There is no general or continuous legislative policy, because the legislature, having no recognized leaders, and no one guiding committee, acts through a large number of committees, independent of one another, and seldom able to bring their measures to maturity. What continuity exists is due to the general acceptance of a few broad maxims, such as that of non-intervention in the affairs of the Old World, and to the fact that a large nation does not frequently or lightly change its views upon leading principles. In minor matters of legislation and administration there is little settled policy. The Houses trifle with questions, take them up in one session and drop them the next, seem insensible to the duty of completing work once begun. It is no one's business to press this duty on them.

There is no security that Congress will attend to such minor defects in the administrative system of the country as may need a statute to correct them. In Europe the daily experience of the administrative departments discloses small faults or omissions in the law which involve needless trouble to officials, needless cost to the treasury, needless injustice to classes of the people. Sometimes for their own sakes, sometimes from that desire to see things well done which is the life-breath of a good public servant, the permanent officials call the attention of their parliamentary chief, the minister, to the defective state of the law, and submit to him the draft of a bill to amend it. He brings in this bill, and if it involves no matter of political controversy (which it rarely does), he gets it passed.1 As an American minister does not sit in Congress, and has no means of getting anything he proposes attended to there, it is a mere chance if such amending statutes as these are introduced or pass into law.

These defects are all reducible to two. There is an excessive friction in the American system, a waste of force in the strife of various bodies and persons created to check and balance one another. There is a want of executive unity, and therefore a possible want of executive vigour. Power is so much subdivided that it is hard at a given moment to concentrate it for prompt and effective action. In fact, this happens only when a distinct majority of the people are so clearly of one mind that the several

This remark applies rather to France, Germany, and Italy, than to England, because of late years the rules of the English House of Commons have enabled a single private member so to retard as usually to defeat any measure which the Government does not put forth its full strength to carry.

co-ordinate organs of government obey this majority, uniting their efforts to serve its will.

VII. The relations of the people to the legislature are far from perfect. These relations are in every free country so much the most refined and delicate, as well as so much the most important part of the whole scheme and doctrine of government, that we must not expect to find perfection anywhere. But comparing America with Great Britain from 1832 to 1885, for it is still too soon to judge the condition of things created by the Reform Acts of that year, the working of the representative system in America seems somewhat inferior.

There are four essentials to the excellence of a representative system :

That the representatives shall be chosen from among the best men of the country, and, if possible, from its natural leaders.

That they shall be strictly and palpably responsible to their constituents for their speeches and votes.

That they shall have courage enough to resist a momentary impulse of their constituents which they think mischievous, i.e. shall be representatives rather than mere delegates.

That they individually, and the Chamber they form, shall have a reflex action on the people, i.e. that while they derive authority from the people, they shall also give the people the benefit of the experience they acquire in the Chamber, as well as of the superior knowledge and capacity they may be presumed to possess.

Americans declare, and no doubt correctly, that of these four requisites, the first, third, and fourth are not attained in their country. Congressmen are not chosen from among the best citizens. They mostly deem themselves mere delegates. They do not pretend to lead the people, being indeed seldom specially qualified to do so.

But one also learns in America that the second requisite, responsibility, is not fully realized. This seems surprising in a democratic country, and indeed almost inconsistent with that conception of the representative as a delegate, which is supposed, perhaps erroneously, to be characteristic of democracies. Still the fact is there. One cause, on which I have already dwelt, is to be found in the committee system. Another is the want of

organized leadership in Congress. An English member's responsibility usually takes the form of his being bound to support the leader of his party on all important divisions. In America, this obligation attaches only when the party has "gone into caucus," and there resolved upon its course. Seeing that the member need not obey the leader, the leader cannot be held responsible for the action of the rank and file. As a third cause we may note the fact that owing to the restricted competence of Congress many of the questions which chiefly interest the voter do not come before Congress at all, so that its proceedings are not followed with that close and keen attention which the debates and divisions of European Chambers excite.

One may say in general that the reciprocal action and reaction between the electors and Congress, what is commonly called the "touch" of the people with their agents, is not sufficiently close, quick, and delicate. Representatives ought to give light and leading to the people, just as the people give stimulus and momentum to their representatives. This incidental merit of the parliamentary system is among its greatest merits. But in America the action of the voter fails to tell upon Congress. He votes for a candidate of his own party, but he does not convey to that candidate an impulse towards the carrying of particular measures, because the candidate when in Congress will be practically unable to promote those measures, unless he happens to be placed on the committee to which they are referred. Hence the citizen, when he casts his ballot, can seldom feel that he is advancing any measure or policy, except the vague and general policy indicated in his party platform. He is voting for a party, but he does not know what the party will do, and for a man, but a man whom chance may deprive of the opportunity of advocating the measures he cares most for.

Conversely, Congress does not guide and illuminate its constituents. It is amorphous, and has little initiative. It does not focus the light of the nation, does not warm its imagination, does not dramatize principles in the deeds and characters of men.1 This happens because, in ordinary times, it lacks great leaders,

1 As an illustration of the want of the dramatic element in Congress, I may mention that some at least of the parliamentary debating societies in the American colleges (colleges for women included) take for their model not either House of Congress but the British House of Commons, the students conducting their debates under the names of prominent members of that assembly. They say that they do this because Congress has no Ministry and no leaders of the Opposition.

and the most obvious cause why it lacks them, is its disconnection from the executive. As it is often devoid of such men, so neither does the country habitually come to it to look for them. In the old days, neither Hamilton, nor Jefferson, nor John Adams, in our own time, neither Stanton, nor Grant, nor Tilden, nor Cleveland, ever sat in Congress. Lincoln sat for two years only, and owed little of his subsequent eminence to his career there.

VIII. The independence of the judiciary, due to its holding for life, has been a conspicuous merit of the Federal system, as compared with the popular election and short terms of judges in most of the States. Yet even the Federal judiciary is not secure from the attacks of the two other powers, if combined. For the legislature may by statute increase the number of Federal justices, increase it to any extent, since the Constitution leaves the number undetermined, and the President may appoint persons whom he knows to be actuated by a particular political bias, perhaps even prepared to decide specific questions in a particular sense. Thus he and Congress together may, if not afraid of popular displeasure, obtain such a judicial determination of any constitutional question as they join in desiring, even although that question has been heretofore differently decided by the Supreme court. The only safeguard is in the disapproval of the

people.

It is worth remarking that the points in which the American frame of national government has proved least successful are those which are most distinctly artificial, i.e. those which are not the natural outgrowth of old institutions and well-formed habits, but devices consciously introduced to attain specific ends.1 The

1 See Chapter IV. ante, and Note thereto, in which it is shown that most of the provisions of the Federal Constitution which have worked well were drawn from the Constitutions of the several States.

This may seem to be another way of saying that nature, i.e. historical development, is wiser than the wisest men. Yet it must be remembered that what we call historical development is really the result of a great many small expedients invented by men during many generations for curing the particular evils in their government which from time to time had to be cured. The moral therefore is that a succession of small improvements, each made conformably to existing conditions and habits, is more likely to succeed than a large scheme, made all at once in what may be called the spirit of conscious experiment. The Federal Constitution has been generally supposed in Europe to have been such a scheme, and its success has encouraged other countries to attempt similar bold and large experiments. This is an error. The Constitution of the United States is almost as truly the matured result of long and gradual historical development as the English Constitution itself.

election of the President and Vice-President by electors appointed ad hoc is such a device. The functions of the judiciary do not belong to this category; they are the natural outgrowth of common law doctrines and of the previous history of the colonies and States; all that is novel in them, for it can hardly be called artificial, is the creation of Courts co-extensive with the sphere of the national government.

All the main features of American government may be deduced from two principles. One is the sovereignty of the people, which expresses itself in the fact that the supreme law-the Constitution is the direct utterance of their will, that they alone can amend it, that it prevails against every other law, that whatever powers it does not delegate are deemed to be reserved to it, that every power in the State draws its authority, whether directly, like the House of Representatives, or in the second degree, like the President and the Senate, or in the third degree, like the Federal judiciary, from the people, and is legally responsible to the people, and not to any one of the other powers.

The second principle, itself a consequence of this first one, is the distrust of the various organs and agents of government. The States are carefully safeguarded against aggression by the central government. So are the individual citizens. Each organ of government, the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, is made a jealous observer and restrainer of the others. Since the people, being too numerous, cannot directly manage their affairs, but must commit them to agents, they have resolved to prevent abuses by trusting each agent as little as possible, and subjecting him to the oversight of other agents, who will harass and check him if he attempts to overstep his instructions.

Some one has said that the American Government and Constitution are based on the theology of Calvin and the philosophy of Hobbes. This at least is true, that there is a hearty Puritanism in the view of human nature which pervades the instrument of 1787. It is the work of men who believed in original sin, and were resolved to leave open for transgressors no door which they could possibly shut.1 Compare this spirit with the enthusiastic optimism of the Frenchmen of 1789. It is not merely a difference of race temperaments; it is a difference of fundamental ideas.

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With the spirit of Puritanism there is blent a double portion

1 "That power might be abused," says Marshall in his Life of Washington, 'was deemed a conclusive reason why it should not be conferred."