section, cross-references,-table of cases and of overruled cases, and an analytical index.

Almost the only criticism to which the work seems to be open, relates to its plan, and not the execution of the plan. It is a mistake to include in a digest of railway law, cases whose only connection with that topic is the accidental circumstance that a railway corporation happens to be a party. Many textwriters and digest compilers make a similar mistake, without avowing it. There is a constantly acting temptation to err in this respect. The practicing lawyer, will, however, we imagine, rather regard this feature of the work of Mr. Lacey as adding to its practical value, since he knows that if every case in which an American railway is a party is included in it, he will be quite certain to find any given case he is searching for, and will also feel an assurance that no case relating to railways is omitted. We commend Mr. Lacey's digest as a useful and excellent work. J. F. D.

A TREATISE ON THE COUNTY AND TOWNSHIP OFFICERS OF IOWA

being a complete guide to Clerks, Sheriffs, Boards of Supervisors, Auditors, Treasurers, Recorders, Coroners, Surveyors and Notaries Public, and Township Trustees, Clerks, Constables, Assessors and Collectors; showing

wise take days to hunt up in the digests. The book is eminently worthy of
patronage, and no lawyer, especially in the western country, can well afford to
do without it.
D. W.

Briefs.

[Members of the profession who send us briefs for notice will confer a great favor by giving their address, and by enclosing a brief statement of the points argued. That will save us much labor, avoid the danger of our making mistakes, and render it possible for us to notice briefs when we might not otherwise have time to do so. As it is sometimes convenient for us to cut extracts out of briefs, and as we desire to preserve all good briefs for binding, we should take it as a favor if those who send us briefs would enclose two copies.-Ed C. L. J.]

Condensed by W. L. MURFREE, Jr., of Saint Louis. Municipal Corporations - Loan of Credit by "Two-Thirds of the Qualified Voters."—Hawkins v. Supervisors of Carroll County, Supreme Court of Mississippi. Brief and argument for plaintiff in error, by J. A. P. Campbell, Esq. In this case a bill was filed by certain tax-payers, to

restrain the issue and delivery of bonds of Carroll County, Miss., to the Greeneville, Columbus and Birmingham Railroad Company, to the amount of $125,000, in payment of a subscription made to the capital stock of that com

their several Powers, Duties and Liabilities, with all the Forms required in their Official Business. And an appendix of Forms for general use. By G. W. FIELD, of the Anamosa Bar. Des Moines: Mills & Co. 1875. It is impossible for a person, not familiar with the code and system of prac-pany, by authority of an act of the legislature. The plaintiff claims that tice of the state to which a local book of this kind is applicable, to pass a critical judgment upon its merits. This volume appears, however, to embrace within a convenient compass, a large amount of useful information, and many convenient forms designed to assist the officers named on its title page, and which will no doubt prove a great convenience to attorneys, as such books usually do. It is commended by Chief Justice Cole, by Circuit Judges | McKean and Rothrock, and by several attorneys and county officers.

the issue would be void, on the ground that the constitutional restriction requires two-thirds of all the registered voters of the county, and not simply twothirds of those voting. It is also argued by counsel for plaintiff, that an election held by the registrars of a county, and their appointees, instead of by the board of supervisors of such county, is invalid in Mississippi. [Address J. A. P. Campbell, Esq., Columbus, Miss.]

Negligence of Railroad Employes - Killing Infant.-Heman IsaBLACKWELL ON TAX TITLES.-Fourth Edition. Boston: Little, Brown Missouri, brief and argument by Dunn and Johnson, and M. A. Low, for rebel v. The Hannibal and St Joseph Railroad Company, Supreme Court of

& Co. 1875.

The first edition of this valuable work was published in 1855, and was received with great favor by the profession. It was the first attempt to collect the decisions, and lay down in anything like symmetrical form, the law on a subject of great and constantly increasing importance.

The power to sell land for the non-payment of taxes, is an extraordinary power, and was unknown to the common law; hence the lawyer in the consultation of legal treatises, derives very little knowledge on the subject, except so far as they treat of the general principles applicable to the exercise of all powers. Laws imposing a tax on lands-regulating its collection, and providing for a sale of the lands in case they are returned delinquent, exist in nearly all the states, and as a complete divestiture of title may be worked, if the proceedings are properly conducted, the great and paramount importance of the subject is readily perceived.

Mr. Blackwell commences his treatise with a chapter on the fundamental principles which control the taxing power, and then follows one on the nature of the power to sell. These chapters contain clear and full discussions of these interesting questions, and show the sturdy and uniform decisions of the courts in maintaining the rights of the citizen and his property against all encroachments that would effect a deprivation, without pursuing the strict sanctions of the law. These chapters are well worthy of an attentive perusal as the general principles they inculcate have a much wider scope than the immediate topic under discussion.

After a consideration of these preliminary views, the author then proceeds step by step, to examine every necessary requisite in reference to the matter, from the appointment of the officers, and the assessment of the property, to the final act which culminates in making the tax-deed. The questions relating to the burden of proof-listing and valuation of the land-levy of the tax-authority to collect and demand the tax-advertisement and sale--tax deed-mode of pleading and evidence, are all thoroughly considered and the principles adduced from the authorities are laid down and explained.

The book is well edited. The editor has performed his duties faithfully and conscientiously, and exhibited unusual diligence in the collection of the latest authorities. I have however discovered an occasional omission. Thus, upon the authority of Hunsaker v. Wright, 30 Ills. 146, and O'Kane v. Treat, 25 Ills. 557, he advances the proposition that the legislature has no power to exempt from taxes, but may commute them. But he has omitted to notice the cases of The Life Association, etc. v. Board of Assessors, 49 Mo. 512, and City of Zanesville v. Richards, Auditor, etc., 5 Ohio St. 589, decided upon a constitutional provision similar to that existing in Illinois, in which that doctrine was denied.

But the edition is an excellent one, and contains references which will enable the examining lawyer to find cases in a few minutes, which would other

spondents. This suit was instituted by plaintiff to recover damages for the negligent killing of his infant son, by defendant's employees, while running and managing a locomotive and train of cars upon the railroad. The evi dence tends to show these facts: That plaintiff's wife being dead, he placed his child in charge of its grand-parents, Mr. and Mrs. Balke, who reside about seventy-five yards north of defendant's road; that plaintiff's child was not permitted to go upon the railroad track, but on the contrary, his grandmother kept as close watch over him as possible; that being poor, it was necessary for her to work for a living, and, consequently, she could not devote her undivided attention to him; that one morning, while his grandmother was attending to her household duties, the little child, then about nineteen months old, stole out of the house and wandered to the railroad track, where it sat down between the rails, and while sitting there, was run over by a freight train; that the morning was bright and clear, that the track where the child sat was filled with earth between the rails, and was free from weeds; that for eighty rods west (the direction from which the train was coming) the track was perfectly straight and almost level; that a public road crossed the track about sixty feet west of where the child sat, that with ordinary care and prudence, the child might have been seen by the engineer, at for at least 800 feet before the child was run over. On these facts, it is argued that the defendants are not liable. The argument is full, and the citations abundant. [Address M. A. Low, Esq., Hamilton, Mo.]

Summary of our Legal Exchanges.

CHICAGO LEGAL NEWS, MARCH 27.

Removal of Causes-Conclusive Effect of Judgments of State Courts.-Dupasseur v. Rochereau, Supreme Court of the United States, opinion by Mr. Justice Davis. 1. When, in a case in a state court, a right or immunity is set up under and by virtue of a judgment of a court of the United States, and the decision is against such right or immunity, a case is presented for removal and review by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States, under the act of February 5th, 1867. 2. In such a case, the supreme court will examine and enquire whether or not due validity and effect have been accorded to the judgment of the federal court, and if they have not, and the right or immunity claimed has been thereby lost, it will reverse the judgment of the state court. 3. Whether due validity and effect have or have not been accorded to the judgment of the federal court, will depend on the circumstances of the case. If jurisdiction of the case was acquired only by reason of the citizenship of the parties, and the state law alone was administered, then only such validity and effect can be claimed for the judgment as would be due to a judgment of the state courts under like circumstances. 4. Judgment was rendered by the Circuit Court of the United

States for Louisiana on a vendor's privilege and mortgage, declaring it to be the first lien and privilege on the land; and the marshal sold the property clear of all prior liens and the mortgagee purchased, and paid into court for the benefit of subsequent liens, the surplus of his bid beyond the amount of his own debt. This judgment and sale were set up by way of defense to a suit brought in the state court by another mortgagee who claimed priority to the first mortgage, and who had not been made a party to the suit in the circuit court. The state court held that the plaintiff was not bound by the former judgment on the question of priority, not being a party to the suit. The case was brought to the Supreme Court of the United States by writ of error, and this court held, that the state court did not refuse to accord due force and effect to the judgment; that such a judgment in the state courts would not be conclusive on the point in question, and the judgment of the circuit court could not have any greater force or effect than judgments in the

state courts.

Taxation - Power of Equity to Restrain-Equalizing Assessments-Duty of Board of Supervisors in Illinois.-McConkley v. Smith, Supreme Court of Illinois, opinion by Walker, Ch. J. [7 Chi. Leg. News, 210.] 1. A court of equity will restrain the collection of taxes in cases of fraud, or when the assessment or levy is made without the authority of law,

or when it is levied on property not subject to taxation. 2. When a party
liable to taxes, makes out and delivers to the assessor, a list of his taxable
property, which is accepted by the assessor, without question, the
assessor has no power afterwards, arbitrarily and of his own motion,
to alter it, without first giving the party assessed notice.
3. The
board of supervisors can equalize assessments, but can not originate
assessments. They can equalize assessments between the several towns, but
can not of their own mere motion raise an assessment beyond the amount re-
turned by the assessor.

Accretions-Dower.-Lombard v. Kinsie, Supreme Court of Illinois, opinion by Walker, Ch. J. [7 Chi. Leg. News, 211.] The facts of this case are stated in 56 Ill. 56. The court now hold that a wife's right of dower attaches to an accretion upon her husband's land, and is not devested by a sale of the land by his assignee in bankruptcy.

mortgagors may remain in possession of the goods and sell them as heretofore, and supply their places with other goods, and the goods substituted by purchase for those sold, shall, upon being put into the store now occupied by them, or any other in Evansville in which they may be put for sale, be subject to the lien of the mortgage," was held to be constructively fraudulent as to creditors.

Effect of War on Authority of Agent to Receive Payment.Fritz v. Stover, Supreme Court of the United States, opinion by Davis, J. [7 Chi. Leg. News, 19.]-The principal, in 1861, left a bond secured by deed of trust, with his attorney in Virginia, and went to Pennsylvania; the agent during the war received payment in confederate notes and Virginia bank notes, and delivered up the trust-deed and bond: Held, on a bill filed after the war, that the bond had not been paid, or any part of it, and that the deed of trust to secure it is still a subsisting security in full force and effect.

Mistake in Description in Deed-Notice to Judgment-Creditor. -Lumbard v. Abbey, Supreme Court of Illinois, opinion by Sheldon, J. [7 Chi. Leg News, 195.]-There was a mistake in the description of the premises in a deed. After the execution of the deed a creditor of the grantor obtained judgment against him, and levied upon the land by a correct description, and sold the same: Held, under the evidence in this case, that there was such a use by the grantee in the deed of the premises as a wood lot, and for such a length of time as would apprise the community in its vicinity that he was in the exclusive use and enjoyment of its possession, and that it was sufficient to put a creditor or purchaser on enquiry at the time he obtained his judgment, and to charge him with notice of the grantee's interest in the land.

Twenty Years' Adverse Possession under Illinois Statute of Limitation.--Weber v. Anderson, Supreme Court of Illinois, opinion by Craig, J. [7 Chi. Leg. News, 196.]-This case expounds the Illinois statute which prohibits the bringing of suits for the recovery of land after the lapse of twenty years, the nature of the possession required, and the evidence by which the fact of possession may be established.

PITTSBURGH LEGAL JOURNAL, MARCH 10.

Fox v. Seal, U. S. Supreme Court, opinion by Strong, J. [22 Pittsb. Leg.

Jour., N. S. 113.]—1. Under the resolution of the legislature of Pennsylvania of January 21st, 1843, P. L. 367, a contractor's claim for the construction of a railroad is a lien itself, without a judgment, of indefinite duration, and has priority of claim to the company's property, over every right that could be

made after the contractor's debt was incurred. 2. That resolution declares

Widow's Dower in Mines-How it may be Assigned-When Dowress may Work Mines Partition-Waste.-Lenfers v. Henke, Supreme Court of Illinois, opinion by Scott, J. [7 Chi. Leg. News, 211]. In this case the court say that the general doctrine is, where mines have been opened and worked during the lifetime of the husband, that the wife is dow-acquired by a mortgagee or acquired under a mortgage, if the mortgage was able, but not in mines or strata not opened at all. It makes no difference, if the mines have been temporarily abandoned; it is only material that they were opened in the lifetime of the husband; she may not only work the mines but she may construct new approaches to them. That there is no reason why the wife may not be entitled to be endowed of mines opened by the heir or owner of the fee after the right of dower attaches, and before there has been any assignment, as well as in mines opened by the husband. That it is not waste for a widow to work mines opened by her husband, and by a parity of reasoning the court reaches the conclusion that it is not waste for her to work mines opened by the heir, before assignment of dower, at all events she would be entitled to dower in the profits in case the mines should be worked by the heir or owner of the fee before the assignment of dower. The court also states the proper manner of assigning dower in mines.

LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (PHILA.), MARCH 26. Construction of Treaty - Jurisdiction of German Consular Courts.-Meyer v. Basson, Philadelphia Common Pleas, opinion by Player, P. J. [32 Leg. Int. 106.] The treaty of December 11th, 1871, between the United States and the German Empire, containing provisions which give to the consuls of the respective governments exclusive cognizance of differences of every kind arising between the captains and crews of vessels belonging to the respective countries, and enacting that the local tribunals shall not, on any pretext, interfere in these differences, it was held, that a sailor, who was a Hollander, who had shipped at Liverpool as a seaman, on board of a German ship, and who, upon the arrival of the ship in this port, had been arrested and handed over to the German consul upon a requisition made by him on a complaint preferred to him by the captain of the ship, could not maintain an action in this court against the captain for such arrest.

CHICAGO LEGAL NEWS, MARCH 13.

Chattel Mortgage, when Constructively Fraudulent-Possession of Goods-Sale of Same by Mortgagor at Retail.-Robinson v. Elliott, Supreme Court of the United States, opinion by Davis, J. [7 Chi. Leg. News, 193.]-A chattel mortgage containing this provision: "The property is conveyed upon the express agreement that, until default be made in the payment of some one of said notes, or some paper in renewal thereof, the

null and void every mortgage, the effect of which is to defeat, postpone, en-
danger, or delay contractors, laborers and workmen. The mortgage may be
good as against other creditors, but it is a nullity as to them. 3. The act of
April 4, 1862, sect. I, recognizes the existence of such a lien and points out a
mode for making it available to the creditor. 4. The supposed policy of a
state against secret liens, or liens not of record, or liens on lands created by
parol, can not, in a judicial proceeding, prevail over a plain statute. 5. Plain-
tiff should have been permitted to prove his offer "that his claim was within
the protection of the resolution; that the mortgage under which the defend-
ants held was invalid as against him; that his case was embraced in the reme-
dial act of 1862, and that the defendants had bought under a decree of fore-
closure of mortgage, which expressly directed that the property should, not-
withstanding the sale, remain subject to the claim of the plaintiff." 6. The
sale on March 1, 1871, under a decree of the Supreme Court of Pennsylva-
nia, did not disturb plaintiff's lien, and he had no right to look to the pro-
ceeds of sale for payment. 7. The act of 12th of April, 1851, did not ex-
empt the company from the operation of the resolution of 1843.
Vested Legacy.-Stover's appeal, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, opin-
ion by Gordon, J. [22 Pittsb. Leg. Jour., N. S. 114.]-The syllabus of this
case is as follows: Item, I give and bequeath unto my nephew, Mason
Hutchins Darrach, an annuity of one thousand dollars, chargeable upon and
yearly payable out of my estate, for and during the term of his natural life.
And I do further order and direct that the said sum shall be paid to him in
person only, and upon his personal application therefor, and to no other per-
son for him; and in case the said Mason Hutchins Darrach shall not for the
space of five years apply in person for the payment of the said yearly sum,
after the same shall become due, then I order each and every such annual
sum uncalled for, to revert to and become part of my residuary estate." The
testator died in 1866, and the legatee died in 1871, never having made per-
sonal application for the legacy. The administrator of Darrach now presents
his petition to the orphans' court, praying for a decree ordering Hutchins, ex-
ecutor to pay over said annuity. Held, that the legacy was contingent upon
the compliance with certain conditions which were not met, and therefore the
legacy vested in the estate.

SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON,

Editor.

}

ST. LOUIS, FRIDAY, APRIL 16, 1875.

THE case of Craig v. Smith, which we elsewhere print, will have an interest more from the subject-matter to which it relates than from the discussion of any mooted legal propositions. There has been of late considerable litigation threatened or actually begun in various parts of the country upon patents for well tubes or well drills. The review of the state of the art, contained in the opinion of the court, will interest those who are, or may be connected with, or affected by this litigation.

FEDERAL COURT PRACTICE-AFFIDAVITS BEFORE NOTARIES.-Mr. District Judge Dyer of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, has ruled, in the case of Heath v. Dunbar, on a motion for an injunction on bill, and on affidavits sworn to before a notary public, that, under the Revised Statutes of the United States, notaries public have no power to administer oaths or take affidavits in civil causes pending in federal courts. Their authority in administering oaths is restricted to cases in which justices of the peace may administer the same, and to taking proof of debts in bankruptcy, and depositions de bene esse.

By the kindness of H. Scott Howell, of Keokuk, Iowa, one of the attorneys for appellees, we have been furnished with the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, rendered on March 1st, 1875, in the case of Samuel Atlee, Appellant, v. The North Western Union Packet Company, which we publish elsewhere. The case seems to have been very ably argued, and presents some very interesting and important points. It is of vast importance to all steambaot men, and other parties doing business on the Mississippi river, as establishing the law that no riparian owner can permanently obstruct any part of the navigable channel of that river, whatever may be the breadth of navigable water outside of it. Howell & Rice, and Jas. H. Davidson, were counsel for appellee. Hon. Geo. W. McCrary, D. J. Miller, and P. T. Lomax, were counsel for appellant.

ity and integrity, who have shown themselves to be familiar with the principles which must be looked to in settling the different questions growing out of the war, the reconstruction acts and the recent constitutional amendments.

BIGAMY-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-Elder George Q. Cannon, delegate in Congress from Utah, was put upon trial in the territorial district court at Salt Lake, the other day, for polygamy. He pleaded the statute of limitations, relying upon the fact that he had committed no polygamous marriage within two years next preceeding the indictment. This defence the court sustained, holding that the offence consists in the bigamous marriage and consummation, and not in the subsequent cohabitation. Dr. Cannon, therefore, goes scot-free. This decision seems like the verdict of the "We'll have no jury-"not guilty; but don't do it again!" more marriages," said Hamlet; "they that are married shall live; the rest shall remain as they are." So in Utah. Those that are twenty times married, if more than two years since, may remain so; but if they marry any more, they must look out. The above decision was made by Judge Emerson. Judge Boreman, of the same territory, holding court in another district at Beaver, charged a jury that polygamy committed in 1862 is punishable now; that the crime of bigamy is a continuous crime, and that the statute of limitations does not apply so long as the unlawful relation

* *

is kept up.

IN our remarks last week on the case of Langdeau v. Hanes, we fell into some slight inaccuracies. Hanes, we fell into some slight inaccuracies. The case was the Messrs. Edwards, but, we believe, by Governor Hendnot argued in the supreme court by Governor Koerner and ricks. Governor Korner's brief and argument were, how ever, filed in the case of Crews v. Brewer, decided in the same court at the previous term, and involving the same principle, but which was not decided on the merits. Governor Korner furnished Judge John Law (now deceased) with his brief and argument, at his request, to use in the Langdeau case. The case was argued in the circuit court, for the dePOLITICS AND THE BENCH.-There seems to be a growing disposition on the part of both the great political parties, to fendant, by Governor Koerner and Judge Edwards; and Mr. select from the bench independent and honest judges for im- Hallum, who represented the plaintiff, was assisted by Mr. portant political offices. We have already noted this tend-Jewett, of Saint Louis (who made a very able argument), and also by Hon. John F. Darby. Mr. Hallum was represented ency in the promotion (if it were a promotion) of Judges in the supreme court by General Albert Pike, of Arkansas. Bedle, Peck, Christiancy and McMillan, two of them to the

office of governor of their respective states, and two to the senate of the United States. A similar piece of fortune (or misfortune) has just overtaken Judge Phelps of the Supreme Court of Connecticut, who has been elected to Congress on the democratic ticket. Judge Phelps is said to be a man of

We make these corrections owing to the importance of the case; since it is understood as substantially overruling Gibadd that the Supreme Court of Missouri (per Napton, J.) has son v. Chouteau, although it professes not to do so. We may rendered a recent decision in which a commendable ingenu

character and ability, and the only objection urged against ity is said to have been shown in evading the rule in Gibson v. Chouteau. We expect to publish the case hereafter.

him, aside from party objections, was that it was unwise to select candidates for political offices from the bench. Whilst THE VACANT LOUISIANA JUDGESHIP.-We are unable to we should be sorry to have the judicial bench come to be re-understand upon what grounds the Attorney-General advised garded as a stepping-stone to politics, we should be glad if the President that the latter was without power to fill, by an both the great political parties would, in the next contest for ad interim appointment, the vacant office of judge of the the presidency, have the wisdom to nominate jurists of abil- United States District Court for the District of Louisiana

The decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals in the case of Capt. Thomas C. Jones, its clerk, indicted for usurping an office for which he was alleged to be disqualified, possesses some interesting points beyond its merely personal significance. Jones was elected clerk of the court of appeals last year by a

majority of 50,000 over Cochrane, his republican opponent, but Cochrane, after the election, contested the matter before the returning board, on the ground that Jones had, five years before, disqualified himself to hold office in the state by accepting a challenge to fight a duel. Jones denied the formal acceptance of the challenge, but admitted that he was ready to fight, and had

The uniform rulings of the attorneys-general, including such of Kentucky. We subjoin the following excellent summary names as Wirt, Taney and Evarts, and the uniform practice of the case, which we find in the columns of the Saint Louis of the executive department of the government in like cases, Republican : both before and since the Tenure of Office Act, support the power of the President to make this appointment. Swartwout's Case, 1 Op. Atty's Gen. 631; Gwinn's Case, 2 Ibid. 525; 4 Ibid. 523; 3 Ibid. 673; 12 Ibid. 455; 12 Ibid. 499. A careful examination of the provisions of the Revised Statutes which bear upon this question, leaves no doubt in our mind that the circuit judge has no power to grant relief in this case by designating a district judge of some other state to hold the court. A district judge can be called from another state only in case of disability or an accumulation of business. Rev. Stat. U. S., §§ 591-596. And under section 603, the judge of another district in the same state may hold the court in the case of a vacancy. But as there is but one district in Louisiana, this provision can not apply. Clearly, the President ought to make an appointment to hold until the next session of the senate, so that the public interests may not suffer any longer.

placed himself in the hands of his friends. The returning board, on this showing, assumed to declare him ineligible. Nevertheless, he entered upon the duties of the office, and was indicted in the Franklin Circuit Court for

usurpation He demurred to the indictment, the demurrer was sustained, and the state appealed. The court of appeals now affirms the judgment of

the lower court, dismissing the prosecution.

It will be observed that the case is, not one for accepting a challenge, but

for usurping office for which Jones was alleged to be disqualified because he had accepted a challenge. There had never been a trial of the issue whether he had accepted or not-and this was the flaw in the case. Jones denied that he had accepted the challenge, and the court of appeals declares that he is to be considered innocent of the offence until proved guilty; in other words, the constitutional prohibition is not a self-executing penal statute; if he had admitted the offence, or if he had been convicted of it, the admission on the record of conviction would have been sufficient before the returning board; but the board has no judicial authority, and therefore no right to determine the question of guilt. These points argued and explained at length and with much ability in the decision, are thus summed up at its close:

"I. That the constitutional provisions relating to duelling are not self-exe

cuting, except to the extent that persons who can not, or will not, take the constitutional oath, are thereby prevented from holding office.

"2. That a citizen who denies that he is guilty of having violated those provisions, and is willing to take the oath of office, may enter upon and discharge the duties thereof without subjecting himself to an indictment for usurpation of office. until he has first been indicted, tried and convicted for the disquali

indicted and prosecuted for the crime thereby committed.

"3. That the st tutes regulating the proceeding and prescribing the duties of the contesting board in elections for clerk of the court of appeals, do not empower said board to enter into an original enquiry as to whether the party elected has, by a violation of said constitutional provisions, subjected himself to be deprived of the right to hold office, nor upon their own conviction as to his guilt to adjudge him not entitled to the office and thereupon to declare it

vacant.

ferred such a power upon a board or tribunal composed of executive officers.

"4. That the legislature could not, if it had attempted so to do, have con

INTERESTING DECISION RELATIVE TO THE NATIONAL BANKS.-Judge Wallace of the United States Circuit Court at New York City, recently rendered an interesting decision in the action in which The Chemical National Bank and Thomas Nelson are plaintiffs and Isaac H. Bailey, receiver of the National Bank of the Commonwealth, John Jay Knox, comptroller of the currency, and the National Bank of the Commonwealth are the defendants. The actions were brought to determine whether, when the comptroller of the currency has declared a national bank in default and ap-fying offence; but that if he takes the oath falsely and corruptly, he may be pointed a receiver, under the provisions of the act organizing such banks, and a sufficient fund is realized from the assets to pay all claims against the bank and leave a surplus, the comptroller should or should not allow interest on the claims during the period of administration before appropriating the surplus to the stockholders of the bank. The learned judge stated, according to the Herald, that the equity of the creditors to receive interest on their claims for the time during which they have been precluded from receiving their principal, is obvious. Their right is clear on general principles. Interest is allowed not only on strict legal grounds where there is a contract for the payment of interest, or by way of damages where there is a wrongful detention of a debt, but upon consideration of equity and natural justice, which always arise where a party is entitled to a payment of money, and can not obtain it except by resort to a fund created by operation of law, the distribution of which is attended with delay. It is upon this ground that when, by statute, preference is given to one class of creditors over another in the distribution of an estate, the preference includes interest on the preferred class of claims. 11 Sergt. & Rawle, 182. There is nothing in the provisions of the act under which this fund is to be distributed in conflict with this general rule. Jndgment is accordingly ordered for the plaintiff in each action as against the bank. For plaintiff, E. P. Johnson and R. M. Henry; for defendants, Edmund H. Smith.

"Wherefore, upon the whole case, the judgment of the criminal court sustaining the demurrer to the indictment and dismissing the prosecution, must be affirmed."

The Fourteenth Amendment and Woman Suffrage.

We have already alluded to the fact that on the 29th ult. the Supreme Court of the United States, decided the case of Minor v. Happersett, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution does not confer on a woman who is a citizen of the United States and of the state in which she resides, the rights of suffrage. The opinion of the court is perhaps of sufficient interest to be published. The following is the substance of it:

WAITE, Ch. J.-This is the case presenting the question whether, under the fourteenth amendment, a woman, who is a citizen of the United States and of a state, is a voter in the state, notwithstanding the provisions of the constitution and laws of that state confine the right of suffrage to men alone. It s said that women are citizens. They are persons, and, therefore, under the fourteenth amendment, declared to be citizens of the state wherein they reside. But it did not require that amendment to make them such. They were before, persons and people, and were not in terms excluded from citizenship by This case, which has no doubt attracted the attention of the constitution. The federal constitution was ordained by the people of the our readers, has at last been decided in the Court of Appeals | United States, composed of the people of the several states, and whoever at

The Kentucky Duelling Case.