(157 C. C. A. 436, 245 Fed. 244.) Christie Case, supra, 198 U. S. 250, 49 L. ed. 1031, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 637, likened property in news to property in trade secrets. The two are strikingly similar. The owner of a trade secret will be given protection against any breach of confidence in respect to it by his employees and against any dishonest discovery of it by third parties. If, however, he communicates the secret to another without condition, or if anyone by his own efforts, for instance, by analysis of a secret compound, learns how it is made, such person may use it without any accountability to the original discoverer. That the discoverer spent much time and money in discovering the secret would not be regarded as a reason why such persons, learning it honestly, should not make use of it. In this case the complainant furnishes news to its members for the express purpose of their putting it on their bulletin boards and issuing it to the public in their newspapers. This is what they live on. After this it seems to me pure fiction to say that any property in the distributer survives. Everything in the nature of a confidence about the communication has ceased. That the rotation of the earth is slower than the electric current is a physical fact the complainant must reckon with in doing its business. That news dedicated to the public with the complainant's consent by the morning newspapers in New York can be telegraphed in time to appear in the morning newspapers of San Francisco cannot qualify the legal effect of the dedication. There being not the least evidence of anything fraudulent or underhanded in this method of obtaining news, I think the injunction should be denied. Affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States, December 23, 1918, in (U. S. Adv. Ops. 1918-19, p. 79), 248 U. S. 215, 63 L. ed. ante, 293, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 68. NOTE. In view of the widespread interest in the reported case (ASSOCIATED PRESS V. INTERNATIONAL NEWS SERVICE, ante, 317), it has been deemed advisable to publish the opinions of the Circuit Court of Appeals for comparison with the opinions of the United States Supreme Court (International News Service v. Associated Press, ante, 293) in the same case, affirming the decision of the former court. 1. The attempt by a public service corporation to exercise its right of eminent domain for a private purpose under the guise of a public one renders it liable in tort to one injured thereby, although there is no interference with the physical possession of the property. [See note on this question beginning on page 331.] Eminent domain right to abandon proceedings. 2. A corporation lawfully exercising its right of eminent domain may, prior to the determination of damages, abandon its attempt to take a particu lar parcel of property, since the rights of the parties have not become reciprocally vested. REPORT by the Supreme Judicial Court for York County for the determination by the Law Court of an action brought to enjoin defendant from taking plaintiff's timber land by eminent domain. Judgment for plaintiff. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Mr. E. P. Spinney, for plaintiff: Defendant cannot escape liability for damages by filing its abandonment proceedings. York Shore Water Co. v. Card, 116 Me. 483, 102 Atl. 321, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 945; 15 Cyc. 942; Clarke v. Manchester, 56 N. H. 502; Van Valkenburgh v. Milwaukee, 43 Wis. 574. Messrs. Ralph W. Hawkes and Josiah Chase for defendant. Deasy, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The defendant corporation, having by legislative grant the right of eminent domain, attempted to condemn and take timber owned by the plaintiff. A notice of taking and later a petition for assessment of damages were filed, as provided by its charter. The damages were not determined. Before the time set for hearing the plaintiff applied to this court, sitting in equity, for an injunction on the ground that the proposed taking was for private purposes. A bond was filed and temporary injunction granted. Another suit in equity, brought against the same defendant by Samuel M. Bowden, was pending at the same time, involving other lands which the defendant was attempting to condemn and take. The Bowden Case was reported to the law court, and in the opinion (114 Me. 150, 95 Atl. 779) the purpose of taking in that case was held to be a private purpose. On this ground the bill was sustained, and a permanent injunction ordered issued. After the decision in the above case was announced, defendant abandoned its attempt to take the plaintiff's (Sidelinker's) land, and filed with the county commissioners and gave to the plaintiff notices of such abandonment. Later the plaintiff's bill was sustained without hearing, and the injunction made permanent. It seems to be conceded that there was an agreement between the parties to the pending Isuit that it should abide the result of the Bowden Case. In the meantime the plaintiff, who had, at the time the notice of taking was filed, planned and prepared to operate his land, suspended such operation until after the defendant's abandonment. The plaintiff brings this action of tort, alleging that by the defendant's acts above outlined he has (- Me. - been "hindered and prevented from The acts complained of, as above outlined, stated in chronological sequence, are as follows: July 12, 1913.-Bowden equity suit begun. September 26, 1913.-Notice filed by the defendant in the office of the county commissioners of York county, setting forth that the defendant "has taken and hereby does take" the plaintiff's land involved in this suit. September 27. 1913.-Letter written by the defendant's attorney to the plaintiff, inclosing copy of notice, and saying: "Under the charter of the York Shore Water Company the filing of the paper of which the inclosed copy is an exact duplicate constitutes a taking of your land and timber for all purposes, subject to their paying the fair value for the same." November, 1913.-Petition filed by the defendant with the county commissioners of York county, praying for determination of compensation. December 8, 1913.-Plaintiff's bill against defendant, praying for injunction, filed, and subpoena issued. Temporary injunction granted, upon filing bond. November 24, 1915.-Rescript from law court having been received, Bowden bill sustained, and writ of permanent injunction ordered to is sue. January, 1916.-Notice of abandonment by defendant given to plaintiff, and filed with county commissioners. January 23, 1916.-Plaintiff's (Sidelinker's) bill sustained, and perpetual injunction ordered to is sue. In the meantime, from the au tumn of 1913 until the autumn of 1916, the plaintiff suspended operation on his land described in the condemnation proceedings. The plaintiff says this suspension was by reason of the defendant's attempted taking of the land. The essence of the plaintiff's case is the charge that the attempted condemnation, while professedly for public, was in truth and in fact for private, purposes. Granting a lawful taking, the abandonment warranted, for at right to its date, damages abandon not having been determined, the rights of the parties had not become reciprocally vested. Furbish v. Kennebec County, 93 Me. 117, 44 Atl. 364. The abandonment before determination of compensation of property properly taken for public purposes does not ordinarily cause liability. Damages suffered by the landowner are in such case incident to the ownership of property. Same-delay It has been held, however, that undue and unreasonable delay or other misconduct in the proceedings will render the corporation liable for liability for damages. Winkel- damages. man v. Chicago, 213 Ill. 360, 72 N. E. 1066; Cushman v. Smith, 34 Me. 247. What the plaintiff in this case complains of is not delay or misconduct in a condemnation proceeding lawfully initiated, but the wrongful beginning of such proceeding. His complaint is that the defendant, having power to take his land for public purposes, proceeded by legal formalities to take it for illegal purposes. The attempted taking was, as stated in the notice, for "the protection of the water of Chase's pond." There is no testimony in this case showing the situation of the plaintiff's land with reference to the pond. pond. But prior to the beginning of this action a suit in equity was begun by the plaintiff against the defendant, praying that it be en joined from proceeding with its condemnation for the reason that the purpose was private; the very ground upon which this case rests. An answer and replication were filed, and a decree obtained, sustaining the bill and directing that the temporary injunction be made permanent. This decree, although granted apparently by consent without actual hearing, estops the defendant from Judgmentconsenteffect. denying in the present case that the taking was for pri vate purposes. Corey v. Independent Ice Co. 106 Me. 485, 76 Atl. 930; Wilson v. Lacroix, 111 Me. 324, 89 Atl. 69. This brings us to the main issue. Did the filing by the defendant in the county commissioners' court of a notice of taking, stating that the defendant "has taken and hereby does take" the plaintiff's land, such act being ostensibly for a public and lawful purpose, but really for a private and unauthorized purpose, render the defendant liable in this action of tort? A private individual, enjoying no special privileges, who, without malice, wrongfully asserts, and presses, by suit or otherwise, a Tort-wrong fully asserting title to property. claim to the property of another, provided he do not physically interfere with such property or its possession, is not, under the common law, guilty of tort. But a different and stricter rule should be applied to a corporation armed with the right of eminent domain. Authority in some measure determines accountability. Responsibility is a corollary of power. Privilege and duty grow on the same stem. The high standard demanded in the conduct of trustees, the rule of trespass ab initio applied in the case of public officers, and the extraordinary degree of care required of common carriers, are some of many illustrations of the broad application of this principle. The defendant was intrusted by the state with the power of taking private property by eminent domain. This power is an attribute of sovereignty. Its possession is a privilege of high import. While nothing in this case shows. that it was so used by this defendant, it may be made an instrument of oppression. Its exercise should. be sedulously guarded. Atonement should be made for its abuse. While counsel have not cited, nor have we discovered, any authority directly in point, we hold that, when this defendant filed in the office of the county commissioners its notice of taking the plaintiff's land, stating Eminent domain -wrongful exerciseliability. therein that it "has taken and hereby does take" such land, professedly for public, but in fact for private, purposes, and also filed its petition for determination of damages, it committed an act tortious as to the plaintiff, notwithstanding it did not by any physical means interfere with the plaintiff's possession. Damages-rule In determining the amount of damage, the rule in this case, as in all cases, is that the plaintiff should be for computing. made whole. He should have actual, but not speculative, damages. The plaintiff claims that his damages were enhanced by reason of a contract that he had made to sell the lumber on the lot. The evidence does not satisfy us that his legal damages were affected by this circumstance. On the other hand, the weight of evidence is clearly opposed to the defendant's contention that the growth wholly offsets the loss. The plaintiff shows that the cost of operation increased considerably during the suspension. But it also appears that the market value of lumber increased in about the same proportion. We find that the plaintiff was justified in suspending his lumbering operation. A corporation vested with the right of eminent domain having filed notice in proper form Eminent domain-right to suspend operations on property. and in the proper office that it had taken his land, he rightly determined to submit until, by orderly legal procedure, the rights of the parties could be settled. But on November 24, 1915, the Bowden Case was decided by the law court. We are not convinced that the continued suspension after this time was due to the defendant's acts. From September 25, 1913, to November 24, 1915, the plaintiff suspended his lumbering operation, and was justified in so doing by reason of the defendant's attempted condemnation. The plaintiff was deprived of the use of his land for a period of about two years and two months. He paid Damageswrongful exercise of right of two years' taxes, which presumably would have been eminent domain. much less if he had stripped the land in 1914. He suffered some damages caused by sacrifice of his preparation for operating in that year. Upon all the evidence, without extending this opinion by further analysis or comment, we think that the plaintiff will be made whole if he is awarded damages in the sum of $600. Judgment for the plaintiff for $600. NOTE. While a search has failed to disclose any instance other than the reported case (SIDELINKER V. YORK SHORE WATER Co. ante, 327), in which it has been sought to hold a corporation liable for an attempt to use the power of eminent domain for private purposes, the case is one of novelty in the application, rather than in the principle involved. It may be considered as an illustration of the principle, of diverse application, that one who wrongfully attempts to exercise an existing right is liable for the damages occasioned thereby. Here, although there was a right in the defendant to condemn property for public purposes, it exceeded such right when it attempted to exercise it for a private purpose. And since the existence of a right in one who interferes with the business of another must unite with good faith in its exercise in order to constitute justification, it is not enough that the corporation may have acted in good faith. Attorney and client - lien — compromise of suit. 1. Where an attorney files a lien claim for his fee, as provided by statute, and the case is, without his knowledge or consent, compromised and dismissed by his client before a trial and judgment are had, he may sue the party who settled with his client for the amount of his fee, and on a hearing in that case present the facts essential to establish the merits of the case in which he was employed; and if his client should have prevailed in that action, then he is entitled to recover in his action the amount of his lien claim. But if his client had no rights, then his cause of action 'must fail. [See note on this question beginning on page 337.] Headnotes by BRETT, C. |