tary tribunes, and the two year's administration of the decemviri; till Julius Cæsar's ambition left nothing but some few forms of the Republic. It was to the state of the Roman people at that and subsequent periods, that the attention of those who examined the question must be directed.

So long as the Germans were in the state which the pen of the immortal Tacitus had described, individuals might be granted lands from the public stock, and after possession for a year, those lands might be restored to the public. The communities were then small. Men could perceive their own particular importance. An extensive or deep knowledge of property was not acquired; and thus patriotism could produce its influence. When, however, their own increasing population, and the luxurious impotence of the Roman provinces, encouraged an invasion of those countries nearest them; when their possessions increased; when the ideas of property evolved; and when men became more anxious for their own private interest than that of the public, the annual change of property became impossible. Thus, the tenure of land from fleeting became permanent; and that character arose, which afterwards became so important, the allodial landholder. When the land had thus been divided according to the rank of the different members of the tribe,-when the king had received his domains, the nobles their estates, and the people their respective portions, still a great extent of territory remained unoccupied. This they called the fisc, and it was the property of the public generally. While the independence of the people had thus been secured by the allodial divisions of land, it was of course the object of the nobles to continue the same influence, which they had formerly possessed among their countrymen, when Tacitus observed their manners t. To gain the affections of a band of bold warriors, who might be their ornament in peace, and their defence in war, was that to which they were led by inclination and necessity. To this end, they were to court their inferiors by honours and by presents,-by their own valour and personal qualifications. Strong as the connexion thus formed might be, nothing lasting could be expected from it, since land had not yet become alienable. Thus, the service of the state was uncertain; while the opinions, and not the duties of men,

* Agri pro numero cultorum ab universis per vices occupantur, quos mox inter se secundum dignationem partiuntur. Facilitatem partiendi campornm spatia præstant. Arva per annos mutant, et superest ager.— Tacit. de Moribus Germ. c. 26.

+Magna comitum æmulatio quibus primus apud principem suum locus; et principum cui plurimi et acerrimi comites. Hæc dignitas, hæ vires, magno semper electorum juvenum globo circumdari, in pace decus in bello præsidium.-Tacit. de Mor, Germ. c. 13.

were to guide them in its performance. To remove this difficulty, the lands of the fisc were vested absolutely in the monarch, and he parcelled them out to the most worthy of his chiefs, under the obligation of military service*. They again divided their possessions among their most faithful vassals, on a similar condition,-military service, in proportion to the value of their benefice. Thus was formed one of the finest political systems mentioned in the annals of the world. The king, aware that it was on his illustrious nobles he must depend, whenever his ambition or his necessity required him to engage in war, was careful not to do any thing which might be in fact, or in appearance, derogatory to their dignity, or injurious to their rights. The noble, aware that his vassals were those who must enable him to fulfil his engagements, to protect his territory, to join in his wars, to oppose the encroachments of the crown, and to add to his splendour, was ever anxious to guard their liberties and interests. The people, aware of their own importance, and the benefits they received from their lords, were equally desirous that their kindnesses should be reciprocal. From the principles of affection and friendship, by which the feudal government was then directed, a number of incidents arose. During that period of the feudal history, when the grants of land were either precarious or for life, the lord was desirous of educating in his hall those youths who were afterwards to be his companions in arms. Thus, he might instruct them in those rules, by which their conduct throughout life was to be guided; and thus obtain that affection, and inspire that fidelity, it was so much his interest to encourage. When the ancestor died during the minority of his heir, the lord took both the future vassal and his estate under his protection: thus arose the incident of wardship. After the youth had attained the age of manhood, and taken possession of his estate, as a return for the care his lord had bestowed on his interests and education, a present was usually made by the former to the latter: this constituted the relief. When his advancing years made it necessary that a matrimonial con

The idea or essence of the feudal system seems to have existed among the Germans and the Gauls. It was customary for the larger communities to grant a portion of their land to the smaller ones, under the obligation of military service, in a manner similar to the Roman province. Innumerable proofs of this fact might be collected from the authors who have described the manners of the two nations.-The client or vassal tribes of Ariovistus were the Marcomani, Tribocci, Vangiones, Harudes, Nemetes, and Seduisii. Cæsar de Bel. Gal. lib. i. c. 51.By imitation, the Romans afterwards granted lands to their people under an obligation of military service. Super ipsam Rheni ripam collocati, ut arcerent, non ut custodirentur." Tacit. de Mor. Germ. c. 28.

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nexion should be formed, the private interests of the vassal, and the public interest of the lord, were to be consulted; that the fortune and dignity of the one, and the political importance and glory of the other, might not be deteriorated; thus was formed the incident of marriage. The distress or the captivity of the lord were sometimes produced by his extravagance, or the fortune of war. Then, the affection of the vassal was to bear a trial, and the riches or liberty of the lord to be restored by pecuniary assistance: this was the aid. Crime, cowardice, treachery, or any great enormity, rendered the vassal unworthy of his fief, and thus it was again placed by escheat in the hands of the lord, that he might choose a more worthy servant. These were the incidents of the feudal system before fiefs became hereditary, and before its real genius was lost. While they were required, and granted according to their original intention, the happiness of the feudatory was secured; but, the mutability of worldly affairs, the evolving knowledge of property, the corruption of the human heart, soon conspired to render those very incidents, which had once been the strongest proofs and firmest bonds of affection, the principal causes of hatred, jealousy, clamour, discontent, and outrage. The lord forgot his attention to his vassal, and the vassal his duty to his lord. What had once been requested as a favour, was now demanded as a right: what had once been given with all the freedom of generosity, was now afforded with the parsimonious niggardliness of a needy debtor. The duties, whether military or civil, which the necessities of the state required, were imperfectly or seldom performed. The number of soldiers, the amount of the aid, the periods at which they would be required, were uncertain; and thus it was rendered possible, if not easy, to elude the force of their obligations. The security of the state required that some method should be invented or adopted to remove these extraordinary evils. Fiefs were still merely for life. The granting perpetuity. of them afforded an opportunity of ascertaining exactly the number of knights to be furnished, and the proportion of the pecuniary supply. According to the value or extent of land, were the number of knights and supply of money to vary; but their respective quotas being once determined, no subterfuge of the vassal could prevent the performance of the contract. Still however the evils, to which allusion was above made, continued to exist; and hatred, mingled with distrust, still annihilated cordiality. It was the feudal system, in that state, the opener proposed to consider.

Then as to the comparison. If the feudatory was in

some things at the absolute disposal of the lord, was not the Roman in every thing subject to the commands of the emperor? If he might be deprived of his liberty, might not the Roman be deprived of both liberty and life? If he was to pay a relief, on taking the estate of his ancestor, was not the Roman provincial to pay the honorarium to the new governor? The feudist was certain that he should have to pay his relief but once, but the provincial must pay his honorarium as often as the governor was changed. If the feudist was subject to aids, was not the Roman subject to taxes; to the portorium, the scriptura, the decuma, the frumentum emptum, the frumentum decumanum, and the frumentum estimatum? The last of these, it must be remembered, was imposed at the suggestion of the governor. If military service was required, the feudist was certain that at any time he could be detained but forty days in the field; whereas the Roman was obliged to serve in all seasons and all climates, to gratify the ambition or caprice of the wretch who enjoyed the imperial purple. The feudist, in the last point at least, enjoyed some advantage. If he was to have a tyrant for his master, he was at least a noble tyrant, descended from the ancestors his forefathers had obeyed: not like the Roman, to be governed by a monster, raised to the throne by his own vices, or the fancy of some successful Sejanus. Were these distinctions not sufficient to prove the despotism of Rome far more galling than the feudal burdens, let it be remembered, that in the latter the monarch or the noble must be convinced that his interest depended on the welfare of his vassal. If he were so exhausted as to be unable to supply the demands of his superior, the superior must soon be in a similar state of deprivation. If the king or the noble did so far forget his interest as to tyrannize over his inferior, that conduct always brought its own punishment; for the men, who had long been accustomed to wage war against their equals, to avenge their own wrongs or those of their lord, could easily join to avenge their public injuries. In fine, reviewing both systems, the one was an unlimited monarchy, the other a limited one. Until the former could be considered as superior to the latter, the feudal system would be preferred to the Roman despotism.

ON THE OTHER HAND, it was remarked, that the Opener had carefully avoided those points in the subject, which he was well aware would deprive him of any title to a decision in his favour. During the happy æra of the feudal system, that gentleman had been very particular in his observations;

but when the scene was changed, and the evils with which it abounded, had made their appearance, he then very cautiously dismissed it in general terms.

The rise and changes of the feudal system had been traced, with tolerable exactness, but the Roman government had been touched very lightly. Even the Imperial government had not been described particularly, but subjected to one general, and sweeping anathema. Its disadvantages had certainly been mentioned, but as to its advantages, not one of them had been pointed out. Were the Roman government alone formed for the exertion of the cruel prerogatives, to which the Opener had alluded, the words of an ingenious political writer would then be realised; if power without justice were the sole object of its rulers, it would not be imperium, but improperium; not patrocinium, but latrocinium. The Roman government did not, however, merit the censure which had been so liberally bestowed upon it. On principle, and in nature, as well as in advantage to the subject, it would be contended, that the government of the Roman empire was superior to the Feudal system.

Was it not better that inferior states should be protected by one superior, that the common good might better be guarded? In case of an attack by a hostile power, would not the forces of an extended empire be better concentrated, so as to repel it? But were the nations left singly to compete with a powerful adversary, would not the Machiavelian principle of "divide et impera" become successful? In case of discord arising among the nations, of which the empire was composed, the superior power could interfere, and prevent any fatal consequence arising. But were they left to gratify, without restraint, their ambition, revenge, or jealousy, what could be expected, but a continued scene of confusion, and bloodshed. Nation against nation, king against king, republic against republic, chief against chief, -in short, the feudal system.

war,

A proof of the advantages arising from governments on a more extended scale, was afforded, by the duration and universality of such governments. The monarchy of the Assyrians, according to Augustinus, lib. 5, de Civitate Dei, lasted from Ninus, till Sardanapalus, twelve hundred years. Then it was translated to the Chaldeans, or Babylonians. Next, by Darius

* Ex hoc etiam ulterius patet quod si Romanum Imperium orbem terræ, et ejus dominationem obtinuit, et tenet sola potentia, sine justitia, tunc jam non erit imperium, sed improperium; et non patrocinium sed latrocinium. Engelberti, qui sub Rudolpho Habspurgio floruit de ortu, et fine Romani Imperij, liber, p. 67.

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