one of the United States. Certain French subjects inherited lands under this statute in 1799, but, having failed to perform the conditions of the proviso, claimed that they were protected in their estate by Article VII. of the treaty between the United States and France of September 30, 1800, by which it was provided that, in case the laws of either country should restrict the rights of foreigners with respect to real estate, such real estate "might be sold, or otherwise disposed of, to citizens or inhabitants of the country where it may be." It was claimed that these stipulations secured the right of disposal for life, and also that they operated on an estate which was vested when they were entered into. These positions were sustained, Marshall, C. J., delivering the opinion. Chirac v. Chirac (1817), 2 Wheat. 259, 276. A treaty giving certain rights of succession to realty to subjects of a foreign sovereign is not retroactive so as to affect the succession of a person who died before the treaty. Prevost v. Greneaux, 19 How. 1. "The principle that a treaty is not to be held to operate retroactively in respect to vested rights does not apply to conventions of extradition. It is a general principle that such conventions apply to offences committed prior to their conclusion, unless there is an express limitation." Moore on Extradition, I. 99, citing Twiss, Law of Nations (1884), 411; A fugitive has no vested right of asylum; nor does the provision of the A stipulation that a treaty should not apply to crimes "committed an- See, also, In re Vandervelpen, 14 Blatchf. 137. The covenants or guarantees in a treaty, when dependent on certain concessions, cannot be enforced until the concessions are actually made. Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Baxter, min. to Honduras, No. 19, Mar. 20, 1871, For. Rel. 1871, 577, as to the guarantee by the United States of the neutrality of the proposed Honduras Interoceanic Railway under Art. XIV. of the treaty of 1864. VI. INTERPRETATION. 1. GENERAL RULES. § 763. Treaties should be interpreted "in a spirit of uberrima fides," and in a manner to carry out their manifest purpose. Tucker v. Alexandroff (1902), 183 U. S. 424, 437. A treaty is to be construed so as to exclude fraud and to make its operation consistent with good faith. The Amistad, 15 Pet. 518. That a reservation in a treaty may operate as a grant of lands, see That construction of a treaty most favorable to its execution, as designed by the parties, will be preferred. United States v. Payne, 2 McCrary, 289, 8 Fed. Rep. 883. A treaty is not only a law, but also a contract between two nations, and, under familiar rules, it must, if possible, be so construed as to give full force and effect to all its parts. Goetze v. United States (1900), 103 Fed. Rep. 72. "Vattel says that the interpretation which would render a treaty null and inefficient can not be admitted; that it ought to be interpreted in such a manner as that it may have its effect, and not prove vain and nugatory." Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Beaupré, No. 331, Nov. 16, 1900, MS. Inst. "There is no rule of construction better settled either in relation to covenants between individuals or treaties between nations than that the whole instrument containing the stipulations is to be taken together, and that all articles in pari materia should be considered as parts of the same stipulations." Mr. Livingston, Sec. of State, to Baron Lederer, consul-general of Austria, Nov. 5, 1832, MS. Notes to For. Legs., V. 63; with reference to Articles V.-IX., inclusive, of the treaty with Austria-Hungary, Aug. 27, 1829, as to the treatment of vessels touching duties and other charges. It is a rule, in construing treaties as well as laws, to give a sensible meaning to all their provisions, if that be practicable. Geofroy v. Riggs (1890), 133 U. S. 258, 270, citing Vattel, Bk. II. ch. xvii. "The reason of the law, or of the treaty-that is to say, the motive which led to the making of it, and the object in contemplation at the time, is the most certain clue to lead us to the discovery of its true meaning; and great attention should be paid to this circumstance, whenever there is question either of explaining an obscure, ambiguous, indeterminate passage in a law or treaty, or of applying it to a particular case. When once we certainly know the reason which alone has determined the will of the person speaking, we ought to interpret and apply his words in a manner suitable to that reason alone; otherwise, he will be made to speak and act contrary to his intention, and in opposition to his own views." Vattel, Book II. ch. 17, sec. 287. The original of the treaty of 1819 with Spain being in the Spanish language, not corresponding precisely with the original in English, the language of the former is to be taken as expressing the intent of the grantor as to the lands granted and reserved. The King of Spain was the grantor; the treaty was his deed; the exception was made by him; and its nature and effect depended on his intention, expressed by his words, in reference to the thing granted and the thing reserved and excepted in and by the grant. The Spanish version was in his words and expressed his intention, and, though the American version showed the intention of this government to be different, we can not adopt it as the rule by which to decide what was granted, what excepted, and what reserved. The court must be governed by the clearly expressed and manifest intention of the grantor and not the grantee in private, a fortiori in public, grants. United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691. It has been settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court (1) that compacts between governments or nations, like those between individuals, should be interpreted according to the natural, fair, and received acceptation of the terms in which they are expressed; (2) that the obligation of such compacts, unless suspended by some condition or stipulation therein contained, commences with their execution by the authorized agents of the contracting parties, and that their subsequent ratification by the principals themselves has relation to the period of signature; (3) that any act or proceeding, therefore, between the signing and ratification of a treaty, by either of the contracting parties, in contravention of the stipulations of the compact, would be a fraud upon the other party, and could have no validity consistently with a recognition of the compact itself; (4) that a nation which has ceded away her sovereignty and dominion over a territory can, with respect to that territory, rightfully exert no power by which the dominion and sovereignty so ceded would be impaired or diminished, United States v. D'Auterive, 10 How, 609, A treaty of cession is a deed of the ceded territory by the sovereign grantor, and the deed is to receive an equitable construction. United States v Arredondo, 6 Pet. 710. In doubtful cases that construction is to be adopted which will work the least injustice-which will put the contract on the foundation of justice and equity rather than of inequality. Mr. Livingston, Sec. of State, to Baron Lederer, Nov. 5, 1832, MS. Notes to For. Legs., V. 63. "It is a general principle of construction with respect to treaties that they shall be liberally construed, so as to carry out the apparent intention of the parties to secure equality and reciprocity between them. As they are contracts between independent nations, in their construction words are to be taken in their ordinary meaning, as understood in the public law of nations, and not in any artificial or special sense impressed upon them by local law, unless such restricted sense is clearly intended. And it has been held by this court that where a treaty admits of two constructions, one restrictive of rights that may be claimed under it and the other favorable to them, the latter is to be preferred. Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483, 487." Geofry v. Riggs (1890), 133 U. S. 258, 271. See, to the same effect, United States v. Auguisola, 1 Wall. 352. Technical rules of construction ought not to be applied to treaties with the Indians. Taney, At. Gen., 1831, 2 Op. 465. A stipulation, though inconvenient, must be fulfilled if it be explicit; but, in case of doubt, the inconveniences which would result from a particular construction may be used as an argument to show that that construction can not be conformable to the intent of the parties. Mr. Livingston, Sec. of State, to Baron Lederer, Nov. 5, 1832, MS. Notes to For. Legs., V. 63. The doctrine of a performance cy pres, so just and appropriate in the civil concerns of private persons, belongs not to the solemn compacts of nations, so far as judicial tribunals are called upon to interpret or enforce them. The Amiable Isabella, 6 Wheat. 1, 73. In the construction of treaties, the general doctrine is that any special advantage conceded by a party under any one article is in consideration of all the advantages enjoyed by the same party under that and all other articles of the treaty. Cushing, At. Gen., 1853, 6 Op. 148. When a treaty is executed in more than one language, each language being that of a contracting party, each document, so signed and attested, is to be regarded as an original, and the sense of the treaty is to be drawn from them collectively. United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691, 710. Where treaties are drawn up in two languages each text is considered as the equivalent of the other and as being in a sense explanatory of it. Thus interpreted the two texts have a common meaning. Both parties to it stand on a footing of equality, and the object sought to be attained by them is accomplished. Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Beaupré, No. 331, Nov. 16, 1900, MS. Inst. "Treaties are subjected to the following general rules which all contractual engagements: govern "(1) There must be a concurrence of minds to one and the same thing. "(2) The interpretation of obscure terms in a treaty is a matter of fact, as to which extrinsic evidence may be taken for the purpose of explaining objective obscurity. "(3) Construction of treaties is a matter of law, to be governed by the same rules mutatis mutandis, as prevail in the construction of contracts and statutes. "(4) As contracts may be modified and rescinded, so may treaties. "(5) Immoral stipulations are void in treaties as they are in contracts. "(6) Construction' is to be distinguished from interpretation.' 'Construction' gives the general sense of a treaty and is applied by rules of logic; 'interpretation' gives the meaning of particular terms, to be explained by local circumstances and by the idioms the framers of the treaty had in mind. "(7) If two meanings are admissible, that is to be preferred which the party proposing the clause knew at the time to be that which was held by the party accepting it. "Treaties are distinguishable from contracts as follows: "(1) Contracts (unless we regard marriage as a contract) are, in all cases, the subjects of a suit for debt or damages, or for a specific thing. But no such suit lies on breach of treaty. "(2) Contracts can only be vacated or rescinded by consent, or by the action of a court. But this is not necessarily the case with a treaty. There is no court which can be appealed to to dissolve it, and when one party violates its terms the practice is for the other party to declare it not to be any longer binding. |