sign a satisfaction of judgment for a nominal consideration.

The court held in Stewart v. Armel (Ind.) supra, that an entry of satisfaction of judgment, being in the nature of a mere receipt subject to explanation or even avoidance, might be vacated, where it appeared that the debtor, by threats to withhold other large amounts due until the judgment creditor failed in business, compelled him to enter satisfaction of judgment. In support of this view the court said: "The appellants alleged that said satisfaction and agreement to pay costs were procured by the fraudulent conduct of the appellees, for the purpose of cheating and defrauding the appellants out of their just debts, and were procured by the coercion of the appellants, as shown by the facts above stated, and were not the free and voluntary act of the appellants; and that said judgment remained due and wholly unpaid. . . . The appellants have stated a cause of action in their complaint, which entitled them to relief, even if it is conceded that the matters alleged are not sufficient to show duress of any kind.

These alleged facts, if sustained by the evidence, would certainly, we think, vitiate and avoid the said entry of satisfaction and agreement. The entry of satisfaction, indorsed on the judgment, was in the nature of a receipt for the amount of the judgment. It was no more conclusive, and of no more binding force, than a receipt of the judgment would have been; and, like a receipt, such entry of satisfaction might be explained, controlled, qualified, or even contradicted by parol evidence."

b. Mistake or improper entry.

The fact that a satisfaction of judgment has been entered through mistake may render it inequitable to let the satisfaction stand on the record, and may constitute a sufficient ground for vacation of the entry.

Kansas.-McNeal v. Hunt (1897) 6 Kan. App. 670, 50 Pac. 63.

Maryland. Wilmer v. Brice (1900) 91 Md. 71, 46 Atl. 322.

Missouri.-Cohen v. Camp (1870)

46 Mo. 179.

New York. Mechanics' Bank v. Minthorne (1821) 19 Johns. 244; Bernstein v. Demmler (1870) 9 Abb. Pr. N. S. 285; Bensen v. Perry (1879) 17 Hun, 16, affirmed in (1879) 77 N. Y. 625.

North Dakota.-Acme Harvester Co. v. Magill (1906) 15 N. D. 116, 106 N. W. 563; Cross v. Hillsboro Nat. Bank (1917) 38 N. D. 261, 164 N. W. 695.

Ohio. Wayne County Bank v. Abernethy (1851) 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 405.

Okahoma.-Sneary v. Nichols & S. Co. (1918) 70 Okla. 133, 173 Pac. 366. Pennsylvania.- Delta Bldg. & L. Asso. v. McClune (1897) 6 Pa. Dist. R. 569; Paul v. Eurich (1897) 3 Pa. Super. Ct. 299, 39 W. N. C. 455; Philadelphia v. Simon (1899) 12 Pa. Super. Ct. 159.

South Carolina.-Sims v. Campbell (1825) 6 S. C. Eq. (1 M'Cord) 53, 16 Am. Dec. 595.

It has been said that where an entry of satisfaction of judgment is entered by mistake it may be canceled, provided the rights of others are not injured thereby. Paul v. Eurich (1897) 3 Pa. Super. Ct. 299, 39 W. N. C. 455.

In Sims v. Campbell (S. C.) supra, it was held that an entry of satisfaction of judgment might be vacated and the lien restored, where it appeared that a public officer in charge of the records by mistake marked the judgment in question "Satisfied," whereas it was not in fact paid. The court said: "Mistakes may be explained and errors corrected in a sheriff's office as well as elsewhere.

The word 'Satisfied' is found written on an execution. It is equivocal at best, because it does not show in what manner it has been satisfied. It is not pretended to be in the handwriting of the sheriff, nor does it appear to be by his authority. It was, therefore, open to explanation. Suppose the sheriff had actually received the money and entered satisfaction in due form, and it had afterwards turned out that the money was counterfeit, or had been taken away by an older execution.

Would it have been a bar to another execution? Most unquestionably not."

The court in Sneary v. Nichols & S. Co. (Okla.) supra, sustained an order vacating a satisfaction of judgment on the ground that the clerk of the court made a mistake in entering on the regular judgment docket a full satisfaction, instead of a $200 credit, on a judgment.

It has been held that, where by mistake a judgment was entered as satisfied instead of assigned, the entry of satisfaction might be set aside. Delta Bldg. & L. Asso. v. McClune (Pa.)

supra.

It was held in Bensen v. Perry (N. Y.) supra, that a satisfaction of judgment might be vacated so that the sheriff could collect his fees, which the plaintiff's attorney had overlooked in entering the satisfaction.

In Cross v. Hillsboro Nat. Bank (1917) 38 N. D. 261, 164 N. W. 695, the court held that a county court might set aside an entry of satisfaction of judgment on the ground of mutual mistake or misapprehension of the facts inducing it. It appeared that a garnishee, misunderstanding instructions and supposing an agreement had been reached among the parties, as long expected, authorized payment of the judgment and entry of satisfaction. Subsequently, finding that the parties had not agreed on the finality of the judgment, a motion was made to vacate the entry. The court, in granting the vacation, said: "The court has the inherent power to set aside a satisfaction of a judgment entered through mistake of fact, or for any other reason that appeals to the sound discretion of the court, when the granting of the order vacating the judgment would tend to do justice between all the parties, and to have the matters involved disposed of entirely upon their merits."

Where a satisfaction of judgment is entered under the erroneous impression that the amount collected on the judgment is sufficient to satisfy it in full, a motion should be granted to set aside the satisfaction and to restore the unpaid portion of the judgment.

Acme Harvester Co. v. Magill (1906) 15 N. D. 116, 106 N. W. 563, wherein the court said: "The right to vacate satisfactions is based upon the inherent right of a court to correct its records to conform to the facts. In this case the judgment was satisfied on the erroneous conclusion that the judgment was paid in full. . . . Plaintiff's judgment was only partially satisfied. The plaintiff was therefore entitled to have its judgment reinstated to the extent that it was unpaid. To permit it to stand wholly satisfied would be an injustice, and to correct such injustice it was equitable and just to reinstate the judgment by setting aside the satisfaction."

It was held in Bernstein v. Demmler (1870) 9 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.) 285, that on motion a satisfaction of judgment must be declared inoperative on the ground of mistake, where the satisfaction was given inadvertently on receipt of the amount of the judgment and costs, without including the interest which had accrued after entry of the judgment.

In Mechanics' Bank v. Minthorne (1821) 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 244, the court granted a vacation of an entry of satisfaction of judgment on the ground of mistake. It appeared that after entry of satisfaction it was discovered that the clerk of the court had made a mistake of $525 in calculating interest on the judgment. The court said: "We have no doubt of our power to set aside the satisfaction entered, as well where there is a clear mistake, as in a case of fraud. . . . Here is a clear and acknowledged mistake of the clerk of this court. We interfere, in such a case, to do that equity which the party would be entitled to on application to the court of chancery."

A satisfaction of judgment may be vacated on the ground of mistake where it appears that the judgment creditor did not receive payment, that no third person will be injuriously affected, and that the judgment creditor mistook the nature of the instrument he signed as a satisfaction. Wilmer v. Brice (1900) 91 Md. 71, 46 Atl. 322.

It was held in Cohen v. Camp (1870) 46 Mo. 179, that an entry of satisfac

tion of judgment should be set aside on the ground of mistake, where it appeared that the acknowledgment was made by mistake and without the knowledge of the judgment creditor. The court said: "Acknowledgment of satisfaction is merely evidence of payment, and, if made bona fide and correctly, forever discharges and releases the judgment or decree. But, as between the parties, if made unauthorizedly or by mistake, it may be canceled or set aside on motion."

In Philadelphia v. Simon (1899) 12 Pa. Super. Ct. 159, the court held that a satisfaction of judgment should be vacated on the ground of mistake, where it appeared that the city was induced by the mistake of a person making a payment to enter satisfaction on the wrong judgment, i. e., on a judgment not intended to be paid. The court said that for such mistake, as well as for fraud, the entry could be set aside.

It has been held that a satisfaction of judgment, prematurely entered by the judgment creditor on a mistaken report of the sheriff that he had collected the judgment on execution, might be vacated on the ground of mistake and the judgment lien restored. McNeal v. Hunt (1897) 6 Kan. App. 670, 50 Pac. 63, wherein it was said: "Whenever process is irregularly issued, or any entry of the satisfaction of a judgment is improperly made, the court has power to inquire into the subject, and to cause the former to be set aside, and the latter to be vacated."

But in Davis v. McCullers (1923) 132 Miss. 572, 97 So. 8, it was held that a satisfaction of judgment should not be set aside on the ground of mistake in the amount of a compromise which supported an entry of satisfaction, where it appeared that on cancelation of the satisfaction all parties could not be restored to status quo, and where the compromise was founded on a valid consideration between the parties.

And it was held in Seattle v. Krutz (1914) 78 Wash. 553, 139 Pac. 498, that, by virtue of a statute limiting to one year the time allowed to vacate

or modify a judgment, a satisfaction which had been of record for two years could not be vacated on the ground of mistake in canceling the record without payment of interest from the return day of the verdict to the date of entry of the judgment.

The decision in United States v. Biggert (1895) 16 C. C. A. 666, 32 U. S. App. 762, 70 Fed. 38, was to the effect that the plaintiff, having accepted $1,000 and costs in satisfaction of a judgment of $5,577 secured against the defendants, should not have the satisfaction of the judgment set aside on the ground of mistake, on discovering that the Treasury Department owed one of the defendants two items of $434.02 and $344.21 respectively. The court said that the plaintiff was not entitled to cancelation of the entry of satisfaction of the judgment, in the absence of proof that the sums standing to the credit of the one defendant had any connection with the transaction out of which the cause of action arose, and on which the joint judgment was rendered, and that the one defendant agreed to the entry as a satisfaction of his individual claims against the plaintiff, or that the compromise had any relation to the individual transactions of the parties with the government.

It was held in Thomas v. Rock Island Gold & S. Min. Co. (1880) 54 Cal. 578, that, where satisfaction of judg ment had been entered by court order without due notice to a judgment creditor or assignee, the order and entry could be set aside on motion.

In Henry v. Traynor (1889) 42 Minn. 234, 44 N. W. 11, the court held that a sheriff holding an execution might cancel a satisfaction of judgment entered by the judgment creditor on receipt of payment by the debtor directly after levy, but before execution sale. The court in support of this holding said: "The judgment having been legally levied upon, the debtor, paying the same to his judgment creditor, Henry, after notice of such levy, did so at his peril. This must be deemed to have been a voluntary payment. The sheriff who had levied upon the judgment was author

ized to collect it, and for this purpose, doubtless, might take out an execution, for that is the proper manner of enforcing judgments. The satisfaction of the judgment by the judgment creditor being an obstruction to the performance of this duty by the sheriff, it was proper for him to apply to have the satisfaction set aside, as he has done by this motion."

c. Lack of authority.

A satisfaction of judgment entered by one not having proper authority so to act may be set aside.

Indiana. Freeman v. Paul (1886) 105 Ind. 451, 5 N. E. 754.

Iowa. Milligan v. Bowman (1876) 42 Iowa, 414.

Kansas. Bowersock v. Wickery (1900) 61 Kan. 632, 60 Pac. 317. Maryland.-Waters v. Engle (1880) 53 Md. 179.

Michigan.-Potter v. Hunt (1888) 68 Mich. 242, 36 N. W. 58.

Missouri.-Ekonomou v. Greek Orthodox Church, St. Nicholas (1926) Mo. App., 280 S. W. 57.

New Jersey. Faughnan v. Elizabeth (1895) 58 N. J. L. 309, 33 Atl. 212.

New York.-Fitzsimons v. Fitzsimons (1894) 79 Hun. 13, 29 N. Y. Supp. 510; Mitchell v. Piqua Club Asso. (1895) 15 Misc. 366, 37 N. Y. Supp. 406.

Pennsylvania. - McClurg v. Wilson (1862) 43 Pa. 439; Geissinger's Appeal (1886) 8 Sadler, 35, 4 Atl. 344; Maxfield v. Carr (1895) 8 Kulp, 214; Sullivan's Use v. Gorsline (1895) 17 Pa. Co. Ct. 205.

Thus, a satisfaction of judgment entered by the judgment creditor's attorney without authority may be vacated. Moore v. Cairo & F. R. Co. (Ark.); Freeman v. Paul (Ind.); Faughnan v.

Elizabeth (N. J.); and Fitzsimons v. Fitzsimons (N. Y.) supra; Maxfield v. Carr (1895) 8 Kulp (Pa.) 214.

So, where an attorney of record, without authority to collect and satisfy judgment for his client, does so for 85 per cent of the amount, the entry of satisfaction may be vacated and the judgment revived as to the unpaid balance. Faughnan v. Elizabeth (N. J.) supra, wherein the court said: "When a defendant has not been misled by the attorney's apparent power, and no rights of third parties are affected, I see no reason why a satisfaction should not be vacated if wrong has been done by its entry, even though it was not obtained by fraud.

After judgment, the attorney

of record has no authority under his original retainer to satisfy the judgment upon receiving less than the amount due thereon, without the plaintiff's consent. Upon de

livering a release which will be satisfactory to the city attorney, he may enter a rule vacating the satisfaction, and may enforce the judgment for the amount not released."

In Maxfield v. Carr (1895) 8 Kulp (Pa.) 214, the court vacated a satisfaction of judgment on the ground that the attorney of the judgment creditor, without his consent and authority, settled the judgment for considerably less than the full amount and entered the satisfaction.

On the death of a judgment creditor any authority given his attorney is revoked, and an entry of satisfaction of judgment thereafter put in the record. without authority of the executors may be vacated and set aside, even though it affects the rights of a third person, who has purchased property on which the lien will be restored. Turnan v. Temke (1876) 84 Ill. 286.

A substitution of attorneys likewise revokes any authority given to collect and cancel a judgment so that an entry of satisfaction by the original attorney may be set aside as without authority. Mitchell v. Piqua Club Asso. (N. Y.) supra.

In Clark v. Johnston (1920) 49 Cal. App. 315, 193 Pac. 864, it was held that a satisfaction of judgment should

be vacated where it appeared that the agent of the real creditor secured judgment for $3,500, but without authority compromised and entered satisfaction of the judgment on payment of $50 in cash and a note for $1,950.

In Haggin v. Clark (1882) 61 Cal. 1, it was held that a satisfaction of judgment was properly set aside where it appeared that one partner, without authority from the other, compromised a judgment and entered a satisfaction without full payment of the judgment. The court said that only on payment of the whole amount of the judgment could one cojudgment creditor lawfully enter satisfaction without consent of the other creditor.

In Geissinger's Appeal (1886) 8 Sadler (Pa.) 35, 4 Atl. 344, it was held that a satisfaction of judgment should be stricken off the record where one holding a judgment by confession as collateral assigned it, and authorized it to be satisfied without the consent of the owner and without consideration.

Where a codefendant, who had refused to share the expense of appeal, without the knowledge or consent of the other defendant, executed a satisfaction of the final judgment, it was held that such entry of satisfaction might be vacated, and the judgment, together with costs, restored on the record. Potter v. Hunt (1888) 68 Mich. 242, 36 N. W. 58.

It was held in Sullivan v. Gorsline (1895) 17 Pa. Co. Ct. 205, that a satisfaction of a judgment entered by a nominal plaintiff without authority of the equitable plaintiff might be struck off the record.

In McClurg v. Wilson (1862) 43 Pa. 439, it was held that an entry of satisfaction of judgment should be vacated, where it appeared that the real owner of a claim brought action and recovered judgment under the name of the plaintiff, who was induced by the defendants to sign a satisfaction of judgment without any consideration.

A satisfaction of judgment may be vacated where it appears that it was canceled by the sheriff for a small portion of the amount thereof, without

the authority of the judgment creditor. Bowersock v. Wickery (1900) 61 Kan. 632, 60 Pac. 317.

In Waters v. Engle (1880) 53 Md. 179, it was held that a judgment creditor was entitled to have an entry of satisfaction of judgment vacated on the ground of lack of authority, where the clerk of the court, in excess of authority, marked the judgment "Satisfied" before all of the debt had been paid.

In Aicardi v. Robbins (1868) 41 Ala. 541, 94 Am. Dec. 614, it was held that an entry of satisfaction of judgment should not stand, where it appeared that the clerk of the court, without authority, accepted Confederate notes and marked the record "Satisfied."

An entry of satisfaction of judgment entered by the next friend of an infant judgment creditor, unlawfully and without authority, may be set aside in equity. Galway v. Chicago (1917) 207 Ill. App. 304.

Where it appeared that, contrary to statute, a person who was neither an attorney of record for a judgment creditor, nor his agent duly authorized in writing, entered a satisfaction of the judgment, it was held that the entry would be vacated on motion. Ekonomou v. Greek Orthodox Church, St. Nicholas (1926) Mo. App. 280 S. W. 57.

There is no doubt that a forged acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment may be vacated and set aside in equity. Milligan v. Bowman (1876) 42 Iowa, 414.

However, it was held in Miller v. Preston (1893) 154 Pa. 63, 25 Atl. 1041, that the vacation of a satisfaction of judgment should not be granted on the ground of lack of authority and consideration, where it appeared that three years had elapsed since the death of the attorney who collected the judgment and entered satisfaction, but who never paid over the money to the plaintiff.

Although a satisfaction of judgment may have been entered by an attorney without authority to do so, the entry cannot be vacated so as to defraud a third person who has relied