frain from further discussion of this point. Much stress was laid upon Straat v. Ührig, 56 Mo. 482, as holding a contrary doctrine. Judge Adams says of the deed in that case: "The consideration moved from the wife, and the object of the deed was, no doubt, to settle the property on her, to be at her absolute disposal during her lifetime, with power in her to dispose of the property by will, or by any writing signed by her or by her author-heritance. Rev. Stat. 1845, p. 219, chap. ity, to be carried into effect by the trustee after her death. By the terms of the deed there was a springing contingent trust created in favor of the children." I submit that the deed in that case created an absolute equitable fee in Mrs. Pemberthy, with an added power of alienation in fee, and that the attempted limitation over was void. That case has never been referred to since in any opinion of this court, and has never been approved. It cites no authority, and is clearly out of line with the cases already cited and discussed. 40 Burgess, Robinson, and Williams, JJ., concur. of this deed. Dr. Minor, whose invaluable Institutes counsel has so often invoked in his brief and argument, lays it down as a settled principle that, in the limiting of estates under the statutes of uses, the same words are required as at common law, save and except where the statutes, as in Virginia and Missouri, dispense with the necessity of the word "heirs" in creating an estate of in32, § 2; Rev. Stat. 1889, § 8834. They areno longer necessary. Certainly it will not be seriously contended that the mere covenant of the trustee, who never signed this deed, would have destroyed the operative and controlling words of the grant, which, as we have seen, vested in the trustee, Goodlett, a fee simple, in trust for Mrs. Cornwell, who was at the time a married woman. The covenant of the trustee, even if he had signed the deed and accepted the trust, would not have had a greater effect than a habendum, which this court has held may be entirely The deed of Yeates must be construed as it rejected if repugnant to the granting clause is written. Its granting clause is short and of the deed. Major v. Bukley, 51 Mo. 227. unambiguous. It is as follows: "That the As the other points involved in Cornwell said parties of the first part [Yeates and v. Orton, 126 Mo. 355, are no longer urged, wife], in consideration of the sum of thirty-the judgment of the Circuit Court, having one hundred and seventy-two and dol- been in strict conformity to our former judglars, to them in hand paid by the said ments, is affirmed. party of the second part [John A. Goodlett], receipt whereof is hereby confessed and acknowledged, have granted, bargained, sold, and conveyed, and by these presents do grant, bargain, sell, and convey, unto the said party of the second part, and his heirs and assigns, a certain tract or parcel of land, situated," etc., "to have and to hold the same, with all the rights, privileges, and appurtenances thereto belonging or in any wise appertaining, unto him, the said party of the second part, his heirs and assigns, forever, in trust, however, to and for the sole and separate use, benefit, and behoof of said Catherine Cornwell, wife of said James Cornwell." Here the granting clause ends. Nowhere within the four corners of this deed can be found one word by which Yeates and wife conveyed, granted, or limited any portion of their estate in said lands over to the use of any other person upon the happening of the condition that Mrs. Cornwell had not conveyed said land in her lifetime. Goodlett, the trustee, did not join in the said deed at the time of its execution, and, if he had, his covenant, voluntarily imposed, could not and did not enlarge his own powers, so that he could defeat the trust imposed upon him to hold the fee simple in said lands for the benefit of Mrs. Cornwell. His covenant as grantee, moreover, did not create, or assume to create, another use in James Cornwell. The power to limit the duration of the estate which he was conveying belonged to the grantor, Yeates, and nowhere in said deed has he conveyed any estate to the use of James Cornwell, or to anyone else save Mrs. Cornwell, and to her he gave an unlimited Marshall, J., dissenting: Ejectment for 10 acres in the north part of lot 3 of a survey and subdivision of the W. 1⁄2 of the N. W. corner of section 12, township 44, range 5 E., in St. Louis county. Robert A. Yeates is the common source of title. Plaintiffs claim as the heirs at law of Catherine Cornwell, and defendant claims as grantee, by mesne conveyances, of James Cornwell, deceased, husband of Catherine Cornwell. On October 15, 1859, Yeates and wife executed and delivered to John A. Goodlett, trustee, the following deed: "This deed, made and entered into this 15th day of October, 1859, by and between Robert A. Yeates and Sophie Yeates, his wife, of," etc., "parties of the first part, and John A. Goodlett, of," etc., "party of the second part, and Catherine Cornwell, wife of James Cornwell, of," etc., "party of the third part, witnesseth: That the said parties of the first part, in consideration of the sum of thirty-one hundred and seventy-two and dollars, to them in hand paid by the said party of the second part, receipt whereof is hereby confessed and acknowledged, have granted, bargained, sold, and conveyed, and by these presents do grant, bargain, sell, and convey, unto the said party of the second part, and his heirs and assigns, a certain tract or parcel of land, situated," etc., "to have and to hold the same, with all the rights, privileges, and appurtenances thereto belonging or in any wise appertaining, unto him, the said party of the second part, his heirs and assigns, forever, in trust, however, to and for the sole and separate use, benefit, and behoof of said Catherine Cornwell, wife of said James Cornwell. And the said John A. Goodlett, party of the second part, hereby covenants and agrees to and with the said Catherine Cornwell that he will suffer and permit her, without let or molestation, to have, hold, use, occupy, and enjoy the aforesaid premises, with all the rents, issues, profits, and proceeds arising therefrom, whether from sale or lease, for her own sole use and benefit, separate and apart from her said husband, and wholly free from his control or interference, and from his debts, in such manner as she may think proper, and that he will at any and all times hereafter, at the request and direction of the said Catherine Cornwell, expressed in writing, signed by her or by her authority, bargain, seil, mortgage, convey, lease, rent, or otherwise dispose of said premises, or any part thereof, and will pay over the rents, issues, profits, and proceeds thereof which may come into his hands, and not otherwise liable, to her, the said Catherine Cornwell, in such manner as she shall in writing direct or request, and that he will, at the death of the said Catherine, convey or dispose of the said premises, or such part thereof as may then be held by him under this deed, and all profits and proceeds thereof, in such manner, to such person or persons, and at such time or times as the said Catherine Cornwell shall by her last will and testament, or any other writing signed by her or by her authority, direct or appoint, and in default of such appointment then that he will convey said premises to said James Cornwell, his heirs or assigns." On the trial in the circuit court the parties made the following admissions: "(1) That the defendant is now in possession of the property, and was at the institution of this suit; (2) that Mrs. Catherine Cornwell died intestate, December 23, 1860, without having made any conveyance or appointment of said real estate under said conveyance in her lifetime; (3) that James Cornwell died December 25, 1889, and the plaintiffs are Mrs. Catherine Cornwell's children and grandchildren, and her heirs at law, and are also the only children and heirs of James Cornwell; (4) that the plaintiffs Frederick J. Cornwell and Catherine Holmes, wife of James C. Holmes, are the children of Catherine Cornwell, and that Charles J., Frederick L., and Benjamin S. Cornwell, infant plaintiffs, are the children of Benjamin Cornwell, who died prior to the institution of this suit, and who was the son of Catherine Cornwell, and these plaintiffs are represented in this suit by their next friend, Helen V. Cornwell, plaintiff, and widow of said Benjamin Cornwell, deceased, who was duly appointed their next friend in this case prior to the institution of this suit; (5) that James Cornwell and Catherine Cornwell were husband and wife at and prior to the date of the deed of Yeates to Goodlett; (6) that plaintiffs are the only heirs at law of Catherine Cornwell; (7) that the value of the monthly rents and profits of the premises is, and since James Cornwell died has been, $10." Defendant read in evidence a decree of the St. Louis land court, rendered at the March term, 1862, in the case of James Cornwell, plaintiff, against John A. Goodlett, defendant, directing the defendant to convey the property in controversy to the plaintiff, and the deed made in pursuance thereto, and mesne conveyances from Cornwell to Wulff. The circuit court rendered judgment for plaintiff, in conformity to the opinion of this court when this case was here on former appeal (Cornwell v. Orton, 126 Mo. 355, and Cornwell v. Wulff, 126 Mo. 355), and defendant appealed. The true construction of the deed above set out determines the rights of the respective parties. Plaintiffs contend that the deed conveyed a fee-simple estate to Catherine Cornwell, and that, as a fee cannot be limited on a fee, the direction to the trustee to convey to James Cornwell, in default of a disposition by Mrs. Cornwell by deed or will, being repugnant to the creation of the fee in Mrs. Cornwell, is void. Defendant claims First, that the limitation to James Cornwell is good as a conditional limitation, and that, although the deed created an equitable fee simple in Mrs. Cornwell, the limitation of a fee to James Cornwell after the termination of the estate of the first taker is valid in equity; and, second, that under the decisions in this state the intention of the grantor must be observed in preference to any mere technical construction, and that to give effect to that intention the estate of Mrs. Cornwell must be construed as a mere life estate, and that of Mr. Cornwell the fee limited upon the life estate. Formerly there was a difference between the rules for the construction of wills and deeds. A deed required words of inheritance to pass the fee, while in a will no such formality was necessary. Now, under our statute (Gen. Stat. 1865, chap. 108, § 2; Wagner, Stat. 1365; Rev. Stat. 1879, § 4004; Rev. Stat. 1889, §§ 8834, 8912, they stand on the same footing, and a grant or devise by name carries the fee, without the term "heirs" or words of inheritance (Green v. Sutton, 50 Mo., loc. cit. 192; and especially Waddell v. Waddell, 99 Mo., loc. cit. 345). The true rule of construction of deeds and wills is that the intention of the giantor or devisor shall be observed, unless it conflicts with some inflexible rule of law. In Hogan v. Welcker, 14 Mo., loc. cit. 185, Napton, J., said: "If a deed admit of two constructions, one of which will support and the other defeat the intent, the construction which will uphold the deed must be adopted, unless some inflexible rule of law interfere." In Small v. Field, 102 Mo., loc. cit. 122, Sherwood, J., said: "And in construing wills, the polar star of construction or exposition of a will-the meaning, the intention, of a testator-is never to be lost sight of. Single words, single clauses, will not be considered singly; but the whole instrument, its general scope and design, as gathered from its four corners, will be taken into consideration, in connection with the surrounding circumstances, when properly admissible, in order that the intention of the testator may, if possible, prevail." In Chiles v. Bartleson, 21 Mo. 346, Leonard, J., said: "The inten tion of the testator is plain enough. The | dent, the superadded power of disposal to whole will must be read together, and effect the first taker will not raise the estate to a given to every clause of it, and the words fee, nor defeat the limitation over. Leonused are to be understood in the sense indi- ard, J., in Chiles v. Bartleson, 21 Mo. 344; cated by the whole instrument." In Carr v. Vories, J., in Carr v. Dings, 58 Mo. 400; Dings, 58 Mo., loc. cit. 406, Vories, J., said: Adams, J., in Straat v. Uhrig, 56 Mo. 482; "By a technical construction of the language Ray, J., in Russell v. Eubanks, 84 Mo., loc. used in the will, the bequest to the children cit. 82; Ray, J., in Bean v. Kenmuir, 86 Mo., might be so limited; but in construing wills loc. cit. 666; Ray, J., in Harbison v. James, the intention of the testator is the object to 90 Mo. 411; Brace, J., in Munro v. Collins, be attained, and in order to ascertain this 95 Mo. 33; Brace, J., in Redman v. Barger, object it frequently becomes necessary to 118 Mo. 568; Black, J., in Lewis v. Pitman, look at the whole will, by which it will some- 101 Mo. 281. Of the cases last referred to, times become necessary to qualify particu- the following have been cited approvingly in lar clauses, so as to bring them in harmony the following cases: Chiles v. Bartleson, 21 with the general intention, as the same may Mo. 344, by Black, J., in Cook v. Couch, 100 be indicated by other clauses." In Munro v. Mo. 29, and in Emmerson v. Hughes, 110 Collins, 95 Mo., loc. cit. 37, Brace, J., said: | Mo. 630, though they were not followed by "It will not be necessary, in order to deter- the judge in either instance; Carr v. Dings, mine this question, to consult authorities 58 Mo. 400, by Henry, J., in Wead v. Gray, outside of our own state, and in examining 78 Mo. 64, though he distinguishes the two them it will be well to remember that courts, in the construction of wills, endeavor never to lose sight of that leading canon: to ascertain, if possible, the true intent and meaning of the testator in any given case, as the same can be gathered from the whole context of the will, viewed in the light of the circumstances under which it was made, and aim to give effect to that meaning, unless some positive legal principle forbids." In Redman v. Barger, 118 Mc., loc. cit. 573, Brace, J., said: "The first and last inquiry in the construction of a will is, What was the intention of the testator? To that intent technical rules must yield, and to it other canons of legal hermeneutics must be subordinated." In the light of these principles we approach the crucial question in the case, to wit, Did the deed from Yeates to Gooodlett vest a fee in Catherine Cornwell? or did it vest in her only a life estate, notwithstanding the power of disposal given to her? or did it create a fee in her, with a conditional limitation over to her husband? cases; by Henry, J., in Russell v. Eubanks, 84 Mo. 86; and by Sherwood, J., in Small v. Field, 102 Mo., loc. cit. 123; Munro v. Collins, 95 Mo. 33, by Black, J., in Lewis v. Pitman, 101 Mo., loc. cit. 293, and by Sherwood, J., in Small v. Field, 102 Mo., loc. cit. 122; Harbison v. James, 90 Mo. 411, by Macfarlane, J., in Jarboe v. Hey, 122 Mo. 348. It is plain, therefore, that there is a most unusual and deplorable conflict of authority in our own state upon this question. It may fairly be said that the first group of cases follows the lead of Parsons, Ch. J., in Ide v. Ide, 5 Mass. 500, and of Chancellor Kent, in 4 Kent, Com. 14th ed. *270, and is in line with Jackson, Brewster, v. Bull, 10 Johns. 19; Jackson, Livingston, v. Robins, 16 Johns. 537; Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 590; Howard v. Carusi, 109 U. S. 725, 27 L. ed. 1089; Van Horne v. Campbell, 100 N. Y. 287, 53 Am. Rep. 166; Fisher v. Wister, 154 Pa. 65; Ball v. Hancock, 82 Ky. 108; Cushing v. Blake, 30 N. J. Eq. 689; Wright v. Pearson, 1 Eden, 119; Boswell v. Dillon, Dru. 291; Egerton v. The previous adjudications in this state Brownlow, 4 H. L. Cas. 1; Witham v. Brooncannot be harmonized. On the one hand, iter, 63 Ill. 344; Lynch v. Swayne, 83 Ill. 336; has been held by this court that, if a deed or will gives an absolute power of disposal, a fee is created, and, as a fee cannot be limited upon a fee, a limitation over in such an instrument is void for repugnancy, and that it is only in cases where the absolute power of disposal is qualified by express words, limiting the first estate to a life estate, that a limitation over is valid or effectual. Scott, J., in Rubey v. Barnett, 12 Mo., loc. cit. 7, 49 Am. Dec. 112; Scott, J., in Norcum v. D'Ench, 17 Mo. 98; Bliss, J., in Green v. Sutton, 50 Mo., loc. cit. 191, 192 (concurred in by Wagner, J., but Adams, J., expressing no opinion); Hough, J., in State, Haines, v. Tolson, 73 Mo., loc. cit. 326; Hough, J., in Tremmel v. Kleiboldt, 75 Mo., loc. cit. 258; Henry J., in Wead v. Gray, 78 Mo. 59; Black, J., in Cook v. Couch, 100 Mo. 29. On the other hand, it has been held by this court that it is not necessary that the life estate be created by express words, but that if an intention of the grantor or devisor, as gathered from the whole instrument, to limit the estate of the first taker to a life estate be evi Dean v. Long, 122 Ill. 458; Gifford v. Choate, 100 Mass. 343; Kent v. Morrison, 153 Mass. 137, 10 L. R. A. 756; Combs v. Combs, 67 Md. 11; Horsey v. Horsey, 37 N. J. Eq. 21; Melson v. Cooper, 4 Leigh, 408; Riddick v. Cohoon, 4 Rand. (Va.) 547; Cook v. Walker, 15 Ga. 459. All of these cases proceed upon the principle that the intention of the grantor or devisor must be observed, but that a life estate must be created in express terms, or the power of disposal will create a fee, and that an absolute power of disposal may be limited by the creation of a life estate in express terms, and in such event the limitation over will be good. On the contrary, the second group of Missouri cases cited is bottomed upon the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Smith v. Bell, 6 Pet. 68, 8 L. ed. 322, where the will gave the property with the absolute right of disposal thereof to the first taker, "remainder of the said estate, after her decease, to be for the use of the said Jesse Goodman." No life estate was created by express words. In construing the absolute power of disposal, the court said: If this would be true, provided the restrain- nothing more to give to a third party. This was the reason underlying the old doctrine that a fee could not be limited on a fee. Yet the cases first above grouped admit a relaxation or modification of this original doctrine, so as to permit an absolute gift to be limited to a life estate, provided the set phrase "for life" is made to qualify the absolute title. If this is permissible because it effectuates the intention of the grantor, what logic is there in requiring the grantor to express his intention in set or stereotyped language, and in refusing to observe that intention when clearly expressed in equivalent terms? In either event the qualification imposed on the absolute ownership (or power of disposal, which is the equivalent of absolute ownership), by limiting the estate of the first taker to cne for life, must be construed that he has power to dispose of the estate only during his life, but that after his death the remainder, or what is left, is to go to the expectant owner. And, if this is true, what difference does it make in what words this intention is expressed? In both cases the old, inflexible rule is equally softened, modified, and made more elastic. In our day there is not the undefined apprehension about tenures that formerly disturbed the placid dreams of our English predecessors in the law. In all other respects our laws, as to pleading and practice, as to proceedings and remedies, and as to interpretation and construction, have been softened and broadened, and made plainer and simpler; and it is hard to give a reason why we should tread with leaden heel with respect to conveyances, or try to hamper our real-estate transactions with gauges and measures which do not fit our conditions. If the maxims of interpretation first hereinbefore referred to are applied, the second group of cases will be found to be in consonance with them. If the latest enunciations of this court are to be observed as the law, the second group of cases must be followed. If we are to be governed by the rules of stare decisis, The first group of cases, like the rule in we are hopelessly lost, unless we treat the Shelley's Case, establishes an absolute rule second group as overruling the first group. of law, while the second group establishes a It is a most singular circumstance that none rule of intention or of construction to reach of these conflicting decisions have noticed. and carry out the grantor's or devisor's in- this conflict in our state, or in terms overtention. The first group professes to re- ruled the prior inconsistent cases. It can spect the will of the grantor or devisor, but not be said that these decisions have estab requires him, by an inflexible rule, to ex- lished a rule of property in our state, unless press his intention by limiting the estate of the second group, being the later utterthe first taker to a life estate in express ances, have done so. The wonder is that terms, employing the identical words of the greater confusion has not already arisen. As rule. The second group also respects the if to mark more plainly the discrepancy in intention of the grantor or devisor, but this regard, this court has had before it two gathers that intention from the four corners cases wherein the deeds under consideration of the instrument, and regards any equiva- were identical with the deed involved in this lent words that clearly express the inten- case, and in the first case (Straat v. Uhrig, tion as of as much force as the words "life 56 Mo. 482), Adams, J., held that it created estate." Technically and strictly speaking, a life estate only in the first taker, and that when property is granted or bequeathed to a the fee passed to the remainderman, while person with full power to dispose of the same in the second (Tremmel v. Kleiboldt, 75 in any manner the grantee or devisee chooses to employ, it involves the idea of absolute ownership; for the jus disponendi implies a fee-simple estate, and, logically, one who has given all he has to another has Mo. 255), Hough, J., held that it vested a fee-simple estate in the first taker, and that the limitation over was void, for repugnancy. It is a noteworthy fact that the last of the first group of cases, Cook v. Couch, 100 Ma tention ought to prevail. This is the common-sense view of the matter, and it has the support of well-considered judgments." 29, was decided by Black, J., in which he posed of shall go to my three daughters.' cited and commented upon the prior cases, There was no express life estate created in without attempting to reconcile them or the wife in that case, and yet it was held, overrule the conflicting ones, and decided notwithstanding the power of disposition, the case in hand according to the doctrine that she had but a life estate. The inten of the first group, and that the next time tion of the testator, so clearly expressed. the question was presented to this court in was allowed to prevail. Although a life esLewis v. Pitman, 101 Mo. 281, Black, J., tate is not created in express terms, still an wrote the opinion of the court, and again added power of disposition will not convert referred to both classes of cases, and fol- it into an absolute estate, if, upon a consid lowed the later or second group of cases, eration of the whole will, it is clear the tes practically, though not expressly, overrul- tator intended to give a life estate only. ing those of the first group, and said: "If This is the deduction to be made from Smith we follow the common-sense reading of the v. Bell and Harbison v. James, and they will from first to last, it seems to us there is have the support of other well-considered no difficulty in discovering its true purpose cases. Giles v. Little, 104 U. S. 291, 26 L. and meaning as to the personal property, ed. 745; Siegwald v. Siegwald, 37 Ill. 435; and that is this: The testator gives Green v. Hewitt, 97 Ill. 113, 37 Am. Rep. all of it to his wife, with the right and power 102. If the first taker is to have but a life in her to carry on the manufacturing busi- estate, then it matters not whether this apness, or to dispose of the same, as to her may pear from express words creating a life esseem best, with the further qualification that tate or from a consideration of the whole whatever she has remaining at her death will. What difference can it make in which shall go to the children. Thus interpreted, form the testator expresses his intention, so does the will violate any rule of law? It is that it is clearly expressed? There may be, claimed by the appellant that it does, and and are, many cases where the added power this for the reason that where there is a de- of disposition will turn the scale; but if it vise of property, with an absolute power of is the intention of the testator to give the disposal in the first taker, a subsequent lim- first taker a life estate only, notwithstanditation over is void. We shall not reviewing the power of disposition, then that inthe many authorities cited in support of this proposition of law. It may be conceded that a devise of an estate generally or indefinitely, with a power of disposition over it, carries a fee. Green v. Sutton, 50 Mo. 186. But there is a wide difference between that class of cases and those where there is a devise for life with a power of disposition. Where an express life estate is created, an added power of disposition does not convert the estate into a fee. Rubey v. Barnett, 12 Mo. 3, 49 Am. Dec. 112; Gregory v. Cowgill, 19 Mo. 416; Reinders v. Koppelmann, 68 Mo. 482, 30 Am. Rep. 802. Nor is it necessary that the life estate should be created in express terms. If it is the clear intention, from the whole will, that the first taker is to have but a life estate, then the added power of disposition will not corvert the estate into one of absolute ownership. Thus, in the case of Smith v. Bell, 6 Pet. 68, 8 L. ed. 322, the testator gave to his wife all of his personal estate, 'to and for her own use and benefit and disposal absolutely,' the remainder of said estate, after her decease, to be for the use of the said Jesse Goodman.' It was held the wife took but a life estate, and that for the reason that the will as a whole disclosed a clear intent to make a present provision for the wife and a future provision for the son. In Wead v. Gray, 78 Mo. 62, it was said that Smith v. Bell is an exceptional case, and has not been followed in this state. Smith v. Bell was cited with approval, and liberal quotations made from it, in the recent case of Harbison v. James, 90 Mo. 411. In that case the testator gave all of his property, real and personal, to his wife, with 'the right to sell and reinvest, as she may desire, any part of the same, for her separate use and benefit, and at her death I desire that any portion of my estate remaining undis The court was then composed of Ray, Ch. J., and Sherwood, Black, Brace, and Barclay, JJ., and they all concurred. It is patent, therefore, that, if the doctrine of the first group of cases had been followed, the conclusion reached by the learned judge would have been exactly the reverse; and it is manifest that he had both groups of cases in his mind, for he referred to cases belonging to each, and that upon fuller and maturer consideration he concluded that the better rule, founded upon the better reason and logic, was that announced by the second group of cases, and so he followed the "common-sense view of the matter," effectuated the intention of the devisor, and discarded the old, inflexible rule, which measured every man's intentions by a set phrase, which was formerly held to be the only words in the English language a party could employ to effectively express his intention. This case must therefore be regarded as settling the law in this state up to 1890, when it was decided. Afterwards, in 1893, the question came again before this court, in Redman v. Barger, 118 Mo. 568, and Brace, J., delivering the opinion of the court, cited and ap proved Lewis v. Pitman, 101 Mo. 281; Munro v. Collins, 95 Mo. 33; Harbison v. James, 90 Mo. 411; Russell v. Eubanks, 84 Mo. 83; Bean v. Kenmuir, 86 Mo. 660, and Smith v. Bell, 6 Pet. 68, 8 L. ed. 322. This decision was concurred in by Black, F. J., and Barclay and Macfarlane, JJ., being all the judges of division No. 1. It follows that Lewis v. Pitman is still the law in this state, unless it has been overruled by Cornwell v. Orton, 126 Mo. 355. That case stands squarely upon the doctrine of the first |