cles to inspection are removed, still it is only the surface of the convolutions which is perceived, and the soul may be enthroned in the long fibres which extend from the surface to the medulla oblongata, or thought may be elaborated there, and still evade detection. It will be said, however, that death will solve the question, and allow the whole secrets of the soul to be disclosed; but, alas! when the pulse has ceased to beat, and the lungs no longer play, the brain presents nothing to our contemplation, but an inert mass, of a soft and fibrous texture, in which no thought can be discerned, and no sentiment perceived, and in which also no spirit or immaterial substance can be traced; so that from inspecting it even imagination receives no food for conjecture, as to the presence or absence of an immaterial guest while life and health yet animated its folds.

Observation, therefore, reveals as little in regard to the substance of the mind, as does reflection on consciousness; and as no other modes of arriving at certain knowledge are open to man, the solution of the question appears to be placed completely beyond his reach. In short, to use an observation of Dr. Spurzheim, Nature has given man faculties fitted to observe phenomena as they at present exist, and the relations subsisting between them; but has denied to him powers fitted to discover, as a matter of direct perception, either the beginning, or the end, or the essence, of any thing under the sun; we may amuse our imagination with conjectures, but will never arrive at truth, when we stray into these interdicted regions.

The solution of this question, therefore, is not only unimportant, but it is impossible; and this leads me to observe, that no idea can be more erroneous than that which supposes the dignity and future destiny of man as an immortal being, to depend, of necessity, on the substance of which he is made.

Let us allow to the materialist, for the sake of argument, that the brain is the mind, and that medullary matter thinks,-What then? If, in fact, it does so, it must be the best possible substance for thinking, just because the CREATOR selected it for the purpose, and endowed it with this property. In this argument, the religious

constantly forget, that the same OMNIPOTENT hand made the brain that created the mind and the universe itself, and that, in the dedication of every cerebral convolution to its objects, be they thinking or any other process, the Divine Wisdom is as certainly exercised, as in impressing motion on the planets, or infusing light and heat into the sun. If, therefore, de facto, GoD has made the brain to think, we may rest assured that it is exquisitely and perfectly adapted for this purpose, and that His objects in creating man will not be defeated, on account of His having chosen a wrong substance, out of which to constitute the thinking principle. But what are His objects in creating man? This brings us to the jet of the question at once. Mr. Lawrence, it is said, founds no moral doctrine on his opinions regarding the essence of the mind; but other materialists, who make these opinions the foundation of atheism, wish us to believe that the best evidence of the Divine intention in creating the human soul, is to be found by discovering the substance of which it is made; and they insinuate, that, if it be constituted of a very refined and dignified material, the conclusion necessarily follows, that it is intended for magnificent destinies, while, if it be composed of a rude and vulgar stuff, it must be intended only to crawl on this filthy world. Here, however, sense and logic equally fail them for no principle in philosophy is more certain than that we cannot infer from a knowledge of the mere substance of any thing for what ends it is fitted. Exhibit to a human being everv variety of imaginable essence, and if you allow him to know no more of its properties than he can discover from examining its constituent parts, he will be utterly incapable of telling whether it is calculated to endure for a day, or last to eternity. The materialist, therefore, is not entitled, even from the supposed admission that medullary matter thinks, to conclude that the human being is not immortal and responsible. The true way of discovering for what end man has been created, is to look to the qualities with which he has been endowed, trusting that the substance of which he is composed is perfectly suited to the objects of his creation. Now, when we inquire into his qualities, we find the thinking principle in him to differ, not only in degree, but in kind, from that of

the lower animals. The latter have no faculty of justice, to indicate to them that the unrestrained manifestation of Destructiveness or Acquisitiveness is wrong; they have no sentiment of Veneration. to prompt them to seek a GoD whom they may adore; they have no faculty of Hope, pointing out futurity as an object of ceaseless anxiety and contemplation, and leading them to desire a life beyond the grave; and, indeed, the convolutions of the brain, which in man form the organs of these sentiments, appear not to exist in the lower animals. Those organs also, which in man serve to manifest the faculties of Reflection, are, in the lower animals, eminently deficient, and their understanding, in exact correspondence with this fact, is so limited as to be satisfied with little knowledge, and to be insensible to the comprehensive design and glories of creation. Man, then, being endowed with qualities which are denied to the lower creatures, we are entitled, by a legitimate exercise of reflection, the subject being beyond the region of the external senses, to conclude, on principles truly philosophic, that he is designed for another and a higher destiny than is to be allotted to them, whatever be the essence of his mind.

These principles enable us to dispose of an objection, which was long ago stated by Dr. Barclay, and has since been repeated by many other opponents, and yet is in itself very absurd. Dr. Barclay's hypothesis is that the mind fashions the organs. If it is impossible to discover the substance of which the mind is composed, it is equally impracticable to tell whether the faculties determine the size of the organs, or the organs limit the power of the faculties. Some of the difficulties with which Dr. Barclay's notions are beset are the following: If the immaterial mind fashions the organs, then God bestows idiotic minds, insane minds, stupid minds, and viciously disposed minds, on different individuals; and these make bad organs,—a doctrine which appears fully more objectionable than the theory, that the mind itself, in all individuals is perfect; but that the manifestations of its dispositions and powers, in this life, are affected by the state of the organs with which it is connected. On the former supposition human efforts can do nothing to ameliorate the condition of the mind; for the immaterial

principle is beyond our reach, and until we modify it no change in the organs can take place. On the latter hypothesis we are encouraged, with hopes of success to do our best; for it assumes that the mind in all individuals is sound, and that the imperfections lie in the organs, which are subject to modification by means of propagation and exercise, in other words by education. According to this view, also, insanity is not a disease of the immaterial principle, but an affection of the organs, which may be cured by medicine.— Phren. Journ. Vol. ii. p. 149.

ON THE EFFECTS OF INJURIES OF THE BRAIN ON
THE MANIFESTATIONS OF THE MIND.

BY DR. A. COMBE.

Or all the arguments advanced for the subversion of Phrenology, not one has been more frequently or more confidently urged, than that which rests on the alleged fact of the brain having, in various instances, been wounded or destroyed in whole or in part, without in any degree impeding the usual operations of mind. When narrowly examined, however, this objection proves to be at variance with the views of those who maintain it, and completely demonstrative of their ignorance of the principles of the science against which it is directed. "The system of Gall and Spurzheim," it is said, "however ingenious or amusing in theory it may be, is annihilated by the commonest reference to fact. Experience has shown us, that a man may live in the full enjoyment of his intellectual faculties, although a part of his brain is destroyed by disease. Portions of the brain, various in situation and size, have been found to have been entirely disorganized, yet no single power of the mind was impaired, even to the very day of the patient's death. It would be difficult to find any one portion of the brain, that has not, in some case or another, been deranged in its structure, without injury to the mind. Certainly, of the parts specified by Gall and Spurzheim, every one has, in its turn, been found wanting, without any deficiency in that intellectual faculty

which they would represent it either to produce or sustain."* Such are the ipsissima verba of a learned and respectable, though prejudiced opponent; and although others might be quoted, who go still farther than he does, I am ready to admit, that, if the statements here recorded were as clearly substantiated as they were sweepingly made, neither the system of philosophy which we advocate, nor any other which acknowledges the necessity of the intervention of a material instrument for the manifestation of the mind, could possibly survive for a day.

At first sight, the foregoing objection appears to be highly plausible and relevant; and coming as it generally does, directly or indirectly, from the members of the medical profession, who, naturally enough, are supposed to be best qualified to judge, it is received by many with implicit confidence, and thus operates upon them with all the force of truth; and, in fact, to those who are alike ignorant of Anatomy and of Phrenology, and who, therefore, have no means of forming an accurate estimate of its force, it does pre, sent a very formidable aspect. As, however, to those who are acquainted with both these sciences, and who are consequently better qualified to judge correctly, the very facts upon which the objections are grounded, seem, instead of invalidating the fundamental principles of the new philosophy, to be clearly and unequivocally demonstrative of their truth; it may be useful to state such an abstract of the evidence itself, as shall enable even the unprofessional reader to determine how far it authorizes the inferences which have been deduced from it by our opponents. With this intention, I shall first make some observations on the testimony offered of the alleged integrity of all the mental faculties, in cases of extensive injury of the brain; and then examine anatomically, how far the extent, situation, and nature of the injuries sustained in the cases alluded to, authorize us to infer the partial or total destruction of any individual phrenological organ; and, lastly, I shall offer a few remarks on the possibility of discovering the functions of the brain, from noticing the effects of its injuries, -a mode of proceeding lately recommended from high authority.

* Rennel on Skepticism, p. 100.