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THE

PHILOMATHIC JOURNAL.

JULY 1825.

THE

HISTORY OF ETHICS.

WHEN Cicero wrote for his son that excellent treatise on moral duties, which commonly goes by the name of his Offices, he commenced by observing, "I shall follow at this time, and on this subject, more especially the Stoics; not as a bare translator of them, but, according to my usual custom, shall take out of their stores so much, and after such a manner, as in my own judgment I shall think most convenient."

This mode of procedure is especially necessary on a subject so universally important in practice, and yet so difficult precisely to define in theory. Exceptionable principles may be found in systems of general excellence; and where so much is at stake, in respect of society and ourselves, we must follow a rule no less philosophical than sacred,-" Prove all things, hold fast that which is good." In the spirit of this admirable precept, we are desirous of entering upon the topic of this article, which is, An Examination of the doctrine of Expediency.

In referring to the doctrine of Expediency, the most perpicious, upon the whole, as to its consequences, which has ever been proposed as a principle of Ethics, it is painful to advert to one of the most distinguished names that ever graced the records of morals or religion. It will be easily conceived that no light motives could have induced your lecturer to associate the venerated and venerable name of Paley with any remarks which are intended to censure the basis which he has

assumed relative to this interesting subject. Paley, with a manliness of sentiment worthy a philosopher and a Christian

VOL. III. PART I.

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divine, (and these characters are not necessarily at variance,) boldly came forward at a time when it was fashionable to dismiss the morality of the gospels from all discussion relative to Ethics, when our soi-disant philosophers had prided themselves in erecting a temple to virtue, to which they would not admit Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, to contribute,-no, not as even hewers of wood, and drawers of water:" Paley then advanced, in all the dignity of a true philosopher, to clothe in beautiful and attractive language a subject which had been rendered disgusting by the metaphysical subtleties in which it had been involved, and demonstrated that whatever a Shaftesbury had declared beautiful, fit, and proper, had alike its place in revelation, and its sanctions from it. We recollected that not a British nobleman, or a Heathen philosopher alone had contended for the attractions and the obligations of virtue; but that Paul had also said, "Finally," as the sum of the glorious system of which he was the minister, "Whatsoever things are true,-whatsoever things are honest;" the word being employed in the old and classical use of it, as referring to decorum,-to that moral fitness which lacks an adequate expression in modern tongues-"Whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise," any principle of noble ambition which appreciates the estimation of the wise and the good; and, above all, of the only Perfect Being, the Parent of the Universe,-" think on these things,"

so meditate upon them, that they may employ all your faculties, and become the primary objects of your pursuit. No man will venture to compare these sentiments with the most admired, and justly-admired apophthegms of antiquity, without conceding, as a philosopher, and a man of integrity, that they are equal to any precept that fell from the lips of the most distinguished sages of Greece and of Rome: that the single verse quoted embodies all the grand principles which have been advanced in all ages in favour of morals, or in elucidation of them; and Paley, at a time when every man stood aloof from the unadorned morality-the simplex mundities of Christianity, avowed his conviction of the truth and sufficiency of a system, which French arrogance had attempted to extirpate, and succeeded in rendering unfashionable even in Britain. Paley calmly advanced to examine the various existing systems of ethics, and hesitated not to refer to the Scriptures as the ultimate rule of morals.

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With no unhallowed or unfriendly touch, therefore, your lecturer selects what he deems an exceptionable principle in this truly great man's work, for animadversion. Had he

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been less than he was,-less eminent for talent,-less amiable in character,-less distinguished for integrity,-less pure in deportment,-less influential in society,-his errors might have slept in that sepulchre, in which, alas! he reposes too early for us, although not prematurely as to the admeasurement of human life! Had his principles been generally licentious, their tendency would have been their antidote. We might have left them to their own fermentation, and the poison would have floated upon the surface. Had they professedly, like some other modern systems, set at defiance the decencies and the habitudes of life; had they openly struck at the existence and the weal of society; had they commenced with questioning all that was venerable for antiquity, sublime in sentiment, powerful in the concurrent suffrages of mankind, -tried by a long and universal experience-they would have presented themselves in such a questionable shape, that virtue and truth would have stood upon their guard; and although "the lover of change" might have hailed whatever innovation upon established customs the imagination might propose, philosophy, so warned, would have subjected the unknown elements presented to her to the test of experiment, and have learned the effect of their combination before she would venture to pronounce upon their character, or to adopt them as her own. But when Paley's good and enlightened mind submitted a proposition, it was admitted without suspicion, almost without examination. The general accuracy of his reasoning, the unquestionable purity of his mind, the evident tendency of his labours, the comprehensive character of his powers, all recommended whatever sentiments he might advance; we were secure as to his motive; we were sa tisfied as to his abilities; we knew his great principle of founding morals upon religion and revelation. I submit, that, upon these grounds-to him so honourable, and at the same time so just-his errors become of correspondent importance. When it is remembered that his treatise on "Moral and Political Philosophy" is the standard work on ethics used in our English universities; when it is observed that his principle of expediency, so false in itself, and so dangerous in its consequences, pervades that otherwise beautiful system; that it is so attractively stated, so ably supported, and so judiciously blended with sentiments the most elevated and the most just; not assuredly because the writer intended to deceive, but because he was himself convinced of the accuracy of the basis, -because he did not calculate the results to which, if pursued to its consequences, it must lead, because he did not imagine the abuses which would arise out of it, nor could possibly foresee how dangerous a weapon it would become in

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the hands of men whose interest it is to subvert all morals; when the character of Dr. Paley, his celebrity, the influence which his opinions must have, the construction of which they are capable, are all taken into the account, it becomes a paramount duty, without forgetting, even for a moment, what is due to such a man, to point out whatever is inconsistent as to principle or dangerous as to results; and both of these appear to me to be censurable in his celebrated doctrine of expediency.

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It will be necessary to state the principle as he lays it down, and to add the rules by which he is willing it should be applied, that we may neither misapprehend nor misrepresent his meaning. The principle is nakedly-that whatever is expedient, is right, (vol. 1. p. 70). Such a proposition assumes something of merit from its apparent simplicity; but he was too correct a reasoner not to be aware that this principle, as it must be made to bear upon all moral points, must be rendered capable of an infinity of application. Among the circumstances that would necessarily arise, some, which were individual, might militate against the ultimate harmony and advantage of the whole. Accordingly he proceeds to guard this general principle, and to establish a standard for its application. That which he pronounces right, “must, he says, "be expedient upon the whole, at the long run; in all its effects collateral and remote, as well as in those which are immediate and direct; as it is obvious, that, in computing consequences, it makes no difference in what way, or at what distance, they ensue :" (vol. 1. p. 78). He further affirms, that he intends this rule to apply to all possible cases, and in effect to make it the basis of morals. "It is," said he, "the utility of any moral rule alone which constitutes the obligation of it:" (vol. 1. p. 70.) Having seen the principle, and listened to the exposition of its proper application, and ascertained that it is presented alone, and offered as the grand rule of morality, it can be only necessary to ask further, who is to be the judge in its practical employment? To this momentous inquiry Dr. Paley answers, "Every man for himself:" (vol. II. p. 142.) He foresees, indeed, "the danger of error and abuse," maintains that every rule is liable to the same or greater, and settles the appeal at once by establishing, that this, in common with every other moral rule which has been, or "can be propounded on the subject," "must in the application depend upon private judgment:" (vol. 11. p. 143.) This is the principle defined, guarded, enforced, and applied, by this great writer, to all possible moral subjects, private, social, or public. We need not look further, the detail is complete; the sentiments are conveyed in no doubtful terms;

and we are in possession of the principle, with all its series of effects and consequences lying before us. It ought, however, to be premised, that the defence of it, which Dr. Paley sets up, and the consideration which probably seduced him into the adoption of it, is the very plausible (and even in itself pious) argument, that God proposes the universal good for his object. "God Almighty," he argues," wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures; and consequently, those actions which promote that will and wish must be agreeable to him, and the contrary." This truth must be undisputed by every mind admitting the being of God: for Deity is the same with all his perfections taken together; and all his purposes regard human felicity. But will the general expediency, to which the Divinity successfully directs his providence, prove therefore a safe standard for human operation? "Have we an arm like God? or can we thunder with a voice like him?” He who takes the purposes of Deity as his own standard, ought himself to be a God: he who assumes the plans of infinite wisdom, ought himself to be infinite; he should sit upon the circle of the earth, as the sovereign disposer of events: enthroned in eternity, and unmoved by all the revolutions of time-out of the reach of accident; and, placed beyond the possibility of mistake, he should comprehend, at one glance, the past, the present, and the future, with all their dependencies, and the remotest contingency. Nothing should escape him, to the fall of a sparrow, or the numbering of a hair. In his calculations not an atom should be omitted, since any error may lead to a series of incalculable evils. Any thing overlooked, or unprovided for, may disturb the grand march of his designs to their completion, and defeat the object ultimately of general expediency. He should have the control of all circumstances, the command of all instruments, the power not merely to pursue a plan which shall probably tend to the general benefit, but to secure it against all possible hazard. When man is possessed of such faculties, of such a grasp of intellect and power, such an infallibility of end and of means; when he has no interest of his own as possibly apart from the general weal, and is no more liable to error or caprice,—we may trust him with expediency as the principle of his moral operations; in other words, when he is God, we may ascribe to him the same rules which regulate the Divine conduct. In the meanwhile, it is palpably untenable to make the standard of Deity the basis of morals to man, while he is wholly destitute of those attributes and of that power which constitute all the fitness and infallibly work out all the designs of Providence. This, which is the principal argument for the doctrine of expediency, is so inconclusive in it

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