chosen from among many, as upholding our conclusions in the present case: Chelsea Exch. Bank v. First United Presby. Church, 89 Misc. 616, 152 N. Y. Supp. 201; Liebscher v. Kraus, 74 Wis. 387, 5 L.R.A. 496, 17 Am. St. Rep. 171, 43 N. W. 166; Reeve v. First Nat. Bank, 54 N. J. L. 208, 16 L.R.A. 143, 33 Am. St. Rep. 675, 23 Atl. 853; Wright v. Drury Petroleum Corp. 229 Mich. 542, 201 N. W. 484; Jump v. Sparling, 218 Mass. 324, 105 N. E. 878; Consumers Twine & Machinery Co. v. Mt. Pleasant Thermo Tank Co. 196 Iowa, 64, 194 N. W. 290; Wilson v. Clinton Chapel, A. M. E. Z. Church, 138 Tenn. 398, 198 S. W. 244. In Chelsea Exch. Bank v. First United Presby. Church, supra, the note read: "Thirty days after date we promise to pay," etc. "First United Presbyterian Church, 16 West 108th St. Pres. John Elliott. Treas. Edward A. Shea." On the back of the note appears the following indorsement: "First United Presbyterian Church. "John Elliott, Pres. "Edward A. Shea, Treas. "Finance Committee. "John Elliott, "Edward A. Shea, "John McKee." The question was whether those who signed the note on the back under "Finance Committee" could be held individually as indorsers. The court held them not liable, saying: "If there were doubt of this under common-law principles, the Negotiable Instruments Law has resolved the doubt in favor of these defendants" (citing the section of that law above quoted and a further section, being identical with § 3977, Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1920, and reading as follows): "Where any person is under obligation to indorse in a representative capacity, he may indorse in such terms as to negative personal liability." "The words 'Finance Committee, John Elliott, Edward A. Shea, John McKee,' appear as an integral part of the corporate indorsement, and parol proof to show an intent thereby to create a personal liability would necessarily be rejected or disregarded, as contrary to the convincing evidence of intent to be found within the four corners of the note itself." In the case of Liebscher v. Kraus, 74 Wis. 387, 5 L.R.A. 496, 17 Am. St. Rep. 171, 43 N. W. 166, the note read as follows: "Ninety days after date we promise to pay," etc. "San Pedro Mining and Milling Company, F. Kraus, Pres." It was held that this note was, as a matter of law, the note of the company alone, and that parol evidence was inadmissible to show that Kraus signed in his individual capacity and was himself liable. The court, after discussing a great many cases, said: "The principle of these authorities seems to be 'that if the agent signed the note with his own name alone, and there is nothing on the face of the note to show that he was acting as agent, he will be personally liable; but if his agency appears with his signature, then his principal only is bound.'" In Reeve v. First National Bank, 54 N. J. L. 208, 16 L.R.A. 143, 33 Am. St. Rep. 675, 23 Atl. 853, the note read, "We promise to pay," etc. "Warrick Glassworks, J. Price Warrick, Pres." The court, in discussing this case, had this to say: "In such case the note is taken conclusively to be that of the corporation. . . I do not perceive any significance in the use of the words 'we promise to pay' instead of 'the company promises to pay.' The contention was that the use of these words raised an implication that it was the joint note of the corporation and of Warrick. But, as has been remarked in more than one of the cases cited, the word 'we' is often used by a corporation aggregate." In the case of Wright v. Drury Petroleum Corp. 229 Mich. 542, 201 (— Wyo. —, N. W. 484, the note read: "Sixty The court, in holding Anderson not personally liable on this note, said: "The Drury Petroleum Corporation could execute the note only by some representative, and in the affixing of 'Executive Board,' to Mr. Anderson's signature, showed he signed the corporate name in that character and capacity alone. The use of the word 'by' or 'per' or 'pro' would not add to the certainty of what is thus expressed.' . . . The nominative 'we' in the note aptly designates the corporation aggregate." The In Wilson v. Clinton Chapel, A. M. "G. A. Robinson, Chm. "Wm. Greenlee "W. A. Murrell "David Malcolm "Jno. H. Alexander, G. Sec. The court, in holding the church alone liable and holding that those who signed the note were acting for the church, said: "The rule relied on has been changed by the negotiable instruments statute [quoting the statute above set out]. . . . This note clearly shows that the trustees signed for and on behalf of a dis closed principal, to wit, the Clinton Corporationsnote-effect of promise." Plaintiff in error, in its brief, lays emphasis on the fact that the note in question reads, "we" promise to pay. pay. However, we think the use of the word "we" aptly words "we designates a corporation and the cases above so hold. It may be, though we do not decide the point, there being great conflict in the decisions, that one suing on a note similar to the one in question might be permitted to allege and prove that the defendants in question signed as individuals and not as agents. Some cases so hold. But the only allegation in the petition in this case pointing in that direction is that the note was executed by defendants. This allegation must, however, be read in connection with the copy of the note set structionout in the petition, Pleading-con exhibits. and when so read clearly could have no such effect. The word "execute" means to sign, or sign and deliver (David v. Whitehead, 13 Wyo. 189, 79 Pac. 19, 923), and, as shown above, a note of a corporation must be executed by its agents, and the note in question shows on its face that it was executed by the board of directors of the corporation. Judgment affirmed. Blume, Ch. J., and Burgess, Dist. J., concur. ANNOTATION. Personal liability of directors as affected by terms of contract or form of signature. [Corporations, §§ 146, 147.] This annotation is supplementary to that in 33 A.L.R. 1353. As to liability of officers of corporation as dependent on form of contract, see 7 R. C. L. 495. And generally as to personal liability of one who signs or indorses, without qualification, commercial paper of corporation, see annotations in 42 A.L.R. 1075, and 46 A.L.R. 496 [Bills and Notes, § 4; Corporations, § 147]. [1925] 2 K. B. (Eng.) 301-C. A., where directors indorsed a bill of exchange beneath the corporate name, which was placed thereon by a rubber stamp, adding after their names the word "Directors," after having previously accepted the bill for the corporation, the decision that they became personally liable was placed upon the ground that, the corporation being already liable by reason of accepting the bill, no value could be added to it by the corporation indorsing it, and that accordingly the directors must be considered as having indorsed for the purpose of creating an additional or personal liability. Kessel v. Murray (1924) 197 Iowa, 17, 33 A.L.R. 1346, 196 N. W. 591, was cited to the point that a plea of certain directors who indorsed the corporation's note (without any indication of their being directors), that they indorsed simply as directors, was not meritorious, and was legally meaningless, in Northern Trust & Sav. Bank v. Ellwood (1925) 200 Iowa, 1213, 206 N. W. 256. The decision in the latter case, however, turned on other grounds. Contract containing promise in proper form for individual-signed with corporate name followed by name of director. The reported case (KENNEDY & P. Co. v. LANDER DAIRY & P. Co. ante, 315) holds that, in view of the provision of the Negotiable Instruments Act, as quoted in the opinion, the sign ing of the individual names, after the corporate name and the words "Board of Directors," did not make the directors personally liable on the note, in the absence of any allegation that they acted without authority, the word "we" being regarded as merely designating the corporation. And in holding that an officer of a corporation was not personally liable on a note, which he signed, with another, after appending to the note the corporate name and the words "Executive Board," the court in Wright v. Drury Petroleum Corp. (1924) 229 Mich. 542, 201 N. W. 484, relied upon the same provision; and made a similar observation as to the use of the word "we" in the note. In St. Joseph Valley Bank v. Napoleon Motors Co. (1925) 230 Mich. 498, 202 N. W. 933, holding that a vice president and secretary treasurer who signed a guaranty for the corporation, as follows: "Full performance is individually guaranteed by the following persons," under the corporate name, adding after their names their official designations, were not individually liable thereon, it was said that, if the paper had been signed by "certain other and additional officers, such as directors, not customarily or usually signing instruments, and if it were sought to charge them personally, a different question might be presented "citing Flick v. Jordan (1920) 74 Ind. App. 314, 129 N. E. 42, which was set out in 33 A.L.R. 1353. - signed with corporate name "by" or "per" director or directors. 1. Where a person is divorced in this state, and, during the prohibited period, for the purpose of evading the law of this state, goes into another state and marries another person, such marriage during the prohibited period is invalid within this state. [See annotation on this question beginning on page 325.] bigamy of one of the parties for contracting another marriage within this state, such party will not be heard to say that the marriage outside the state is invalid and the relation of the parties meretricious. Bigamy, § 1 effect of common-law marriage on. 4. Where a party is divorced within this state, and within the prohibited period goes outside the state and marries, and the parties so married reside outside the state in the relation of husband and wife for a period of some months after the expiration of the prohibited period, and then return to this state and the parties reside together as husband and wife, such state of facts established a valid marriage under the common law, and the again marrying of one of the parties to such common-law marriage, without having obtained a divorce, is bigamous. ERROR to the District Court for Ottawa County (Smith, J.) to review a judgment convicting defendant of bigamy. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. error: Defendant is not guilty of the crime of bigamy, because he was never legally married to the Adams woman in the first place, but his marriage to Inez Vaughn was and is a legal marriage. Atkeson v. Sovereign Camp, W. W. 90 Okla. 154, 32 A.L.R. 1108, 216 Pac. 467; Durland v. Durland, 67 Kan. 734, 63 L.R.A. 959, 74 Pac. 274; Niece v. Territory, 9 Okla. 535, 60 Pac. 300; Wilson v. Cook, 256 Ill. 460, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 365, 100 N. E. 222; Wilhite v. Wilhite, 41 Kan. 154, 21 Pac. 173; Jordan v. Missouri & K. Teleph. Co. 51 A.L.R.-21. 136 Mo. App. 192, 116 S. W. 432; Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. 625, 39 L.R.A. 539, 63 Am. St. Rep. 776, 39 Atl. 16; Phillips v. Phillips, 69 Kan. 324, 76 Pac. 842; Jacobs v. Gaskill, 69 Kan. 872, 77 Pac. 550; State v. Penn, 47 Wash. 561, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 800, 92 Pac. 417; Peerless P. Co. v. Burckhard, 90 Wash. 221, L.R.A.1917C, 353, 155 Pac. 1037, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 247; Lanham v. Lanham, 136 Wis. 360, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 804, 128 Am. St. Rep. 1085, 117 N. W. 787; Ross v. Bryant, 90 Okla. 300, 217 Pac. 364; Clark v. Barney, 24 Okla. 455, 103 Pac. 598. Messrs. George F. Short, Attorney General, and J. Roy Orr, Assistant Attorney General, for the State: If the marriage of defendant to Mrs. Harvey No. 2, at Carthage, Missouri, was not a legal marriage, it was undoubtedly a common-law marriage, which was valid. Smith v. Blunt, 84 Okla. 225, 202 Pac. 1027; Draughn v. State, 12 Okla. Crim. Rep. 479, L.R.A.1916F, 793, 158 Pac. 890; Clark v. Barney, 24 Okla. 455, 103 Pac. 598. Edwards, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The plaintiff in error will be referred to as defendant, as in the court below. The defendant was charged by information with the crime of bigamy. A jury was waived, and a stipulation of facts entered into, and the case submitted to the court on such stipulation. a Upon the undisputed facts as set out in the stipulation, it appears that the defendant is much married individual, and given time would surpass the record of Henry VIII. The facts are about as follows: In December, 1920, the defendant, Harvey, obtained a divorce at Tulsa from Mrs. Harvey, I. On February 12, 1921, Mrs. Adams procured a divorce from her husband, and, according to prior arrangements between her and the defendant, she and the defendant on February 13th went to the state of Missouri and were married, she thus becoming Mrs. Harvey, II. This was on the day following her divorce in Oklahoma. From Missouri the defendant, Harvey, and Mrs. Harvey, II, went to Kansas and lived together as husband and wife for about a year, returning to Oklahoma in February, 1922, where they continued to reside together as husband and wife until April 15, 1923, when Mrs. Harvey, II, departed for a visit to Illinois. On the 2d day of June, following, the defendant in Ottawa county, Okla., during the absence of Mrs. Harvey, II, married Inez Vaughn, thereby became Mrs. Harvey, III. Mrs. Harvey, III, lived with the defendant as his wife until the 11th of June, when, on the return of who Mrs. Harvey, II, the defendant was arrested, charged with bigamy. In the stipulation it is agreed that the defendant and Mrs. Harvey, II, went to the state of Missouri for the purpose of evading the restriction in the divorce decrees in the state of Oklahoma; that they considered their marriage in Missouri legal, and there was no divorce of the defendant from Mrs. Harvey, II. Upon this state of facts the defendant contends that, at the time of the attempted marriage between him and Mrs. Harvey, II, the parties were not competent to enter into a marriage contract, and that their attempted marriage was absolutely void, and that the relation between him and Mrs. Harvey, II, was adulterous. The state contends, in effect, that the inhibition on marriage contained in the divorce decree of defendant and Mrs. Harvey, II, had no extraterritorial effect, and that, as they did not forthwith return to the state of Oklahoma, but removed to the state of Kansas, their marriage in Missouri was legal. And that in any event, before the marriage of defendant to Mrs. Harvey, III, his relations with Mrs. Harvey, II, had ripened into a valid common-law marriage. A mere recital of the facts discloses that the conduct of the defendant is reprehensible in an extreme degree, and that his defense is such that he is entitled to only what the cold letter of the law gives him. It also discloses that Mrs. Harvey, II, was an unfaithful wife to her first spouse, and abandoned her own home, and was a particeps criminis in breaking up the home of defendant. What has befallen her is in the nature of retributive justice. As to Mrs. Harvey, III, she apparently knew the marital status of the defendant at the time she entered the marriage relation with him, and is entitled to no sympathy. However lacking in the personal equation this case may be, yet, if the marriage between the defend |