ment. By the amendment, as first proposed, ministers plenipotentiary were to be allowed only at London and Paris. The gentleman from Maryland proposed to allow one at Madrid also, because he had observed that the impropriety of recalling our minister from that court had been particularly insisted on, by some who opposed the amendment. The gentleman from Virginia immediately consented to modify his amendment, so as to leave a minister plenipotentiary at Madrid. From which it would appear most evidently, if we did not know it before, that gentlemen care not how many ministers plenipotentiary there are, nor how much money is spent in maintaining them, provided the House of Representatives can obtain the power of controlling and directing the appointment. It is to obtain this power, and not to save public money, that gentlemen struggle; and provided the principle can but be established, they are content to have ministers plenipotentiary as many as any body pleases; for they know that the principle may be as completely established in the case of one minister, as by turning out the whole diplomatic corps.

And notwithstanding all this, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gallatin,) tells us, that this is merely a question about salaries, a question of saving nine thousand dollars, and wonders how it could lead to a controversy, about the constitutional powers of the President and the House! This proves that the gentleman from Pennsylvania intended his speech for a concluding speech; or that he entertains a most contemptuous opinion of the understanding of the House.

I shall therefore, Mr. Chairman, consider this amendment as having for its object, and its sole object too, the establishment of this principle: "that the House of Representatives, by its power over appropriations, has a right to control and direct the executive, in the appointment of foreign ministers." I shall treat the question, which arises upon this amendment, as a question of power, between this House and the President

and senate, and I shall endeavor to show that the amendment, if carried, would be a direct breach of the constitution, an alarming usurpation by this branch, on the constitutional powers of the executive depart

ment.

The supporters of this amendment, avowing its object to be the establishment of a control over the appointment of foreign ministers, contend that this House have a right to exercise that control, and rely on that part of the constitution which provides, that "no money shall be issued from the treasury without an appropriation by law." As this House, say gentlemen, must concur in passing all laws, it follows that it may refuse its assent to appropriations. In judging whether it will give or refuse this assent, it must be guided solely by its own discretion, by its own opinion about the necessity or utility of the object, for which an appropriation is wanted. If it should think this object unnecessary, or hurtful, it is bound in duty to withhold the appropriation. Consequently, it may refuse to appropriate for a minister to Lisbon, Berlin, or any other place, if it should think such minister, though appointed by the President and senate, unnecessary or injurious. This I take to be a fair state of the argument.

But gentlemen, while they lay such stress upon this part of the constitution, seem entirely to forget another part, that part which provides, that the " President, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint foreign ministers and consuls." It will, however, be admitted, that these two parts of the constitution are equally authoritative, and must both have effect; that the whole instrument, like all other instruments, must be taken together, and so construed, that none of its provisions may be defeated or rendered nugatory. These two powers, therefore, the power of appointment in the President and senate, and the power of appropriation in the House, must be reconciled to each other: must be made to act as mutual helps.

not as mutual obstructions. How is this to be done? Certainly not by admitting the doctrine of this amendment, which would utterly destroy one of the powers; would give the House an absolute control over the appointment of ministers, and reduce the President and senate to the mere power of making a nomination, which the House might refuse to agree to according to its good pleasure. This is the plain and necessary consequence of admitting the principle contended for in support of this amendment, that the House, when called on to appropriate for an officer, legally appointed, may in the first place inquire, whether the appointment is necessary.

Some other way of reconciling these powers must therefore be found out; and what is it? We contend, Mr. Chairman, that it is thus. An office must first be authorized by law: for nobody pretends that the President and senate can create offices. When the office is thus authorized, the President and senate exercise their power of appointment, and fill the office. The House of Representatives then exercises its constitutional power over appropriations, by providing an adequate compensation for the officer. In the exercise of this power they cannot inquire, whether the office was necessary or not; for that has already been determined by the law which authorized it. Neither can they inquire whether the office was properly filled; for that would be to invade the powers of the President and senate, to whom, by the constitution, the right of choosing the officer is exclusively referred. Into what then may they inquire? They may inquire what is a proper and adequate compensation for such an officer: they may fix the amount of his salary; and in fixing it they must be guided by a proper discretion, by a sense of duty, by the nature of the office, the circumstances of the country, and the public service. Thus the constitution would be reconciled, and each department would act within its proper sphere. The President and senate could make no appointment till

the office should be authorized by law, consequently, there would be no danger of abuse. When they had made the appointment, they could not fix the amount of salary, or order the money to be paid out of the treasury; another guard against the danger of abuse. When the appointment should be duly made, the House, on the other hand, would be bound to provide an adequate salary, and could not, by refusing it, defeat the law and the appointment, because they might think the one unnecessary, or the other unwise; and this principle would be a guard against any abuse of the powers of the House; would prevent it from invading the province of the other departments, and subverting the principles of the constitution.

Had gentlemen confined themselves within these limits, had they carried their inquiries no further than to the adequacy of this or that salary, this debate would never have existed. We should have met them on the ground of sufficiency of salaries, without any reference to constitutional points, or contention about constitutional powers. But this was not their conduct. They expressly declared, not that the salaries were too high and ought to be reduced, but that the appointments themselves were unnecessary, and ought to be abridged; and thus they drove us into the constitutional question, and compelled us to defend the executive powers, against their attacks in this House.

But, say gentlemen, is the House always bound to appropriate? If the President should appoint an hundred ministers plenipotentiary, must the House without inquiry give money to support them all? What guard would there then be, they exclaim, against an enormous and abusive extension of the diplomatic establishment?

To this I answer, Mr. Chairman, in the first place, that we have a security in the responsibility of the President. He is elected by the people; and elected every four years. All these appointments, though sanctioned by the senate, must originate with him;

and therefore he is particularly and almost solely responsible. His character is at stake. He is a single actor, on a most conspicuous theatre; and all eyes are upon him. He is watched with all the jealousy, which, in this country, particularly, is entertained of executive power. He is watched by the gentlemen themselves who support this amendment, and who are sufficiently prone to find fault with him and abuse him, even when he acts properly. This he well knows, and consequently will take care to do nothing which may strengthen their hands, by giving them grounds for censure. Should he act improperly, make foolish or unnecessary appointments, he must disgust his friends and supporters, forfeit the public esteem, and lose his election. He may be even turned out by impeachment, before the time for a new election arrives. These I apprehend are sufficient securities against wanton misconduct.

I answer, in the next place, that if the President should think fit to abuse his powers, it is his own concern, and no business of this House; unless, indeed, we choose to impeach him. We are sent here by the people to exercise our own powers, and not to watch over the President; who equally with us derives his powers from the people, and is amenable to them and not to this House, for the exercise of those powers. We may, indeed, as individuals, censure his conduct, as we may that of any member on this floor, and endeavor to prevent the people from re-electing him; but as a body, we have nothing to do with him, or his conduct, but to impeach him. If he proposes measures to us which we do not approve, we may reject them, in the same manner as he may reject bills which we send up to him; but we have no more right to prevent him, either directly or indirectly, from making such appointments as he pleases, than he has to prevent us from passing such votes or resolutions as we please. The interference in one case is equally unconstitutional as in the other. It has indeed become fashionable,