Bitker noted during your 1970 hearing, "The requirements of morality are more likely to be recognized if they are also the requirement of law."

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Mr. Chairman, I have not attempted in my statement to provide a line by line discussion of the Genocide Convention and the arguments that will be raised by Liberty Lobby later in this hearing. Your next panel will be addressing those questions and I have merely attempted to set the stage for that discussion.

However, I would like your permission to include as a permanent part of this record, at the conclusion of my statement, material which I believe will be helpful to the committee's review:

"(1) An article by article analysis of the Genocide Convention just produced by the Congressional Research Service at my request. I have also provided additional copies to every Member of the Committee.

"(2) Copies of speeches which I have made responding in detail to the arguments of the new Liberty Lobby White Paper on the Genocide Convention, about which you will be hearing more shortly.

"(3) Letters from each branch of the Armed Services and the General Counsel of the Defense Department during the Carter Administration, outlining their support for the Convention.

"(4) A listing of 52 labor, civic, religious and nationality groups which endorse the Genocide Convention.

"(5) A law review article by Louis Henkin from the April, 1968 issue of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review entitled "The Constitution, Treaties and International Human Rights', which conclusively proves the constitutionality of treaties such as the Genocide Convention."

Mr. Chairman, the fight for ratification of this Convention has often been frustrating. As Senator Javits noted during the 1977 hearings, "The numbers of rumors, innuendos, misconceptions and scares that have been spread about this treaty are literally endless, and this has been done by people who are very, very competent and able in many other ways, but who somehow have an absolute blind spot on this one."

IN CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, some opponents of the Genocide Convention want it both ways. On the one hand, they assert that the Genocide Convention is a strong document, threatening our very civil liberties—a position which is simply not substantiated by this Committee's own hearing record.

On the other hand, they argue that the Treaty is a "paper tiger". Where is the real enforcement authority they ask? Yet this question comes most often from those who would oppose any international enforcement mechanism the most. Let me get the record straight.

This Senator is no advocate of One World government.

This Senator does not support any Super Government with "enforcement authority" to interfere in our internal affairs.

I do not believe in yielding United States sovereignty in any way.

And this Treaty does not do that.

This is a very limited Treaty. Not a panacea for the world's ills. Not a step toward One World Government.

But it is an important moral statement, a strong diplomatic tool in the hands of the world's most powerful and influential country.