suit; (5) that James Cornwell and Cather- | fendant. On the former occasions it was inine Cornwell were husband and wife at and sisted, as now, by defendant-First, that prior to the date of the deed of Yeates to the deed only created a life estate in Mrs. Goodlett; (6) that plaintiffs are the only Cornwell, with a power of appointment only, heirs at law of Catherine Cornwell; (7) that and that, as she failed to appoint, the trus the value of the monthly rents and profits tee was authorized to convey the remainder of the premises is, and since James Cornwell to Mr. Cornwell, as covenanted by the trus died has been, $10. Whereupon plaintiff tee; second, that, granting that the deed rested. The defendant then asked the court created an equitable fee in Mrs. Cornwell, to declare that under the pleadings and the this deed was a conveyance to uses, and the evidence the plaintiff was not entitled to re- feoffor to use had a right to, and did, procover, which the court refused to do, and vide for the vesting of a fee simple upon the defendant excepted at the time. Defendant fee simple granted Mrs. Cornwell upon her offered and read in evidence a decree of the failure to appoint as permitted by the deed. St. Louis land court, rendered at the March Essential to any intelligent discussion of term, 1862 in a case wherein James Corn- this deed, it must be first determined what well was plaintiff and John A. Goodlett was equitable estate Mrs. Cornwell took under defendant, by which decree the court re- the deed, as to duration,-whether for life quired said Goodlett to convey to James or in fee simple. The words of the grant Cornwell the premises described in the deed convey the land to the trustee and his heirs from Yeates to Goodlett, as provided in the and assigns, to have and to hold the same final clause in said deed. Defendant then with all the rights, privileges, and appurte offered and read in evidence a deed from nances, unto him, and his heirs and assigns, John A. Goodlett, as trustee, to James Corn- forever, in trust, however, to and for the well, dated May 21, 1862, conveying the sole and separate use and benefit of Mrs. same property pursuant to said decree. Cornwell, and the words of the covenant of 'Defendant then offered and read in evidence said trustee are that she shall have the full a warranty deed from James Cornwell to use and occupancy of said land, with all Peachey A. Garriott, dated January 31, 1867, rents, issues, and products, for her own sole conveying the same property. Defendant use and benefit, and with full power to barthen offered and read in evidence a war- gain, sell, mortgage, convey, lease, rent, or ranty deed from Peachey A. Garriott and otherwise dispose of said premises, etc. Now wife to Hans Tyson and George W. Wulff, dated July 26, 1887, conveying the same property. Defendant then offered and read in evidence a quitclaim deed from Hans Tyson to George Wulff, dated September 21, 1887, conveying the same land. And this was all the evidence. The court found for the plaintiffs, and rendered judgment accordingly. Within four days defendant filed his motion for new trial, alleging as grounds that the court erred in refusing to declare that plaintiff was not entitled to recover, and in finding for the plaintiffs under the evidence, when the finding should have been for the defendant. This motion was overruled, and the defendant excepted at the time; and during the same term, and on August 30, 1895, defendant was given sixty days within which to file his bill of exceptions; and on October 28, 1895, defendant filed his bill of exceptions, preserving all exceptions above noted; and during the same term of court at which said judgment was rendered the defendant duly perfected his appeal to this court. As already remarked in the accompanying statement, the deed of Robert Yeates, the common source of title, has been twice construed by this court, in Cornwell v. Orton, 126 Mo. 355, and Cornwell v. Wulff, 126 Mo. 355. In those cases it was held that the said deed created an absolute equitable fee simple in and to the land in controversy in Mrs. Catherine Cornwell, and at her death it descended to her heirs, subject to the curtesy of her husband, James Cornwell, and at his death, on the 25th of December, 1889, they were entitled to the possession thereof. It is that construction of said deed which is now, for the third time, challenged by de it is a fundamental principle that equitable estates are governed by the same rules as legal estates, as to duration; otherwise, inextricable confusion must result. Omitting, for the present, all discussion of the claim that the covenant of the trustee constitutes a conditional limitation over to James Cornwell, the husband, it must, we take it, be entirely plain that, in the absence of that clause in the deed, the trustee acquired the entire fee-simple estate in the land, leaving no reversion whatever in the grantor, Yeates, and that he took said fee in trust for the sole use and benefit of Mrs. Cornwell, and with an unlimited and absolute right in her to take and hold the possession of said lands, free from any molestation on the part of said trustee, and receive all and every beneficial interest to be derived therefrom, and with full power to sell, mortgage, or dispose of, in any manner she saw fit. In other words, it cannot be controverted, we think, that Mrs. Cornwell took exactly as large an equitable estate in these lands as her trustee or feoffee to her use held in law for her benefit, to wit, an equitable fee simple. Webster v. Cooper, 14 How. 499, 14 L. ed. 515. No principle is more securely imbedded in the law of the state than that, in the construction of instruments conveying land, an absolute power of disposition carries with it a full power in the real estate itself. Rubcy v. Barnett, 12 Mo. 5, 49 Am. Dec. 112; Norcum v. D'Ench, 17 Mo. 98; Green v. Sutton, 50 Mo. 186. This court, in Rubey v. Barnett and Green v. Sutton, also approved the rule laid down in Jackson, Livingston, v. Robins, 16 Johns. 587, in which the court of errors of New York said: "We lay it down as an incontrovertible rule that, where an estate is given to a person | these lands, it follows that, upon her death, generally or indefinitely, with a power of it descended to her heirs, the plaintiffs in disposition, it carries a fee; and the only this case, subject to the curtesy of her husexception to the rule is where the testator band. But, more than that, by the statute gives to the first taker an estate for life only of uses of Missouri, but for the fact that she by certain and express words, and annexes was a married woman, and at that time not to it a power of disposal. In that particu-sui juris, the whole beneficial interest would lar and special case the devisee for life will have been executed in her during her life in not take an estate in fee, notwithstanding fee simple, with absolute power to convey the distinct and naked gift of a power of disposition of the reversion." and dispose of, and at her death no estate whatever would have remained in the trus tee, Goodlett. An examination of the deed will convince the most skeptical that the grantor or feoffor to uses imposed no duties whatever upon Mr. Goodlett, the trustee, which could in any manner interfere with Mrs. Cornwell's complete enjoyment or alienation of these lands. On the contrary, the sole duty devolved upon him was to passive during her coverture, and to do and perform whatever Mrs. Cornwell might direct him to do. That he so construed the deed is evidenced by the fact that he did not even formally accept the trust, did not sign the deed,. and never made a deed to James Cornwell until compelled by the decree of the land court to do so. There is not a line or word which confers upon him the slightest discre tion in the devolution of said estate. It is a perfect example of a dry, executed trust, except that it is for a married woman. As pointed out in Cornwell v. Orton, 126 Mo. 355, that rule has been modified, particularly in the construction of wills, in this state, by subsequent decisions, to this extent only, that it no longer is necessary that the life estate should be created by express words, but, if it is the clear intention from the whole will that the first taker is to have but a life estate, the added power of dis-ly permit the legal estate to remain in himposition will not convert it into an absolute ownership. Lewis v. Pitman, 101 Mo. 281; Munro v. Collins, 95 Mo. 33; Harbison v. James, 90 Mo. 411; Redman v. Barger, 118 Mo. 568. There are no words in this deed which expressly limit Mrs. Cornwell's use to her life only, nor are there any words which indicate an intention to so limit her use in said lands. This is a deed of bargain and sale, and not a gratuity, and it is a wholesome and familiar rule that it shall be construed most favorably to the bargainee. We confidently assert that no adjudicated case can be found in which a more unlimited, unrestricted power of sale, coupled with a beneficial interest in the estate granted, is vested in the first grantee than was conferred upon Mrs. Cornwell by this deed. Moreover, there is nothing in the habendum that squints at a limitation of the equitable fee simple created in her by the granting clause of the deed. Nor is there a single limitation over by the grantor, by way of remainder or conditional limitation, to any other person or persons. It goes without saying that, if this conveyance is to be tested by common-law principle, having created an estate in fee simple in Mrs. Cornwell, any attempt to create a remainder thereafter would be void. 2 Bl. Com. 164; 1 Fearne, Contingent Remainders, 4th Am. ed. 12; 2 Thomas's Co. Litt. 126, and note B; Green v. Sutton, 50 Mo. 186. If it is to be considered a trust, nothing can be plainer than that, upon Mr. Cornwell's death, the trust, being an executed trust, ceased when the occasion for its creation ended, to wit, the protection of her equitable fee during coverture, and thereupon her estate devolved upon her heirs at law, subject to her husband's curtesy, just as if it had been a legal estate. McTigue v. McTigue, 116 Mo. 138; Roberts v. Moseley, 51 Mo. 282; Pitts v. Sheriff, 108 Mo. 110. It is elemental that equitable estates are governed by the same rule of descents that governs the devolution of legal estates, and, if this were not so, great confusion would result. 1 Perry, Tr. 357; Cushing v. Blake, 30 N. J. Eq. 689. When, therefore, it is determined that Mrs. Cornwell, by the terms of the deed itself, took an equitable estate in fee simple in The English and American reports are re plete with well-considered cases which draw the distinction between executed and executory trusts. Wright v. Pearson, 1 Eden, 119; Boswell v. Dillon, Dru. 291; Cushing v. Blake, 30 N. J. Eq. 689; 1 Perry, Tr. § 359. Lord Chancellor Sugden, in Boswell v. Dillon, Dru. 291, points out the distinction in these words: "By the term 'an executory trust,' when used in its proper sense, we mean a trust in which some further act is directed to be done. Executory trusts, inthis way, may be divided into two classes: One in which, though something is required to be done (for example, a settlement to be executed), yet the testator has acted as his own conveyancer, as it is called, and defined the settlement to be made, and the court has nothing to do but to follow out and execute the intentions of the party as appearing in the instrument. Such trusts, though executory, do not differ from ordinary limitations, and must be construed according to the principles applicable to legal estates depending upon the same words. The other species of executory trusts is where the testator, directing a further act, has imperfectly stated what is to be done. In such cases the court is invested with a larger discretion, and gives to the words a more liberal interpretation than they would have borne if they had stood by themselves." "All trusts," says Lord St. Leonards, "are in a sense executory, because a trust cannot be executed except by conveyance, but this is not the sense which a court of equity puts upon the term 'executory trusts." " Egerton v. Brownlow, 4 H. L. Cas. 210. In Cushing v. Blake, 30 N. J. Eq. 689, the chancellor says, with the unanimous approval of the . whole court: "In this case the trusts upon which the trustee was required to hold the estate were definitely and perfectly expressed, and he had no duties to perform but to hold and convey accordingly." Pugh v. Hayes, 113 Mo., loc. cit. 432. "The trusts are such as are regarded as executed trusts in a court of equity, and the estates created by the trust, and all the incidents connected therewith, are the same as would arise in law upon a legal conveyance expressed in the same language." Accordingly, the husband, as in this case, upon issue born capable of inheriting and the death of Mrs. Cornwell, was entitled to his curtesy. So that, whether we regard this deed as creating in Goodlett, the trustee, an estate by way of bargain and sale, to the sole use of Mrs. Cornwell, in fee simple, or that the use was created in the bargainee, Goodlett (Guest v. Farley, 19 Mo. 147), upon her death the equitable estate devolved upon her heirs as an executed trust, and the trustee had no discretion left in him to convey to any other persons than her heirs, who became the cestuis que trustent. McTigue v. McTigue, 116 Mo. 138. But it is argued by respondents that the trust created was what is denominated a "dry trust." Such a trust arises, says Perry, in his work on Trusts (§ 520), "when property is vested in one person in trust for another, and the nature of the trust, not being prescribed by the donor, is left to the construction of law. In such case the cestui que trust is entitled to the actual possession and enjoyment of the property, and to dispose of it, or to call upon the trustee to execute such conveyance of the legal estate as he directs." In such case the duty of the trustee is simple: (1) To permit the cestui que trust to occupy and receive rents and incomes of the estate; (2) to execute such conveyances as the cestui que trust directs; (3) to protect the title, or allow his name to be used for that purpose. Now, this is just the character of trust which was created in Mr. Goodlett for Mrs. Cornwell, had she been a feme sole or sui juris. Witham v. Brooner, 63 Ill. 344; Lynch v. Swayne, 83 Ill. 336; Kirkland v. Cor, 94 Ill. 400. The duties imposed upon the trustee were such, and only such, as the law would have required at his hands, leaving to her the absolute control over the beneficial interest, together with a right to call for the legal title. But, being a married woman at the time of its creation and at her death, it has been ruled that the statute of uses did not vest the legal estate in her during her life or coverture, but in her trustee for her sole use and benefit. Dean v. Long, 122 Ill. 458; Perry, Tr. 4th ed. §§ 310, 310a, and cases cited. But when she be comes discovert, or dies, the statute executes the use in her, or her heirs. Roberts v. Moseley, 51 Mo. 282; Pitts v. Sheriff, 108 Mo. 110; 2 Minor, Inst. 737, 739; 2 Thomas's Co. Litt. 574, note A; Dean v. Long, 122 Ill. 458. When this case was here on former occasions, we ruled that the deed created an equi Un table fee simple in Mrs. Cornwell, which, upon her death, descended to her heirs at law, the plaintiffs in the case; that the trust was an executed one; that, therefore, Mrs. Cornwell took the same estate in duration as in a legal estate, which, under our statute, would most clearly have been a fee simple, in law, but for the intervention of the trustee; that the estate so granted to her was subject to the same incidents, properties, and consequences as belong to similar estates at law; and that it was not competent to limit a remainder upon it, seeing that such a limitation would be repugnant to the grant to Mrs. Cornwell. Learned. counsel now concedes that if this covenant of Mr. Goodlett, the trustee, is to be construed as creating a remainder, then it must fail, because a remainder cannot be limited after a fee simple; but he urges that it can be upheld as a conditional limitation of a fee upon a fee, under the statute of uses. All the learning upon this subject has been brought in review to show that, under our statute of uses, which is but a rescript of the statute of uses (27 Hen. VIII., chap. 10), a fee simple may be limited upon a fee simple. der the statute of uses, and, indeed, before that statute, a species of limitations known as "shifting or springing uses" had been recognized, which permitted ulterior estates to be created, to arise upon the defeasance of prior estates in the same property, contrary to the strict rules of the common law. The courts, after the passage of the statute of wills (32 Hen. VIII.), following the analogies furnished in conveyances to uses, and in support of the intention of the testator, gradually came to recognize the validity of limitations not permitted in conveyances at common law. In this way originated what lawyers denominate "executory devises," whereby a fee may be limited after a fee. That this could be done was finally settled in England, in the case of Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 590, a case which Lord Kenyon, in Porter v. Bradley, 3 T. R. 145, declares has ever since been regarded as "the foundation, and, as it were, Magna Charta, of this branch of the law." Far be it from me to question this doctrine, as declared in that case. The philosophy of that case, as I understand it, and as I find it interpreted by the courts since, is that, although the prior estate is denominated a "fee," because it may last forever, it is nevertheless a "base or determinable fee," because it is liable to be defeated by the happening of the contingency upon which it is limited. 2 Minor, Inst. 772e. Thus, in Pells v. Brown, the devise was in fee to Thomas and his heirs, forever, and, if he die without issue in the lifetime of William, his brother, then to William and his heirs. The court all agreed that this was a good devise of the fee to William by way of that contingency, not by way of immediate remainder; for they all agreed it could not be by remainder, "as if one deviseth land to one and his heirs, and, if he die without heir, that it shall remain to another, it is void and repugnant to the estate, for one fee cannot be in remainder after another, for the law doth not expect the determina- trine rested upon the great name of Kent. If so it has no ignoble origin; but, as we shall presently see, this is not true, though his recognition of the rule has, no doubt, greatly added to its stability. We have the testimony of the court of appeals of New York, in Van Horne v. Campbell, 100 N. Y. 287, 53 Am. Rep. 166, to the effect that, beginning with Jackson, Brewster, v. Bull, 10 Johns. 19, and down to Van Horne v. Campbell, there is an unbroken line of authorities in that state reasserting, following, and adopting the rule as announced by Chancellor Kent. It has been assailed in New York, as in this case; but the court of appeals held that the question must be considered as closed in New York. It has received the unqualified indorsement of Chief Justice Savage and Justices Cowen and Denio, and of all save one member of the court, in Van Horne v. Campbell. In Massachusetts, in Ide v. Ide (1809) 5 Mass. 500, the same doctrine was announced by Chief Justice Parsons, several years before Jackson, Brewster, v. Bull was decided; and it has been reaffirmed in Gifford v. Choate, 100 Mass. 343; Kelley v. Meins, 135 Mass. 231; Joslin v. Rhoades, 150 Mass. 301; Kent v. Morrison, 153 Mass. 137, 10 L. R. A. 756; Foster v. Smith, 156 Mass. 379. In Fisher The question presented here, and argued v. Wister, 154 Pa. 65, Jackson, Brewster, now for the first time, is this: Can there v. Bull, came under review, and all the be a valid conditional limitation or execu- learning on the subject was re-examined, and tory devise where the executory limitation the doctrine approved. The validity of the is conjoined with an absolute power in the rule announced by Kent has been repeatedly first taker or primary devisee to defeat and recognized and followed in Illinois. Faircut off the further estate or interest by alien- man v. Beal, 14 Ill. 244; Welsch v. Belleation of the entire fee in his lifetime, and ville Sav. Bank, 94 Ill. 203; Wolfer v. Hemwhether it makes any difference as to the mer, 144 Ill. 554. Kentucky, in an able rights of the ulterior grantee or devisee opinion by Chief Justice Harges, in Ball v. whether this power to alien has or has not Hancock, 82 Ky. 108, a case strikingly like been exercised? Whatever preconceived no- the one at bar, approves Kent's statement of tions we may have, I take it this question, the law and Jackson, Livingston, v. Robins, being one so seriously affecting property 16 Johns. 588. The court of appeals of rights, should be determined by the adjudi- Maryland, in Combs v. Combs, 67 Md. 11, cated law, and we should not be swerved citing Chief Justice Parsons in Ide v. Ide, from the law because some grantor, devisor, and quoting Chancellor Kent's declaration, or conveyancer has attempted to do what the that "we are obliged to say that an absolute settled rules of law will not permit. Hogan ownership or capacity to sell in the first v. Welcker, 14 Mo. 177;Brown v. Rogers, 125 taker, and a vested right by way of execuMo., loc. cit. 398. Appealing, then, to the tory devise in another, which cannot be afdecided law and recognized authority, we fected by such alienation, are perfectly infind Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries compatible estates, and repugnant to each (4 Kent, Com. 12th ed. 270), declaring: other, and the latter is to be rejected as "If, therefore, there be an absolute power of void," said: "Both of these great jurists disposition given by the will to the first tak cited and relied upon the case of Atty. Gen. er, as if an estate be devised to A in fee, and v. Hall, Fitzg. 314, decided by Lord Chanif he dies possessed of the property without cellor King, assisted by the master of the lawful issue, the remainder over, or remain- rolls and Chief Baron Reynolds, and quoted der over the property which he, dying with- with approval by Lord Hardwicke in Flandout heirs, should leave, or without selling or ers v. Clark, 1 Ves. Sr. 9. These, assuredly, devising the same, in all such cases the re- are authorities of great weight. We think mainder over is void as a remainder, because they ought to be considered as settling the of the preceding fee; and it is void by way of law." In Horsey v. Hoxsey, 37 N. J. Eq. 21, executory devise because the limitation is the chancellor relied upon 4 Kent, Com. 270, inconsistent with the absolute estate or and Ide v. Ide (1809) 5 Mass. 500, to the power of disposition expressly given or nec- effect that a valid executory devise could not essarily implied by the will." "A valid ex- subsist with an absolute power of disposiecutory devise cannot subsist under an ab- tion in the first taker. In Howard solute power of disposition in the first Carusi, 109 U. S. 725, 27 L. ed. 1089, the taker." Supreme Court of the United States unaniIt was urged in argument that this doc-mously cite and follow Jackson. Brewster, V. v. Bull and Ide v. Ide, and adopt Chancellor Kent's text (4 Kent, Com. 271). In Alabama, Flinn v. Davis, 18 Ala. 132, and McRee v. Means, 34 Ala. 349, assert that the law is too well settled to be controverted that an absolute power of disposition in the first taker defeats a limitation over. And so it will be found in Maine (Ramsdell v. Ramsdell, 21 Me. 288), and in Virginia (Melson v. Cooper, 4 Leigh, 408; Riddick v. Cohoon, 4 Rand. (Va.) 547), and in Georgia (Cook v. Walker, 15 Ga. 459), and in Indiana (Tower v. Hartford, 115 Ind. 186). In a word it may be asserted that, as late as 1893, there could be found but two American cases, outside of Missouri, which disputed the authority of Ide v. Ide and Jackson, Brewster, v. Bull; and these were Hubbard v. Rawson (1855) 4 Gray, 247, and Andrews v. Roye (1857) 12 Rich. L. 536; and neither of these cases has been followed in their respective states. Turning, now, to another class of cases, in which the conveyances were deeds, instead of wills, and we find the same doctrine announced in Green v. Sutton, 50 Mo. 186. The deed in that case was in all substantial respects similar to the deed under construction, save and except that in that deed there were words in the granting clause of the deed which attempted to create a limitation over, after Mrs. Green's death, whereas, in this deed, there are no such words to be found, save in the unsigned covenants of the trus tee. On the main proposition, Judge Bliss held, first, that, the deed having conveyed a fee simple to the trustee, it was unnecessary to use the word "heirs" in connection with Mrs. Green's name; that she took an unlimited power of disposal, and the attempted limitation over was void. He asks: "Was the use unlimited? If so, the attempted limitation is void, and the rule is not a technical one. It cannot matter whether the wife held the legal estate, or whether or when the use was executed in her. It is just as impossible to limit an unlimited use as to have a remainder, when the whole is giv This brings us to inquire, now, as to the state of the law in this state. In Rubey v. Barnett, 12 Mo. 3, 49 Am. Dec. 112, Judge Scott said: "It has always been held that an absolute power of disposition over prop-en." erty conferred by will, not controlled by any provision or limitation, amounted to an absolute gift of the property. A power to dispose of a thing as one pleases must necessarily carry along with it a full property in it." He cites with approbation Jackson, Livingston, v. Robins, 16 Johns. 587. In Gregory v. Cowgill, 19 Mo. 415, Judge Scott cites Ide v. Ide, 5 Mass. 500, with approval. But in Wead v. Gray, 78 Mo. 59, this court, after deciding that the first taker took an absolute estate, referred to the clause giving a remainder over to a designated charity and a niece of the testator, and said: "The limitation over was void as an executory devise. Mr. Redfield, in his work on Wills, vol. 2, p. 278, says: 'It is a settled rule of American, as well as English, law, that where the first devisee has the absolute right to dispose of the property in his own unlimited discretion, and not a mere power of appointment along certain specified persons or classes, any estate over is void, as being inconsistent with the first gift,'"-citing Ide v. Ide, 5 Mass. 500. Here is a clear, distinct recognition and approval of the case decided by Chief Justice Parsons. Prior to that, however, in State, Haines, v. Tolson, 73 Mo. 320, this court held that the attempt to limit by executory devise after an absolute fee simple was void on the ground that "the limitation was repugnant to the devise and therefore void." Those two cases were afterwards cited with approval in Munro v. Collins, 95 Mo. 33, but distinguished from the latter as to the facts. And see Hardy v. Clarkson, 87 Mo. 171. It may be well to remark, now and here, that those cases in which this court has construed the estate of the first taker to be only a life estate (and there are many such), have nothing to do with this question, which is predicated on the proposition that the first taker takes an unconditional fee, and the attempt then is to limit another fee after the first. Green v. Sutton, in its different aspects, has been approved in many subsequent cases. Thus, in Tremmel v. Kleiboldt, 75 Mo. 255, it was unanimously said of a like deed: "By the terms of the deed under consideration the entire estate was vested in the wife, and no remainder was or could be created by the covenant of the trustee to convey the property to her legal heirs at her death, in default of appointment or other disposition thereof by her during her life. Green v. Sutton, 50 Mo. 186." In Cook v. Couch, 100 Mo. 29, it was said: "The general rule is that a devise of an estate generally or indefinitely, with a power of disposition over it carries a fee. Rubey v. Barnett, 12 Mo. 3, 49 Am. Dec. 112; Green v. Sutton, 50 Mo. 186." And, to same effect, see Lewis v. Pitman, 101 Mo. 291. In Wood v. Kice, 103 Mo. 338, the proposition announced by Judge Bliss in Green v. Sutton, that a married woman was not restricted in disposing of her separate estate to the specific mode detailed in the deed to her use, was affirmed. It was cited with approval in Reinders v. Koppelmann, 68 Mo., loc. cit. 491, 30 Am. Rep. 802. Green v. Sutton was decided in 1872. It announced a rule of property. Nearly one hundred volumes of the decisions of this court have since been promulgated, without any doubt of its soundness having been expressed. It seems to me a serious matter to say now that it was wrongly decided. The writer had no hesitancy in following it in Cornwell v. Orton, 126 Mo. 355, and the report of that case will show that it was not questioned as authority by counsel. Evans v. Folks, 135 Mo. 397. We find, then, that the doctrine announced by Chief Justice Parsons, and followed by Chancellor Kent, has met the approval of nearly every appellate court in the land, this court among the others. This court has so recently construed the counterpart of this deed to convey an equit able fee simple in the wife, in the case of McTigue v. McTigue, 116 Mo. 138, that I re |