is liable to a bona fide holder of a check it has certified regardless of the state of the drawer's account, the implication being that the check is drawn upon sufficient funds, and the bank being estopped to deny that such is the case. The following cases support this rule: Merchants Nat. Bank v. State Nat. Bank (1870) 10 Wall. (U. S.) 604, 19 L. ed. 1008; Bowen v. Needles Nat. Bank (1898) 87 Fed. 430, affirmed in (1899) 36 C. C. A. 553, 94 Fed. 925; Born v. First Nat. Bank (1889) 123 Ind. 78, 7 L.R.A. 442, 18 Am. St. Rep. 312, 24 N. E. 173 (holding that the bank could not defeat the right of the holder to payment upon the ground that the drawer had no funds on deposit); Union Trust Co. v. Preston Nat. Bank (1904) 136 Mich. 460, 112 Am. St. Rep. 370, 99 N. W. 399, 4 Ann. Cas. 347; Robinett v. Bank of Willow Springs (1914) 178 Mo. App. 422, 163 S. W. 248; Ozark Sav. Bank v. Bank of Bradleyville (1918) Mo. App. -, 204 S. W. 570; Farmers' & M. Bank v. Butchers' & D. Bank (1857) 16 Ν. Υ. 127, 69 Am. Dec. 678, affirming (1855) 4 Duer, 219 (the opinion delivered in this case by Denio, Chief Justice, is reported in (1856) 14 N. Y. 623, and the opinion of Brown, J., is reported in (1863) 28 N. Y. 425 and 26 How. Pr. 1; Claflin v. Farmers' & C. Bank (1862) 25 N. Y. 293, reversing (1861) 36 Barb. 540 (holding that such is the rule as to checks of ordinary depositors in the bank); Cooke v. State Nat. Bank (1873) 52 N. Y. 96, 11 Am. Rep. 667 (so holding although the drawer had no funds in the bank at the time of the certification which was fraudulent); Pope v. Bank of Albion (1871) 59 Barb. (N. Y.) 226, reversed in (1874) 57 N. Y. 126 (the reversal was upon the ground that the check showed on its face that the certification was by a subordinate officer who had no authority to certify checks); Goshen Nat. Bank v. Bingham (1890) 118 N. Y. 349, 7 L.R.A. 595, 16 Am. St. Rep. 765, 23 N. E. 180; Willets v. Phœnix Bank (1853) 2 Duer (N. Υ.) 121; Rankin v. Colonial Bank (1900) 31 Misc. 227, 64 N. Y. Supp. 32, affirmed without opinion in (1901) 60 App. Div. 629, 69 N. Y. Supp. 1144; Baldinger & K. Mfg. Co. v. Manufacturers'-Citizens' Trust Co. (1915) 93 Misc. 94, 156 N. Y. Supp. 445 (dictum); Security State Bank v. State Bank (1915) 31 N. D. 454, 154 N. W. 282; Hill v. Nation Trust Co. (1884) 108 Pa. 1, 56 Am. Rep. 189 (holding that where a check is certified by a bank when the drawer thereof has no funds, the consequences of the bank officer's infidelity or blunder should be visited not upon the innocent holder of the check so certified, but upon the agent's employers who put it in his power to commit the wrong); Farmers' & M. Nat. Bank v. Elizabethtown Nat. Bank (1906) 30 Pa. Super. Ct. 271; Andrews v. German Nat. Bank (1872) 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 211, 24 Am. Rep. 300; French v. Irwin (1874) 4 Baxt. (Tenn.) 401, 27 Am. Rep. 769. And this is the rule with respect to any national bank which overcertifies a check, in violation of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5208, Comp. Stat. 1916, § 9770, which provides that "it shall be unlawful for any officer, clerk or agent of any national banking association to certify any check drawn upon the association unless the person or company drawing the check has on deposit with the association at the time such check is certified an amount of money equal to the amount specified in such check. Any check so certified by duly authorized officers shall be a good and valid obligation against the association, but the act of any officer, clerk or agent of any association in violation of this section shall subject such bank to the liabilities and proceedings on the part of the comptroller," etc. Thompson v. St. Nicholas Nat. Bank (1889) 113 N. Y. 325, 21 N. E. 57, affirmed in (1892) 146 U. S. 240, 36 L. ed. 956, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 66. And in Michigan an overcertified check is valid in the hands of a bona fide holder, notwithstanding a statute declaring it unlawful to certify a check for an amount greater than the drawer's deposit, and making such a certification a crime, and this even though the statute does not provide, as does the National Bank Act, that such a check shall be good as against the bank. Union Trust Co. v. Preston Nat. Bank (1904) 136 Mich. 460, 112 Am. St. Rep. 370, 99 N. W. 399, 4 Ann. Cas. 347; First Nat. Bank v. Union Trust Co. (1909) 158 Mich. 94, 133 Am. St. Rep. 362, 122 N. W. 547, both of which construe and apply Mich. Comp. Laws 1897, § 6108. And see First Nat. Bank v. Currie (1907) 147 Mich. 72, 9 L.R.A.(N.S.) 698, 118 Am. St. Rep. 537, 110 N. W. 499, 11 Ann. Cas. 241. And in at least one state where it is made a felony for any officer, agent, clerk, or employee of a bank wilfully to certify a check unless the amount called for actually stands to the credit of the drawer on the books of the bank, it is expressly provided that any such check so certified by a duly authorized person shall be a good and valid obligation of the bank in the hands of an innocent holder. See Smith v. Field (1911) 19 Idaho, 558, 114 Pac. 668, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 354, construing Idaho Rev. Codes, § 2988. But where a bank, because of a mistake of fact, certifies a check for an amount greater than the drawer has on deposit at the time, it may upon discovering the mistake, cancel the certification as between the holder and the bank, provided no rights of other parties have intervened and the holder has in no way changed his position or rights between the certifying and the cancelation. Dillaway v. Northwestern Nat. Bank (1899) 82 III. App. 71 (in this case the bank, after certifying the check, delivered it to the holder, and upon again getting temporary possession of it, canceled the certification); Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Toler (1892) 65 Hun, 187, 19 N. Y. Supp. 975, affirmed without opinion in (1893) 138 Ν. Υ. 675, 34 Ν. Ε. 515 (holding that a certification could be revoked except in so far as it had caused a change of circumstances); Security Sav. & T. Co. v. King (1914) 69 Or. 228, 138 Pac. 465. At least where the check is still in the hands of the person who procured the certification thereof, and the rights of third parties have not intervened, such holder can recover from the bank only for the balance the drawer had on deposit when the certification was made. Rankin v. Colonial Bank (1900) 31 Misc. 227, 64 N. Y. Supp. 32, affirmed without opinion in (1901) 60 App. Div. 629, 69 N. Y. Supp. 1144. And for a better reason, where a bank has been induced by fraud to certify the check of a depositor for an amount in excess of his deposit, it may countermand payment unless the rights of other parties have intervened. Farmers' Sav. Bank v. American Trust Co. (1918) 199 Мо. App. 491, 203 S. W. 674; Bank of the Republic v. Baxter (1858) 31 Vt. 101. Of course, neither mistake (see Ozark Sav. Bank v. Bank of Bradleyville (1918) Mo. App. -, 204 S. W. 570, holding that where a bank certified a check of a depositor having a balance of $350, believing that it was for $200 when in fact it was for $2,000, it was liable to an innocent purchaser who paid full value therefor) nor fraud (Cooke v. State Nat. Bank (1873) 52 Ν. Υ. 96, 11 Am. Rep. 667) constitutes a defense as against an innocent holder for value. b. As to others than bona fide holders. In the absence of statutory influence, the view seems to be that the reasoning upon which the general rule is based does not apply as between the drawer and the drawee bank, the rule being limited to innocent holders for value. See the reported case (STATE V. SCARLETT, ante, 83); Cooke v. State Nat. Bank (N. Y.) supra; and Baldinger & K. Mfg. Co. v. Manufacturers'-Citizens' Trust Co. (1915) 93 Misc. 94, 156 N. Y. Supp. 445. And the same is true as to a holder who is in the same position as the drawer. Stevens v. Corn Exch. Bank (1874) 3 Hun (N. Y.) 147, 48 How. Pr. 351, 5 Thomp. & C. 283. And in New York it has been held that where a check in favor of the drawer is transferred by him without indorsement, a bank which has fraudulently been induced to overcertify the check is not estopped by the certification from questioning the validity of the check. Goshen Nat. Bank v. Bingham (1890) 118 N. Y. 349, 7 L.R.A. 595, 16 Am. St. Rep. 765, 23 Ν. Ε. 180. And it has been held that the fact that a check shows on its face that the certification was made by a subordinate officer who ordinarily is not invested with authority to certify checks prevents one becoming a bona fide holder where the certification was in fact made by such an officer, if the drawer did not have sufficient funds on deposit to cover the check. Pope v. Bank of Albion (1874) 57 Ν. Y. 126, reversing (1871) 59 Barb. 226. And even under § 5208 (above set out), a bank certifying a check is not liable to one not a bona fide holder, it having been held that the provision, "any check so certified by duly authorized officers shall be a good and valid obligation against the association," does not apply where the check is in the hands of the original payee, who knows or is chargeable with constructive notice that the check was drawn and certified in violation of law. Bowen v. Needles Nat. Bank (1898) 87 Fed. 430, affirmed on other points in (1899) 36 C. C. A. 553, 94 Fed. 925. However, it has been held that the prohibition in this section of the Revised Statutes of the United States against certifying any check drawn upon a national banking association unless there is a sufficient deposit at the time to meet the check does not affect the validity of a contract even as between the parties to such an extent that a violation of the provision by a national bank in overcertifying a check precludes the bank from enforcing its claim out of collaterals pledged to secure the debt created by the certifying of the check. Thompson v. St. Nicholas Nat. Bank (1892) 146 U. S. 240, 36 L. ed. 956, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 66, affirming (1889) 113 N. Y. 325, 21 N. E. 57, which affirmed (1888) 47 Hun, 621. The Supreme Court of the United States in this case said that the only penalty incurred for violation of the provisions of this statute is a forfeiture of the bank's charter and the winding up of its affairs, and that the validity of transactions falling within such provision can be questioned only by the United States, and not by private parties. But for the purposes of the general rule a creditor who accepts a cashier's check drawn to his own order in payment of his individual debts and un lawfully certified by himself takes the risk of such lack of authority and is not a bona fide holder, since such a course of dealing is sufficiently out of the line of ordinary conduct of the cashier of a bank to put the payee upon notice. Gale v. Chase Nat. Bank (1900) 43 C. C. A. 496, 104 Fed. 214. So, in the New York case of Claflin v. Farmers' & C. Bank (1862) 25 Ν. Υ. 293, reversing (1861) 36 Barb. 540, it was held that where a personal check is drawn by a bank officer and certified by himself, it shows on its face an attempt to use his official character for his private benefit, so that one to whom it comes is put on inquiry precluding his recovery as a bona fide holder when the certification is false. And generally to the effect that a personal check drawn by a bank officer and certified by himself is void on its face, so that one accepting it cannot claim that he is a bona fide holder, see Lee v. Smith (1884) 84 Mo. 304, 54 Am. Rep. 101. And in New Brunswick it has been ruled that the payee of a check is placed on strict inquiry as to the authority of a manager of a bank to bind the bank by a certification of a check which there was no deposit to meet when such payee knew that the drawer gave the check in the interest of the manager, who certified it. McIntosh v. Bank of New Brunswick (1913) — Ν. B. —, 15 D. L. R. 375. II. Criminal liability. In some jurisdictions a question has been made as to the criminal liability, if any, of one who certifies a check in violation of a statutory prohibition. Thus it has been held that § 5208 of the United States Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. 1916, § 9770) which is set out supra, does not create any criminal offense. United States v. Heinze (1908) 161 Fed. 425. And see Thompson v. St. Nicholas Nat. Bank (1892) 146 U. S. 240, 36 L. ed. 956, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 66, affirming (1889) 113 N. Y. 325, 21 N. E. 57, as set out supra. But § 5208 of the Revised Statutes was supplemented by the Act of July 12, 1882 (22 Stat. at L. 166, chap. 290, § 13, Comp. Stat. 1916, § 9771), so as to make it a misdemeanor for any officer, clerk, or agent of any national banking association to wilfully violate the provisions of § 5208, as enacted in 1869. Construing the Amendatory Act of 1882, it has been held that, to constitute the offense by a bank officer of certifying a check without a sufficient deposit to meet it, there must be on the part of the officer knowledge and a purpose to do wrong in addition to the certification, wrongful intent being the essence of the crime. Potter v. United States (1894) 155 U. S. 438, 39 L. ed. 214, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 144, reversing (1892) 56 Fed. 83; Spurr v. United States (1899) 174 U. S. 728, 43 L. ed. 1150, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 812, reversing (1898) B1 С. С. А. 202, 59 U. S. App. 663, 87 Fed. 701 (holding that specific intent to violate the statute may be imputed, as where the officer purposely keeps himself in ignorance of whether the drawer has money in the bank or not, or is grossly indifferent to his duty in respect to the ascertainment of that fact); United States v. Heinze (1908) 161 Fed. 425 (holding that § 5208 should be read with § 13 of the Act of 1882, and that, when so read, a criminal offense is created). And under the Federal "Conspiracy Act" (U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5440, Comp. Stat. 1916, § 10,201), which imposes a penalty upon all the parties to a conspiracy to commit any offense against the United States where one or more of such parties has done any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, it has been held that it is not essential, in order to obtain a conviction under an indictment charging a conspiracy with officers of a national bank for the certification of a check when the drawer had insufficient funds on deposit, in violation of § 5208, that the defendant should have had knowledge that such false certification was in violation of law, since the necessary criminal intent will be imputed where it is shown that the parties have acted without knowledge of the facts. Chadwick v. United States (1905) 72 С. С. A. 343, 141 Fed. 225. And for illustrations of state statutes which expressly make it a criminal offense for a bank to overcertify a check drawn upon it, see Smith v. Field (1911) 19 Idaho, 558, 114 Pac. 668, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 354, and Union Trust Co. v. Preston Nat. Bank (1904) 136 Mich. 460, 112 Am. St. Rep. 370, 99 N. W. 399, 4 Ann. Cas. 347, as set out supra. G. J. C. S. BANE, Appt., V. NORFOLK & SOUTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY. North Carolina Supreme Court - October 23, 1918. Carrier - language of notice - inability of passenger to read. That a passenger cannot read the English language in which a carrier prints a notice required by statute, warning passengers not to ride upon the platforms of the cars, does not relieve him from the operation of a statute providing that, in case a passenger is injured while on the platform in violation of the printed regulations, the company shall not be liable for his injury, if the statute does not require the printing of the notice in other than the English language. [See noto on this question beginning on page 93.] APPEAL by plaintiff from a judgment of the Superior Court for Durham County in favor of defendant in an action brought to recover damages for (N. O., 97 S. E. 11.) personal injuries alleged to have been caused by defendant's negligence. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. pellant: To constitute contributory negligence, plaintiff must have committed a negligent act, and such negligent conduct must have been the proximate cause of the injury. A failure to establish proximate cause, although negligence be proved, is fatal. Ramsbottom v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 138 N. C. 38, 50 S. E. 448; Brewster v. Elizabeth City, 137 N. C. 394, 49 S. E. 885; Hoaglin v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 161 N. C. 398, 77 S. E. 417; Henderson v. Durham Traction Co. 132 N. C. 785, 44 S. E. 598; Pritchard v. Southern R. Co. 157 N. C. 101, 72 S. E. 828; Paul v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 170 N. C. 230, L.R.A. 1916B, 1079, 87 S. E. 66; Lea v. Southern Public Utilities Co. 175 N. C. 459, 95 S. E. 894. Even if plaintiff was on the platform in violation of the statute, or in violation of the printed rules of the company, it would not prevent his recovery unless such violation was the proximate cause of the injury. Ledbetter v. English, 166 N. C. 129, 81 S. E. 1066; Ferrell v. Durham Traction Co. 172 N. C. 682, L.R.A.1917B, 1291, 90 S. E. 893; Boney v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 155 N. C. 95, 71 S. E. 87. Messrs. W. B. Rodman and W. B. Guthrie for appellee. Clark, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court: The plaintiff, a passenger on the east-bound train from Raleigh to Norfolk, had paid his way to Farmville, North Carolina. At Stantonsburg, a small station just before reaching Farmville, where there was a pass track, the plaintiff got out on the platform, and on the left side of the train, which was on the opposite side to the station, while his train was still moving, when a freight train coming from the west moved into the siding, pushing ahead of it three cars already on the siding, which ran over a section hand, thereby derailing the front box car, which was empty. This car, leaning over towards the main track, bouncing along on the ties, struck the side of the passenger coach, where the plaintiff was holding to the grabiron as he stood on the platform with one foot on the top step. This box car, striking the passenger train, broke some of the windows in the forward colored coach, the engine and baggage car passing safely, and knocked off the grabiron which the plaintiff was holding, and the plaintiff received a slight scratch or wound on the hand. The coach in which the plaintiff was riding was not injured at all; no windows broken, and none of the passengers in any of the coaches were hurt; and plaintiff admits that, if he had kept his seat in the car, he would not have been hurt. The court charged the jury, as requested by plaintiff, that "The mere announcement of the name of a station is not an invitation to alight; but, when such an announcement is followed by a stoppage of the train soon thereafter, it is ordinarily notification that the train has arrived at the usual place for landing passengers, and under such circumstances a passenger may reasonably conclude that it has stopped at the station, and endeavor to get off, unless the circumstances and indications are such as to render it manifest that the train has not reached the proper and usual landing place." "The court charges you that, if you find from the evidence in this case, and the greater weight, that the train upon which plaintiff was riding was struck by an engine or box car owned and operated by the defendant, this would be negligence; and if this was the proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff, and you so find, you would answer the first issue, 'Yes.'" "If you find from the evidence in this case, and by the greater weight thereof, that the plaintiff was a passenger on the defendant's train going from Raleigh to Farmville, North Carolina, that he had not had |