Supreme Court, October, 1919. [Vol. 109. to a considerable extent, the jurisdiction of the public service commission granted in the provisions of section 25 as it was enacted in 1913, of which the commission had been deprived by chapter 669 of the Laws of 1915. As the section read prior to 1915, the certificate of the commission was necessary for bus lines operated over state routes or state highways outside of the city, and the legislative intent to return this jurisdiction is evident upon a reading of the 1919 amendment. The amendment of 1915 had subjected the suburban railways of the state to much competition resulting in what is generally known by communities to be practical bankruptcy, and almost universal applications for increases in fares; and undoubtedly in recognition of this situation and of the inequity of permitting competing bus lines to use, without license fee or public service regulation, the highways and streets, for which in many instances the railroad companies had been required, by the terms of their franchise, and under the General Railroad Law, to pave, the law was restored in its general features to that of 1913, and the option was given every village and town to bring itself within the provisions of the amended section. requiring local consents and certificates of public convenience and necessity from the public service commission. This review of the legislation disposes of the suggestion of counsel for defendant that anything sinister exists in the amendment of 1919. It is also pertinent to suggest that in addition to the positive and direct requirement contained in section. 25, that "Any person a bus line who operates or route described in the next succeeding section of this act, wholly or partly upon or along any street in any city must obtain the commission's certificate, the provi Misc.] Supreme Court, October, 1919. sions of section 26 applicable alone to cities contains, in the same language, the requirement later made applicable to towns and villages, that no bus line shall be operated "nor receive a certificate of public convenience and necessity," until the owner had obtained the consent of the local authorities. If the legislature did not, by these words, intend to confer jurisdiction upon the public service commission as to the portions of bus lines and routes in towns and villages, then the language of the legislature above quoted must be held to be without any meaning whatever. It was clearly the legislative intention to restore the jurisdiction of the public service commission over bus lines, not only in the places described in section 25, prior to the amendment of 1915, but to extend to the towns and villages of the entire state the local right and option to supervise, regulate and prescribe the terms on which motor bus lines might be operated over their highways, afford the protection which such regulation and control would provide, and incidentally protect the investment of those who were operating existing interurban railway lines from such form of competition as is shown to be adopted by the defendant in this suit. The legislature has clearly recognized the necessity of vesting in the public service commission authority to pass upon the question as to the convenience of and necessity for such competing lines, and the power to supervise and control their operation. Unless defendant has come under the jurisdiction of the public service commission, he may so operate that his competition will make plaintiff's operation impossible because of the financial loss resulting, and thereby the service guaranteed to the public through the supervision of the plaintiff by the public service commission may be destroyed. Supreme Court, October, 1919. [Vol. 109. I am also of the opinion that defendant became a common carrier under the provisions of the 1919 amendment, and as such under section 53 of the Public Service Commissions Law, was required to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity before exercising its franchise granted by the village of Lewiston. Section 26 prior to the 1919 amendment described bus lines carrying passengers" in competition with another common carrier which is required by law to obtain the consent of the local authorities of said city to operate over the streets thereof." The 1919 amendment provided that any town or village may adopt a resolution" providing that the provisions of this section shall apply to such town or village." The amendment thus added to the bus line operated in cities, and which by section 25 were made common carriers who must obtain certificates of public convenience and necessity, such bus lines as compete with other common carriers required by law to obtain the consent of local authorities of towns and villages. This made such bus lines, including the defendant, common carriers, and as such were brought within the provision of section 53 of the Public Service Commissions Law, which would require the certificate of convenience and necessity, regardless of the requirements of section 25 of the Transportation Corporations Law, to the same effect. common car The Public Service Commissions Law, section 53, provides: "Nor shall any such rier exercise any franchise or right under any provision of the railroad law or of any other law * * without first obtaining the permission and approval of the proper commission." Defendant's counsel admitted upon the argument that the 1919 amendment made defendant a common Misc.] Supreme Court, October, 1919. carrier, a perfectly obvious conclusion. As such he was required by the provision of both the Public Service Commissions Law, and section 25 of the Transportation Corporations Law to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity. As a matter of fact, the provision of section 25 of the Transportation Corporations Law stating that such a common carrier "shall be required to obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity for the operation of the route or vehicles proposed to be operated, and shall be subject to all the provisions of said law applicable to common carriers "is entirely superfluous, as when by the preceding matter in said section 25, a bus line was made a common carrier within the meaning of that term, as used in the Public Service Commissions Law, then as a natural result, the public service commission acquired jurisdiction, and the requirement of section 53 of the Public Service Commissions Law became operative. Such very evidently was the understanding of the draftsman of section 26 of the Transportation Corporations Law, which as variously amended, always provided that the bus line should not operate "nor receive a certificate of public convenience and necessity" until the local authorities had granted their consent. The amendment of 1919 is as effective in adding bus lines operating over routes through towns and villages to the bus lines operating within the city, as if the first sentence of section 26 had been amended by adding thereto after the word " city" the words "towns or villages." The bus lines operating in towns or villages became common carriers within the } meaning of the term used in the Public Service Commissions Law, because such bus lines are such Supreme Court, October, 1919. 66 [Vol. 103. described in lines as are mentioned in section 25 as the next succeeding section of this act." The words of the amendment "nor receive a certificate of public convenience and necessity" show clearly the legislative intention that such a certificate should be obtained by the defendant. If that were not the legislative intent, the words are meaningless and ineffective for any purpose, and such a construction of the statute urged by the defendant violates all recognized rules for the interpretation of statutory enactment. The defendant's demurrer is overruled and judgment on the pleadings ordered, directing that a permanent injunction issue as pleaded for in the complaint, with the costs of the action. Judgment accordingly. PEARL RIDER, an Infant, etc., Plaintiff, v. LENA PHILLIPS et al., Defendants. (Supreme Court, Dutchess Special Term, October, 1919.) One tenant in common cannot purchase an outstanding claim or title to the exclusion of his co-tenant, but if he does, the purchase is presumed to be for the benefit of all. Upon the purchase by E. and R. of certain premises they gave a purchase money mortgage and the balance of the purchase price was paid in cash and the deed taken in the name of R.'s wife. By arrangement among all parties in interest, R. collected the rents and paid them to E., who applied them to the carrying charges and in reduction of the second mortgage, and in case of a deficiency E. and R. were each to pay one-half thereof. The wife of R. died intestate, leaving her surviving her husband and an infant daughter, who there |