intelligence needed to work it; the more liable it is to derangement, so much greater must be the skill and care applied by one who tends it. The English Constitution, which we admire as a masterpiece of delicate equipoises and complicated mechanism, would anywhere but in England be full of difficulties and dangers. It stands and prospers in virtue of the traditions that still live among English statesmen and the reverence that has ruled English citizens. It works by a body of understandings which no writer can formulate, and of habits which centuries have been needed to instil. So the American people have a practical aptitude for politics, a clearness of vision and capacity for selfcontrol never equalled by any other nation. In 1861 they brushed aside their darling legalities, allowed the executive to exert novel powers, passed lightly laws whose constitutionality remains doubtful, raised an enormous army, and contracted a prodigious debt. Romans could not have been more energetic in their sense of civic duty, nor more trustful to their magistrates. When the emergency had passed away the torrent which had overspread the plain fell back at once into its safe and well-worn channel. The reign of legality returned; and only four years after the power of the executive had reached its highest point in the hands of President Lincoln, it was reduced to its lowest point in those of President Johnson. Such a people can work any Constitution. The danger for them is that this reliance on their skill and their star may make them heedless of the faults of their political machinery, slow to devise improvements which are best applied in quiet times. CHAPTER XXVI GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE FRAME OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT THE account which has been so far given of the working of the American Government has been necessarily an account rather of its mechanism than of its spirit. Its practical character, its temper and colour, so to speak, largely depend on the party system by which it is worked, and on what may be called the political habits of the people. These will be described in later chapters. Here, however, before quitting the study of the constitutional organs of government, it is well to sum up the criticisms we have been led to make, and to add a few remarks, for which no fitting place could be found in preceding chapters, on the general features of the national government. I. No part of the Constitution cost its framers so much time and trouble as the method of choosing the President. They saw the evils of a popular vote. They saw also the objections to placing in the hands of Congress the election of a person whose chief duty it was to hold Congress in check. The plan of having him selected by judicious persons, specially chosen by the people for that purpose, seemed to meet both difficulties, and was therefore recommended with confidence. The result has, however, so completely falsified these expectations that it is hard to comprehend how they came to be entertained. The presidential electors are mere cyphers, who vote, as a matter of course, for the candidate of the party which names them; and the President is practically chosen by the people at large. The only importance which the elaborate machinery provided in the Constitution retains, is that it prevents a simple popular vote in which the majority of the nation should prevail, and makes the issue of the election turn on the voting in certain "pivotal" States. II. The choice of the President, by what is now practically a simultaneous popular vote, not only involves once in every four years a tremendous expenditure of energy, time, and money, but induces of necessity a crisis which, if it happens to coincide with any passion powerfully agitating the people, may be dangerous to the commonwealth. III. There is always a risk that the result of a presidential election may be doubtful or disputed on the ground of error, fraud, or violence. When such a case arises, the difficulty of finding an authority competent to deal with it, and likely to be trusted, is extreme. Moreover, the question may not be settled until the pre-existing executive has, by effluxion of time, ceased to have a right to the obedience of the citizens. The experience of the election of 1876 illustrates these dangers. Such a risk of interregna is incidental to all systems, monarchic or republican, which make the executive head elective, as witness the RomanoGermanic Empire of the Middle Ages, and the Papacy. But it is more serious where he is elected by the people than where, as in France or Switzerland, he is chosen by the Chambers.1 IV. The change of the higher executive officers, and of many of the lower executive officers also, which usually takes place once in four years, gives a jerk to the machinery, and causes a discontinuity of policy, unless, of course, the President has served only one term, and is re-elected. Moreover, there is generally a loss either of responsibility or of efficiency in the executive chief magistrate during the last part of his term. An outgoing President may possibly be a reckless President, because he has little to lose by misconduct, little to hope from good conduct. He may therefore abuse his patronage, or gratify his whims with impunity. But more often he is a weak President.2 He has little influence with Congress, because his patronage will soon come to an end, little hold on the people, who are already speculating on 1 In Switzerland the Federal Council of seven are elected by the two Chambers, and then elect one of their own number to be their President, and therewith also President of the Confederation (Constit. of 1874, art. 98). In some British colonies it has been provided that, in case of the absence or death or incapacity of the Governor, the Chief Justice shall act as Governor. In India the senior member of Council acts in similar cases for the Viceroy. 2 A British House of Commons in the last few months before its impending dissolution usually presents the same alternations of recklessness (generally taking the form of electioneering bids to powerful sections of opinion in the country) and feebleness which shrinks from entering on any large scheme of policy, or giving any important decision. This was marked in the latter part of the session of 1885. the policy of his successor. His secretary of state cannot treat boldly with foreign powers, who perceive that he has a diminished influence in the Senate, and know that the next secretary may have different views. The above considerations suggest the inquiry whether the United States, which no doubt needed a President in 1789 to typify the then created political unity of the nation, might not now dispense with one. This question, however, has never been raised in a practical form in America, where the people approve the office, though dissatisfied with the method of choice.1 The strength and worth of the office reside in its independence of Congress and direct responsibility to the people. Americans condemn any plan under which, as lately befell in France, the legislature can drive a President from power and itself proceed to choose a new one. V. The Vice-President's office is ill-conceived. His only ordinary function is to act as Chairman of the Senate, but as he does not appoint the Committees of that House, and has not even a vote (except a casting vote) in it, this function is of little moment. If, however, the President dies, or becomes incapable of acting, or is removed from office, the Vice-President succeeds to the Presidency. What is the result? The place being in itself unimportant, the choice of a candidate for it excites little interest, and is chiefly used by the party managers as a means of conciliating a section of their party. It becomes what is called "a complimentary nomination." The man elected Vice-President is therefore never a man in the front rank. But when the President dies during his term of office, which has happened to four out of the seventeen Presidents, this second-class man steps into a great place for which he was never intended. Sometimes, as in the case of Mr. Arthur, he fills the place respectably. Sometimes, as in that of Andrew Johnson, he throws the country into confusion.2 He is aut nullus aut Cæsar. VI. The defects in the structure and working of Congress, and in its relations to the executive, have been so fully dwelt on 1 The question of replacing the President by a ministerial council is rarely discussed in America. It has recently been mooted in France. 2 Mr. James G. Blaine observes that a Vice-President having honour but no power is usually the malcontent centre of disappointed and discontented men, as the heir-presumptive to the throne is apt to be in monarchies.-Twenty Years in Congress, vol. ii. p. 57. already that it is enough to refer summarily to them. They are The discontinuity of Congressional policy. The want of adequate control over officials. The want of opportunities for the executive to influence the legislature.1 The want of any authority charged to secure the passing of such legislation as the country needs. The frequency of disputes between three co-ordinate powers, the President, the Senate, and the House. The maintenance of a continuous policy is a difficulty in all popular governments. In the United States it is specially so, because The executive head and his ministers are necessarily (unless when No accord need exist between Congress and the executive. There is (as already explained) no such thing as a party in power, in the European sense of the term. The Americans use But this it to denote the party to which the President belongs. party may be in a minority in one or both Houses of Congress, in which case it cannot do anything which requires fresh legislation, may be in a minority in the Senate, in which case it can take no executive act of importance. There is no true leadership in political action, because the most prominent man has no recognized party authority. Congress was not elected to support him. He cannot threaten disobedient followers with a dissolution of Parliament like an English prime minister. He has not even the French president's right of dissolving the House with the consent of the Senate. There is often no general and continuous cabinet policy, because the cabinet has no authority over Congress, may perhaps have no influence with it. 1 It is remarked by Mr. Horace White (Fortnightly Review, 1879) that the quality of the President's cabinet suffers by the exclusion of ministers from Congress, because if they had to hold their own and defend their master's policy in the House, the President would be driven to select able men instead of, as has sometimes happened, his own personal friends. This is true; though Europeans may answer that under the English system it sometimes happens that men are placed in great administrative office only because they are able speakers, and persons of higher administrative gifts passed over because they have not a seat in Parliament or are unready in debate. |