resolutely carried through. Furthermore, the security of the country did not rest only on the stones of our fortresses but also on the army of campaign and manoeuvre. The concentration of our troops was carefully prepared for as well as the arrangements for strategic transportation. A high railroad commission was newly established whose studies and records were always kept up to the minute and in 1914 made it possible to mobilize and concentrate our troops without any difficulty or serious accident. Finally, the creation of the geographic service completed the equipment of our armies.

The reorganized French army could face the future with confidence.

But the progress of science did not allow the country to relax its efforts. Twelve years after the adoption of the "74" rifle the appearance of repeating rifles obliged us to transform the weapons of our infantry. The troops received the Lebel rifle, model "86." At the same time the discovery of a new explosive, melinite, was calculated to bring about for the artillery somewhat later, after considerable developments, the transformation of our fortifications by the necessary adoption of the concealed cupola.

Shortly after, by the active initiative of M. Freycinet, a series of regulations of the highest importance for our military staff was adopted. There was first the decree of 1888 which created the general staff of the army; the substitution of this body for the general staff of the ministry assured a greater stability and a greater continuity of views. At the same time the High War Council was created with the duty to give its advice in all great questions of interest to the national defense. Its vice-president was the commanding general of the French armies. The later decrees (notably those issued by M. Messimy) merely developed the principles then established. On the other hand the internal organization of the army, as far as its officers were concerned, was assured by the decree creating classification commissions.

In the year following (1889) it became necessary to revise the law of 1872 on the recruiting of the army. In spite of the

political situation, still troubled by incessant strife in parliament, the government succeeded in having a new law passed constituting the three years service but incorporating the entire contingent. The reduction of length of service did not injure the troops nor the army as a whole. While the principle of obligatory service was confirmed by the suppression of exemptions and substitutions, it is true that too many dispensations were granted to such classes as those who supported families or who had certain educational qualifications, limiting their service to a single year; this was one of the principle defects of the law.

But interest in the complete assurance of the national defense remained keen. After 1891 considerable development was given to manoeuvres on a large scale, in which as many as four army corps participated, and to manoeuvres by squadrons. Some years later in 1897, the artillery in its turn was modernized following the adoption of the cannon of 75 millimeters. This was a serious burden for the country but every one knows how well it paid. The only thing to be regretted is that the really incomparable qualities of the "75's" have led people to consider them adequate for all necessities of the battlefield.

In 1899 the French army was increased in power by the law providing for the colonial army. The former marine infantry was again attached to the ministry of war and the foundations for its development were laid. That law permitted the organization of native colonial troops who played such an important rôle in the world war.

Moroccans, negroes, Annamites were able to stand beside the children of the attacked metropolis and the very indignation of the Germans against the use of these troops in Europe demonstrates to us what an invaluable reinforcement they were and again may be for us. At the same time the colonial army is an admirable training school for officers of all ranks. Unfortunately the adoption of the last-mentioned law coincided almost exactly with a relaxation of our effort that almost resulted fatally for us.

From about 1900 the party in power ceased to believe in the possibility of a war and in the need of having a strong army. The radical socialists were not unpatriotic but they facilitated the work of the anti-militarists by their ill-judged measures. The army would have been only slightly shaken by the Dreyfus case if that case had not been made the occasion of a formidable campaign against everything military. The men who at that time occupied the ministry of war made no struggle against this movement. The army was abandoned, morally and materially.

Everyone remembers the scandals of the André ministry. The corps of officers, deteriorated in all ways after the suppression of the classification committees, lost confidence. As they believed no more in war they began to be niggardly; under pretext of economy they neglected upkeep and reduced manufactures; indispensable improvements were postponed under pretext of preliminary studies.

Finally a last serious blow was dealt to our military organization by the passage of a new recruiting law in 1905—a political law in which the good of the army was the least care of its author. That law established the two years service without exception or dispensation. No provision was made to compensate by judicious organization for the weakening of the army by the loss of a third of its numbers. It was simply a question of relaxation of military duty. The length of the periods of training for men in the reserve was shortened at the same time as that of the men in active service.

Hardly was that law passed when the Moroccan incident came to show the disadvantages of such a careless policy. Important credits were obtained outside of Parliament in order to resume manufacture. But very quickly carelessness again was in control. The great improbability of a war was officially proclaimed. During the long ministry of M. Clemenceau the war budget was continually reduced with regard to expenditures for supplies. It was at the moment when the power was in the hands of the man, who, in 1917, by a marvellous chance, was going to represent the will of France

to resist, that the development of our military equipment was the most delayed. This delay could not be compensated for before the war. In spite of the efforts of MM. Millerand and Etienne, French equipment was not developed as it ought to have been. Meanwhile a number of well-taken measures succeeded in raising the morale of the army.

The country, and Parliament also, would have granted demands for more important efforts to insure its safety. In spite of some opposition, the necessity was admitted of a new recruiting law increasing to three years the length of active service. This was a compromise solution as our equipment was still insufficient, but it indicated the will to live that animated the nation.

However that may be, the collection of laws and decrees of the Third Republic relative to the army assured us of numerous well-trained contingents when the enemy invaded us again. There was a satisfactory organizaton of large units and perfect transportation for mobilization and concentration. The general staff knew its profession. Without doubt serious lacks were revealed at the beginning of the war. We had no heavy artillery, very few machine guns and our high command was surprised by the German strategy (this because of the discredit thrown by the Dreyfus affair on the work of the instruction service). But in spite of all these imperfections, the French Army, in the first weeks of the war, almost alone saved the country and the whole world from German domination. Then the army learned to adapt itself to war conditions and finally conquered the enemy. While it was aided by the allied armies, it supplied the commander-in-chief who forced the victory. The race has lost nothing of its warlike qualities. The Republic has supplied the military institutions which make it possible for the race to put force to the service of justice. As our glorious Joffre said after the victory of the Marne, "The government of the Republic may well be proud of its army."

The term "social laws" is today currently employed to designate those laws whose object is either to regulate the conditions of classification of employers and employees, to intervene in agreements relative to contracts for the performance of labor, to impose regulations in regard to labor, or to organize prudential institutions on bases more or less authoritative and of differing forms, of which industrial insurance is the most generally adopted; in fine, the legal relief carries out a plan whose limits have been much broadened during the last generation.

From all points of view one of the most important of the social laws among those that have been passed and made effective under the Third Republic is certainly the law of March 21, 1884, authorizing the creation of trade syndicates. This importance is measured by the consequences produced by it which existing facts make notable.

The law of March 21, 1884, rests on a principle which it was indispensable to apply to meet new technical conditions of economic production. When Turgot, by the celebrated edict of February, 1776, the preamble of which is one of the most beautiful bits of economic literature, abolished the privileged corporations, company wardens and company freedom, he only met the economic necessities of the period and performed an act of high justice.

It is known how and why that edict, registered March 12, 1776, became shortly after a dead letter through the fall of the great minister whom Louis XVI had the weakness to dismiss.

1 Translated from Journal des Debats, November 19, 1920.