OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS CONTENTS EUROPEAN WAR: Diplomatic correspondence respecting the war published by the French Government: PAGE Chap. I. Warnings. (1913)... 133 Chap. II. Preliminaries. From the death of the Hereditary Archduke (June 28, 1914) to the presentation of the Austrian note to Servia (July 23, 1914). . . . 157 Chap. III. The Austrian note and the Servian reply (Friday, July 24, and Saturday, July 25).... 168 Chap. IV. From the rupture of diplomatic relations (July 25, 1914), to the declaration of war by Austria on Servia (July 28, 1914)... Chap. V. From the declaration of war by Austria on Servia (July 28, 1914) to the German ultimatum to Russia (July 31, 1914)... Chap. VI. Declaration of war by Germany on Russia (Saturday, August 1, at 7.10 p. m.) and on France (Monday, August 3, at 6.45 p. m.). . . . . . Chap. VII. Declaration of the Triple Entente (September 4, 1914)..... List of Appendices, with references... 191 233 260 303 303 OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING THE WAR PUBLISHED BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT 1 CHAPTER I WARNINGS (1913.) No. 1. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of the Republic at Berlin, to M. Jonnart, Minister for Foreign Affairs BERLIN, March 17, 1913. Our naval and military attachés are sending to their respective ministers reports on the new German military law. I take this opportunity of drawing the attention of your excellency to these important documents. The consideration of the financial expedients by which Germany intends to provide for these military measures is the sole cause of the delay in the publication of the definite proposals of the government. In spite of the patriotism with which the rich classes affect to accept the sacrifices asked of them, they are none the less, particularly the business circles, dissatisfied with the financial measures which have been announced, and they feel that a compulsory levy imposed in times of peace creates a formidable precedent for the future. On the other hand, the Federal Governments have strongly opposed an innovation which grants to the Empire resources derived from direct taxation. Hitherto, taxation of this kind has been reserved to the Federal States, and the latter see in the surrender of this principle a new declaration of the corporate unity (personalité) of the Empire, constituting a distinct diminution of their own sovereign power. However this may be, in increasing the strength of the German army the Empire desires to leave nothing to chance in the event of a possible crisis. 1 British Command Paper, 7717, Miscellaneous No. 15 (1914). The German changes have produced a result unexpected by that country, viz., the proposal of the Government of the Republic to reestablish the three years' service, and the manly determination with which this proposal has been welcomed in France. The surprise occasioned by these proposals has been utilized by the Imperial Government for the purpose of insisting on the absolute necessity of an increase of German military strength; the German proposals are represented as a reply to our own. The reverse is the case, since the immense military effort which France is undertaking is but the consequence of German initiative. The Imperial Government is constantly rousing patriotic sentiment. Every day the Emperor delights to revive memories of 1813. Yesterday evening a military tattoo went through the streets of Berlin, and speeches were delivered in which the present situation was compared to that of a hundred years ago. The trend of public opinion will find an echo in the speeches which will be delivered next month in the Reichstag, and I have reason to fear that the Chancellor himself will be forced to allude in his statements to the relations of France and Germany. It was of course to be expected that national patriotism would be worked up just when fresh sacrifices are being required, but to compare the present time to 1813 is to misuse an historical analogy. If, to-day, there is anything corresponding to the movement which a hundred years ago roused Germans to fight the man of genius who aspired to universal dominion, it is in France that such a counterpart would have to be sought, since the French nation seeks but to protect itself against the domination of force. Nevertheless, it is true that the state of public opinion in both countries makes the situation grave. JULES CAMBON. ENCLOSURE I Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Serret, Military Attaché to the Embassy of the French Republic at Berlin, to M. Etienne, Minister of War BERLIN, March 15, 1913. The patriotic movement which has manifested itself in France has caused real anger in certain circles. I do not, indeed, mean to say that the virulent article in the Kölnische Zeitung is the expression of prevalent opinion. It is rather the angry outburst of an impulsive journalist, which has been immediately disavowed by the government. However, in spite of its want of good manners the article in the Kölnische Zeitung cannot be disregarded; several important newspapers have approved of its substance, if not of its form, and it appears to express a real feeling, a latent anger. It is interesting to note this fact, because it throws very vivid light on the meaning of the present armaments. For some time now it has been quite a common thing to meet people who declare that the military plans of France are extraordinary and unjustified. In a drawing room a member of the Reichstag who is not a fanatic, speaking of the three years' service in France, went so far as to say, "It is a provocation; we will not allow it." More moderate persons, military and civil, glibly voice the opinion that France with her forty million inhabitants has no right to compete in this way with Germany. To sum up, people are angry, and this anger is not caused by the shrieking of certain French papers, to which sober-minded people pay little attention. It is a case of vexation. People are angry at realizing that in spite of the enormous effort made last year, continued and even increased this year, it will probably not be possible this time to outrun France completely. To outdistance us, since we neither will nor can be allied with her, is Germany's real aim. I cannot insist too much on the fact that the impending legislation, which French public opinion is too apt to consider as a spontaneous outburst, is but the inevitable and expected consequence of the law of June, 1912. This law, while creating two new army corps, had deliberately, ac-. cording to German fashion, left regiments and other large units incomplete. It was evident that there would be no long delay in filling in the gaps. The Balkan crisis, coming just at the right moment, furnished a wonderful opportunity for exploiting the centenary of the War of Liberation, and obtaining with greater ease sacrifices through the memory of those made in days gone by, and that too at a time when Germany was opposed to France. 1 The problem which is set us to-day would, therefore, only be set again a few years later, and in a much more acute fashion, since the decrease of our contingents is continually lowering the number of our effectives on a peace footing. |